11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

Penelope

875楼参考译文

Alex2011

发帖时，在高级回复中，一些编辑键失去功能了

showfun

马扎里太固执，那不勒斯基本上没有潜力可挖了

pedro

QPR v Arsenal: diagrams and chalkboards
April 2, 2012


The starting line-ups, and how Taarabt found space

At the Guardian I’ve written on how Queens Park Rangers played against Arsenal in their 2-1 win at Loftus Road on Saturday.

There were two key points in the victory, explained in that piece and outlined here.

Taarabt

First, Adel Taarabt was given far too much space, and was unquestionably QPR’s key player. He played more passes (31), more passes in the attacking third (12), took more shots (3) and dribbled past an opponent more often (4) than any of his teammates.

There were three reasons why he got space, depicted on the left:

1. Theo Walcott played high up against Taye Taiwo, which meant there was a lot of vertical space between he and Bacary Sagna. Taarabt could come deep and pick up the ball away from Sagna under no pressure. On the other side, Aaron Ramsey was playing deeper (and more central), so the same ball wasn’t on to Mackie.

2. The tilt of Arsenal’s midfield triangle allowed Taarabt into space behind them. This was a problem in two ways, both because Mikel Arteta playing in advanced of Alex Song meant space in that zone, and because the rotation of those players means they can both be caught too high up the pitch, and leave space behind.

3. Song was the first function midfielder and in theory screening the space in front of the defence, but his direct opponent was Joey Barton (who Song stamped on earlier in the season, picking up a three-game ban). Barton played not as a number ten, but as a right-central midfielder, and Song got attracted to him – again, opening up space behind.



Zamora v Vermaelen

As outlined two years ago on ZM, Thomas Vermaelen likes to move high up the pitch and leaves space in behind. Mark Hughes realised this at the start of 2009/10 with Manchester City…



…and he told his players to do the same again. Sure enough, the pattern of interceptions shows how much more eager Vermaelen is to move up the pitch, whereas Laurent Koscielny sits deeper.



Therefore, Zamora tended to move towards the right of the pitch, and QPR sent long balls towards that flank (also evident in the earlier chalkboard of Mackie’s received passes).

pedro

879楼参考译文

Alex2011

Barcelona 3-1 Milan: Guardiola goes with a 3-3-4April 3, 2012


The starting line-ups

Barcelona weren’t at their best, but were fairly comfortable after scoring their third.
巴萨虽然不在其最佳状态，然而当他们打进第三球时却相当惬意，“万里长江横渡，极目楚天舒。不管风吹浪打，胜似闲庭信步。”

Pep Guardiola brought in Isaac Cuenca to stretch the play on the flank and used Cesc Fabregas in a free role, with Seydou Keita and Alexis Sanchez dropping out.
佩普-瓜迪奥拉将伊萨克-昆卡放在边翼、把小法放在前场自由人角色上，而将赛伊窦-凯塔和阿莱克斯-桑切斯放在替补席上。

Max Allegri recalled Ignazio Abate at right-back, but otherwise kept the same team from last week.
马克西-阿莱格里召回艾格纳西奥-阿巴特坐镇右边后卫，但阵型却是上周模子

This was an odd game – Barcelona predictably dominated possession but struggled to create chances in open play…yet still scored goals and weren’t particularly troubled after the third goal, in the 53rd minute.
这是一场奇特比赛 - 巴萨开场如愿统治控球但是纠结于把握机会上挣扎不已。。。直到第十分钟进球；而在第53分钟打进第三球后他们已经不再那么纠结了，局势依然掌控在自己手中（肿么翻译得这么别扭呀）

Formation

The real interest here was Barcelona’s shape. Dani Alves was pushed up even higher than in the first leg, with (at first) no responsibility to get back into the right-back zone. He and Cuenca played on roughly the same horizontal line, with Fabregas in a free role and Lionel Messi as a false nine. It could be interpreted as a 3-4-3 with a diamond midfield, with Fabregas at the front tip, but he and Messi were often together, playing as a partnership and dovetailing – therefore, the unusual 3-3-4 notation makes sense here.

Barcelona have played that way briefly in league games at the Nou Camp against weak opposition, but this was probably the first time they’ve looked 3-3-4 in a truly big game. In many ways, it makes perfect sense against this Milan side. It allows a spare man at the back, and if Fabregas dropped back slightly, equal numbers in midfield against Milan’s diamond. The obvious problem with a 3-3-4, on paper, is the lack of cover on the flanks – but few sides are as narrow as Milan, so in theory it shouldn’t be an issue.

Channels



There were problems with the approach, however. In the defensive phase of play, because Alves and Cuenca were playing higher up than they would as wing-backs, Milan’s two shuttlers could move outside into the channels and find space. There was an example in the first half when Alves deliberately didn’t retreat to a position alongside Javier Mascherano, and instead took up a position level with the midfielders. But then, briefly, Clarence Seedorf slipped unmarked into a position to the left of Mascherano, and had Zlatan Ibrahimovic played the right pass, he would have had a one-on-one against Victor Valdes. Only when he realised Seedorf was free in a dangerous position did Alves suddenly dash back – it would have been too late.

And almost exactly the same thing happened for the goal on the opposite side – the right-sided shuttler, Antonio Nocerino, moved forward into space outside of Carles Puyol to score. Cuenca had been watching the left-back, and this was Barcelona’s problem – who was meant to be tracking the shuttlers? If it was Xavi Hernandez and Andres Iniesta, they would have been dragged into something approaching full-back positions. If it was Alves and Cuenca…well, it wasn’t, since they were staying much higher up. It might have been a deliberate tactic from Allegri to exploit Barca there, and it worked quite well.

Barca higher up

The shape did help Barcelona press high up the pitch, four against four, and Milan’s troubles in playing out from the back were evident throughout the game – Philippe Mexes’ error that led to the first goal being one example. They arguably pressed less well in midfield, again because of the confused duties of Xavi and Iniesta.



How Milan's shuttlers moved forward unchecked

There was another problem though, with chance creation. Barcelona didn’t produce a lot in the final third – Messi had an early chance, as did Adriano and Thiago Alcantara late on, but they depended upon two penalties and a fortunate deflection for their goals, and weren’t as slick as usual. It was interesting that Fabregas often came deeper than Massimo Ambrosini to get the ball, which then gave Milan a spare man at the back.

When Fabregas dropped deeper, Messi wasn’t at his best: isolated and often struggling to beat both Alessandro Nesta and Mexes. Fabregas and Messi might have been better off staying high up, keeping 4 v 4 against the Milan defence, and leaving the initial through-ball to Xavi and Iniesta. Guardiola wanted to dominate possession and not be 3 v 4 against in midfield, clearly, but 61% possession isn’t great for Barca, even considering the standard of the opposition.

Positioning of attackers

The other main issues were the positioning of two attackers. Cuenca’s role was interesting – he was told just to stay wide, try to beat the full-back on the outside, and then cross the ball. On the ball he did relatively little, but with he and Alves either side, Milan’s back four was noticeably more stretched – the full-backs were (at a guess) ten metres further away from the centre-backs compared to the first leg, on average.

Cuenca’s role was unspectacular and largely unproductive but entirely functional, and Guardiola will have been happy with his job. He brings something new to Barca, he’s more of a winger – tricky and willing to cross – rather than a wide forward like Pedro Rodriguez or Cristian Tello, who like space and to get the ball in behind the Barcelona defence. He meant the pattern of Barca’s passes in the final third stretched across the width of the pitch, rather than staying central where Milan were comfortable, as in the first game.



The positioning of Robinho was also interesting. In the first leg he was poor because he wasn’t doing enough to stretch the Barcelona defence with his movement and starting positioning. Here he was much better – he dropped deep to form a 4-3-2-1 without the ball, and this brought Mascherano high up into zones he didn’t do well in. The Milan goal came when the Argentine got drawn out, then turned, then followed Robinho and dropped too deep, playing Nocerino onside. Robinho wasn’t doing that kind of thing in the first leg – he was staying too high up. This was a big improvement.



At half-time Guardiola sensed the problems and moved to more of a 4-4-1-1ish shape. Alves went back to right-back, Cuenca switched to the right, and Iniesta went to the left with Fabregas behind Messi. Milan could no longer find the gaps, and Barca weren’t troubled so much.

Conclusion

Barcelona are a far better football team than Milan on paper – but over the two legs, they only looked marginally better. Milan didn’t do anything special to frustrate Guardiola’s side, but a combination of an over-cautious approach in the first leg, and a slightly confused formation in this second game meant that Barca struggled to demonstrate their natural superiority in the final third. In the tie, the goal that was most Barcelona-like was Nocerino’s equaliser.
巴萨理论上要比米兰强大得多 - 但是只是场面上看起来略胜米兰一筹。米兰给瓜迪奥拉队伍并未带来特别麻烦，但是首回合巴萨相当谨慎打法，而次回合排出的这个令人颇显困惑的阵型，则意味着巴萨欲纠结于要在近米兰禁区腹地处证明他们的超自然能力。在这意义上而言，最像巴萨式进球风格的，则是米兰人诺切里诺打进扳平比分之球。

Maybe it is worth other sides copying Milan and playing a diamond against Barcelona – the last side to win at the Nou Camp was Hercules, who parked the bus with a flattened diamond (in the defensive phase) and then broke quickly into the channels.

Still, Barcelona progressed, and though it wasn’t 100% successful, the shape showed Guardiola’s ability to tinker with his system without disturbing the rhythm of the side too much. Don’t expect 3-3-4 in the next round, though.

Alex2011

881楼参考译文

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巴塞罗那 3-1 AC米兰战术分析：3-3-4的使用及其问题探究

由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·巴萨专区



巴塞罗那并不在其最佳状态，但在攻入第3球之后，他们踢得就很舒服了。

瓜迪奥拉让昆卡首发以打开边路的空间，并让法布雷加斯踢前场自由人的位置，上一场首发的凯塔和桑切斯本场未能得到首发机会。
阿莱格里让复出的阿巴特踢右后卫，而其他布阵和上周一样。

这场比赛有点儿奇怪——巴萨不出意外掌握了控球权，但在运动战中费劲气力才创造了几个机会……不过他们还是进球了，并且第53分钟打入第3球后就没啥问题了。

斗阵

本场比赛有意思的地方是巴萨的阵型。阿尔维斯的位置比第一回合还要靠前，而且（比赛刚开始阶段）没有作为右后卫回防的任务。他和昆卡差不多处于同一水平线，同时法布雷加斯踢前场自由人，梅西踢伪9号。这可以视作是菱形中场的343，法布雷加斯位于菱形的前端，但他和梅西常常位置靠近，如影随形密切合作——因此，这就是不常见的所谓334的阵型。

巴萨采用的这种阵型，是他们在联赛中主场面对弱旅时常用的阵型，但面对这样一场关乎生死的重大比赛中使用它，今天大概还是第一次。从很多意义上说，对阵米兰用这种阵型很靠谱。这使得他们在米兰后场能多出一人，而且法布雷加斯要是稍稍后撤一些的话，他们就能有同样多的球员以抗衡米兰的菱形中场。从理论上说，334最明显的缺点是两翼的身后缺乏保护——但很少有球队像米兰这样收紧在中路踢球，所以从理论上说这也不是什么大问题了。

肋部



然而这种阵型还是有些问题的。在防守端，由于阿尔维斯和昆卡的位置，比他们踢边后卫时要靠前得多，于是米兰的两个不断前插的中场能向两翼移动，走边路通道以寻求空间。在上半场有一次阿尔维斯有意没有回防到马斯切拉诺附近，而是回到与中场球员齐平的位置，但那之后不久，西多夫摆脱盯防跑位到马斯切拉诺左侧，要是伊布拉希莫维奇能送出妙传，他就有面对巴尔德斯的单刀机会了。那时阿尔维斯才意识到西多夫很自由地处在危险位置，他才突然加速回追——这可太迟了。

而米兰在另一侧策动的进球基本上是同一情形——右路中场诺切里诺前插利用了普约尔外侧的空间并进球。昆卡的注意力放在了左后卫的防守区域，而这正是巴萨的问题——谁来盯防对方前插的中场？如果这是哈维和伊涅斯塔的活儿，那他们得回撤到边后卫的位置。如果这是阿尔维斯和昆卡的责任……好吧呀，怎么会是呢，他们踢得那么靠前。这应该是阿莱格里利用巴萨漏洞的妙招，很有效的嘛。

巴萨之高位逼抢

巴萨的阵型有利他们实施高位逼抢战术，以四人对抗四人，而整场比赛中米兰想要从后场开始组织进攻都困难重重——梅克斯的失误导致巴萨攻入第1球就是例证。但巴萨在中场的逼抢做得要差一些，这也是由于哈维和伊涅斯塔防守端指责划分不清所致。



巴萨在制造机会方面还有另一个问题。他们在前场没制造出太多机会——梅西很早就一次破门良机，阿德里亚诺和蒂亚戈在后来也有可能，但他们却是依靠两粒点球和一次纯运气的折射才破的门，也不如平时那样灵巧。有意思的是法布雷加斯经常回撤很深拿球，相比安布罗西尼更靠近巴萨大门，于是米兰在其后场有多一人的优势。

当法布雷加斯回撤时，梅西就没法打出他的最佳状态，经常苦苦挣扎企图过掉内斯塔和梅克斯。法布雷加斯和梅西可能还是一起留在前场比较好，保持对米兰后防4对4的人数，把策动进攻的直塞球留给哈维和伊涅斯塔才是上策。显然瓜迪奥拉想要保持控球率，不想中场3对4人数处于不利，因为即使考虑到对手是米兰这样的一流强队，61%的控球率还不够。

前锋的跑位

另外一些问题在于巴萨两个锋线球员的跑位。昆卡的位置很有意思——他被指示要守在边路，尽量从外侧吃掉对方边后卫，然后传中。拿球时他所做的其实很少，但有他和阿尔维斯各居一边时，米兰的后防线很明显被拉开了——与首回合相比，两个边卫离中卫的距离平均而言增大了10米（我猜的）。



昆卡的角色不怎么引人注目，很大程度上也没什么贡献，但完完全全是有其用途的，瓜迪奥拉也应该对他的表现很满意才是。他为巴萨带来了些新的东西，他更像是一个边路中场——善盘带，好传中——而不是像佩德罗或者特略那样，需要空间并喜欢在巴萨防线后拿球的边锋。他使得巴萨前场的传球能充分利用场地的宽度，而不仅是像首回合那样停留在米兰可以从容对付的中路。

罗比尼奥的位置也值得一说。在首回合他表现欠佳，因为他在用首发位置和跑位扯动巴萨防线方面做得不够。本场他做得要好得多——无球时他回撤较深以形成4321的阵型，这使得马斯切拉诺上前到他不太擅长处理的区域。阿根廷人被吸引出自己的防守区域，转而盯防罗比尼奥并回撤得太过，于是诺切里诺并不越位，米兰的进球也就来了。罗比尼奥首回合并无此类表现——他的位置一直太靠前。这是一个大进步。



在中场休息时瓜迪奥拉发觉了这些问题，并将阵型改为更像4411。阿尔维斯回到右后卫的位置，昆卡换到右路，伊涅斯塔居左，法布雷加斯处在梅西身后。米兰找不到空隙，巴萨也不再受其困扰了。

结论

从理论上来说，巴萨比米兰要强得多，但两回合比赛看下来，他们也就是稍微强一点儿而已。米兰并没有采用什么特别招数来对付瓜迪奥拉的队伍，但首回合的过于谨慎，加上次回合任务分配稍微不清的阵型，使得巴萨在展现其前场实力时困难重重。就进球而言，最巴萨式的进球是诺切里诺的那一球。

对阵巴萨时摆出菱形中场，米兰的这种做法大概值得其他球队效仿——上一次在诺坎普击败巴萨的球队要数赫库莱斯了，防守时他们在门前摆了一个带压扁了菱形中场的大巴，能快速解围并传到边路的进攻通道。

巴萨一直在改进，尽管并不是100%成功，这种变阵展现了瓜迪奥拉在不太影响球队节奏的前提下，对其体系进行修补的能力。不过，还是别指望下一场能再看到这样的334了。

showfun

in the final third 意思是在对方的1/3场地内，也就是进攻端

Alex2011

in the final third 意思是在对方的1/3场地内，也就是进攻端
showfun 发表于 2012-4-4 11:14

谢谢指教

大致就是接近禁区腹地吧

倔强的西瓜

赢得不漂亮，但总算赢了，感谢上帝。

pedro

赢得不漂亮，但总算赢了，感谢上帝。
倔强的西瓜 发表于 2012-4-4 12:48

胜利是美好的

不能强求太多的

竞技体育是强调好胜的

例如梅西上一场西甲对阵毕巴，有2次表现可给梅黑们口舌的：

一次是快发任意球，这是“故伎重演”，多次了，但他毫不在乎对方的感受的。试想一下，那场比赛中梅西遭到对方球员多次拉拽，裁判就在跟前，不理不睬的，对方又有谁在乎梅西感受？！

二是，比分领先后，梅西有一次明知在越位位置上，还是将球打进网内的，直到边裁举旗，主裁哨响，梅西只是笑了笑，还向边裁示意没越位的，那镜头可滑稽了

那么，南非世界杯预选赛最后一班车争夺战中，亨利手球帮助法国队最后晋级，裁判当时也没看清，也没改判，这又作何理论呢？

Alex2011

Positioning and movement of Aimar, Mata and Gaitan in Chelsea 2-1 BenficaApril 5, 2012


The starting line-ups

Chelsea have progressed into the Champions League semi-finals after a 2-1 victory over Benfica, winning 3-1 on aggregate.

The game wasn’t as interesting as it could have been, mainly because of Benfica’s indiscipline. Javi Garcia’s clumsy tackle on Ashley Cole resulted in a penalty and an uphill struggle, then Maxi Pereira picked up a silly second booking to leave Benfica down to ten men before half time. They struggled on manfully, and did well with ten, but the game (and tie) was a little disappointing.

However, this was a game featuring three very intelligent playmakers: Pablo Aimar, Juan Mata and Nicolas Gaitan. The latter two owe much to Aimar – Mata has described him as his favourite player when younger, while Gaitan has clearly benefited from playing alongside him at Benfica. All are technically gifted, are 5′7, have great balance and good appreciation of space.

It was that final quality that was most obvious in this game. The match was surprisingly open – partly because Chelsea went with a much more attacking line-up than in Portugal, while Benfica needed to score, so pushed forward. This meant plenty of space for the three playmakers.

Aimar

Aimar was brilliant here, the catalyst for Benfica’s excellent attacking moves in the first half. He was up against John Obi Mikel, and frequently burst past the Nigerian, particularly towards the left. Chelsea’s problem here was that Mikel was left to fend for himself – Frank Lampard played too high up, particularly at the start of the game. Lampard was trying to get tight to Axel Witsel, and with the Belgian moving laterally across the pitch, Lampard often followed. Mata found space behind him, and had plenty of shots.



The positioning in the Chelsea midfield was odd – at kick-off, Lampard lined up directly ahead of Mikel, and that’s pretty much what happened throughout the game, with Mata also in a central position higher up. Chelsea’s midfield was essentially three men in a vertical line, and Mata made the most of the space to either side, constantly playing good, direct forward passes.



Mata

Juan Mata was fielded as the central playmaker in a 4-2-3-1, in a system where the wide players dropped back to help out the full-backs and form a second bank of four (rather than in the 4-2-3-1 briefly used by Andre Villas-Boas, where the wide players pressed the full-backs and left the defending to the deeper six players). As such, Mata was the closest support to Fernando Torres throughout the game.

His positioning was interesting, because the natural man to pick him up was Nemanja Matic, Benfica’s deepest midfielder. However, Matic was playing as the left-of-centre midfielder, with Witsel to his right. Therefore, it didn’t suit the task of picking up Mata, who tends to move to Chelsea’s left. He did that here, and picked up the ball unchallenged towards the left flank, in particular.

The other way Mata tested Matic positionally was to move very high up the pitch – a little like Mesut Ozil at the World Cup – and basically move into such an advanced zone that Matic felt uncomfortable following. With Benfica’s makeshift centre-back pairing focusing on maintaining a spare man against Torres, Mata often became free in the centre of the pitch. He was caught offside three times in the first half – so he wasn’t quite timing his runs correctly, but he was making the right runs.


Mata's varied positioning - despite playing as a number ten, he barely ever picked the ball up in a central position, and instead ventured to the flanks. Three times he did get the ball in a central zone were when moving high up the pitch and getting caught offside

Gaitan

The most interesting movement was that of Gaitan, the Benfica left-winger. He was up against Branislav Ivanovic, who was very cautious in coming out from the back four. On the other flank, Ashley Cole is a natural full-back and very mobile, and covers a large amount of ground when shutting down a winger – he can move high up the pitch, or a long way out to the flank.

Ivanovic is a converted centre-back and prefers to stay tight to the right-sided centre-back, in this case David Luiz. This meant that Gaitan had time and space to come inside into the centre of the pitch and pick the ball up to the side of Mikel, and combine with Aimar.


The different areas covered by Ivanovic and Cole

It also meant that Gaitan often got into strange, wide and deep positions when Benfica had possession, into a zone where Ivanovic didn’t want to venture out to. The positions of his attempted take-ons (dribbles) are very deep, and he tended to get the ball and then drift around the outside of Ivanovic when he got up to full speed, before crossing the ball.





Chelsea’s imbalance in the full-back positions wasn’t a huge problem because of the different roles of the wide players. Ivanovic was static but had the energy of Ramires ahead of him to help out, while Salomon Kalou could stay higher up the pitch on Chelsea’s left.


How Chelsea's midfield four defended

Alex2011

887楼参考译文
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切尔西本菲卡次回合，前场组织者站位移动的比拼

2012-04-06 / 大步一趟

首发阵容

主场2-1战胜本菲卡之后，切尔西凭借两回合总比分3-1成功晋级冠军联赛半决赛。

回顾在斯坦福桥进行的这场比赛，本菲卡球员在防守端的不冷静让比赛的对抗性失色不少。先是哈维-加西亚在禁区内糟糕的铲断撞倒了阿什利-科尔，本菲卡被判处极刑，造成了比分上的落后；接着马克西-佩雷拉的犯规又导致他两黄变一红被罚下，使得球队在半场没结束就少一人应战。不得不说，葡萄牙球队还是像男人一样战斗到了最后一刻，十人应战的他们仍然发挥尚佳，但比赛（这个系列赛）多少还是有些令人失望。

这场比赛也见证了三位进攻组织者的闪光：帕布洛-艾玛尔，胡安-马塔和尼古拉斯-盖坦。事实上后两者都要感谢艾玛尔：艾玛尔是马塔小时候最喜欢的球星，影响了马塔的成长；盖坦在艾玛尔身边踢球也受益匪浅。三位球员都有极高的技术天赋，甚至连身高都是一样的5英尺7英寸（170cm），身体平衡能力极佳，善于利用空间。

他们的最后一点特质在本场比赛中体现地淋漓尽致。比赛基调出乎意料地极为开放，切尔西在主场排出了富有攻击性的首发，本菲卡方面，则因为需要进球来扳回首回合的劣势，阵型也不断前压。这也为这三位进攻组织者提供了足够的活动空间。

艾玛尔

艾玛尔的表现可圈可点，他是本菲卡上半场一系列美妙进攻的催化剂。与他对位的米克尔多次被他突破（尤其从左侧）。切尔西面对的难题是，米克尔需要独自应付艾尔玛的冲击。兰帕德的位置过于压上（尤其在开场阶段），他尝试去压迫埃克塞尔-维特塞尔。当比利时人横向移动时，兰帕德也跟上逼抢。这样的踢法使得时常出现在兰帕德身后的马塔也获得了足够的空间，获得多次射门的机会。



切尔西中场站位很奇特：开场后兰帕德的站位就一直在米克尔身前，全场比赛他也保持了这样的站位；马塔的位置球场中央地带，不过更加靠上。这样一来切尔西中场中路实际上是前后3人垂直排列，马塔向两侧扯动最为频繁，他也经常送出质量高的直塞球。



马塔

马塔是4231阵型中的3里面处于中间的组织者，迪马特奥的阵型中3里面的边前卫被要求回撤，同边后卫一起构筑中路防线之外的另一道4人防线（在博阿斯的阵型中边前卫的人物则是疯狂压迫对方边后卫，通常不回撤防守）。切尔西的阵型使得马塔踢得更加靠近托雷斯。

他的站位很有趣。按理同他对位的球员应该是内曼亚-马蒂奇，本菲卡最后置的中场。但是马蒂奇的传统站位偏左，维特塞尔偏右。但马塔活动通常集中在切尔西的左路，也就是本菲卡的右路，这让盯防他的马蒂奇很不舒服。场上经常出现马塔拿球时并没有人立刻逼抢的情况。

马塔的跑位让马蒂奇不舒服另一点是他经常提到非常高的位置---就像世界杯里厄齐尔做的那样---他持续在这个区域内活动，马蒂奇跟也不是，不跟也不是。本菲卡这场排出的临时中卫组合中特别安排了一个人盯防托雷斯，马塔在中路区域活动的自由度大大增加。上半场他就有三次越位。虽然西班牙人跑位时机把握还欠火候，但是至少他的这种尝试是成功的。

身为10号，但马塔跑位灵活，很少在中路接球，时常游曳到边路。3次中路接球处在了越位位置，但都险些致命。



盖坦

盖坦的跑位最为有趣。左边锋的他对位的是伊万诺维奇，伊万本场比赛踢得相对谨慎，很少从边后卫位置插上。另一侧的阿什利-科尔则上下飞奔，活动范围很大。科尔在逼抢对方边路球员时覆盖面积很大---有时逼抢到对方后场，有时甚至离开边路的位置。

伊万诺维奇原来毕竟是打中后卫出身，即便在改造成边后卫之后，他也更习惯同靠右的中后卫站得很近。本场切尔西的右中卫是大卫-鲁伊兹。盖坦有足够的时间和空间跑到球场的中间区域，甚至可以活动到米克尔的附近，同艾玛尔做配合。


伊万诺维奇和阿什利-科尔防守的覆盖范围





除此之外，盖坦还可以拿到拉到边路很深的位置接球，伊万在这种情况下通常不会冒险跟出来防守。好几次盖坦拿球盘带的位置都靠近底线，他倾向于拿球之后从伊万的外侧突破，提速之后完成传中。

切尔西边后卫位置上这样的不平衡站位不是什么大问题，毕竟他们边路的球员的风格不同。伊万的比赛风格更加静态稳当，在他身前跑不死的拉米雷斯能同他互补，帮他协防。而左路的卡卢则因为阿什利-科尔的存在而不怎么需要回撤。


切尔西中场四人如何防守

阿根廷万岁！

正如黄健翔所说裁判黑了巴萨，没有争议点球，巴萨依然可以获胜

Alex2011

正如黄健翔所说裁判黑了巴萨，没有争议点球，巴萨依然可以获胜
阿根廷万岁！ 发表于 2012-4-5 19:38

黄某人貌似没脸说裁判如何如何吧?

当年要不是裁判吹罚那个有争议的点球，意大利队能淘汰希丁克执教的澳洲袋鼠吗？他那时肿么不说裁判黑了意大利呢？

嘿嘿

看看人家健宏童靴以及张指导，同样解说巴萨 vs 米兰，肿么没有那么大好恶呢？！

人家还四平八稳坐在cctv5这个垄断平台上四平八稳地想解说欧冠就解说欧冠，想解说意甲就解说意甲，想解说世界杯就解说世界杯，而且人家还会做人，谁都不大得罪，也没有说不标榜自己nb就能憋死自己的

张指导，虽说是铁杆意甲老戏迷，建宏据说是拜仁迷（？），可是大家还基本都能接受他们的观点，即使是他们有时也带有个人倾向性说法，但也不是太离谱的，就是说不是为了黑而黑的

再有陶伟靠解说德甲站稳cctv嘉宾坐席这么多年，可是人家解说时并不排外，担得起公众人物角色，例如他解说巴萨与勒沃库森两场比赛。

可是黄鼠狼一天不黑一下梅西或者巴萨，貌似就显不出来自己在天朝足球界的存在感的

点球肿么了？

车子最近2个主场得了2个点球，以此淘汰了总体上比丫发挥好的拿波里和本菲卡，丫肿么不说呢？

飞鹰战士

鄙视黄贱象这2B

Alex2011

Barca: Reinventing Total Football

wembley68

April 2nd, 2012

Arrigo Sachi, the mastermind of the Milan side of the 80′s, had once staked a claim that the next tactical revolution in the game, would be the conversion of the whole pitch into a midfield area. What does it imply? The teams in the forefront of this revolution would have the luxury of having defensive midfielders playing as defenders, and attacking midfielders playing as strikers. Having said this, they would still function as midfielders i.e – passing the ball around quickly, closing down spaces and playing a high tempo game.

“It’s become all about specialists. Is football a collective and harmonious game? Or is it a question of putting x amount of talented players in and balancing them out with y amount of specialists?” – Arrigo Sachi.

By this, Sacchi primarily pointed out the ‘cost’ incurred in having the ‘luxury’ of an attacker. For instance, a classic Trequartista like Kaka needs an enforcer like Makelele.

Further, Sacchi hoped for the elimination of specialists, in order to uphold the motto that - ”Football is a team game.”
Well, two decades on, and Sacchi may have finally seen his saying come true. Pep Guardiola has certainly upheld Sacchi’s sayings and put his words into practice.

Till last season, we all were aware of the prototype Barcelona which would pass their way to victory. A four Man defence, and a three man midfield – which was led by a three man attack.

With the acquisition of Cesc Fabregas, Guardiola has ushered in a new era, a new beginning at the Nou Camp. So, without much ado, let us divulge into the details of this revolution.

1) CONVERSION OF DEFENCE AND ATTACK INTO MIDFIELD

With the signing of Cesc Fabregas, many were of the assumption that Fabregas would soon replace Xavi in the starting XI. But, Guardiola had other plans. The signing of Cesc Fabregas signaled the start of the Guardiola revolution.

The ageing of Carles Puyol meant that Pep could not rely on him week in, week out. Many quarters of the press thus linked Barcelona to an array of Center Backs, but Pep instead chose Mascherano. This signing was first met with contempt, but instead of playing the Argentinian as a holding midfielder, Guardiola has successfully re-invented Mascherano in the Center Back role, and he has definitely made a good fist out of it!

This season, with the arrival of Fabregas, there were presumptions that he would initially benched since Xavi is an immovable figure in the XI. But , Guardiola, pulled off yet another rabbit out of the hat. Who would have thought!
Fabregas was consequently transformed into the ‘False 9′ role.

“We wanted to try Cesc in that position because he gets into good positions in and around the area. He did well and it gives us another option,” cited Guardiola, for making a No. 4 into a No. 9.


Mascherano's heat map.



Fabregas' heat map.

The above heat maps shows us the positions taken up by Mascherano and Fabregas, respectively. For starters, it is worth mentioning their respective starting positions in the respective games. Whereas, Mascherano started as the Center back in the SuperCopa against Madrid, Fabregas started up front alongside Messi and Sanchez in the ‘False 9′ role.


Notice the Starting and the Average position of the No 4 – Cesc Fabregas.

Putting under the microscope, Cesc Fabregas’ off the ball movements and on it, we come to the conclusion that though Cesc Fabregas started off up front, he ended up playing in midfield. Eventually, this created a 4 vs 2 in the middle of the park, and consequently, Barcelona gained control of the game. Also, Fabregas popped up to score the 3rd goal for his side in the 77th minute.

2) REJUVENATION OF THE FALSE 9 :

The Center Forward role at the Nou Camp has been subject to much scrutiny and debate over the past three seasons. In his first season, Guardiola had Eto’o at his disposal. In the summer transfer market, the Catalan club made it’s most expensive buy in history in the form of Zlatan Ibrahimovic. But for the towering Swede, his Camp Nou spell was nothing short of a nightmare.

Consequently, he was shipped to AC Milan, and Laporta brought Villa to the Nou Camp. After playing centrally for the first few weeks, Villa was moved to the left flank to accommodate Messi in the ‘False 9′ role.

But what exactly is the False 9?

A unconventional lone striker, who drops deep into midfield.

This tactical tinkering by Pep ultimately paid dividends as Barcelona won the double in that season – a season which saw Lionel Messi gather a record 53 goals.

The heat map below of Lionel Messi(given below) shows us the function and the movements of a False 9.


Lio Messi – genius redefined.

The long term injury to David Villa and the arrival of Sanchez signaled the beginning of a revolution. Sanchez, an attacking midfielder was deployed as the forward on the left flank. Messi was stationed on the right wing, with Fabregas now playing as the False 9. In fact, Messi and Fabregas interchange positions during the course of the 90 minutes in a game.


Barcelona, with the false 9(right) and without the False 9(left)


3) 3-4-3 with a Twist

Until the last season, the wall of Barcelona remained untouched – the back four picked themselves. Alves, Pique, Puyol and Abidal laid the cornerstone of the success of the Blaugrana.


The Fab 4.

But due to the health problems concerning Abidal and the frequent injury problems to Puyol, the wall of this team had to be re-constructed. It was surely not an easy job to replace one of the most consistent yet the most non-prolific of left-backs, and to find an alternative to the Caveman.

Many expected Pep to take a dip into the inflated market and go all guns blazing for a top notch center back. Thiago Silva’s comments on his apparent desire to play in the Blue and Red added much needed fuel to the fire. But instead of using his transfer kitty for a defender, Pep decided to tinker with the system and he consequently moved to the 3-4-3, with a twist!

In this, the Holding midfielder in Sergio Busquets drops back and functions like a libero, and the center backs radiate to the flanks from their positions. It is probably one of the most complicated defensive structures, which makes able use of each defender’s forte. As the commentator pointed out in one of the El Clasicos:

“Just as Mourinho thought he had all the answers, Guardiola changed the questions!”

Putting the Holding Midfielder – Sergio Busquets under the microscope :


Left – Starting formation of FCB. Right – Heatmap showing the positions taken up by Busquets.

The heatmap reveals to us, that though Sergio Busquets started as a central midfielder, he dropped back during the course of the 90, with the Center Backs moving wide, thereby becoming full backs. To simplify matters, I shall use the following formation diagram :


On Left – The starting position of the Barcelona team. On right – Formation after player interchange.

Thus, we notice that as Busquets drops back, Barcelona revert to the 4-3-3 and the default system is restored.
Though, such is the fluidity of this team that, if the opposition seem to have found a way through, Guardiola can easily tinker the system and revert back to the 3-4-3 in a jiffy.

(The above team lined up in the 2-0 victory against Mallorca.)

The roots of Total Football are ingrained deep within the setup at La Masia. The golden generation of Barcelona and arguably, the Golden Team of world football has its logistics based on the codecs of this simple yet so confusing style of play, and it is fitting that the mastermind – Pep Guardiola – is making apt use of the ‘user-friendly- and ‘use how you want’ nature of these players!

Alex2011

Guardiola's Barcelona-Reinventing Total Football
Saturday, 7 April 2012





Arrigo Sachi, the mastermind of the Milan side of the 80′s, had once staked a claim that the next tactical revolution in the game, would be the conversion of the whole pitch into a midfield area. What does it imply? The teams in the forefront of this revolution would have the luxury of having defensive midfielders playing as defenders, and attacking midfielders playing as strikers. Having said this, they would still function as midfielders i.e – passing the ball around quickly, closing down spaces and playing a high tempo game.

“It’s become all about specialists. Is football a collective and harmonious game? Or is it a question of putting x amount of talented players in and balancing them out with y amount of specialists?” – Arrigo Sachi.

By this, Sacchi primarily pointed out the ‘cost’ incurred in having the ‘luxury’ of an attacker. For instance, a classic Trequartista like Kaka needs an enforcer like Makelele.

Further, Sacchi hoped for the elimination of specialists, in order to uphold the motto that - ”Football is a team game.”
Well, two decades on, and Sacchi may have finally seen his saying come true. Pep Guardiola has certainly upheld Sacchi’s sayings and put his words into practice.

Till last season, we all were aware of the prototype Barcelona which would pass their way to victory. A four Man defence, and a three man midfield – which was led by a three man attack.

With the acquisition of Cesc Fabregas, Guardiola has ushered in a new era, a new beginning at the Nou Camp. So, without much ado, let us divulge into the details of this revolution.

1) CONVERSION OF DEFENCE AND ATTACK INTO MIDFIELD

With the signing of Cesc Fabregas, many were of the assumption that Fabregas would soon replace Xavi in the starting XI. But, Guardiola had other plans. The signing of Cesc Fabregas signaled the start of the Guardiola revolution.

The ageing of Carles Puyol meant that Pep could not rely on him week in, week out. Many quarters of the press thus linked Barcelona to an array of Center Backs, but Pep instead chose Mascherano. This signing was first met with contempt, but instead of playing the Argentinian as a holding midfielder, Guardiola has successfully re-invented Mascherano in the Center Back role, and he has definitely made a good fist out of it!

This season, with the arrival of Fabregas, there were presumptions that he would initially benched since Xavi is an immovable figure in the XI. But , Guardiola, pulled off yet another rabbit out of the hat. Who would have thought!
Fabregas was consequently transformed into the ‘False 9′ role.

“We wanted to try Cesc in that position because he gets into good positions in and around the area. He did well and it gives us another option,” cited Guardiola, for making a No. 4 into a No. 9.

Mascherano's heat map.

Fabregas' heat map.

The above heat maps shows us the positions taken up by Mascherano and Fabregas, respectively. For starters, it is worth mentioning their respective starting positions in the respective games. Whereas, Mascherano started as the Center back in the SuperCopa against Madrid, Fabregas started up front alongside Messi and Sanchez in the ‘False 9′ role.

Notice the Starting and the Average position of the No 4 – Cesc Fabregas.

Putting under the microscope, Cesc Fabregas’ off the ball movements and on it, we come to the conclusion that though Cesc Fabregas started off up front, he ended up playing in midfield. Eventually, this created a 4 vs 2 in the middle of the park, and consequently, Barcelona gained control of the game. Also, Fabregas popped up to score the 3rd goal for his side in the 77th minute.

2) REJUVENATION OF THE FALSE 9 :

The Center Forward role at the Nou Camp has been subject to much scrutiny and debate over the past three seasons. In his first season, Guardiola had Eto’o at his disposal. In the summer transfer market, the Catalan club made it’s most expensive buy in history in the form of Zlatan Ibrahimovic. But for the towering Swede, his Camp Nou spell was nothing short of a nightmare.

Consequently, he was shipped to AC Milan, and Laporta brought Villa to the Nou Camp. After playing centrally for the first few weeks, Villa was moved to the left flank to accommodate Messi in the ‘False 9′ role.

But what exactly is the False 9?

A unconventional lone striker, who drops deep into midfield.

This tactical tinkering by Pep ultimately paid dividends as Barcelona won the double in that season – a season which saw Lionel Messi gather a record 53 goals.

The heat map below of Lionel Messi(given below) shows us the function and the movements of a False 9.

Lio Messi – genius redefined.

The long term injury to David Villa and the arrival of Sanchez signaled the beginning of a revolution. Sanchez, an attacking midfielder was deployed as the forward on the left flank. Messi was stationed on the right wing, with Fabregas now playing as the False 9. In fact, Messi and Fabregas interchange positions during the course of the 90 minutes in a game.

Barcelona, with the false 9(right) and without the False 9(left)

3) 3-4-3 with a Twist

Until the last season, the wall of Barcelona remained untouched – the back four picked themselves. Alves, Pique, Puyol and Abidal laid the cornerstone of the success of the Blaugrana.

The Fab 4.

But due to the health problems concerning Abidal and the frequent injury problems to Puyol, the wall of this team had to be re-constructed. It was surely not an easy job to replace one of the most consistent yet the most non-prolific of left-backs, and to find an alternative to the Caveman.

Many expected Pep to take a dip into the inflated market and go all guns blazing for a top notch center back. Thiago Silva’s comments on his apparent desire to play in the Blue and Red added much needed fuel to the fire. But instead of using his transfer kitty for a defender, Pep decided to tinker with the system and he consequently moved to the 3-4-3, with a twist!

In this, the Holding midfielder in Sergio Busquets drops back and functions like a libero, and the center backs radiate to the flanks from their positions. It is probably one of the most complicated defensive structures, which makes able use of each defender’s forte. As the commentator pointed out in one of the El Clasicos:

“Just when Mourinho thought he had all the answers, Guardiola changed the questions!”

Putting the Holding Midfielder – Sergio Busquets under the microscope :

Left – Starting formation of FCB. Right – Heatmap showing the positions taken up by Busquets.

The heatmap reveals to us, that though Sergio Busquets started as a central midfielder, he dropped back during the course of the 90, with the Center Backs moving wide, thereby becoming full backs. To simplify matters, I shall use the following formation diagram :

On Left – The starting position of the Barcelona team. On right – Formation after player interchange.

Thus, we notice that as Busquets drops back, Barcelona revert to the 4-3-3 and the default system is restored.
Though, such is the fluidity of this team that, if the opposition seem to have found a way through, Guardiola can easily tinker the system and revert back to the 3-4-3 in a jiffy.

(The above team lined up in the 2-0 victory against Mallorca.)

The roots of Total Football are ingrained deep within the setup at La Masia. The golden generation of Barcelona and arguably, the Golden Team of world football has its logistics based on the codecs of this simple yet so confusing style of play, and it is fitting that the mastermind – Pep Guardiola – is making apt use of the ‘user-friendly- and ‘use how you want’ nature of these players!

This post first appeared on Sportskeeda

-Dhruv Saraf

Alex2011

892-893楼参考译文

说明：892-893楼是同一个内容，只是虎扑译文是根据老外后来的即4月7日转贴标题来翻译的，不妨将两个出处都放在这里，便于有兴趣的童靴去查找
--------------------------

瓜迪奥拉的巴塞罗那：重拾全攻全守足球

2012-04-08 / baiy07

缔造了80年代米兰王朝的阿里戈-萨基曾经打赌说，足球运动的下一次战术革新将是整个球场向中场区域的转变。这暗示了什么？这种革新的先驱球队中将奢侈地用防守中场来作为后卫、进攻中场作为射手。虽然这样说，但他们从功能上来说仍然是中场球员，例如完成快速的传球配合、封锁空间并且进行快节奏的比赛。

这一切都与专司一职的球员有关。足球是不是一项需要集体与和谐的运动？抑或足球是否就是把x个充满天赋的球员组合在一起，让他们与其他y个专司一职的球员达到平衡？——阿里戈-萨基

通过这个问题，萨基第一次指出了奢侈地拥有一名攻击手所带来的“花费”。例如，一个卡卡一样的经典九号半需要一个马克莱莱式的人保护。

进一步，萨基希望清除那些专司一职的球员，从而遵循那句名言——“足球是一项集体运动”。

嗯，20年过去了，萨基大概终于看到他的预言成为了现实。佩普-瓜迪奥拉显然遵循了萨基的名言并且付诸于实践。

直到上个赛季，我们都熟知巴塞罗那典型的以控球求胜的打法。4个后卫，3个中场——3个进攻球员领衔全队。



自从得到了法布雷加斯，瓜迪奥拉引领了一个新的纪元，诺坎普球场的一个新起点。那么废话不多说，我们深入细节来审视一下这次战术革命。

1) 将防守和进攻与中场融合

签下法布雷加斯的时候，许多人猜测小法将会很快替代哈维在首发中的位置。但瓜迪奥拉有其他的计划。小法的签约标志着瓜迪奥拉战术革新的开始。

普约尔的年龄问题意味着瓜迪奥拉不能每周都依靠他。因此许多媒体将巴萨与一系列的中卫联系在了一起，但瓜迪奥拉选择了马斯切拉诺。这笔签约一开始遇到了质疑，但阿根廷人没有作为后腰出现，瓜迪奥拉成功地重新发明了马斯切拉诺的中卫角色，他在这一点上确实做的很赞！

这赛季随着法布雷加斯的到来，有许多人猜测他一开始将从板凳坐起，因为哈维是不可动摇的首发人选。但瓜迪奥拉又一次施展了他的魔法。谁能想到这一点！

小法最终被改造成了“伪九号”的角色。

“我们想让赛思克试一试那个位置因为他在那个区域的位置感很好。他做的不错，这给了我们不同的选择”，瓜迪奥拉说，解释他将一个4号成功改为了9号。

马斯切拉诺的热图


法布雷加斯的热图

上面的热图分别显示了马斯切拉诺和法布雷加斯出现的位置。对于首发球员来说，我们应该提到他们在每场比赛中的先发位置。马斯切拉诺在对阵皇马的西班牙超级杯比赛中首发担任的是中卫，小法首发突前作为伪九号，身边是梅西和桑切斯。


注意4号法布雷加斯的首发位置和平均位置

如果细致观察小法无球时和有球时的移动，我们可以得出这样的结论，尽管小法首发的位置突前，他最后踢的还是中场。最终，这使得中场区域是4V2的情况，结果就是巴塞罗那掌握了比赛。同时，在77分钟时小法还突然出现打入了本方的第三个进球。

2) 伪九号的重获青春：

诺坎普的中锋角色在过去三个赛季一直被审视和激辩包围。在他的第一个赛季，瓜迪奥拉有埃托奥可以使用。在夏季转会期，加泰罗尼亚俱乐部完成了史上最昂贵的转会带来了伊布拉希莫维奇。但对于瑞典神塔来说，他的诺坎普岁月就是一场噩梦。

最终，他转会去了AC米兰，拉波尔塔把比利亚带到了诺坎普。在最初的几周打中锋之后，比利亚到了左路去辅佐梅西的伪九号角色。

但是到底什么是伪九号？

一个非传统的、回撤到中场的射手。

瓜迪奥拉的这种战术修补最终收到了回报，因为巴塞罗那在那个赛季拿到了双冠——梅西还打入了创纪录的53粒进球。

下面这张梅西的热图向我们表明了伪九号的功能和跑位。


梅西——被重新定位的天才

比利亚的长时间伤病以及桑切斯的到来标志着一场革新的开始。本来是一名攻击中场的桑切斯被当做左翼的边锋使用。梅西被安排在右翼，法布雷加斯现在踢伪九号。事实上，梅西和小法在90分钟内也经常换位。


巴塞罗那, 有伪九号(右) 以及 没有伪九号(左)

3) 有换位的3-4-3

直到上个赛季，巴塞罗那的防线是不可触动的——防线上的四个人选无可争议。阿尔维斯、皮克、普约尔和阿比达尔为红蓝军团的成功打下了基础。


后防四人组

但由于阿比达尔的健康问题和普约尔频繁的伤病，这支球队的防线需要重建。要取代这位最具持续性同时也是最不多产的左后卫之一、并且给“洞穴人”找一个替代者，显然不是一项简单的工作。

许多人期待瓜迪奥拉将会进入这个充斥着泡沫的转会市场用尽全力寻找一名顶级中卫。蒂亚戈-席尔瓦向往红蓝军团的言论也给这些流言添了一把火。但瓜迪奥拉没有去转会市场上找一个后卫，而是决定修补他的体系，最后变为了存在着换位的3-4-3。

在这个体系中，后腰布斯克茨后撤，发挥一个后场自由人的功能，而两个中卫向两翼拉开。这也许是最复杂的防守结构之一，让每一个防守球员的长处得以发挥。就像一场国家德比中的评论员指出的那样：

“ 正当穆里尼奥认为他已经找到了所有的答案时，瓜迪奥拉换了问题！”

深入审视后腰布斯克茨：


左—巴萨的首发. 右 – 布斯克茨出现的位置热图.

热图向我们表明，尽管布斯克茨作为中前卫首发，但他在90分钟内都经常回撤，中卫向两边移动成为边卫。为了简化问题，我会使用下面的阵型图来说明：


左– 巴萨首发阵型. 右 – 换位后的巴萨阵型

因此，我们注意到随着布斯克茨的后撤，巴萨转换为了4-3-3，回到了原始的体系。

这就是这支球队流动性的体现，如果对手看上去将要突破防线，瓜迪奥拉可以很容易地改变体系，迅速变回3-4-3阵型。

（上面的阵容取自2-0战胜马洛卡的比赛）

全攻全守的思想根植于拉玛西亚之中。巴萨的黄金一代以及争议中的足球史上的黄金球队基于这种简单而又复杂的体系建队也有它自身的逻辑。而且对于佩普-瓜迪奥拉来说，这些球员都是你想怎么使用就可以怎么使用的，恰当地利用这些特性也刚好合适。

Alex2011

上文翻译中，欧觉得关于梅西那张图注释，译为“梅西——需要重新阐释的天才”，才够味！

Alex2011

瓜瓜跟传说中的“牛鼻子老道”堪有一比了

第一，将小马改造为中卫

第二，又将小法移植为上赛季梅西伪九号作掩护，梅西可以忽左忽右忽中

但是，欧总觉得，对小法使用是双刃剑，赛季初小法确实进球不少，可是现在呢虽然能够激活巴萨不够成形的三叉戟所带来的疲软有余的前场，但老是在进球上差那么一点点，而且作为中场人员在防守上还是不太给力的

最近首发两场比赛，对米兰对萨拉戈萨，就是很好说明例子，所以到下半场他总是被换下，对米兰被凯塔换下，对萨拉戈萨被哈维换下

而在西班牙队，尤其是10南非世界杯上，博斯克是将他作为阿隆索或者哈维替补派上用场的，决赛那场比赛他帮助小白打进绝杀球，就是很好的说明

乔治六世

不明白，老外为啥将阿比达尔称为“山顶洞人caveman”呢

Alex2011

Arsenal 1-0 Manchester City: City lose the midfield battle – and probably the title
April 9, 2012


The starting line-ups

Mikel Arteta’s long-range strike settled a match Arsenal could have won by more.

Arsene Wenger made one change from the side that lost to QPR last weekend. Aaron Ramsey, who looked uncomfortable out on the left in that match, was dropped and replaced by Yossi Benayoun, a player who more naturally drifts inside from the flank.

Roberto Mancini was without David Silva, so used Samir Nasri, James Milner, Sergio Aguero and Mario Balotelli, who almost always starts big games ahead of out-of-form Edin Dzeko. Pablo Zabaleta played at right-back, with Micah Richards on the bench.

Arsenal made this much harder work than it should have been – they hit the post, missed an open goal, had a goalbound shot by one of their own players. The win was never certain, but they were clearly the better side.

From the line-up, it could have been assumed that Manchester City were playing the 4-4-2ish shape they’ve played in most big Premier League games this season, with Balotelli upfront and Aguero behind. But instead, Mancini was being a little more cautious and seeking to match Arsenal in the centre of midfield. Nasri was the attacking midfieler, with Milner on the right and Balotelli high up on the left – the role he played away in Napoli, for example.

That was an attempt to compete in terms of possession. City enjoy more possession, on average, than any other Premier League throughout away games – but Arsenal have more than any side in home matches.

It didn’t remotely work, however, with Arsenal completely dominant in the opening stages, and prospered through the unlikely approach of hitting crosses into the box. Bacary Sagna got plenty of freedom out on the right, with Balotelli generally staying high up the pitch and not defending the left well (though when he did, his tackles were often reckless, so he was probably best off staying high up). A couple of Arsenal corners also threatened.


City's changes when Pizarro replaced Toure

Toure off, Pizarro on

The first half changed when Yaya Toure went off injured, and the obvious man to replace him was David Pizarro. He could quite easily have played the Toure role (or at least the Toure position – they’re clearly different players), but instead Mancini took the curious decision of playing him at the top of the midfield three. This meant that Nasri moved out to the right, Milner came inside to a left-centre position, and Barry became the right-centre midfielder. It caused mass disruption to the shape of the side, when it could have been quite a simple change.

But it helped City get some degree of control in the game. Pizarro didn’t look for space in between the lines like Nasri had in that position. He dropped deep and helped City retain the ball in midfield, with his reverse movement encouraging the likes of Milner and (to a lesser extent) Barry to move past him towards goal.

When Pizarro got the ball in deep positions, he played a couple of good long straight passes in behind the defence, trying to exploit the space in behind defence (due to their high defensive line). Wojciech Szczesny had to sweep.

However, City now had none of their midfielders or forwards in their favoured position. Nasri was right when he likes being central, Aguero alone upfront rather than with a partner. Balotelli prefers upfront to the left, Pizarro likes to be deeper, Milner likes to be more of an attacking player, while Barry is better on the left of the midfield two.

Playing Barry on that side of the pitch was probably because Tomas Rosicky was drifting there, with Yossi Benayoun moving inside from the flank into that zone. City had to be tight there, rather than on the other flank, where Theo Walcott was high up against Gael Clichy, with no midfield support needed.

Second half


City changed again for the second half

Mancini changed things in the second half. Pizarro dropped back to play as the deepest midfielder, with Barry to the left and Milner to the right. These two essentially played as blockers, looking to move up high and close down Alex Song and Mikel Arteta deep in the Arsenal midfield, giving space to Pizarro.

This worked reasonably well and City were OK at the start of the second half. Pizarro swept one wonderful ball out to Clichy on the left.

But the move affected City defensively. Pizarro is clearly not best as the primary holding player – he’s a fierce tackler but lacks the positional sense to play there, and isn’t particularly mobile. Arsenal started to get space between the lines, with Rosicky free in that zone. When he stayed there and drifted either side of Pizarro (rather than dropping deep into midfield), Arsenal created some decent opportunities.

The second result of Pizarro being brought deeper was Song’s role. He’d been fairly cautious in the first half and saw Nasri, then Pizarro, as his responsibility. But now City were 4-3-3 without a real attacking midfielder, so Song could be more of a playmaker. He drifted into a good position to play a (trademark?) chip over the top to Robin van Persie, and Arsenal hit the post. Later in the half he was found drifting out to the left wing, then into an attacking midfield role – pretty much anywhere where he could find space. He and both Rosicky were getting time on the ball, and now Arsenal were clearly dominating.

Mancini needed to make a change, and his first move was odd – Nasri off, Aleksander Kolarov on. City now moved to a 4-4-2ish shape, with Kolarov left, Milner right and Balotelli told to join Aguero upfront. Later, Carlos Tevez would replace Aguero in a straight swap.

But this was a game contested in midfield, and won in midfield. Having helped to stabilize City in the first half, Pizarro made a mistake to let Arsenal in for the winner. He lost the ball, Arteta got space in front of the defence, and thumped the ball in.

Conclusion

A disappointingly tame performance from City, in a game they really had to win. Mancini left Edin Dzeko on the bench for the entire game and Carlos Tevez only played five minutes while City struggled to create opportunities, which doesn’t help Mancini shake off his reputation as a defensive coach.

Mancini could quite rightly argue that City didn’t need another attacker on when they were struggling to compete in midfield, and that the obvious type of switch (Dzeko for Milner, say) would have furthered City’s problems in the centre. But they neither won the midfield duel nor offered a significant attacking threat on the break, and it wasn’t really clear what their gameplan was.

Arsenal started with their usual system and played it throughout the match. There was nothing particularly interesting tactically about their approach (although the use of Benayoun worked well, with Arsenal returning to the team they used against Tottenham), they rather just played their own game and let City struggle with the positional adjustments and unclear strategy.

Alex2011

898楼参考译文

Alex2011

898楼的zm文章题目很有趣，曼城这一场关键比赛中丧失中场战斗能力导致输球，就等于丧失了一度还有可能的英超冠军