11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

Alex2011

Real Madrid 0-0 Valencia: lots of chances, no goals
April 10, 2012


The starting line-ups

Real Madrid dropped points at home despite dominating.

Jose Mourinho gave a rare start to Raul Albiol against his former club, and played Karim Benzema on the right wing, with Angel Di Maria on the bench.

Unai Emery was without Roberto Soldado, and made five changes to the side that drew with Levante last week. The centre-back duo of Victor Ruiz and Adil Rami, who have been excellent this season, was the only part of the side that remained in place.

This match really should have had goals, with both sides missing big chances.

Real shape

Both sides played a 4-2-3-1 formation, and the battles across the pitch were obvious. Real played a very fluid shape in the final third, with Mesut Ozil typically drifting to the flanks and allowing the wide players inside, exploiting the space left when Mehmet Topal followed Ozil. Cristiano Ronaldo played more centrally than usual, coming inside into ‘number ten’ positions, and he had two early efforts from range that went close. On the other flank, Benzema didn’t look happy when getting the ball in wide positions – he doesn’t have the technical skill to beat Jordi Alba. His best contribution was when he came inside into a centre-forward position, Ozil found him, and Benzema backheeled to Ronaldo for a good chance.

The battle between Ricardo Costa and Ronaldo was interesting. Costa was happy to follow Ronaldo into central positions, which meant Feghouli had to become a wing-back and track Marcelo. Going the other way. Ronaldo didn’t track back much into his own third, which meant Costa got a couple of opportunities to prompt attacks – when he was brave enough to get in advance of Ronaldo.

Valencia breaks

Valencia had plenty of chances here, particularly on the break. Real’s front four generally pressed high up when they lost the ball, but their pressing wasn’t always integrated and Valencia were able to break through one ‘line’ at a time when working the ball towards goal. There were two different situations here. Sometimes, the front four would press, but then Alonso and Khedira would stay deeper, and one of the Valencia central midfielders would get time on the ball to play a good pass. Alternatively, if Alonso and Khedira did move forward, they would often leave Tino Costa free between the lines, and neither Pepe nor Albiol wanted to step forward and deal with him.

This was combined with intelligent breaking down the flanks. Costa got forward a little, but down the left was where Valencia really did well. Both Alba and Pablo Piatti broke past their men quickly as soon as Valencia won the ball. With these players in space, plus a bit of time to consider their passes in the centre, Emery’s side manufactured a good number of chances.

Another issue here was the tempo. Valencia were content to slow the game down at set-pieces (though with the ball they broke quickly), and Real struggled to move up through the gears. There was rarely continual spells of heavy pressure from the home side.

Second half

Mourinho made the obvious decision to bring on Angel di Maria on down the right. Higuain departed, and Benzema went upfront. Within thirty seconds the Argentine had made more successful dribbles than Benzema had in the first half, and he teed up Ronaldo for another good chance. Granted, this was after coming inside rather than staying wide, but it was the kind of classic wing play Benzema can’t provide.

Ozil was probably the key player for Real in terms of creating chances and prompting movement, but Valencia continued to hold out, tracking runners in midfield and defending wito two banks of four. Emery took off his wide players on 62 minutes to give more energy to the side, with Pablo Hernandez and Jeremy Mathieu on. They played the same roles as the men they replaced, with Mathieu staying wide (he seems to cause the big two problems, and he had a good chance here by getting in behind Alvaro Arbeloa) and Pablo trying to drift inside into space between the lines.

Further back, Topal started to play deeper, and sometimes seemed to drop in as right-sided centre-back when the ball was wide. He also helped Ricardo Costa with Ronaldo.

Changes

Jose Mourinho went for Kaka on 70 minutes. The Brazilian came on for Khedira, with Alonso now the sole holder and an attacking band of four supporting Benzema upfront. Ozil played a little deeper and was now helping Alonso play the initial pass into the final third. Real continued to play with great fluidity, but still ended up with too many players in a central zone, and they looked better when di Maria stayed wider, where he played a couple of crosses with the outside of his left foot.

Emery didn’t really respond to the added threat from Kaka. Daniel Parejo probably sat deeper, especially with Topal dropping in, but Tino Costa’s main job was still on Alonso, rather than dropping in as a third holder. Valencia continued to be a threat on the break, mainly with straight passes, and especially by getting in behind Arbeloa, who seemed slow on the turn and got little help from ahead against Alba and Mathieu, who switched position at will.

Jose Callejon replaced Ozil in the final ten minutes, and Real had more structure to the side, with Callejon out wide on the right and Di Maria on the left. They stretched the play, and now Valencia came under real pressure, though the crosses from wide were often poor, and Valencia’s last-ditch defending was admirable.

Conclusion

This is an odd Valencia performance to analyse – although the scoreline finished 0-0, and Valencia were decent value for their point, the scoreline doesn’t reflect what Valencia did well, because the game could have finished 3-3 or 4-4.

They didn’t defend particularly well, and were probably relieved that Real were so narrow for so long. Their real skill was being able to break through Real, by playing in the spaces between the lines, and later getting in behind Arbeloa.

Real’s play, unusually for a Mourinho side, lacked structure. They also found it difficult to keep the tempo high, or put Valencia under sustained spells of pressure. The first change worked well, with Di Maria on to provide dribbles, but the second made things too congested with Ozil and Kaka in the same space, and it required the third change to bring some structure to the side – you can’t have five attackers wandering wherever they please.

Alex2011

901楼参考译文
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皇马0-0瓦伦西亚战术分析：皇马缺乏结构，瓦伦反击犀利

2012-04-11 / baiy07


双方首发阵容

尽管统治了比赛，但皇家马德里还是在主场丢了分。

穆里尼奥少见地让阿尔比奥尔首发对阵旧主，同时他派上本泽马出现在右翼，迪玛利亚则坐上板凳。

和上周与莱万特的平局时相比，埃梅里对阵容做出了五处调整，索尔达多并没有首发。本赛季表现出色的中后搭档鲁伊兹和拉米是阵容中唯一保持不动的部分。

这场比赛实在应该出现进球，两方都错失了不少好机会。

皇马的阵型

双方都踢4-2-3-1阵型，场上的对决是明显的。皇马在对方的防守三区内的阵型很灵活，厄齐尔一如既往地拉边，让边路的球员内切利用托帕尔跟防他而留下的空间。C罗踢的比往常更靠中路，来到了10号的位置，他开场时的两脚远射很接近进球。另一侧的本泽马在边路拿球时看上去不是很开心——他的技术不足以击败阿尔巴。他最大的贡献来源于内切进入中锋位置的时候，厄齐尔的传球找到了他，然后本泽马脚后跟做给C罗，那是个好机会。

里卡多-科斯塔与C罗的对抗是很有趣的。科斯塔乐于跟防C罗到中路，这意味着费古利不得不成为翼卫并跟防马塞洛。反过来，C罗并不会跟防对手到自己的防守三区，这意味着科斯塔有大把的机会助攻——当他有足够的勇气放任C罗在自己身后的时候。

瓦伦西亚的反击

瓦伦西亚有好多次机会，特别是反击。在丢球之后，皇马的前场四人组通常采取高位压迫，但他们的压迫并不总是协调一致，而且瓦伦西亚有能力在每次拿球后都突破围抢。这里会出现两种不同的情形：有时，前场四人组压迫对手，但阿隆索和赫迪拉会回撤，这样瓦伦西亚的中前卫之一就有时间拿球并且传出好球。另外一种情形，如果阿隆索和赫迪拉也压上，他们会把蒂诺-科斯塔留在两条线之间，并且无论是佩佩还是阿尔比奥尔都不想上前去对付他。

这同时结合着两翼球员的聪明跑位。科斯塔（译注：里卡多-科斯塔）是向前了一些，但左路才是瓦伦西亚真正打得好的区域。一旦瓦伦西亚拿到球，阿尔巴和皮亚蒂都会迅速地插上并甩开防守他们的人。有了这些球员创造出的空间，加上中场球员有时间思考如何传球，埃梅里的球队创造出了几次不错的机会。

另一个问题是比赛节奏。瓦伦西亚坚持在阵地进攻时把比赛放慢（尽管他们在反击时很快），而皇马则艰难地试图提高比赛节奏。主队很少有那种持续性的高强度压迫。

下半场

穆里尼奥派上迪玛利亚来到右路是显然会有的决定。伊瓜因下场，本泽马突前。上场30秒内阿根廷人做出的盘带就比本泽马在上半场做出的还要多，而且他还给C罗创造了良机。坦白说，这次机会是内切后造成的而不是在边路造成的，但这是那种典型的边锋踢法，本泽马做不到这一点。

厄齐尔可能是皇马在创造进球机会和提高跑位效率上的关键人物，但瓦伦西亚坚持在中场跟防对手，并且中场四人和后卫线四人都参与防守。埃梅里在62分钟的时候用巴勃罗-埃尔南德斯和马蒂厄替换边路球员来给予两边更多的能量。他们上场后的任务和被他们替换的球员一样，马蒂厄拉边（他似乎给两大巨头（译注：指巴萨和皇马）都制造了麻烦，而且他还切入阿贝罗阿身后创造了一个好机会），巴勃罗试图内切利用对手两条线间的空间。

后防方面，托帕尔开始回撤，当球在边路时他似乎成为了右边的中卫。他同时也帮助了里卡多-科斯塔防守C罗。

换人调整

穆里尼奥在70分钟的时候遣上卡卡。巴西人替下了赫迪拉，阿隆索现在成为了单后腰，前场的攻击四人组全力支援突前的本泽马。厄齐尔稍稍回撤，帮助阿隆索把球传入对手的防守三区。皇马继续踢的很灵活，但仍然有太多的球员聚集在中路，当迪玛利亚拉边时看上去好一些，他在边路用左脚外脚背贡献了几次传中。

埃梅里其实并没有真正出招应对卡卡带来的威胁。帕雷霍可能收得更深了，特别是托帕尔回撤的时候，但蒂诺-科斯塔的主要任务仍然是对付阿隆索，而不是回撤成为第三个后腰。瓦伦西亚继续在反击上制造威胁，主要通过直塞球，特别是打阿贝罗阿的身后，阿贝罗阿似乎转身很慢，并且在对付可以随意换位的阿尔巴和马蒂厄时很少得到队友帮助。

卡列洪在最后十分钟的时候上场替下厄齐尔，随着卡列洪在右路拉边，迪玛利亚在左路拉边，皇马的阵型结构更好了。他们拉开了进攻宽度，现在瓦伦西亚感受到了真正的压力，但皇马边路的传中质量经常很差，而且瓦伦西亚坚持不懈的防守令人敬佩。

结论

如果分析瓦伦西亚的表现这是一场奇怪的比赛——虽然以0-0收场，而且瓦伦西亚也配得上这一分，但比分牌并没有反映出瓦伦西亚哪里打得好，因为比赛本来应该以3-3或者4-4收场。

他们的防守并不是特别好，而且也许应该庆幸皇马长时间里都踢得很窄。他们的厉害之处在于能够在对方三条线之间创造空间，比赛后段主攻阿贝罗阿的身后，从而能够突破皇马的防线。

与穆里尼奥球队一贯表现的不同，皇马的阵型缺乏好的结构。他们也无法保持高节奏，或者保持对瓦伦西亚的持续性压迫。第一个换人效果不错，迪玛利亚提供了边路的盘带，但第二个换人使厄齐尔和卡卡出现在同样的区域，反而阻塞了进攻，因此这需要第三个换人来为阵型提供更好的结构——你不可能让五个攻击手都按照他们自己的喜好随意跑位。

pedro

Dortmund 1-0 Bayern: six point lead
April 12, 2012


The starting line-ups

Robert Lewandowski’s clever flick put Dortmund six points clear of Bayern – probably a decisive lead at the summit of the Bundesliga table.

Dortmund were still missing Mario Gotze, who got the winner in the reverse fixture between the sides, and Sven Bender – but there was no surprise team news from Jurgen Klopp

Jupp Heynckes was without Bastian Schweinsteiger, so Luis Gustavo partnered Toni Kroos. In defence, Philipp Lahm was over on the right, with David Alaba at left-back.

Dortmund dominated the first half but didn’t score – then looked nervous in the second and did score.

Opening stages

The first six or seven minutes were played at a very high tempo, with both sides excitedly closing down and getting the ball forward quickly.

When the game settled down, it turned out that Dortmund weren’t going to press particularly heavily from the front – they tended to close down with one attacker at a time, force Bayern to switch the ball to the opposite full-back position, and then drop into shape.

Bayern’s approach was largely the same – they tried to remain compact, as both Mario Gomez and Thomas Muller dropped off when out of possession, getting into a position between the Dortmund centre-backs and holding midfielders. Both centre-backs had plenty of time on the ball, and though both sides tended to play short passes, Dortmund hit a couple of longer balls to Robert Lewandowski, who nodded down to Shinji Kagawa.

Kagawa was probably the key player in the first half, the most intelligent with his movement and appreciation of space. He tended to play to the right of the pitch, exploiting a little pocket of space when Kroos moved higher up than Gustavo. He picked up the ball in that zone and looked dangerous.

Dortmund also did well to bring their wide players inside and make runs from the channels in behind the defence. With Lewandowski often coming deep and pulling the centre-backs out of position, there were opportunities to get the wide players into good situations. Jakub Blaszczykowski found himself with a good early chance from a narrow angle wide on the left, having made an excellent diagonal run. That summed up the movement inside, and the full-backs motored on down the flanks well.

Bayern struggled for sources of creativity early on. Franck Ribery was often intelligent with his movement, drawing Lukasz Piszczek up the pitch and creating opportunities for movement and variation of positions elsewhere, but when Dortmund got men behind the ball, Bayern looked slow in possession. Things got better when Kroos moved forward into the final third to create a little more, but their most promising move of the first half came from a direct break after Piszczek conceded possession cheaply on the right wing, with Ilkay Gundogan ahead of the ball and in no position to cover.

That almost got Mario Gomez in, but overall he Gomez a poor game, and both he and Muller were substituted in the second half. In fact, Gomez came off very badly from the direct comparison to Lewandowski. He didn’t hold the ball up as effectively, he did work the channels as frequently, and he didn’t win as many aerial duels. Mats Hummels was a key reason for that, and was probably the man of the match.


A comparison of Gomez and Lewandowski's runs - even considering that Gomez played only 75 minutes, Lewandowski's runs are much more varied

Second half

The strange this about this match was the timing of the goal. Dortmund had been by far the better side in the first half but failed to take the lead – then Bayern were marginally better in the second half, but Dortmund got their winner while looking more likely to concede.

There was no obvious reason why Bayern stepped it up after the break. Dortmund became a little more cautious – although whether this caused, or was a result of, Bayern’s good spell is questionable. Kagawa was certainly less of a force and seemed to tire quickly; he played much deeper and was given some level of responsibility for picking up Kroos. This isolated Lewandowski, although he moved over to the left and still tried to bring the centre-backs out of position.

Jupp Heynckes chose to introduce Schweinsteiger after an hour, with Muller departing and Kroos moving into the attacking midfield position. He sent a great ball in behind the defence for Ribery, and Bayern looked stronger after the change, even though Schweinsteiger didn’t look 100% fit. The other substitutions all seemed to be about fitness rather than to change things tactically, although Ivica Olic on for Gomez showed how disappointing the latter had been.

Dortmund didn’t do anything special in the second half to merit their victory tactically. Indeed, it was Bayern who created more promising situations in the box, and missed a penalty after Robben was brought down. One feature of the second half was how much more Robben looked to come into central positions – where he was more dangerous than Muller or Gomez.

Conclusion

This wasn’t an especially tactical game. 4-2-3-1 v 4-2-3-1, no real surprises nor dramatic changes from the coaches, and basically a game where Klopp and Heynckes believed their side could outplay the other. In a very open, pure game of football, there were no yellow cards, and a positive feel about the contest.

But it was Dortmund who produced more good moments – they were more cohesive and able to attack in a variety of situations. Bayern actually dominated possession quite clearly (58%), but in Lewandowki and Hummels, Dortmund had the two star performers at either end.

pedro

904楼参考译文

pedro

巴萨vs赫塔菲1-2-3-4战术解析



FC Barcelona vs Getafe - The Pyramid Formation

pedro

萨拉戈萨率先进球后瓜帅的应战对策（萨拉戈萨1-4巴萨）

Alex2011

Five points on Liverpool 2-1 Everton
April 14, 2012


The starting line-ups

Liverpool fought back from 1-0 down to book their place in the final.

Kenny Dalglish went with Andy Carroll upfront and Luis Suarez behind. Jordan Henderson started on the right of a four-man midfield, and at the back Jamie Carragher was selected at centre-back, which meant Daniel Agger moving to left-back.

David Moyes selected Magaye Gueye on the left of midfield, Darron Gibson in the centre of midfield, and Phil Neville at right-back.

This was a rather poor game lacking in technical quality – the goals came from two huge defensive mistakes and then a set-piece. There were a few individual areas of interest, however…


1. Liverpool’s centre-back partnership disturbed

Jose Enrique hasn’t been performing well in the second half of the season, yet it was still a surprise to see Agger out on the left. In isolation that move worked reasonably well – he defended very tight to the centre-backs, which was appropriate for playing against Leon Osman, who was looking to dart through that space and in behind the defence.

But the knock-on effect was that Liverpool were playing a combination of Carragher and Martin Skrtel at the back. Carragher brings great experience to the side (particularly helpful with the troubles in goal), and is still more than capable of doing a job, but the reality is that Agger and Skrtel are Liverpool’s best partnership. To break up their relationship was an odd move from Dalglish. Admittedly, Agger has been injured recently and Carragher has played alongside Skrtel relatively regularly, but this has (perhaps unfortunately) coincided with a poor run that has included defeats to QPR, Wigan, Newcastle, Arsenal and a home draw with Aston Villa.

The error that led to Everton’s goal rather summed up the lack of understanding, even if it was a rather exaggerated example, and might make Dalglish less willing to break up the Skrtel – Agger partnership.

2. Suarez into the channel

The most interesting battle of the first half was taking place in Everton’s left-back zone. There, Henderson was used rather than Dirk Kuyt, and played the role differently to the Dutchman. Rather than playing high up and making direct runs towards goal, he dropped deeper and looked to pick up the ball in deep midfield positions.

Baines quite likes to get tight to opponents, and generally has to cover quite a lot of ground down his side. He often moved high up the pitch towards Henderson, which left Sylvain Distin covering a large amount of space up against Suarez, who played to the right of the pitch. This was particularly obvious when Liverpool built up play on their right, because Carroll generally stayed at the far post and was therefore keeping Johnny Heitinga busy.

Like the first point, the goal was an exaggerated example of the problems – 99% of the time, Distin wouldn’t have disastrously underhit his backpass. But long before that, at the start of the first half, getting Suarez into that channel was the obvious approach for Liverpool – in fact, it was the only area of open play where either side really looked good. Suarez had been caught narrowly offside in this situation early on, Distin had received a booking for checking him, and had also conceded a free-kick on the edge of the box for fouling him. Every time, Suarez had been moving into the channel rather than down the centre.

But the importance of Henderson dragging Baines away shouldn’t be underestimated. When Downing went to that side, Baines played deeper and more narrow (to show Downing onto his weaker right foot) and this approach was less promising. Downing did play a couple of good crosses, though.

3. Patient passers play well

Darron Gibson and Jay Spearing were hardly the most celebrated players on show, but in a scrappy game, both did well by knocking the ball from side to side, keeping possession and bringing the full-backs into play.

4. Cahill – Fellaini switch

After Liverpool’s equaliser, Moyes swapped Fellaini and Cahill – the former played close to Nikica Jelavic, the latter played close to Gibson. This didn’t seem to help Everton in either respect, though – Fellaini didn’t improve things going forward. Aside from one good flick-on to Jelavic, he made Everton too direct and route one. Perhaps more importantly, Cahill lacks Fellaini’s composure, and Everton became overrun in the middle.

5. Everton left-back problems

Baines went down clutching his hamstring late on, and (possibly coincidentally) Craig Bellamy immediately came on for Downing. Bellamy’s pace was crucial in driving Liverpool forward late on.

Then, at 2-1 Moyes replaced Baines with striker Victor Anichebe, and they didn’t bother to re-shape and play someone at left-back. Phil Neville, for example, could have gone across there with Seamus Coleman dropping to right-back, but instead they literally just played the final few minutes without a left-back and with Distin now covering even more ground. It shouldn’t really have mattered for four minutes, and Everton had to gamble, but then Liverpool just kept the ball towards the right-hand corner flag – and then Suarez teed up Maxi Rodriguez for an open goal from that position.

Alex2011

907楼参考译文

showfun

巴萨vs赫塔菲1-2-3-4战术解析

http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/XMzgwNDIzNjEy/v.swf

FC Barcelona vs Getafe - The Pyramid Formation
pedro 发表于 2012-4-14 08:31

巴萨继续这种1234或者334阵型的话，的确需要进补一个高中锋

colinfirth

Chelsea’s change in defensive system under Roberto Di Matteo
April 16, 2012


Three Chelsea systems without the ball: (a) Villas-Boas' 4-3-3, (b) Villas-Boas' 4-2-1-3, (c) Di Matteo's 4-2-3-1

The major change at Chelsea under Roberto Di Matteo has been the difference in the wide positions, stemming from a combination of the change of style, and the change of formation.

Andre Villas-Boas wanted 4-3-3 and lots of pressing – therefore the job of the wide players was to close down the full-backs, and they defended high up the pitch.

Villas-Boas then started playing with Juan Mata as a central playmaker, but the formation remained more 4-2-1-3 than 4-2-3-1 – a minor difference, but the wide players were still staying high up the pitch, even as Villas-Boas went from a heavy pressing game to something more cautious.

Di Matteo’s formation, on the other hand, is 4-2-3-1 – Chelsea are defending with two banks of four behind the ball, something they haven’t done for a long time.

With their past few coaches, Chelsea have been used to playing 4-3-3, or 4-3-1-2, or 4-3-2-1, all of which defend with either a four and a three, or a four and a five, depending on how cautious they were playing.

Defending with a second line of four is very unusual for Chelsea, and Di Matteo deserves a lot of credit for implementing the system so quickly and successfully. Oddly, Di Matteo’s major problem at West Brom was the lack of defensive organisation, and Roy Hodgson’s job when replacing Di Matteo was all about getting the side structured without the ball.

The major effect of the change in system is the identity of the wide players. Daniel Sturridge, [url=http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2114903/Daniel-Sturridge-wants-Thierry-Henry-style-winger-striker.htmlhttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport ... winger-striker.html]who regards himself very much as a forward pushed out wide[/url], rather than a wide midfielder, could work well within the 4-3-3 as he was playing high up, close to goal, and usually receiving the ball within thirty yards of goal. Now ‘his’ role has changed completely – it involves retreating 30-40 yards when the ball is lost, and defensively Sturridge is not particularly adept.

On the other flank, Juan Mata is also no longer quite right for the wide role. This is a different situation – at Valencia he played that role well enough, and he’s certainly more defensively aware than Sturridge. But a combination of factors – (a) his fitness, which has clearly dropped significantly in recent weeks, (b) the fact he’d been used to pressing high up, and now would be being told to drop deep, and (c) the desire to play him in a central role, perhaps the most important factor – has meant he also no longer plays on the flank.

Therefore, in Sunday’s game against Tottenham, it was Ramires and Saloman Kalou who played in the wide positions. These two are clearly less spectacular players, but both are much more disciplined and underrated in terms of their efficiency with the ball. I’ve written about Ramires for the Guardian, but Kalou was also impressive yesterday, and of all the Chelsea players who could broadly be termed attackers, is probably the most aware tactically.

There is also now a central midfield two, rather than a three. This is less of a departure from the 4-2-1-3 we saw occasionally under Villas-Boas, though Chelsea are still getting used to playing this way. Yesterday it was unusual to see John Obi Mikel often briefly higher up than Frank Lampard when Chelsea didn’t have the ball, and that ‘two’ is now functioning as a unit rather than with one given the primary defensive responsibilities.

There was a little bit of confusion about how to pick up Rafael van der Vaart – in the old 4-3-3, he would clearly have been tracked by Mikel, the only holder. Now, there has to be more communication and improvisation as the opposition number ten varies his position.

How Chelsea will cope with Lionel Messi this week Messi remains to be seen, and it’s difficult to work out whether it’s better to play with two holders or one holder against him. The only time Messi looks relatively infffective is when he has to come deeper than both men in a double pivot to pick up the ball – as was the case for Argentina in the Copa America, and for Barcelona in the Copa Del Rey defeat to Real Madrid last season.

That is probably what Chelsea will be hoping for, which means Di Matteo will ask his double pivot to play very deep, probably allowing Barcelona’s midfielders a lot of time on the ball.

colinfirth

910楼参考译文

colinfirth

巴萨继续这种1234或者334阵型的话，的确需要进补一个高中锋
showfun 发表于 2012-4-16 22:53

有了伊布介个不太成功引援案例以后，瓜可能对此比较纠结的

Hawkwalking

巴萨继续这种1234或者334阵型的话，的确需要进补一个高中锋
showfun 发表于 2012-4-16 22:53

巴萨暂时没这种想法。

至于未来，如果看到有范·巴斯滕或克鲁伊维特那种跑起来（而不是死站桩）的技术性中锋的苗子的时候，也许会考虑。

Alex2011

Bayern Munich 2-1 Real Madrid: what type of player to use as the number ten?

April 17, 2012


The starting line-ups

Mario Gomez scored very late to give Bayern a slender advantage going into the second leg.

Jupp Heynckes’ major decision was as expected – Toni Kroos played in the advanced midfield role, with Bastian Schweinsteiger deeper.

Jose Mourinho played Fabio Coentrao at left-back, rather than Marcelo.

Bayern were the better side over the course of the game here – Real started poorly, got better in the second half, and then conceded a late winner when the game seemed to have died.

Line-ups

The two sides set up broadly in a similar fashion. Both systems were 4-2-3-1, or at least a variation upon 4-2-3-1, and both fielded inverted wingers looking to come inside. This allowed the full-backs forward, although Real’s full-backs are always very cautious away from home in Europe, and it was Bayern’s who got forward to greater effect – most obviously Philipp Lahm in the final minute, to set up Gomez’s goal.

Bayern approach

But the real tactical interest came in the centre of midfield. Here, the coaches took the opposite approach. Heynckes reacted to Bayern’s problems in the title decider defeat to Dortmund last week, where Bayern were a broken team. There was a defensive six, and an attacking four – and no-one to link the play. In that game, Heynckes replaced Thomas Muller with Schweinsteiger after an hour, with Kroos moving forward into the attacking midfield role, having started as a holder. Bayern were immediately better, even though they lost.

Here, he started with Kroos in the playmaking role. This was a sign that Bayern wanted to link play more through the centre, wanted to dominate possession, and focus on breaking through Real’s central midfielders. That was a decent approach – despite the fact Bayern usually play down the flanks, Real can be vulnerable to sides breaking through the middle, especially with Xabi Alonso (not the most mobile at the best of times) looking exhausted at the moment.

Real approach

One could have expected Jose Mourinho to make the same decision – to drop Mesut Ozil, a number ten who focuses on attacking, and bring in another central midfielder – Esteban Granero or Nuri Sahin, perhaps. Alternatively, he could have left out Angel Di Maria and pushed Ozil wide. Either way, with Heynckes’ move widely expected, it would be natural for Mourinho to match him in the centre. This could have meant moving to a 4-3-3, as Real have done in Clasicos.

But Ozil started, and played close to Karim Benzema at the start of the game. He had a half-responsibility to get back and pick up Luiz Gustavo, but tended to amble back in his stereotypically slightly disinterested fashion. Bayern could get the ball quickly into the midfield zone and break directly through the middle.

With Ozil out of the way, Bayern simply had a 3 v 2 in the centre of midfield. Alonso and Sami Khedira didn’t know whether to press or stand off – they were either conceding space in behind, with the defence not stepping up, or allowing Bayern time in the ball in midfield. Kroos played his role very well – generally staying relatively high up the pitch when Bayern had the ball (he and Gomez didn’t really press Real’s defence, but instead played close to the holders, which meant Bayern won the ball from Alonso and Khedira quite frequently, with Gomez notably helping out in this respect) but dropping in and creating an overload when Bayern did win the ball, and helping Schweinsteiger forward to make Bayern fluid in that zone. Gustavo stayed holding and kept an eye on Ozil’s lateral movement, though didn’t feel the need to play goalside of him.



Mourinho switches

Mourinho clearly realised this problem, and midway through the first half (on 23 mins), switched Ozil and Di Maria. This was a recognition that Real needed more energy and discipline in the centre – of Real’s attacking band of three, it is clearly Di Maria who is the most attentive defensively. Bayern had already taken the lead, but Real were now competing more in the middle. They kept it fairly solid until half-time.

At half-time Mourinho switched them back again – after that period of caution, he now wanted a goal. Ozil was restored to the centre, which was a very risky move that could have gone dreadfully wrong. Instead, it went well – Ozil was told not to bother dropping back into midfield, and instead get into positions to launch breaks – this worked brilliantly for Real’s goal – finished in a scrappy manner, but owing much to the fact that Real defended a free-kick with only six players, leaving their front four in a position to break. The break featured all four players, getting 4 v 4 against the Bayern defence. That was precisely what the system was meant to do.

Real adjusted the way they closed down in midfield – one of the holders sat deeper on a permanent basis, and if the attacking midfielder, Kroos, found himself free, one of the centre-backs would charge up towards him – though the most obvious time this happened was actually when Muller had come on, and Ramos clattered into the back of him.

Heynckes switch

The Muller change involved Kroos moving deeper into the position Schweinsteiger had played in. It was an attacking move – their number ten was now a forward – but it had been forced by Schweinsteiger’s lack of fitness. This situation, with both Ozil and Muller as the number tens, lasted only eight minutes. Then, Mourinho brought on Marcelo, and Di Maria became the number ten again, helping out more than Ozil in midfield. That lasted a further ten minutes before Granero came on for Di Maria, and now Real truly had three central midfielders, while Bayern had only two, with Muller now playing as a support striker. The situation from the first half had been reversed.



Mourinho’s purpose here was clearly to kill the game. Marcelo, meanwhile, had come on in a strange position that made little sense – first on the left, then drifting about, then over on the right. What he was doing there is unknown, and the fact that the winning goal came from Lahm motoring down the line will make Mourinho wish he’d told Marcelo to stay ahead of Coentrao on the left, the most logical position to use him in if trying to kill the game.

Conclusion

Contested in the centre, won on the flank. Bayern didn’t play particularly well but were certainly the better side – Real lacked structure and organisation during the first half, particularly in midfield.

It is extremely rare to see a Mourinho side overrun so obviously in the centre of midfield. He clearly understood the problems, shown by his constant changes in the attacking midfield role. Perhaps that explained his surprisingly dignified manner after the game.

However, a 1-0 second leg win would take Real through, and they remain marginal favourites.

Alex2011

914楼参考文献
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拜仁2-1皇马战术分析：中路争斗，边路制胜 由 maryantonia 发表在虎扑足球·拜仁专区

拜仁慕尼黑2-1皇家马德里：关于10号的讨论April 17, 2012

首发阵容

戈麦斯终场前的进球帮助拜仁带着微弱的优势进入第二回合。
海因克斯主要的决定和预期的一样——克罗斯打前腰，施魏因施泰格殿后。

穆里尼奥并没有上马塞洛，而是选择了科恩特朗出任左后卫。
纵观比赛，拜仁踢的更好——皇马的开局打的很遭，下半场虽有起色，但是在比赛行将结束之时又被打入了一粒绝杀球。

阵型

显而易见，两队的阵型非常相似。使用的都是4-2-3-1阵型，或者说是4-2-3-1阵型的变种，边锋位置排出的都是喜欢内切的逆足边锋。这就能让边后卫经常前插助攻，但是皇马的边后卫们在欧冠的客场总是小心谨慎，反而是拜仁的边后卫们助攻的更大胆——尤其是最后几分钟里的拉姆，戈麦斯的绝杀球也是他助攻的。.

拜仁的战术

但是真正有意思的战术对决来自中场。两位主教练使用了相反的战术。在上周联赛冠军的天王山之战中被打散并输给多特蒙德之后，海因克斯吸取了教训。在那场比赛里他排出了6人防守-4人进攻的战术——没有人串联前后。那场比赛中，海因克斯在60分钟后用施魏因施泰格换下穆勒， 把本来位于后腰的克罗斯移到前腰的位置。效果立竿见影，虽然最后他们还是输掉了比赛。

这场比赛中，他让克罗斯出任核心。这表明拜仁打算更多地通过中路来串联，想要在控球上占优，注重通过皇马的中场中路来进行反击。这种战术非常高明——尽管拜仁之前的进攻通常在边路，但皇马并不擅长对阵通过中路进行反击的球队，特别是哈维-阿隆索（在最有利的情况下活动范围并也不大）看起来只能勉力招架。

皇马的战术

赛前预测穆里尼奥会做出同样的决定——比如放弃厄齐尔，他是专注进攻的10号球员，而派上另外一名中场，比如格拉内罗或者沙欣。或者，他也可能放弃迪马利亚，让厄齐尔拉边。不管怎么样，因为海因克斯的球队拉得很宽，穆里尼奥自然会相应地在中路排出重兵，也就是使用4-3-3阵型，就像在国家德比中一样。

结果厄齐尔首发了，比赛刚开始的时候他一直在本泽马附近活动，虽然也有后撤盯防古斯塔沃的任务，不过他更倾向于缓步后退，还是以特有的那种看起来漫不经心的方式。拜仁在中场可以很快地拿到球，并直接通过中路进行反击。

厄齐尔不在的话，拜仁在中场中路很容易就形成3对2的局面。阿隆索和赫迪拉不知道是应该上压还是拖后——上压的话会在身后留下空当，因为后卫并没有跟进，拖后的话则给了拜仁太多拿球时间。克罗斯完美地完成了任务——拜仁拿球的时候他会突前（他和戈麦斯并没有真的去压迫皇马的防线，只是非常贴近对方的后腰球员，这意味着拜仁可以很频繁地从阿隆索和赫迪拉处拿到球，而且戈麦斯在这方面的贡献很大），否则他就会后撤，在拜仁抢球的时候形成人数优势，并协助施魏因施泰格向前推进，保持拜仁在这个区域的流畅性。古斯塔沃留在后腰处，他负责留意厄齐尔横向的移动，尽管并没有发觉对方有什么进球机会。



穆里尼奥的换位

穆里尼奥清楚地意识到了问题所在，上半场进行到一半的时候（23分钟），他让厄齐尔和迪马利亚换位。也就是说皇马在中路需要更多的能量和管制——皇马的进攻三叉戟中，显然迪马利亚是最注重防守的。这时拜仁已经领先，但皇马在中路更有竞争力，他们在中场休息之前都保持得相当稳固。

中场休息之后，穆里尼奥又把两人换了回来——在谨慎行事了一段时间之后，他想要取得进球。厄齐尔此时回到了中路，这是一招险棋，可能会引发严重的后果。不过，这确实奏效了——厄齐尔没有回撤到中场来的任务，只负责注重发动反击——这也带来了皇马的进球——当然，球进得有些混乱，不过归功于皇马在防守任意球的时候只派上了6位球员，而让前场4人组留在了反击的位置。这次反击是由4人共同发起的，与拜仁的防守队员形成了4对4的局面。而这正是这招险棋的最终目的所在。

皇马调整了中场紧逼的方式——后腰之一永久留在后场很深的位置，如果对方的前腰（当时是克罗斯）处于无人盯防的状态，中卫之一会上前跟着他——不过最明显的一次发生在穆勒上场之后，是拉莫斯迅速地贴到了他背后的位置。

海因克斯的换位

穆勒的上场让克罗斯后撤到了施魏因施泰格的位置。这次换人其实是加强了进攻——现在拜仁的10号是一名前锋了——这也是因为施魏因施泰格身体还没有完全复原而做出的被动换人。不过厄齐尔和穆勒都作为10号的情形只持续了8分钟左右。然后穆里尼奥派上了马塞洛，迪马利亚又变成了10号，他在中场位置的贡献比厄齐尔要强。又过了10分钟，格拉内罗上场替下迪马利亚，此时的皇马终于变阵成了三中场，而拜仁只有两位，穆勒现在则是一名二前锋。这与上半场的情形刚好相反。



穆里尼奥此时的目的非常明确，他想杀死比赛。马塞洛这个时候的位置有点莫名其妙——一开始是在左路，然后四处游荡，最后来到右路。他在场上干啥谁也不知道，拜仁的绝杀球是来自拉姆下底传中，这会让穆里尼奥希望自己告诉过马塞洛要留在左路的科恩特朗身前，也就是如果他这次换人是想要杀死比赛的话，最最具有逻辑性的位置。

结论

中路争斗，边路制胜。拜仁打得并不出彩，但显然是表现得比较好的一方——皇马在上半场缺乏结构和组织，中场附近尤为明显。

穆里尼奥的球队在中路被压制得如此明显是极其少见的情况。很显然他明白问题出在哪里，因此才会不停地改变前腰的用人。也许这也可以解释为何他赛后会表现得出人意料地凝重。

无论如何，第二回合皇马只需要1-0就可以过关，他们仍然是比较热门的一方。

小豆丁梅西

本泽马那脚传球，我看是射门打次了，成了助攻吧，哈哈。

半生

今年欧冠是拜仁的

午时靡深蓝

攒RP自重。
拜仁主场2-1这种比分太高危了。鸟这场特别是下半场指挥失策的地方太多，还好先客后主可以给他思考调整和放手一搏的机会。另外巴萨搞现在这支车子基本是兵不血刃

ychee

切尔西风格还是克制巴萨 难说;)  达到目的之后保守 不单是魔力鸟 瓜帅欧冠客场也这样

colinfirth

本泽马那脚传球，我看是射门打次了，成了助攻吧，哈哈。
小豆丁梅西 发表于 2012-4-18 11:33

撇开来说吧

本泽马若为前场核心，而且他信心爆棚，这支皇马是可以拿各种冠军的，但可惜了鸟人这半缩头乌龟的战略

你看，皇马最近打希洪，打马竞，还有这场打拜仁，大多不利时候，本泽马这路冲击或者开火，最终会带来进球的，当然天使也会在右路助攻，但是不如丫往禁区走那么厉害的


所以，当年巴萨若用3千还是3千5百万抢来本泽马，比要伊布划算多了

colinfirth

拜仁若是晋级决赛，似乎无人可挡的

关键是信心要爆棚的

就如巴萨在0809赛季那么艰难时刻挺过来一样，那么即使对阵曼联的决赛前，大家（尤其是巴萨球迷）谁敢说就能拿冠军呢，可是比赛一打开20分钟后，基本上球迷的信心就有了，关键是巴萨球员所展现出气质不一样了，比之0708赛季半决赛对阵曼联时，已经脱胎换骨了

colinfirth

欧早就说过类似话或者意思，

秋裤罗貌似见了鸟帅后，表现基本是怂的

0910赛季，拜仁逆转淘汰曼联，他的表现堪比梅西对阵枪手的表现，但是到了伯纳乌决战国米时，他的表现几乎可以说是隐形的

而这场比赛，欧看了下半场，他在拜仁的亮点赶不上刀疤脸、戈麦斯，甚至右路冲击力还不如拉姆那几下犀利

whoscored给他打分仅有6.5分，队内仅比替补穆勒6.1、首发博阿藤6.2和小猪5.7高一些，与巴德斯图贝尔持平，杜斯塔沃也有6.8分，而拜仁其他球员都在7分以上的，包括阿尔巴7.0分

他是鸟的“卧底”，有木有？

或者见了鸟有心理阴影，有木有？

赛后有一个镜头耐人寻味的，佩佩判若有风度的绅士一般，与球裤罗拥抱道别，又与裁判组一一握手致谢告别（偶是猜丫这一刻表现的，是不是？）

harpwind

个人认为拿下现在这支切尔西不难。从赔率看，净胜两球。

难在国家德比。休息时间比皇马少了一天。

低调

小豆丁梅西

个人认为拿下现在这支切尔西不难。从赔率看，净胜两球。

难在国家德比。休息时间比皇马少了一天。

低调
harpwind 发表于 2012-4-18 15:25

是啊，我突然想到这个问题严重啊，国家德比生生少休息一天，娘的。


是周日凌晨吗?

半生

靠，午时是拜仁球迷？我是看了早上比赛中真的这么觉得。拜仁现在给我的感觉就是擎天柱加了翅膀了一样。戈麦斯在前面顶，两个边路玩命传中，光这个就受不了，要不是早上少点运气，那真是……