11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

Alex2011

虽然欧冠上无所事事作徒劳公，可是范草包一回到联赛，先主场拔热刺，后客场绝杀射落红军鸟还是梅开二度，难道成了伊布二世，据说巴萨对他近期还含情脉脉的，这叫啥事呢？

Alex2011

切尔西客场 0-1 西布罗姆维奇：麦考利(82')进球

曼城 2-0 博尔顿 ：克利希(24')、巴洛特利(69')

Alex2011

截至27轮，

曼城27战21胜3平3负积66分，也就说81分中3负丢9分、3平丢6分；

曼联26战19胜4平3负积61分，少赛1场情况下暂时落后宿敌5分；

热刺26战16胜5平5负积53分，少赛1场暂时落后一曼13分、落后二曼8分；

看来，英超冠军之夺也差不多快成二人转了

Alex2011

截至27轮，

曼城27战21胜3平3负积66分，也就说81分中3负丢9分、3平丢6分；

曼联26战19胜4平3负积61分，少赛1场情况下暂时落后宿敌5分；

热刺26战16胜5平5负积53分，少赛1场暂时落后一曼13分、落后二曼8分；

看来，英超冠军之夺也差不多快成二人转了

只是昆在曼城还缺少些霸气，即使曼城本赛季夺冠，对他个人荣誉帮助并不会巨大的，他要做的是学学野兽霸气但不是厉气

Alex2011

范佩西是个好球员，但绝没有媒体吹的那么神乎其神，就好像我说阿奎罗在英超金靴榜上很难争赢他，

并不是昆实力在他之下， 而是阿森纳前场进攻是围绕范佩西来做文章的， 而曼城火力点显然更多，更分散而已。

范佩 ...
小豆丁梅西 发表于 2012-2-17 08:46

有眼光

昆还是缺少野兽那种霸气，前面那么好的禁区带球过人就在要进球时却被队友哲科抢功心切给毁了

而范佩西本轮又是2球进帐，在射手榜又拉大了与昆的距离

Rafael_Nadal

英超彻底堕落了，现在居然吹起范佩西来了

memes

831# Rafael_Nadal

要有点娱乐精神滴

看这里，范pussy 武林高手排名第三了，嘿嘿

http://bbs.zhibo8.cc/viewthread.php?tid=856378&extra=&page=2

Alex2011

Leverkusen focus attacks down the right
March 5, 2012


Leverkusen v Bayern

Bayer Leverkusen’s 2-0 win over Bayern Munich on Saturday was a devastating blow to Bayern’s hopes of winning the title – they’re now seven points behind Dortmund.

The game was evenly balanced, and could have gone either way. Bayern had more possession, Leverkusen broke quicker, and the sides had the same number of attempts. Robin Dutt can hardly take this as a brilliant tactical victory over Jupp Heynckes, but the nature of his side’s shape (whether deliberate or by accident) was interesting, because much of the home side’s play was concentrated down the right flank.

The diagram to the left shows the movement of each player. It was basically a 4-2-3-1 system, the formation Leverkusen have favoured for much of the season. Bayern also lined up 4-2-3-1, and it was a fairly standard tactical battle.

There were interesting nuances to the Leverkusen shape, though. First, in midfield they had Stefan Reinartz playing as the primary holding player. He is more naturally a defender, and so often dropped into the backline when Leverkusen played out from the back, turning them into a three-man defence. His partner in midfield was Lars Bender, a more energetic, vertical player who shuttled forward to help out the forwards.

There was also an imbalance on the flanks – Gonzalo Castro and Andre Schurrle played on either wing. Castro is comfortable as a midfielder but plays (slightly) more often as a right-back, while Schurrle is a converted forward and much more of an attacking player. Naturally, their movement was very different.

Using the Bundesliga’s chalkboards service, we can have a look at the lopsided nature of the side.
First, the full-backs. Left-back Michal Kadlec (24) stays in position on the left, while Daniel Schwaab (2) pushes higher up:



Next, the wingers. Castro (27) on the right plays a wider role, stretching the play – so most of his passes are knocked inside, or are crosses. Schurrle (9) on the left drifts infield immediately (despite having no overlapping full-back) and plays something of a hold-up role, with most passes being very short, backwards balls.



The midfield also contributed to the effect – while left-of-centre Reinartz sat deep…



…while right-of-centre Bender joined the attack, naturally more towards the right side.



The more attacking nature of the right flank meant that the two players on that flank completed significantly more passes than the two left-sided players (Schurrle was removed with eight minutes to go, but based upon his passes per minutes ratio, this cost him only two passes):



Then, finally, there was Stefan Kiessling upfront, who tended to drift to the right (with Schurrle providing support upfront to his left):



And this isn’t uncommon for Leverkusen, according to WhoScored – over the course of the season, they focus more of their passing down the right in general (on the left hand side below), and to an even greater extent at home (the right hand side below):



It seems unlikely that it’s a specific strategy by Dutt, but it demonstrates how a side’s approach can change naturally, depending upon the players used in each role. Both their goals against Bayern came after balls from the right flank into the penalty box.

Alex2011

833楼参考译文

Alex2011

德甲冠军之争，对于拜仁来说难度较大，阻击其的队伍还真不少

当然，多特蒙德自己就击败过拜仁的

pedro

Arsenal 3-0 Milan: Arsenal press excellently but lack options from the bench to maintain it
March 6, 2012


The starting line-ups

Arsenal got very close to the most remarkable two-legged turnaround in Champions League history.

Arsene Wenger named the logical side considering his injury problems – Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain played in midfield, Gervinho was on the left, but Wenger didn’t really have other options.

Max Allegri attacked, using Robinho and Stephan El Shaarawy in the front three. Djamel Mesbah played at left-back, with Urby Emanuelson ahead of him.

So near yet so far – Arsenal defended well throughout, attacked excellently at the start of the game, but fell away badly at the end.

Pressing

Arsenal pressed very well here, as heavily as they’ve done all season. Last season they did it brilliantly against Chelsea and Barcelona, while in 2011/12 they sit back more. But here, the wide forwards closed down full-backs and the midfield was energetic too.

Alex Song pushed high up the pitch and used his energy to pressure the Milan midfield (although he did leave gaps in behind), while Oxlade-Chamberlain dribbled with the ball and Tomas Rosicky also played in a quick, direct manner from the centre. This surprised Milan, and without Kevin-Prince Boateng bringing power and energy to the side without the ball, they got overrun in the middle. Robinho did little without the ball, and Mark van Bommel was seriously constrained by his booking in the first few minutes. Take out van Bommel’s ability to tackle (and his license to foul without fear of dismissal) and he is half the player.

Flanks

But despite the threat from the centre, what Arsenal did particularly well was to attack down the flanks, to get the ball out wide and run with the ball at the full-backs. That was what they strangely failed to do in the first leg (especially when Theo Walcott was removed at the break, and Aaron Ramsey came on down the right). Because of both shape and personnel, Milan are vulnerable at full-back, and with Mesbah making his European debut, he was the clear man to attack.

Sure enough, two of Arsenal’s goals came after attacking at speed down the right. Walcott’s run and cut-back fell to Rosicky for the second goal, while Oxlade-Chamberlain was brought down by Mesbah for the penalty for the third goal. Gervinho on the other flank didn’t contribute as much, though this may have been because Arsenal were focusing on the right (which was the correct strategy).

Allegri could have helped Mesbah out by bringing on another midfielder and getting Emanuelson to play in front of Mesbah – two banks of four seemed the more logical way to defend, but then Milan have defended with 4+3 for the entire campaign, and are more familiar playing that way.

Arsenal’s one problem was that they couldn’t actually cross the ball successfully, aside from the corner for Laurent Koscielny’s goal.



Milan blunt

Milan actually had good possession throughout the game, and completed more passes than Arsenal over 90 minutes. But Robinho is not a trequartista, at least not in this situation and with these players. Allegri loves Boateng because he has the energy to link midfield and attack and prevent Milan becoming a broken side – when he’s unavailable, Emanuelson often does a job there. Robinho ambled back, and Milan’s front three did the job of (at most) two players.

Arsenal also did very well to push their defence high up the pitch, in keeping with their pressing. This meant that Milan were frequently caught offside, although Arsenal’s closing down resulted in a lot of fouls.



Second half

It could have been different for Arsenal, had Robin van Persie not wasted a great chance midway through the half. But equally Antonio Nocerino missed a similar chance, and besides, the van Persie chance and the Gevinho effort that preceded it were the only two serious efforts Arsenal had in the second half.

Milan changed little – though were probably told to get their heads in shape by their coach at half time. However, they did sit a little deeper and were more compact from front to back – Arsenal got less space.

Tiredness

But having pressed so much at the start of the game, Arsenal were now exhausted. They desperately needed more energy from the bench to liven things up and increase the tempo, but as Wenger said after the game, he didn’t have any midfield options to introduce. Aaron Ramsey, Mikel Arteta, Jack Wilshere, Abou Diaby and Yossi Benayoun were all unavailable, and each would have been used in the second half.

Oxlade-Chamberlain got injured early on in the second period, and struggled on for an admirable period of time – but this just contributed to Arsenal’s lack of energy in the second half. It was unfortunate that both he and Walcott had to depart, because these were the two players offering the most pace with the ball, and most able to attack Mesbah.

Subs

The game was a good example of how throwing on more strikers doesn’t automatically lead to more of a goal threat. Maroune Chamakh and Park Chu-Young came on and played high up the pitch, but this allowed Milan more time on the ball in midfield, and they were actually the stronger side late on. It’s difficult to blame Wenger here – three of his available substitutes were defenders, another was a reserve goalkeeper.

However, at one point young attacking midfielder Oguzhan Ozyakup was getting ready to come on – but never appeared, and Wenger seemingly changed his mind. Whether he would have made a difference is debatable (ZM has never seen him play) but if he could run and press, he probably would have been more useful than two static strikers who contributed little.

Milan deserve some credit for their performance late on – Allegri brought on Alberto Aquilani for El Shaarawy, Emanuelson moved to the high tip of the diamond, and Milan were more compact and killed the game well in the second half – they completed much more passes than Arsenal did.



Conclusion

The preview to the tie mentioned “an interesting battle of very different styles”, and how it showed. Both sides were, at different times in this contest, both absolutely superb and dreadful beyond belief. When one got their gameplan right and played to their strengths, the other couldn’t cope. These are completely contrasting sides, which vaguely explains why we had two such extreme matches (with a large slice of pure freak football thrown into the mix).

Looking purely at the two results, the logical conclusion is that Milan maximised their period of dominance (the first leg) for longer. The truth is probably slightly different – Milan were able to fight back in the second half of the second leg and withstand pressure, whereas Arsenal never really got a grip of the away leg.

pedro

836楼参考译文

Alex2011

小老虎沃尔科特，下半场跑得一瘸一拐了

罗比鸟也是招招差半截

范佩西近在咫尺射门还能被阿比亚迪收在怀里，诺切诺里更邪门，只要轻推就能入网的射门也被斯切什尼没收

Alex2011

APOEL v Lyon a good example of when the away goals rule creates a defensive game
March 8, 2012


The starting line-ups

Despite the ultimately exciting method of victory, and the novelty of having a Cypriot club in the final eight of the European Cup, the APOEL v Lyon game was actually a dull spectacle.

This was true in both technical and tactical terms. Technically, the sides finished with fairly low pass completion rates (71% and 74%), and tactically neither changed much throughout the game. Even when it did look as if the coaches might shake things up, when APOEL coach Ivan Jovanovic switched from two strikers to one striker, and Lyon boss Remi Garde did the opposite at the same time, the sides continued to play in much the same manner.

The game had actually started in an exciting fashion, because the home side, in front of a very noisy crowd, needed a goal. They trailed 1-0 from the first leg, and therefore went into the game knowing that if they didn’t score in 90 minutes, they would be eliminated. As a result, they changed their system. This wasn’t the usual counter-attacking 4-2-3-1, and certainly not the defensive 4-1-4-1 they tried in the first leg, but instead featured two strikers for the first time in the competition, with Ailton dropped back behind another forward, Esteban Solari.

APOEL therefore took charge of the game – they needed to attack, be in command, and take the game to the opposition. When they pushed men forward, they would leave spaces at the back for Lyon counter-attacks. It might sound simple, but football needs at least one side to attack for there to be goals in a game, and in the second leg when one side often starts the game needing to score to prevent defeat, the games are generally more open than in the first leg.

As a result of APOEL’s determination, they made a flying start to the game – they went ahead within ten minutes, through Brazilian winger Manduca. But while this was a fine start to the game, the goal arrived too early as far as the spectacle was concerned. It meant that APOEL now had their goal, and they no longer needed to attack.

In fact, their priority was now defence. The tie was evenly-balanced at 1-1, but Lyon now had 80 minutes to get an away goal, which would then leave APOEL having to score twice. Lyon also had the 30 minute extra-time period, where there was the same situation. In short, after scoring after 10 minutes, APOEL now had to face 110 minutes of play where the negative value of a goal conceded significantly outweighed the positive value of a goal scored.

Lyon, on the other hand, had arrived to be patient. They didn’t play for a 0-0, but equally a 0-0 would have been an excellent result for them. As a result, their initial line-up was cautious, with Bafetimbi Gomis on the bench. This wasn’t an XI built for goals.

When they went behind, they had the opposite situation to APOEL. Logically, they’d be the more attacking side – but then they were away from home, and they’d started the game cautiously, and it’s difficult to break out of the shell.
Lyon were slightly more adventurous (hence the opposing nature of the two aforementioned substitutions), but we were basically treated to a 110-minute stand-off, where neither side showed enough determination to score. This is an unintended but problematic aspect of the away goals rule.

Arsene Wenger believes the rule should be scrapped. “The rule was created in the 1950s when teams went away from home, with no television, played with 10 defenders and kicked every ball into the stand,” Wenger says. “Now I believe that the tactical weight of the away goal has become too important. Teams get a 0-0 draw at home and they’re happy. Instead of having a positive effect it has been pushed too far tactically in the modern game. It has the opposite effect than it was supposed to have at the start – it favours defending well when you play at home.”

Alex2011

839楼参考译文

Alex2011

Manchester United 2-3 Athletic Bilbao: United unable to deal with pressing and high tempoMarch 8, 2012


The starting line-ups

Athletic produced an extremely impressive performance, and take a decent lead back to Bilbao.

Sir Alex Ferguson left out the likes of Rio Ferdinand, Paul Scholes, Michael Carrick and Danny Welbeck, and went with Javier Hernandez upfront, and a combination of Chris Smalling and Jonny Evans at the back.

Marcelo Bielsa was able to play his first-choice XI, with the exception of one position – Fernando Amorebieta was suspended, so Mikel San Jose started instead.

Athletic started brightly and were the better side throughout the game, dominating possession and creating more chances.

Formations

Bielsa, as we know, likes to maintain a spare man at the back. If United were playing a straight 4-4-2, Bielsa probably would have played three centre-backs instead of the extra central midfielder that featured here, but because United are actually more like 4-4-1-1, Bielsa could tell Ander Iturraspe to pick up Rooney, with the spare man retained at the back with 2 v 1 against Javier Hernandez.

United’s shape was as expected, though they used Ashley Young on the right and Park Ji-Sung on the left – both probably prefer the left, but since Young’s game is more based around the ball and therefore more highly influenced by which side of the pitch he plays on, it would probably have been better off the other way around. That said, Park is better defensively and Andoni Iraola is the better Athletic full-back, so the decision made sense in that respect.

Pressing

Athletic were highly flexible and versatile, and without the ball they pressed heavily from the front. Fernando Llorente was told to close down the two centre-backs, with the wide players rarely looking to close down the other centre-back to make it 2 v 2 high up, and instead focussing more on tracking United’s full-backs, who seldom managed to break forward unattended.

As seen in the game against Barcelona, Athletic want to practically man-mark the opposition all over the pitch, and this meant that Ander Herrera and Oscar De Marcos moved forward to shut down Phil Jones and Ryan Giggs, playing significantly in advance of Iturraspe. There was often a huge gap in front of Iturraspe, and although United didn’t have anyone to naturally exploit this space, they could have had more lateral movement off the flanks from Young and Park – they would have been tracked, but would have drawn their marker out of position.


Athletic's pressing system

The diagram to the right shows the simple (on paper) way Athletic pressed. Llorente had to cover two men in order to maintain the spare man at the other end of the pitch, but otherwise the wingers pressed full-backs, central midfielders were on central midfielders, and wing-backs on wide midfielders.

At the back the centre-backs took it in turns (though Javi Martinez did it more) to track Javier Hernandez out of the back very tightly, and the Mexican struggled with the physical attention. The other centre-back, usually San Jose, then became the sweeper.

Athletic attacks

But what Athletic did excellently here was with the ball, moving it quickly from player to player, but reasonably patiently when United had men behind the ball. The brilliance in their play comes from the change of tempo when they have the ball 30-40 yards from goal – it usually hinges upon a quick, direct run in behind an opponent from one of the wing-backs or central midfielders, often to create a one-two opportunity and get past an opponent.

The wing-backs were particularly important in Athletic’s play, because they stretched the play and provided attacking overlaps. They often moved so high up the pitch that they became part of the forward line, and neither Park nor Young wanted to move that deep. For Athletic’s first goal, both Iraola and Aurtenexte found got into the box – the away side simple overwhelmed United with numbers.

Passing

The passing wasn’t always particularly precise, but it was generally ambitious and forward-thinking, with the knowledge that if Athletic misplaced a pass and conceded possession, they would win the ball back quickly anyway.

There was an interesting approach to long balls. Bielsa had to wean Athletic off playing long, high balls towards Llorente at the start of the season, but they do still play direct balls for the wingers moving in behind the defence for (straightish) diagonal balls. In the first half, both Iker Muniain and Markel Susaeta had good chances in this fashion.

Llorente did a good job when he did get the ball, though, by holding it up and waiting for midfield runners. Smalling and Evans have the makings of a good partnership but are not yet comfortable against a big, strong number nine.

United were guilty of standing off high up the pitch. Athletic were telling the strikers to press, but Rooney was doing almost nothing without the ball, letting Iturraspe dictate the tempo and spread the play to the flanks. He was told to do more work in the second half, when United were chopping and changing in the midfield zone and trying to find more energy and mobility.

Phil Jones and Ryan Giggs struggled – Jones wasn’t good enough on the ball under pressure, and Giggs lacked the mobility and struggled with close attention in deep positions. Michael Carrick and Anderson ended up in that zone, and though Carrick did OK and stablised United, even he isn’t at his best under pressure.

There were so many chances in the game that the goals barely stood out amongst all the opportunites, but it was notable that United’s two goals came following a free-kick and a penalty – Athletic continue to lack discipline at the back. The away side’s major chances came when the wing-backs overloaded play, stretched the United defence and created gaps for onrushing midfielders to burst though. There could and should have been more goals, but Athletic fully merited the victory.

Conclusion

United knew what to expect from Athletic, but simply seemed unprepared for such heavy pressing. The midfield wasn’t mobile nor good enough on the ball, there was little rotation of positions or even particularly good movement, and when United did break through the centre, Hernandez was extremely wasteful in the box. He’s fallen out of favour dramatically recently, and Welbeck is the clear first choice upfront.

Athletic played (probably) their best game of the season, perfectly in keeping with Bielsa’s strategy and ideology. If they could play this way every week they’d be in La Liga’s top three, but it’s difficult to press with such energy every match.

Alex2011

841楼参考译文
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曼联2-3毕尔巴鄂战术分析：雄狮步步紧逼，红魔中场失势
2012-03-10 / 制霸中轴线

巴斯克雄狮的表现极其出彩，他们也带着一场胜利回到了毕尔巴鄂。
弗格森爵士并没有选择费迪南德、斯科尔斯、卡里克以及维尔贝克，小豌豆顶在最前面，斯莫林和埃文斯搭档中后卫。
贝尔萨排出了他最常规的首发十一人，只有一个例外——阿莫雷比埃塔停赛，圣何塞代替他首发。
毕巴开局很好，全场都是占优势的一方，他们保持了控球并且创造出了更多的机会。
阵型
如你所知，贝尔萨喜欢在防线上安置一名负责扫荡的自由人。如果曼联选用标准4-4-2，贝尔萨可能会排出三名中后卫，而不是像本场比赛一样设置一个后腰。但曼联的阵型更加类似于4-4-1-1，于是贝尔萨就安排伊图阿斯佩司职后腰盯防鲁尼，自由人则留在后场与中卫搭档一同对付小豌豆。
曼联的阵容和赛前估计的出入不大，但阿什利-扬出现在了右路而朴智星身居左路。两个人最擅长的位置应该都是左路，但扬有更多拿球的机会，是否出现在自己擅长的一边会对他的表现影响更大，所以让他打回左路似乎是更为明智的决定。考虑到朴智星防守端表现更好，而毕巴的右后卫伊劳拉攻击性更强，这个决定还是可以理解的。
压迫
毕巴打法灵活多变，无球时他们会展开前场紧逼。略伦特的任务是盯防曼联的两名中卫，毕巴的边路球员并没去帮助他压迫另一名中卫，他们在更多情况下压迫的是曼联的两个边后卫，这也减少了曼联的边后卫前插。
从毕巴对阵巴塞罗那的比赛中就可以看出，他们希望能在全场保持人盯人的防守，这意味着安德尔-埃雷拉和德马科斯压上对位菲尔-琼斯和吉格斯，他们的位置也明显要比伊图阿斯佩靠前。伊图阿斯佩身前有巨大的空当，曼联并没有任何人去利用这一空当，除此之外，红魔本还可以让扬和朴智星向两翼扯动，带走与他们对位的防守者——但曼联这一点也没能做到。

右侧的图以纸上淡兵的形式简单说明了毕巴的压迫战术。略伦特必须一个人对付两名中后卫，这样本队的后方才会有一个负责扫荡的自由人，除此之外皆是一一对应：边锋负责盯防边后卫、中前卫盯防中前卫、翼卫则盯防曼联的边前卫。
后场的两名中后卫轮流负责紧盯小豌豆（更多情况下是马丁内斯），让他远离禁区，墨西哥人因此受困身体对抗发挥欠佳。另一名中后卫（一般是圣何塞）则拖在后面变成了清道夫。
毕巴的进攻
毕巴有球时的表现异常出色，球员之间传递快速，但在前方有防守球员时则更为合理耐心。他们打法的精彩之处在于距离球门30-40码时节奏的变化——通常是一名翼卫或者中前卫突然前插到对位球员身后，这也创造出了通过二过一过掉防守者的机会。
两名翼卫对于毕巴的打法而言尤为关键，他们拉开宽度并且在进攻时套上。他们经常会压得非常靠上，以至于成为了攻击线的一部分，而朴智星和扬都不会回防到那么深。在毕巴的第一个进球中，伊劳拉和奥特内切都进入了禁区，这也让客队轻易占据了人数优势。
传球
毕巴的传球并不是永远精确，但往往犀利且攻击性十足——因为他们就算传丢丧失了控球，也能通过压迫快速赢回球权。
他们对于长传球的使用则很有趣。赛季初贝尔萨就要求球员们少给略伦特传长高球，但他们却经常通过斜长传找到向内游曳到防线身后边锋。上半场穆尼亚因和苏萨埃塔就通过这样的形式双双获得了机会。
略伦特拿球之后的表现很好，他会控住球并等待中场球员插上。斯莫林和埃文斯有成为优秀中卫搭档的潜力，但他们此刻还不太防得住一名高大强壮的九号中锋。
曼联的站位过于靠上，这也带来了问题。毕巴的前锋们都要进行紧逼压迫，但鲁尼无球时却几乎什么也没做，伊图阿斯佩得以从容观察局势并向两翼分球。当下半场曼联改变中场布局，试图获得更多的活力和能量时，伊图拉斯佩也被赋予了更多的使命。
菲尔-琼斯和吉格斯的中场搭档表现不佳。琼斯在有球时面对压迫的处理还不够好，吉格斯则受制于机动性，面对严密盯防时显得束手无策。卡里克和安德森替补上场接管了中场，尽管卡里克在压力之下并不在最佳状态，他还是做得不错，稳住了曼联的局势。
这场比赛之中的进球机会是如此之多，五粒进球也就不足为奇了。但曼联的两粒进球分别来自任意球和点球，由此可以看出毕巴的后防纪律性还是欠佳。客队主要通过翼卫插上形成人数优势进而创造机会，两边翼卫的插上拉开了曼联的防线，给中前卫们的前插提供了空间。巴斯克人本可以也应该获得更多的进球，但毕巴完全可以对这场胜利感到满意。
总结
曼联了解毕巴的打法，但面对高强度的压迫显得准备不足。红魔的中场机动性有限，有球时也不够好。主队在比赛中很少换位，也没有精彩的跑动，即使他们在中路形成了突破，禁区里的小豌豆也都把机会挥霍了。他最近的状态出奇的差，毫无疑问，维尔贝克才是锋线上的第一选择。
毕巴踢出了他们赛季最好的一场球，完美的实现了贝尔萨的战略理念。如果他们每周都有如此表现，那他们将能跻身西甲前三，但他们很难每场比赛都保持这样的高强度压迫。

Alex2011

Five areas of interest in Everton 1-0 Tottenham
March 12, 2012


The starting line-ups

This was another interesting clash between David Moyes and Harry Redknapp. Their tactical battle at White Hart Lane last season was fascinating, and this game followed a similar pattern of Moyes responding to Redknapp’s decisions.

I’ve written about the difference between the two over at the Guardian, using the battle between Gareth Bale and Seamus Coleman to sum up the two managers’ styles.

1. Bale v Coleman

That battle was the first area of interest. Coleman teamed up with Phil Neville to double-mark Bale out of the game at White Hart Lane last year, and had expected to do the same here.

But Bale, as part of a continued experiment to put him in different positions to vary his game, started on the right. That meant that Coleman moved across to the other flank too, with Royston Drenthe moving from the left to the the right accordingly. Bale had a disappointing game, and Coleman found it easier to close down the space. Bale was always looking to come inside, so Coleman could stay relatively central and show him down the line, where the Welshman found it difficult to cross with his right foot, or with the outside of his left.

Bale needed more support from Kyle Walker – on one of the few occasions he did overlap, Coleman got dragged to the flank and Bale could come in and shoot, albeit poorly.

Eventually Bale moved to the left in the second half, and Coleman was happy to follow back to his natural side.

2. Tottenham use 4-4-2 again

It didn’t work against Manchester United, nor against Arsenal, but Redknapp again went with two strikers. It looked particularly bad here – neither Jermain Defoe nor Emmanuel Adebayor dropped off onto Everton’s holding player to prevent Spurs getting overrun in the middle, and there was also a big gap between the lines of midfield and attack.

That was due to the unusual nature of the midfield – Luka Modric on the left, coming inside into the centre. Bale was stranded out on the right with two men on him, and the strikers got little support.

Tottenham have generally made their 4-4-2 work when playing quickly and directly down the flanks, but here that wasn’t much of an option.

3. Parker – Sandro

The use of this duo is probably intended to give Spurs more protection, but it seems to do the opposite. When Redknapp introduced Sandro as an extra holding player against Arsenal, it backfired spectacularly and turned a 2-2 into a 5-2. Here, Spurs were remarkably open in the space between the lines that they were presumably trying to protect.

It’s not clear which of Parker and Sandro is meant to be sitting deeper, and which playing higher up. They’re entitled to take it in turns, of course, but that relies on a good understanding which is plainly not there – not yet, at least.

4. Leon Osman

To describe Osman as underrated would be unfair – few regular Premier League watchers don’t rate him. His use of the ball and appreciation of space is excellent, and he popped up in a good position to create the goal for Nikica Jelavic.

His running from deep was extremely impressive, because it was he, rather than the more naturally placed Tim Cahill, who exploited the gap between the Tottenham lines. Cahill generally motored forward high up against the Tottenham defence, meaning neither could come out to any further midfield runners, and Osman sneaked into space behind Parker to great effect.

5. Everton move to a back five

Late on, Tottenham were piling on the pressure, and Moyes introduced an extra defender – Phil Jagielka for Coleman. Initially it seemed that Neville would sit ahead of Jagielka on the right, but by the end of the game Jagielka was simply an extra centre-back, with Neville continuing at right-back in a 5-4-1.

Alex2011

843楼参考译文
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ZM战术板：埃弗顿1-0热刺中的5个战术亮点

2012-03-14 / 薛定谔的猫




这是莫耶斯和老雷之间又一次的激情碰撞。他们上赛季在白鹿巷的战术交锋仍然历历在目，而本场比赛继续延续了莫耶斯的“过墙梯”VS老雷的“张良计”这一套路。

1.贝尔VS科尔曼
两人之间的对抗是本场比赛的首个亮点。科尔曼去年在白鹿巷联手菲利普内维尔将贝尔牢牢盯死，让大圣整场比赛碌碌无为，而本场比赛科尔曼也寄希望复制去年的辉煌。
但作为不断尝试场上不同位置来拓宽自身球路的实验的一部分，贝尔本场比赛在右边路首发。这就意味着科尔曼也需要调换到另外一个边路去，并且相应的让德伦特从左边路换到右边路去。贝尔本场比赛表现不佳，正因为科尔曼轻松的限制了他的活动空间。贝尔经常试图内切，于是科尔曼只需要站在相对中间的位置任由贝尔下底——威尔士小伙用右脚或左脚外侧的传中简直惨不忍睹。
贝尔需要沃克从身后更多的支持——后者本场比赛仅有为数不多的向前套边，将科尔曼拉向边路并让贝尔能够内切射门，当然准星欠佳。
最终贝尔下半场换到了左路，而科尔曼也很开心的跟着他回到了自己熟悉的位置。

2.热刺再次祭出4-4-2阵型
虽然在对阵曼联和对阵阿森纳时都不怎么管用，但老雷再一次摆出了双前锋阵型。本场比赛这个安排看起来尤其糟糕——迪福或者阿德巴约都没能吸引埃弗顿的后腰来避免热刺在中场处于劣势，同时在锋线和中场缺乏衔接基本脱节。
这个也归结于热刺中场们都站在自己不熟悉的位置上——摩德里奇在左边路，需要向中路移动。贝尔则在右边路与两名盯防他的队员纠缠难以脱身，于是前锋得不到中场的支持。
当球队攻防节奏较快并且两边路直接下底的时候，热刺的4-4-2通常能够发挥威力，但本场比赛显然不是这么一回事。

3.帕克-桑德罗
本场比赛使用这套“二人转”本意可能是希望给热刺中后场更多的保护，但看起来似乎适得其反。当对阵阿森纳时，老雷将桑德罗作为额外一名后腰使用时，场面意外的适得其反并且导致一个2-2的平局直接被改写成5-2惨败。这次，热刺则明显的在中后场两条线之间将他们本应该保护的区域打开。
帕克和桑德罗之间，谁应该回撤保护，谁应该上前逼抢，都不是很明确。当然，他们理应轮流“上前-回撤”，但这是基于一个良好的相互理解上的，而他们没有——至少，到目前为止，没有。

4.莱昂-奥斯曼
将奥斯曼描述成被低估的球员显然不公平——没有几个英超达人不评论他。他对球的处理以及对空间的利用是出色地，而正是他在很好的一个位置插入并创造了耶拉维奇的进球。
他的后插上给人印象非常深刻，因为是他，而不是站在自己习惯位置的卡希尔，发现了热刺中后场两条线之间的空位。卡希尔像往常一样快速前压，意味着热刺的中卫无暇应付其他前插的埃弗顿中场，而奥斯曼则抓住帕克身后的空当偷袭得手。

5.埃弗顿变成5后卫
随着比赛的进行，热刺开始不断增加进攻压力，而莫耶斯也多换上一名防守队员——贾吉尔卡替换科尔曼。最初看起来似乎是内维尔前移而贾吉尔卡踢右边后卫，但到比赛的最后，贾吉尔卡则成了5-4-1阵型中另外一名中后卫，而内维尔继续充当右边卫。

pedro

Bayern 7-0 Basel: Basel’s brave strategy vaguely logical, but their application of it disastrous
March 13, 2012


The starting line-ups

Bayern stormed into the quarter-final after a comfortable victory.

Jupp Heynckes decided Bastian Schweinsteiger wasn’t fit enough to start – he was on the bench. Luiz Gustavo played in the middle with Toni Kroos ahead, Philipp Lahm switched to right-back, with David Alaba on the left.

Heiko Vogel made one change from the first leg, bringing in Cabral for Benjamin Huggel, so Basel were back to the XI that beat Manchester United last year.

Basel started off pressing high in the first five minutes, but then retreated into a deep shape with two banks of four behind the ball.

Basel leave two up

The final scoreline makes Vogel’s tactics look ridiculous, but there was some level of logic to his decisions here. The most notable feature of the first half was that Basel left both strikers high up the pitch. Marco Streller played upfront, and Alexander Frei drifted off, often to the left.

Usually, a manager would instruct one of the strikers to drop into the midfield onto Gustavo to help Basel out when they didn’t have the ball. Vogel didn’t bother, however, which meant the two Bayern holders had all the time on the ball they liked to dominate possession after Basel’s initial press had died down.

However, it did make some kind of sense. Basel wanted to play quickly on the break, and by leaving two strikers up, they could clear the ball downfield and get a 2 v 2 situation at the back. A couple of times towards the end of the first half, they created decent half-chances. The downside was that Bayern would dominate the ball, but then Vogel would have accepted that before the game anyway.

Defensively, the problem wasn’t the formation, but the fact the centre-backs both had awful games, and Bayern’s wingers were on fire. Some defences can defend more than capably with four players in front protecting them, but Basel let Mario Gomez have countless opportunities.

The problem offensively was the transitions from defence to attack. It’s reasonable to play two men high up the pitch and ask Fabian Frei and Xherdan Shaqiri to carry the ball when Basel broke up moves – that’s their natural game – but neither did so well, and Basel’s first pass out of defence was very poor and handed possession back to Bayern.

Bayern wide players

Franck Ribery and Arjen Robben were fantastic. Robben’s display was more impressive, because he drove Bayern forward when the score was 0-0 and 1-0, whereas Ribery did much of his good work at 3-0 and 4-0.

Robben’s positioning here was excellent. Often he stays wide, hugs the touchline to get space to receive the ball, then ducks inside and dribbles from there. He, here started much narrower and essentially played between four Basel players – Lee, Dragovic, Frei and Xhaka. When Basel pushed men forward, he reverted to being a traditional winger.

Part of Basel’s problem was that Fabian Frei had been told to help out Lee and double up, but Robben’s highness and narrowness made this difficult – Frei then played very narrow on the left himself, which simply opened up space for Lahm to motor into (although this did open up space for Alexander Frei higher up).



Robben’s movement was excellent, and varied. He could come inside into a number ten position, or burst between Dragovic and Lee to get in behind to pick up through-balls. This was where Basel’s numerical disadvantage in midfield did come into play, as they often couldn’t close down Kroos without opening up space elsewhere.

Ribery and Gomez looked great once Bayern were in control, but Robben was the man who gave them that control.



Conclusion

Bayern were excellent at times – brave enough to keep four men upfront at times, and also in leaving 2 v 2 at the back. They enjoyed the freedom of the midfield, and spread the ball intelligently from side to side.

Vogel’s overall approach wasn’t as ludicrous as the result makes it seem – but Basel’s penalty box defending was terrible, and the poor transitions meant the ball kept coming back at them. That’s a combination ripe for a thrashing.

Referring to Bayern’s 7-1 win over Hoffenheim at the weekend, Vogel said: “The margin of victory does not impress me. I have absolutely no fear that Bayern will score seven goals in one game [against us].” Oh dear…

pedro

845楼参考译文

pedro

Chelsea 4-1 Napoli: Napoli unable to defend crosses
March 15, 2012


The starting line-ups

Chelsea produced an impressive display to qualify for the Champions League quarter-finals.

Roberto Di Matteo chose a rough 4-2-3-1 system, with Daniel Sturridge wide on the right, and Ramires tucked in on the left.
Walter Mazzarri named his expected side – Juan Zuniga in ahead of Andrea Dossena was the only small debate in his selection. Zuniga got the nod, but then had to move to the right once Christian Maggio picked up an injury, and Dossena came on down the left.

This was an entertaining game with either side being ‘ahead’ in the tie at two separate points – Chelsea came out on top, though it wasn’t a particularly enthralling tactical battle.

Napoli leave two up

The major point of interest in the first half was that Napoli left both Ezequiel Lavezzi and Edinson Cavani very high up the pitch, in a sense replicating the tactics used by Basel last night at Bayern, but also continuing the strategy from the first leg, where Lavezzi played very high up and exploited the space in behind Branislav Ivanovic.

But Lavezzi often remained quite central when Chelsea had the ball – as did Cavani. There was no attempt for Napoli to retreat into the 5-4-1 shape they often form without the ball, presumably as they wanted to offer a continued attacking threat.

To a certain extent they did – Napoli broke well in the first half, although their decision-making in the opposition half was often poor, and a couple of sloppy passes let them down.

But further back it caused problems. Marek Hamsik dropped deep and played as an extra midfielder, but on the opposite flank Napoli had little protection, with Walter Gargano forced to move across to that side. If he couldn’t, then the wing-back would move up the pitch and deal with the danger, and the relevant centre-back would move across into the full-back position. In theory that worked OK, but Napoli were terrible at putting pressure upon the man with the ball in the wide zones. The first goal, for example, came when Ramires was given all the time in the world to put a cross into the box, and Didier Drogba was exactly the man to thrive on this opportunity.



Napoli won 6-3 at the weekend against Cagliari, but all three goals they conceded were headers scored by Joaquin Larrivey, a basic number nine – this is suddenly something they’re vulnerable to (which is bizarre considering their system, which features three centre-backs and decent width on both sides). Morgan De Sanctis also flapped at an early corner, indicating he wasn’t happy with the ball being delivered from wide either.

But the problem continued, with John Terry completely free to head in at the start of the second from a corner. Even the corner had been conceded when Hugo Campagnaro headed behind under no pressure, suggesting poor communication – then from the corner, Gokhan Inler’s marking was non-existent. Lampard’s third came from a penalty, conceded after yet more poor marking from a corner.

Despite this clear weakness and Chelsea taking advantage, the home side weren’t doing their best to exploit the problems. Di Matteo persisted with right-footed Ramires on the left (granted, he provided the assist for the goal, but he’s hardly a classic winger, and certainly not on the left) and Sturridge on the right. Even more strangely, Fernando Torres replaced Sturridge later on, and started off playing on the right – again, he wasn’t likely to provide good service for Drogba.

It took until extra time for Di Matteo to realise the potential. He removed Juan Mata, who had been quiet, and introduced a player comfortable playing down the left, Florent Malouda. Ramires went to the right, and Torres went upfront. 4-4-2. Now Chelsea had two players in more comfortable wide roles, and two strikers in the box to get on the end of crosses. Chelsea were now more direct – see De Sanctis’ error for Torres’ missed open goal (from a narrow angle).

Eventually the fourth did come from a cross, of sorts. The combination of Drogba and Ivanovic wasn’t what the formation had intended, but the move did come after Ramires went down the outside on the right.



Other features

The game wasn’t all about Chelsea delivery from wide areas, of course. Napoli were surprisingly shapeless throughout the game, particularly in extra time when they seemed to tire quickly. Inler’s goal was excellent, but he gave the ball away too often, both with passes and failed dribbles. Walter Gargano was also disappointing, with a pass completion rate down at 67% compared to his usual 82%, although he would argue that his job was to prompt quick attacks with direct passes.

Chelsea did all the physical aspects of the game well – they won over two-thirds of the aerial duels, Ramires provided great energy from midfield and continued driving well into extra-time, and the substitutes gave them more freshness – Napoli’s two (tactical) changes came in extra-time when Chelsea were sitting deep behind the ball, and they didn’t enjoy the benefit of fresh legs.

Conclusion

Napoli broke well in the first quarter of an hour, but even then they didn’t look at their best with the ball. They needed to score in that period, because the constant balls into the box from Chelsea were defended terribly, and the limitations of three fairly average centre-backs (with the slight exception of Paolo Cannavaro) were highlighted. These are midtable Serie A players competing in the knockout round of the Champions League, and unfortunately they weren’t up to scratch. Like Basel, their gameplan depended upon sitting deep then breaking – but you have to be able to deal with the constant pressure, and defend the penalty box well.

However, Drogba was excellent. This was the old-style Drogba – the target of route one balls and crosses compared to the neater, tidier link-up man Andre Villas-Boas wanted:

pedro

847楼参考译文
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切尔西4-1那不勒斯战术分析：魔兽雄霸禁区，蓝军传中逞威
2012-03-16 / baiy07

切尔西打出令人难忘的表现从而晋级欧冠八强。

迪马特奥选用了一个肌肉流4-2-3-1体系，斯图里奇在右边路，拉米雷斯进入阵容左路。

马扎里祭出了他理想中的阵容——替代多塞纳的祖尼加是唯一一个值得商榷的首发人选。最终祖尼加入选，但当马乔受伤下场后他不得不去到右路，多塞纳入替来到左路。

这是一场有趣的比赛，两方都曾在比赛的不同时刻在总比分上获得领先——最终切尔西获胜，但这并不是一场在战术对决上特别引人入胜的比赛。

那不勒斯的前场两人压得很靠前

上半场的主要看点在于那不勒斯让拉维奇和卡瓦尼都压得很靠上，这复制了前一晚巴塞尔对阵拜仁时的战术。但那不勒斯也继续了第一回合所采取的策略，拉维奇顶在前面，试图利用伊万诺维奇身后的空间。

但当切尔西控球时，拉维奇经常站得太靠中路了——卡瓦尼也是一样。在无球时那不勒斯并没有回撤组成他们经常采用的5-4-1阵型，这大概是由于他们想给对方持续的进攻威胁。

在某种程度上来说他们也确实制造了持续的威胁——上半场那不勒斯的反击犀利，然而在下半场他们处理球的决定经常很糟糕，而且一大堆传球失误让他们士气受损。

然而这种布置在后场就产生了问题。哈姆希克回撤很深，踢得像一个中场，但在另一条边路那不勒斯几乎没有保护，使得加尔加诺不得不横向跑动去提供保护。如果他不这么做，翼卫就必须上抢应对威胁，这样一来相应的中卫就得去保护边后卫的位置。理论上这样做没问题，但那不勒斯在边路区域对持球人的压迫做得很糟糕。例如第一个进球，拉米雷斯有大把大把的时间来传中，而德罗巴是把握这种机会的最佳人选。

那不勒斯在周末以6-3战胜卡利亚里，但他们的三个失球都是被一个传统的九号球员华金-拉里维用头球打进的——这突然变成了他们的软肋（考虑到他们的体系有3个中卫并且在两个边路都很强，这一点让人感到奇怪）。

然而这个问题仍在持续，特里在下半场开始阶段接到角球传球，在无人盯防的情况下头球破门。角球机会来源于坎帕尼亚罗在无压迫的情况下将球顶出底线，这意味着那不勒斯队员相互沟通糟糕——然后角球开出后因勒也没有盯人。兰帕德的第三个进球是是个点球，仍然是来源于角球发出后的盯人不紧。

尽管那不勒斯有这个明显的弱点而且切尔西也用它获利了，但主队并没有完全地打爆这一点。迪马特奥坚持让右脚选手拉米雷斯出现在左路（坦白讲，他是助攻了一球，但他并不是一个传统边翼，显然更不是在左路），而让斯图里奇在左。更奇怪的是，托雷斯随后替下斯图里奇并开始在右路活动——又一次，他不可能给德罗巴提供什么帮助。

直到加时赛迪马特奥才意识到他的队伍还有多大潜力可挖。他换下了表现安静的马塔，换上了习惯在左路活动的马卢达。拉米雷斯去到右路，托雷斯顶在前面打4-4-2.这时切尔西有两个球员出现在他们习惯的边路，有两个射手在禁区里随时等待传中。切尔西踢得更直接了——看看因德桑克蒂斯失误而导致的托雷斯空门不进吧（小角度射门）。（译注：托雷斯无法摆脱被黑的命运）
最后的第四个进球也可以说来源于某种传中。德罗巴和伊万诺维奇之间的连接并不是这个阵型本来的意思，但当拉米雷斯在右边路外侧拿球后，这样的跑位确实发生了。

其他因素

当然，这场比赛也不全是切尔西在边路的各种传中。令人惊讶的是那不勒斯在整场比赛中阵型都很松散，特别是加时赛时，他们看起来很快就疲劳了。因勒的进球很精彩，但他太容易丢球了，不管是传球还是带球。加尔加诺的表现也令人失望，传球成功率由平时的82%降为67%，尽管他可以辩解说他的工作是传出直塞球来发动快攻。

切尔西的对抗做得很好——他们赢下了超过三分之二的高球争顶，拉米雷斯为中场提供了很多能量，在加时赛里也不知疲倦，替补们也提供了很多活力——那不勒斯的两个调整（战术性的）出现在加时赛，当时切尔西已经回撤很深了，他们的替补没能发挥什么作用。

结论

那不勒斯在前45分钟里的反击很犀利，但即使如此他们也没有做到最好。他们需要在那时得分，因为切尔西边路持续不断的传中防守起来会很困难，而且放大了三个能力较为平庸的中卫（小卡纳瓦罗稍好一些）的局限性。在冠军联赛淘汰赛的舞台上，他们算是意甲里能力较为一般的球员，很遗憾他们没能达到这个标准。就像巴塞尔，他们的比赛计划本来是摆铁桶并伺机反击——但你必须能抵挡住对手持续的压力，把禁区保护好。

但德罗巴是非常出色的。这是传统的德罗巴——那个输送皮球和传中的目标，而不是博阿斯希望的那个细腻优雅的串联者：

pedro

拿波里出局令人遗憾，不过主帅临场指挥在下半场后半段有很大问题，加时赛几乎是放弃感觉了

pedro

从客场2-0到2-1是个小转折，但到吃点球比分变成3-1时，教练和队员都乱了方寸