11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

Alex2011

Napoli 3-1 Chelsea: Ivanovic plays high up and Napoli exploit the space in behind him拿波里3-1切尔西: 伊万诺维奇压上留空档，主队就此打身后结合部
February 22, 2012


The starting line-ups

Napoli played their classic counter-attacking game to put themselves in a strong position going into the second leg.

Walter Mazzarri was suspended from the touchline, so assistant Nicolo Frustalupi took charge. Morgan De Sanctis returned in goal, Hugo Campagnaro was fit to start, and Juan Zuniga was picked rather than Andrea Dossena on the left.

Andre Villas-Boas left out Frank Lampard and Ashley Cole, though the latter replaced Jose Bosingwa early on at left-back. Florent Malouda got a surprise start (though he has played the majority) of games in Europe this season. As expected, Didier Drogba played rather than Fernando Torres, while John Terry was out.

Formations

The use of Malouda meant Chelsea could play either a 4-3-3 or a 4-2-3-1. Malouda has sometimes played in the midfield three with Juan Mata out on the left – away at Norwich, for example. But the line-up hinted at a 4-2-3-1 with Malouda left and Mata centrally (Malouda rather than Lampard starting), and that’s the way Chelsea lined up.

The formation probably played into Napoli’s hands, and made the basic tactical battle much less exciting. 3 v 3 at the back for Napoli would have been interesting, but because Chelsea played a 4-2-3-1 and defended with two banks of four, they often looked like 4-4-1-1 without the ball. As a result, Napoli’s midfielders could largely leave Mata to the back three, and it was a simply 3 v 2 situation at the back. With 4 v 4 in midfield and 4 v 3 for Chelsea at the back, the formations were evenly-balanced.

Ivanovic v Lavezzi and Cavani

The game was a clear clash of styles, but the key was a battle in the Chelsea right-back zone. Branislav Ivanovic played an extremely attacking role, pushing very high on the right to allow Daniel Sturridge inside. He saw a lot of the ball, attempting 53 passes (compared to Cole and Bosingwa’s combined 35), but crucially, Ezequiel Lavezzi didn’t track him back all the way. With Napoli’s wing-backs retreating back to form a back five, and the home side playing seven players in predominantly defensive roles, Lavezzi could afford to stay high up the pitch and break into the space Ivanovic had vacated. Furthermore, Edinson Cavani made lots of runs into the left channel, which meant he and Lavezzi overloaded Gary Cahill.

Napoli started very direct and hit lots of long balls from deep into the space between Ivanovic and Cahill, with Lavezzi chasing a long Paolo Cannavaro ball in the first five minutes. That was a warning sign, and there no fewer than seven further crucial incidents that involved Cavani or Lavezzi getting space in behind Ivanovic, or between Ivanovic and Cahill:

10 mins Lavezzi drifted inside, Cavani moved to the left. Gokhan Inler hit a diagonal ball out to Cavani, who brought the ball down well for a one-on-one, and had a shot saved well by Petr Cech’s foot.

38 mins A slightly different scenario – Cavani moves left, then makes a run to take Ivanovic away – Lavezzi cuts inside and scores the first goal.

45 mins Cavani makes a run in behind Ivanovic, gets to Inler’s diagonal ball and turns the ball in for the second.

54 mins Ivanovic is on the halfway line as Napoli break quickly – Cahill is dragged towards Cavani in the centre, Lavezzi is all alone with a great chance to make it 3-1, but fires his shot wide of Cech’s left-hand post.

57 mins Ivanovic is caught high up the pitch at a transition, Napoli break through Lavezzi, and Cahill collects a yellow card after fouling him.

65 mins David Luiz defends poorly and is beaten to the ball by Cavani, but on the opposite flank Ivanovic (again defending much higher than the rest of the back four) allows Lavezzi to sprint past him for an open goal.

80 mins Ivanovic is again too high up the pitch and takes too long to get back and defend a Napoli attack – Marek Hamsik gets space on the left, squares the ball for Christian Maggio, and Cole clears off the line.
All these incidents can be viewed here

Things got better for Chelsea after 74 minutes, when the exhausted Lavezzi was taken off, with Blerim Džemaili replacing him, and playing more as a midfielder than a winger.

It was telling that Napoli created more chances by playing the ball to a position to the left of the pitch:



And maybe also relevant that they made very few interceptions on the right, with Lavezzi able to collect the ball on that flank from very straight passes:



There were, of course, other factors in the game. Chelsea left too many spaces at the back in general, and playing a double pivot of two shuttling players was a surprising move that meant little structure in midfield. The away side were always likely to be vulnerable to quick breaks, but it was amazing how often they were exposed in the same zone of the pitch.

Conclusion

Chelsea basically played the way Napoli would have wanted – they didn’t give them a numerical problem at the back, they committed too many men forward at 0-0 and 0-1 when they should have been patient to prevent Napoli breaking, and they also conceded too many free-kicks – 18 compared to Napoli’s 7.

But the main issue was at right-back, the position Chelsea have struggled in for years. Ivanovic is meant to be the best defensive option there, as a converted centre-back – but whether because of managerial instructions or his own poor positioning, he may have cost Chelsea the tie.

Alex2011

801楼参考译文
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那不勒斯3-1切尔西：伊万压太上，空当被利用

2012-02-23 / maryantonia


两队首发阵容

那不勒斯采取了他们经典的防守反击战术，在进入第二回合之前稳稳占得先机。

由于那不勒斯主帅瓦尔特-马扎里被禁赛，助理教练弗鲁斯塔卢皮代理指挥任务。守门员德桑蒂斯复出，坎帕尼亚罗也回到了首发阵容，而祖尼加代替多塞纳出现在左路。

博阿斯则把兰帕德和阿什利-科尔都放在板凳上，不过后者很早就替下了受伤的博辛瓦打左后卫。马卢达首次出现在欧战首发阵容里倒让人有些讶异（虽然他也参加了大部分比赛）。众望所归的德罗巴取代了托雷斯，而特里缺阵了本场比赛。

排兵布阵

派上马卢达意味着切尔西可以打4-3-3，也可以打4-2-3-1。马卢达有时候跟位于左路的马塔一起组成中场三人组——比如客场对阵诺维奇的时候。不过当马卢达（代替兰帕德出现在首发里）位于左路而马塔在中路的时候，这就意味着球队的阵型是4-2-3-1，而切尔西在场上摆出的正是这个阵型。

不过切尔西如此排兵布阵正中那不勒斯下怀，这使得基本的战术对抗少了很多看点。那不勒斯后场的3对3格局本是看点之一，但由于切尔西排的是4-2-3-1，防守时站成两排4人阵线，因而他们在无球时看起来更像是4-4-1-1。于是那不勒斯的中场可以很放心地把马塔留给自己的后场三人组，反正最多也就是3对2的情况。中场4对4，切尔西的后场则是4对3，这样从阵型上看双方处于均势局面。

伊万诺维奇vs拉维奇和卡瓦尼

本场比赛显然是不同风格的对碰，不过比赛的关键在于切尔西右后卫区域的攻防。伊万诺维奇扮演攻击角色太过彻底，他在右路推得相当靠前，让斯图里奇可以内切。伊万拿球很多，有53脚传球（科尔和博辛瓦加起来才35脚），但问题的关键在于，拉维奇并没有一直跟防他回到本方后场。由于那不勒斯的翼卫回撤到后方形成五人防线，而主队主守任务的球员也达到了七名，于是拉维奇可以留在前场，利用伊万留下的空档伺机反击。而且，卡瓦尼也频繁地跑到左路——这样他和拉维奇一起出现在这片区域，使得卡希尔难以招架。

那不勒斯的打法非常直接，从后场直接长传到伊万和卡希尔之间的空档，比赛刚开始五分钟，拉维奇就已经接到了一个来自小卡纳瓦罗的长传球。这其实是一个警示的讯号，在接下来的比赛中，卡瓦尼或者拉维奇插入伊万身后、或者伊万和卡希尔之间的空隙而造成的险情不下七次：

第10分钟，拉维奇移到中路而卡瓦尼拉到左路。因勒斜传给卡瓦尼，后者随即带球前突形成单刀机会，结果被切赫用脚挡出。

第38分钟，情况稍有不同——卡瓦尼移到左路，然后通过跑动引开伊万——于是拉维奇内切打入第一个进球。

第45分钟，卡瓦尼在伊万身后前插，接到因勒的斜传打入那不勒斯的第二球。

第54分钟，那不勒斯快速反击，伊万此时位于中线附近——卡希尔在中路防守卡瓦尼，无人盯防的拉维奇本可以把比分改写成3-1，但他的射门偏出了切赫左侧的立柱。

第57分钟，伊万在攻防转换的时候又过于靠上，那不勒斯由拉维奇发动反击，卡希尔不得不对他犯规，而吃到黄牌。

第65分钟，大卫-鲁伊兹糟糕的防守让球被卡瓦尼抢走，但是另一侧的伊万（比起其他三人的位置，他又太靠前了）又让拉维奇冲刺越过了自己打空门得手。

第80分钟，伊万再次因过于压上而来不及回防那不勒斯的反击——哈姆西克在左路得到空间，将球横传给马乔，不过科尔将球破坏出了边线。

这些都可以从这里看到。

精疲力竭的拉维奇在第74分钟被换下场后，切尔西的情况有所好转——替换拉维奇的是泽梅利，后者的作用更多地是一名中场而不是边锋。

从下图可以看出，那不勒斯在球场的左路创造出了更多的机会：



也可以这么说，切尔西在右路几乎不做什么拦截，边上的拉维奇直接就可以接到传球：



当然，还有其他影响比赛的因素。但整体而言，切尔西在后场留下了太多空间，而让两名以往返奔波为特点的球员组成双后腰也让人诧异，这意味着中场无法建立起架构来。客队在面对快速反击时总是显得很脆弱，但令人吃惊的是，他们在同一片区域了暴露出问题的次数也太过于频繁了。


结论
切尔西的打法正是那不勒斯想要的那种——他们在后场并没有形成人数上的优势，而在0-0和0-1的时候本应该耐心防备那不勒斯的反击，结果他们却让过多的球员继续压上进攻，而且，他们还给了对方太多的任意球——有18个之多，而那不勒斯只给了对手7个。

但是主要问题仍然出在右后卫，这也是切尔西近几年来一直很头疼的位置。伊万被认为是这个位置最好的人选，他还是中后卫出身——然而，本场比赛他或许会葬送切尔西晋级的机会——要么是由于主帅的指示，要么是由于他自己糟糕的位置感

Alex2011

蓝军老矣

343能将4231冲得故顾左顾不了右，顾右顾不了左

乔治六世

Marseille 1-0 Inter: Marseille finally get the breakthrough with their 44th cross of the match
马赛 1-0 国米：主队历经44次横传球终有暂获
February 23, 2012


The starting line-ups

Andre Ayew pounced in stoppage time, and Marseille will take a one goal lead to Inter.

Didier Deschamps was without top scorer Loic Remy, so Brandao was upfront. In midfield, Benoit Cheyrou started rather than Charles Kaboré.

Claudio Ranieri made the fitness-related decision to omit Diego Milito, and instead play Diego Forlan and Mauro Zarate – otherwise, the side was as expected.

A strange game here – Inter looked in control midway through the second half, but then increasingly invited pressure. 0-0 was probably a better reflection of the balance of play.

Formation battle

Inter lined up roughly 4-3-1-2 shape, with Wesley Sneijder drifting over to the left of the pitch without the ball to cover that flank – although even when given no defensive instructions he tends to drift to that flank anyway.

So, as we’ve seen in other games recently – Milan v Arsenal, PSG v Montpellier – we had narrow versus width. Interestingly, all these games have been Italian coaches against French coaches.

Inter shape

This formation battle was complicated, however, by the fluidity of Inter’s attacking system, and it was a more flexible 4-3-1-2 than we often see from Italian clubs. Wesley Sneijder, while hardly enjoying a particularly fruitful evening himself, caused Marseille problems with his movement and made things happen down that side of the pitch. Marseille naturally viewed him as the main threat, but their determination to stop him, plus his unusual movement, resulted in both Alou Diarra and César Azpilicueta being concerned with his positioning.

This meant that Esteban Cambiasso could motor forward down the left of the pitch untracked, and he was the game’s standout player in the first half – he created a couple of chances and had an attempt on goal himself. This was a particularly promising situation for Inter when one of the two forwards, generally Zarate, moved to that flank to further overload Marseille in the right-back position, though it should be noted that Azpilicueta coped well and had a very good game.

Marseille shape

Marseille were a fairly standard 4-2-3-1, and they knew that it was down the flanks that they needed to focus on, with both Azpilicueta and Jeremy Morel getting forward. However, it took a while for Azpilicueta to get forward and become a threat down the right because he was worried about leading Sneijder unattended, and for a while Marseille were too concentrated down the left, where Maicon and Javier Zanetti are very good defensively.

Still, Marseille’s width meant a large number of crosses were attempted – nearly four times as many as Inter, although Lucio and Walter Samuel are happy enough dealing with high balls.



The most interesting aspect of this battle was the positioning of Mathieu Valbuena, the Marseille playmaker. He’s been mentioned before as fitting the mould of a ‘central winger’, and he showed that today by constantly drifting from flank to flank to try and overload Inter 3 v 2 in the wide areas. You won’t find a more obvious pattern of a central player moving to the wings:



The logic of this was sound – Inter packed the centre with three conservative midfielders, so Valbuena had no space to operate, and it was out wide where he was likely to get joy. However, with both him and Sneijder moving to the flanks, it did mean the game lacked a real creator in a central position.

One man who could have solved that problem was Cheyrou, but he was too static and didn’t contribute enough to attacks. Often Marseille were simply attacking 4 v 7, then 5 v 7 when an overlap from a full-back came. Cheyrou could have been braver with his positioning and made some late runs into the box.

Second half

Inter stepped up their attacking threat with Yuto Nagatomo on for Maicon – he was much better than the Brazilian, who may have been unfit. For a while Inter looked the better side, but both their forwards faded, while Sneijder created little.

The game became rather dull in the second half, partly caused by Ranieri’s decision to move to a 4-4-1-1 formation: Joel Obi on for Zarate, and used on the left, with Sneijder becoming a support striker. As mentioned, the forwards weren’t particularly involved, and the new formation gave the full-backs more protection, so despite the eventual defeat it wasn’t a particularly bad move, although either Milito or Giampaolo Pazzini surely should have been introduced to play upfront alone.

Still, better defending from the corner would have secured the draw, and it was primarily that rather than tactics that cost Inter.

Conclusion

A game that seems dull from the scoreline was actually very interesting for a while – then Ranieri’s attempt to nullify the game by switching formation largely killed the contest as a spectacle, which probably indicates the move worked well despite the eventual defeat. He was, after all, trying to shut the game down.

For long periods Marseille attacked intelligently but without enough quality to go ahead. They may have been marginally the better team by the end, but they were fortunate to nick a goal from a set-piece, and could do with Remy back for the second leg.

乔治六世

804参考译文

Penelope

Zonal Marking Team Focus: Athletic Bilbao
by Michael Cox at Thursday, Feb 23 2012 14:55



Marcelo Bielsa’s arrival at Athletic Bilbao was the most exciting managerial appointment of last summer. A notoriously eccentric yet highly intelligent figure, his work with Argentina and Chile had elevated him into the enviable position of being both the neutral’s favourite, and a highly respected, studious tactician.

His tenure at Athletic has been far from plain sailing. The club failed to win their first five league games of the season as Bielsa struggled to find his best system. Athletic were in the relegation places, and there was a real danger Bielsa would replicate his performance with Espanyol in 1998, where he stayed just six matches and left them in 18th place.

It all changed with two important wins at the start of October. A comfortable 2-0 win at home to PSG was a victory for strategy over spending, then three days later in the Basque derby at Real Sociedad, two goals from Fernando Llorente got Athletic their first league win of the season.

They also beat Osasuna in their next game, which was the start of a good run of form and allowed Athletic to rise up the table, from fourth bottom to fourth in the space of four months. Yet it’s difficult to explain quite why they find themselves so high in the table – since that Osasuna game they haven’t won consecutive league games. Their points per game ratio (1.43) would only be good enough for 8th in the Premier League or Serie A – the race for fourth in La Liga is very open, but not of a great standard.

But the main thing Bielsa brings is not necessarily success, it is style. Famed for his high pressing, this has been adopted in a more cautious manner in Bilbao. There is not always the relentless closing down we saw with Chile during the World Cup of 2010, but the front players get through a lot of running. It is interesting that Athletic have the third-highest possession in La Liga (behind only Barcelona and Real Madrid) despite only the sixth-highest pass completion rate. The two figures usually correlate closely, but the indication here is that while Athletic often lose the ball, they win it back very quickly.



For further evidence in that respect, Athletic make the third-highest number of tackles per game in La Liga, 25.3, despite enjoying so much possession. The fact that the two sides ahead of them here – Gijon (26.3) and Zaragoza (26) - are the two bottom clubs, demonstrates how unusual it is for a good side to be tackling so frequently.

In formation terms, Bielsa has also adapted his usual philosophy. A strong advocate of a 3-3-1-3 in South America, the predominance of the 4-2-3-1 in Spain, coupled with Bielsa’s preference for a single spare man at the back, means he’s generally played a back four himself. It’s usually regarded as a 4-2-3-1 system, though it becomes 4-2-1-3 with the wingers pushing high up the pitch to close down. However, he is entirely happy to radically change formation midway through the game depending upon how many forwards the opposition are fielding, or to increase the attacking threat – he seems to view 3-3-1-3 as the more offensive shape. Strangely, this means that sometimes a midfielder is withdrawn for a defender, but this is an attacking change – against Getafe, for example, centre-back Mikel San Jose replaced central midfielder Oscar De Marcos, but the full-backs became wide midfielders and Athletic threw more men forward.



An unexpected feature of the side has been their excellence at set-pieces – they’ve scored more goals (12) than any other La Liga side from dead ball situations, partly thanks to the good form of Fernando Llorente. But equally, they depend too much on Llorente (and set-pieces) for their goals – no other player has scored more than three times in the league.

But if Bielsa’s side isn’t pressing as much as we’re used to, he’s not playing three at the back and a major source of goals is from dead ball situations, where is the evidence of the exciting football we’ve come to expect?

For that, we have to look to his use of players in unusual positions. Javi Martinez, probably the best all-round footballer in the side and a World Cup winner as a holding midfielder, has been used more often at centre-back rather than in midfield. This is something Bielsa did a lot at Chile – he likes midfielders in the backline because they’re often quicker than traditional central defenders, and therefore able to cope with the high defensive line. They’re also more adept at circulating the ball from the back.

The positioning of Oscar De Marcos has also been fascinating – the number ten has been used at right-back, left-back, left midfield, left wing, central midfield and as the central attacking playmaker so far this season, though his usual role has been in the centre alongside Ander Iturraspe, where he can sprint forward to join the front four.

But Bielsa’s greatest achievement so far has been his modernisation of the side. At the start of the season, he told three older players – Aitor Ocio, Koikili Lertxundi and rarely-used Iban Zudiaurre – that he didn’t require their services. 29-year-old David Lopez has also seen little action. Instead, he’s brought on youngsters – De Marcos (22), Iturraspe (22) and Jon Aurtenetxe (20) have already started more games than they did in the entirety of last season. Ander Herrera, a 22-year-old who signed from Zaragoza last summer, has also featured prominently.

All this means that their squad, using the ‘five games or more’ minimum as used in this aritcle (Europe's Youngest Squads), has an average age of 24.9. Their most frequent XI is even younger, at 23.9. Even if Bielsa doesn’t enjoy success himself, his legacy will be embracing youth.

Athletic are into the Copa del Rey final, where Bielsa will take on Pep Guardiola, a man who has frequently spoken of his admiration for the Argentine coach. Guardiola says he wouldn’t describe them as ‘friends’, since they’ve only met twice before, but their long meeting in Rosario before Guardiola took over Barcelona has influenced him greatly. “Bielsa is different from all the coaches in the world,” he says. The league meeting between the two was a brilliant clash of pressing that effectively meant man-marking all over the pitch, and a 2-2 draw. Guardiola has endorsed Bielsa as a replacement if he leaves the club this summer.

Reports linking Bielsa with Chelsea this week seem strange. His approach would be largely the same as that of Andre Villas-Boas, with a focus on pressing and youth. Besides, Bielsa has a long-term project in Bilbao – though with the club’s first trophy for 28 years just one win away, Athletic’s brave appointment might reap instant rewards.

Penelope

806楼参考译文
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ZM球队聚焦：战术疯子麾下的雄狮毕巴

2012-02-25 / maryantonia

马塞洛-贝尔萨入主毕尔巴鄂竞技是去年夏天最激动人心的一次换帅。阿根廷人出了名的脾气古怪，同时也是聪明绝顶，凭借在阿根廷和智利的出色表现，他的地位达到了一个令人称羡的高度，是两个国家最受爱戴的主帅之一，而且是一位德高望重但也非常好学的战术大师。

他在毕尔巴鄂的工作并非一帆风顺。巴斯克雄狮本赛季一开始连续五轮不胜，当时贝尔萨正在努力寻找着队伍的最佳配置。球队落入了降级区，对贝尔萨来说情势非常危急，几乎就要重现98年的厄运，当时的他只执教了六场比赛就离开了排在第18位的西班牙人。

十月来临之际，两场胜利的到来让一切都柳暗花明。主场对PSG的2-0是战术上的完胜，紧接着三天之后，毕尔巴鄂在巴斯克德比中击败皇家社会，略伦特独中两元，帮助球队赢得赛季首胜。

接下来，他们又战胜了奥萨苏纳，这场比赛让球队完全找回了状态，而且毕尔巴鄂在积分榜上的排名也开始有所改善，四个月之内，他们从倒数第四一跃成为正数第四。不过他们爬升这么快的原因也非三言两语解释得清——从战胜奥萨苏纳之后，他们在联赛中还并没有连胜过。而他们的场均得分（1.43）在英超和意甲只能排在第八位——西甲第四名的竞争太过开放，并不是一个好的衡量标准。

但是贝尔萨带给毕尔巴鄂最主要的也许并不是成绩，而是风格。他引以为傲的高位压迫在毕尔巴鄂这里变得更为谨慎。他们没有2010南非世界杯上智利队那种持续不断的逼抢，不过前场球员的跑动非常积极。很有意思的是，毕尔巴鄂竞技的控球率在西甲排名第三（前两位正是巴萨和皇马），但传球成功率却只排在第六。这两项数据一般来说差别不会这么大，不过这也说明了尽管毕尔巴鄂竞技经常失掉球权，他们会很快重新把球抢回脚下。

再进一步去研究就会发现，毕尔巴鄂竞技的铲断数排名西甲第三，场均25.3次，虽然他们拥有着很高的控球率。鉴于排在他们之前的两支球队——希洪竞技（26.3）和萨拉戈萨（26）——是西甲垫底，因此对于一支成绩不错的球队来说，如此频繁的铲断其实并不怎么正常。

谈到排兵布阵方面，贝尔萨也调整了他的一贯方针。南美流行的是3-3-1-3，西甲则大多是4-2-3-1，考虑到贝尔萨喜欢在后场安排一个自由人，因此他实际上排出的是特殊的四后卫阵型。通常情况下可以看做是4-2-3-1，不过当两翼上压逼抢的时候就会变成4-2-1-3。不过，贝尔萨也相当喜欢在比赛中途进行变阵，他会看看对手有几名前锋，或者增强一下己方进攻上的威胁——他似乎把3-3-1-3看做是最具有攻击性的阵型。很特别的是，这种变阵意味着有时候换下去的是一名中场，换上来的是一名后卫，但发生变化的却是进攻端——比如对阵赫塔菲的时候，中后卫圣何塞替换下了中场球员德马科斯，但边后卫同时变成了拉边的中场球员，因此毕尔巴鄂实际上是在进攻端投入了更多的兵力。

球队另一个出人意料的特质是出色的定位球——他们在死球状态下打入了12个进球，比西甲任何一支球队都要多，这也多亏了略伦特的出色状态。不过同样的，球队也过于依赖略伦特（和定位球）来得分——除了他之外，没人在联赛中打入3个以上的进球。

不过如果贝尔萨的球队不再按照我们习惯的方式继续压迫的话，如果他不再排出3后卫，也不再通过定位球来得分的话，我们所期盼的精彩足球的迹象又在哪里呢？

因此，我们还需要看看他是怎样让球员在非本位位置上发挥作用的。比如哈维-马丁内斯，这可能是球队里最优秀的多面手，他是世界冠军西班牙队的主力后腰，现在经常被贝尔萨安排在中卫的位置而不是中场。在智利的时候，贝尔萨也做过很多类似的改变——他喜欢将中场球员放在后防线上，因为他们通常比传统的中卫速度要快上许多，因此更能胜任高位防守。而且，他们也更擅长从后场将球传递起来。

德马科斯的变位也非常精彩——10号球员本赛季以来已经尝试了右后卫，左后卫，左前卫，左翼和中场，目前则是中场攻击核心的角色，尽管他本来的任务是留在伊图拉斯佩的身边，这样他可以随时前插加入前场四人组。

不过贝尔萨目前最伟大的成就是对球队的改朝换代。本赛季初，他告诉三位老队员——埃托-奥西奥、科伊基利以及很少出场的苏比亚雷——他不需要他们留在队里了。29岁的大卫-洛佩兹也几乎没有出场机会。取代他们的是年轻一代——德马科斯（22岁）、伊图拉斯佩（22岁）以及奥特内切（20岁）得到的首发机会已经超过了上赛季。安德尔-埃雷拉，去年夏天刚从萨拉戈萨来的22岁年轻人，也在队里发挥了重要作用。

这一切都意味着球队的阵容，如果以这篇文章（欧洲最年轻阵容）里说的“出场过五次以上”为最低标准来算的话，平均年龄达到了24.9岁。而他们的首发11人则更加年轻，只有23.9岁。即使贝尔萨并没有享受到成功的喜悦，他的方针还是大力提拔年轻球员。

现在，毕尔巴鄂竞技已经打入国王杯决赛，贝尔萨将会与瓜迪奥拉进行较量，而后者已经多次表达了对这位阿根廷籍主帅的仰慕之情。瓜迪奥拉说他们并不是“朋友关系”，因为之前只见过两次而已，但是在执教巴萨之前，他在罗萨里诺与贝尔萨有次长谈，这对他产生了极大的影响。“贝尔萨是世界上独一无二的主帅，”他说。两人在联赛中的那次较量是压迫式打法的碰撞，个人风格在球场上体现得淋漓尽致，最后两队2-2战平。瓜迪奥拉还说，如果自己在夏天离任，那么他会支持贝尔萨接替自己来执教巴萨。

这个星期以来，贝尔萨的名字还与切尔西联系到了一起，这看起来有点匪夷所思。贝尔萨的执教风格其实跟博阿斯非常相近，都注重压迫以及队伍的年轻化。另外，贝尔萨在毕尔巴鄂竞技还有着一份长期的计划——尽管毕尔巴鄂这次大胆的任命可能马上就会获得回报，因为他们距离28年来的首座奖杯仅有一步之遥。

Penelope

Basel 1 – 0 Bayern München – Dejected Bayern frustrated in Switzerland

Posted on February 22, 2012 by Cristian Nyari



FC Basel took their first step in completing the upset of the Round of 16 after narrowly beating Bayern München in their first leg thanks to a late goal from Valentin Stocker. Already heavily scrutinized for their poor performances since the break, the pressure on Bayern has just increased exponentially as they now face a make or break scenario in both the league and in Europe.

After an open first half hour in which both sides carved out several good goalscoring chances the game went into neutral mode for the remaining hour until Basel took advantage of Bayern’s questionable defending to secure the win. In that hour Bayern displayed the same problems that have been ailing them since the break, namely, porous defending, a distinct lack of creativity and predictability going forward, making it easy for a resolute Basel to get the result.

Line ups and Tactics

Former Bayern youth coach Heiko Vogel continued the great work done by Torsten Fink at Basel and maintained the same system and style of play that have gotten them this far. Going into this match, Vogel fielded the same eleven that drew Young Boys 2-2 in the league and made only one change from the team that got the historic win against Manchester United in the group, that being Huggel in for Cabral. The two holding midfielders sit deep and allow the fullbacks and wide players to do most of the attacking but their gameplan is very much based on collective defending and dynamic running, breaking quick on the counter and making it difficult for the opponent to ever settle into a game.

Heynckes had much to ponder since the much criticized draw at Freiburg and made two changes in response. Gustavo and Müler took a seat on the bench while Tymoshchuk and Robben both returned to the starting line up. Bayern and Heynckes had a point to prove and with the final in Munich this year this was the ideal stage to do it. It was a classic example of a traditional 4-4-2 against a modern 4-2-3-1. Bayern have already played a similar side in the league, namely a Hamburg side with former Basel coach Fink at the helm. Bayern struggled to break them down and would suffer a similar fate in Switzerland.


Formations and key movement.

Blistering start

The opening half hour was as open a game as you’ll see this season with both sides creating a flurry of goal scoring chances back to back, denied only by some wonderful individual goalkeeping. To their credit, Bayern exerted a great amount of energy at the opening, getting forward readily and trying to get an early goal. That said, Bayern have typically been better starters than finishers in the Champions League this season, 9 out of their 11 goals in the competition have been scored in the first half. Expectedly, Bayern’s threats came form their two star wingers. Robben crossed in the third minute and Ribery wrangled free of Dragovic to force a fantastic save from Sommer. It wouldn’t be his last because in the 12th minute the Frenchman forced yet another save from Basel’s goalkeeper. His second save was even better and Ribery could not believe his luck.

On the other end, Basel did the same. Their first chance in the 8th minute was a curious creation of a former Bayern youth product and a future Bayern player. Steinhöfer was unchallenged and sent in a dangerous cross to Shaqiri from the right but a last ditch tackle from Boateng kept the hosts out. After Ribery’s second chance, Basel had their best of the first half after Steinhöfer was again unchallenged and his cross was met by a free standing Streller whose header forced a world class reflex save from Neuer from just three meters. The resulting corner presented Basel with yet another chance. This time Dragovic got on the end of it but Neuer again remained aware enough to pull off a save. Both teams were living dangerously and just 20 minutes in the score could easily have been 2-2.

Bayern did not make it easy for themselves throughout the first half. Their high backline exposed them continuously as Rafinha and Lahm spent the majority of the half in Basel’s half. Basel’s strengths is their quick transition play and were all too willing to take advantage of that. A. Frei nearly scored in the 19th minute as a result of such a break but his shot hit the post after he got behind Rafinha. Bayern’s energy did leave them competitive though and ensured that they continued to create chances. Alaba’s shot from outside the box on 29 minutes forced another save from Sommer and Robben had a similar chance before the break but again failed to beat the Swiss keeper who was having a terrific performance.

Bayern fall into familiar trap in second half

Having seemingly exhausted themselves in the first half, Bayern took a foot off the pedal and the game slowed as a result. Basel were less voracious in attack but did well to conserve their energy, knowing they could hold off an increasingly deflated Bayern. The visitors still saw most of the ball and tried probing Basel’s backline but were limited to just passing it around outside the box without a clear idea of how to penetrate it. Their two best chances, Alaba in the 62nd and Lahm in the 68th both came from outside the box and neither threatening enough to break the deadlock. As the game progressed it became clearer that Bayern had fallen into the same predictable pattern seen in the Bundesliga. Possession without penetration in a robotic dance of passes coupled with comedic defensive errors sums up Bayern’s performance in the second half.

Basel meanwhile kept their nerves and stuck to their game. They could have gone down several times during the game but never let that phase them and were eventually rewarded when substitute Zoua cut in from the right, unchallenged by an row of Bayern players, before slipping a through ball to the unmarked Stocker who had only Neuer to beat. In a sense, the goal epitomized both Basel’s persistence and Bayern’s complacency. From a tactical perspective, Bayern lacked variety and sufficient movement from their players. Ribery was Bayern’s most dangerous player precisely because he abandoned his post out wide and cut inside several times with Alaba often replacing him on the left and Kroos dropping next to Tymoshchuk but that is about the extent of Bayern’s interchange. And after Ribery was substituted in the 70th minute that creativity all but vanished.

The game wasn’t just lost by Bayern though. Basel deserve a lot of credit for their determined performance. Vogel has them well drilled and organized and playing with the kind of team spirit that is very much lacking at Bayern at the moment. Xhaka had a good game, winning 8 of his duels and playing a big part in neutralizing Kroos (who won just 2 of his duels in this match). Credit also to Streller and A. Frei who helped out defensively the entire match. It was a classic team performance but then again, those are becoming a bit too frequent these days when Bayern are involved.

Final Verdict

The Swiss champions have already made history by being the first Swiss side in the modern Champions League era to make the knockout stages and can now go even further thanks to this result. Whether they can repeat this performance at the Allianz Arena remains to be seen but what is more apparent than ever this season is that Bayern are beatable.

With the final held in München, the stakes are invariably high and elimination so early into the competition would be nothing short of disastrous, not to mention their shaky domestic form. The game did little to dispel the media projected “crisis mode” at the club. If anything, the performance and body language all but verified it. Short on ideas on with the ball and frustrated without it, the aggravation showed when Ribery refused to shake hands with Heynckes after being substituted in the second half. Reports about dressing room arguments further reinforce the chaotic atmosphere. The next couple of weeks will be crucial in setting the tone for the remainder of the season.

Penelope

808 楼参考译文
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巴塞尔1-0拜仁：萎靡拜仁败走圣雅各布公园

2012-02-24 / Marco.Reus

巴塞尔队在欧冠16强淘汰赛中凭借中场球员斯托克尔在最后时刻的绝杀，击败了德甲巨人拜仁慕尼黑队。冬歇期过后的悲催表现让拜仁的压力陡然提升，他们现在不得不考虑一下联赛和欧冠赛场上的局面了。

在比赛开始的半小时里，双方都创造了良好的得分机会。而此后的一小时里，比赛反而进入到了胶着的模式中，直到巴塞尔利用拜仁的防守漏洞打进制胜进球。在这一小时里，拜仁所表现出来的问题就正如他们冬歇期过后患上的病症一样，防守漏洞百出、在进攻中缺乏创造力和可预知性，这让有着坚定决心的巴塞尔队得到了他们所期望的结果。

首发阵容和战术

前拜仁青训教练沃格尔坚定了前任主帅芬克为巴塞尔打下的坚实基础，他保持了球队原有的体系和比赛风格，这让他们走到了如今这一步。沃格尔的首发11人与联赛2-2战平青年人的比赛一样，与在小组赛中历史性战胜曼联的那场比赛的唯一变化是，胡格尔顶替了卡布拉尔。这两位中场悍将的位置撤的很深，可以让边后卫和边前卫更多的投入到进攻中，但是他们的比赛更多的还是基于他们有组织的防守和充满活力的跑动，他们在场上可以快速的切断对手，从而让对方很难发动反击。


首发阵容和关键跑位

客场被副班长弗赖堡逼平让海因克斯饱受各方批评，他不得不考虑很多事情，并且做出了两处变化。古斯塔沃和穆勒坐在了替补席上，季莫什丘克和罗本顶替二人站在了首发位置。本赛季欧冠决赛在慕尼黑上演，拜仁和海因克斯都需要将目标瞄向最终的决赛。这是一场经典4-4-2与现代4-2-3-1之间的对话。拜仁在联赛中其实已经遇到了与巴塞尔相似的对手，这就是芬克执教的汉堡队。拜仁竭尽全力想要击败对手，但是在瑞士他们又遭遇了相似的命运。

热闹的开局

开局的半小时里，双方你来我往都创造了得分良机，但是都被双方门将的精彩发挥所拒绝。拜仁在开始阶段展现了十足的战斗力，立即将兵力都投入到了前场，试图尽早进球。拜仁本赛季欧冠联赛的比赛都是虎头蛇尾，11个进球有9个都来自于上半场。正如人们所预料的，拜仁的威胁都来自于两个边路球员。罗本在第3分钟将球吊到中路，里贝里摆脱德拉戈维奇后近距离射门被门将左默尔神勇扑出。第12分钟法国人迎来了一次更好的机会，但是他在与左默尔的对话中再次失败，里贝里甚至无法相信他的运气这么差。

巴塞尔同样创造了得分良机。第8分钟前拜仁青训球员施泰因霍费尔在没有任何逼抢的情况下送出了一记精准传球，博阿滕最后的铲球将威胁化解。在里贝里错失第二次良机后，巴塞尔的第一次得分机会出现了，施泰因霍费尔的传中找到了无人盯防的施特雷勒，他在门前三米的头球被诺伊尔拒之门外。之后的角球让巴塞尔再次赢得了进球机会，德拉戈维奇的头球再次被诺伊尔扑出。如果双方都能把握住机会的话，开局20分钟后的比分或许应该是2-2了。

拜仁下半场陷入相似的困境

上半场似乎过度地消耗了球队的体能，拜仁在下半场放缓了节奏，比赛因此变得非常缓慢。巴塞尔在进攻上几乎没有任何欲望，但是他们很好地保存了体能，他们知道自己可以击败愈加泄气的拜仁。客队在控球上仍占据着绝对优势，并试图打破巴塞尔队的防线。但是他们只是有限的的在禁区外倒来倒去，不知道该如何打穿对手。阿拉巴和拉姆在第62和68分钟的两次威胁都来自于禁区外，根本不足以打破场上的僵局。随着比赛的继续，越来越清晰地表明，拜仁陷入了和在联赛中相似的困境。虽然有绝对的控球率，但机器人般的传球根本无法渗透入对方腹地。而在后防线上不断上演着如同喜剧般的防守失误，这是拜仁在下半场表现的总结。

而巴塞尔这边坚持着他们的打法。在比赛中他们有几次甚至已经扛不住了，直到他们将祖阿替换上场，他在右路得球，没有受到拜仁防守球员的任何干扰带向中路，将球分给了左边路无人盯防的斯托克尔，面对出击的诺伊尔瑞士人将球冷静打进。这个进球是巴塞尔不懈努力和拜仁高傲自满的最好缩影。从战术上来看，拜仁球员缺乏多变和有效的移动。里贝里是拜仁最有威胁的球员，他放弃了死打边路，并且多次内切，同时阿拉巴顶替了他在左路的位置，克罗斯则退回到阿拉巴的位置，与季莫什丘克站在一起。但这只是拜仁极为有限的交叉换位。

比赛的失利不仅仅是拜仁单方面的原因，巴塞尔队坚毅的表现让他们有理由成为比赛的胜者。沃格尔将球队打造成具有团队精神和有组织的整体，这是拜仁目前所缺乏的。扎卡本场比赛表现出色，赢得了8次对抗，而克罗斯则表现得过于中庸，只赢得了2次对抗。前锋施特雷勒和弗雷整场比赛对球队的防守也做出了很大贡献。这是一次经典的团队表演，但悲催的是，近来拜仁已经多次成为了背景。

结语

瑞士冠军巴塞尔队在改制后的欧冠联赛中打进淘汰赛阶段，已经创造了历史。而凭借本场比赛的结果他们甚至可以再创辉煌。他们在安联球场是否还能拿出今天的表现我们拭目以待，但是本赛季已经多次证明，拜仁在安联并非不可一世。

在安联球场踢最终的决赛，这看上去变得更加微乎其微，如果过早的被淘汰出局对拜仁来说无疑是灾难性的，何况他们在国内的形式还处于摇摇欲坠的状态。比赛并没有消除球队在媒体中所谓的“危机模式”，如果非要找出点什么的话，肢体语言或许算上一种。当里贝里在下半场被替换下场后，并没有与海因克斯握手只会让气氛更加恶化。媒体报道，在更衣室的争论进一步让球队氛围混乱。接下来的几周时间对于本赛季的拜仁来说是至关重要的。

Alex2011

赛季初，拜仁在欧冠和联赛双线上都是叱咤风云的队伍，冬歇期过后毛病全出来了

Alex2011

Milan 1-1 Juventus: Emanuelson nullifies Pirlo and robs Juve of their spare man too
February 26, 2012

The starting line-ups, with the key battle highlighted

1st v 2nd in Serie A – Milan remain a point ahead, but Juve have a game in hand.
Max Allegri still has big selection problems – Kevin-Prince Boateng joined the injury list, while Zlatan Ibrahimovic was suspended.
Antonio Conte’s first nine names on the teamsheet were as expected – but Marco Borriello and Fabio Quagliarella upfront was a big surprise.
The game finished level, but Milan were the better side here – Conte made mistakes, and Milan played well. The Juve coach seemed to accept this, saying, “First of all we must praise Milan, as they played for an hour at the highest level and put us under pressure with our own weapons. Where I see that we went wrong, it’s also because they made us go wrong.”
Accordingly, the majority of the report will be looking at how Milan outwitted Juve.

Formation match-up
Juve had the players to use either a three or a four at the back. From kick off, they seemed to line up with a back four, but it quickly became apparent that Conte had decided upon a back three, with wing-backs pushing forward to provide width.
Juve had a couple of promising moments when they moved forward by switching the ball from flank to flank. With the away side playing two upfront, Thiago Silva and Philippe Mexes had no spare man, and therefore the two Milan full-backs had to drop in and provide cover – which they both did well throughout the game.
Emanuelson v Pirlo
But Milan were the better side, and the main reason was the battle between Urby Emanuelson and Andrea Pirlo. Pirlo has been enjoying a superb season for Juve in the deep-lying role, and having released him last summer, no club knows that better than Milan. Therefore, they instructed Emanuelson to pick up Pirlo when Juve had the ball, and he struggled to dictate the play. Usually he plays 81 passes per game with 85.4% completion ratio, here he played 73 with 82% accuracy – not a huge difference, but his influence was less obvious.
But crucially, Emanuelson charged past Pirlo when Milan won the ball, which meant that Juve’s spare man at the back (the reason Conte had chosen a three-man backline) was no longer evident. Milan could get the ball forward quickly, drag the back three across the pitch out of position (particularly with Robinho’s movement into deep and wide positions), and power through the gaps.
The Juve back three were stranded against the movement of the Milan front three, receiving little protection from Pirlo ahead of them, while Stephane Lichsteiner and Marcelo Estigarribia moved forward as Juve’s third and fourth highest players up the pitch in attacking moves, meaning they were in no position to defend quick breaks.
(The midfield duos of Sulley Muntari-Antonio Nocerino and Claudio Marchisio-Arturo Vidal battled in the centre, with the Milan partnership stronger in the tackle – particularly Muntari, who made nine tackles in the game. By losing the battle in this zone, Juve struggled to connect the midfield and the attack.)
So where was Conte’s mistake? The forward duo probably wasn’t right, certainly. But Juve weren’t really getting the ball forward in the first place for that to be an issue. The problem was in a deeper zone, and the interesting thing is that while a back three logically makes sense against a front two, it probably wasn’t right considering the personnel involved here. Milan’s trequartista, whether Boateng or Emanuelson, is tasked with connecting the midfield and the attack with constant running, and therefore Milan effectively play more than a front two – a front 2.5, perhaps.
The line-ups for the start of the second half

The back three could still have made sense had Juve’s holding player been more of a defensive force – Sergio Busquets, for example – but with Pirlo very much a creator and often strolling back, they were exposed in that position, especially on counter-attacks.
Although we’ve seen Juve play a back three with Pirlo ahead against other sides, it hasn’t quite been in this situation. Even against Udinese, who also play an energetic player in the number ten role (Almen Abdu), Juve were 3-5-2 but up against a 3-5-1-1 – so when Abdi moved forward Juve still had a spare man, the value of which shouldn’t be underestimated.
Juve fightback
Conte switched things at half time, moving from the 3-5-2 to a 4-3-3ish shape by bringing Simone Pepe on for Estigarribia, putting him on the right and moving Quagliarella to a leftish forward role. Interestingly, Milan’s front three seemed to widen as a result, with Emanuelson playing slightly to the right, Robinho more to the left, and Stephan El Shaarawy on for Pato to provide more energy upfront. With Juve wider at the back and two full-backs trying to get forward, Milan now had to work harder at the front.
But the main reason Juve got back into the game was Conte changing his strikers. Even here, he did things in an odd manner – Mirko Vucinic replaced Borriello on 54 minutes and went upfront – we had to wait until 70 minutes for Matri on for Quagliarella. Matri went upfront and Vucinic to the left. It seemed more logical to bring on Matri for Borriello, then Vucinic for Quagliarella – Vucinic clearly isn’t a number nine, while Matri’s ten goals make him Juve’s best striking option by a considerable distance.
Conclusion
Rarely has Conte got it wrong this season – he did here, as the formation and the identity of the starting forwards were both issues. However, he still emerges with credit – first for having the grace (and intelligence) to say he knew he made errors. Second, more importantly, for turning things around and picking up a point.
Milan were very good for the first hour, with Robinho pulling the strings and Emanuelson driving at the Juve defence – his ability to act as part-midfielder, part-forward caused real problems. Playing a shuttler as a trequartista will win Milan few points for beauty, but it does give opponents an unusual threat they find it difficult to respond to.

Alex2011

811楼参考译文
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AC米兰1:1尤文图斯战术分析：孔蒂首发失策，米兰半场好球

2012-02-27 / baiy07

双方首发，关键较量高亮显示

意甲头两名的较量---AC米兰保持了1分的优势，但尤文图斯少赛一场。

阿莱格里在排阵方面困难不小---博阿滕有伤，而伊布仍在禁赛期。

孔蒂的阵容中前九个队员是意料当中的---但博列洛和夸利亚雷拉担任首发前锋令人大感意外。

比赛以平局收场，但米兰是表现更好的一方---孔蒂犯了错误，而米兰运转良好。尤文主帅似乎同意这个观点，他说，“首先我们必须称赞米兰，他们在一个小时时间内踢出了最高水平，让我们一直处于压力之下，我可以看到我们哪些地方出了问题，但那也是他们造成的”。

因此，本报告将主要着眼于米兰是如何智取尤文的。

双方阵型对比

尤文的球员可以踢三后卫或者四后卫。开球后不久他们似乎排成了四后卫，但显然孔蒂很快就决定采取三后卫，同时两个翼卫压上以提供宽度。

当他们通过在两翼转移皮球而推进时，尤文有几次高光时刻。考虑到客队踢双前锋，蒂亚戈-席尔瓦和费利佩-梅克斯都有人盯防，因此米兰的两个边后卫不得不内收提供保护，在这方面他们整场都做的不错。

埃玛纽尔森VS皮尔洛

但是米兰踢得更好，主要原因在于埃玛纽尔森和皮尔洛的对决。这个赛季皮尔洛在拖后位置上表现极好。由于去年夏天才与他解约，没有球队比米兰更清楚这一点。因此，当尤文控球时，他们采用埃玛纽尔森盯防皮尔洛，让他难以主导进攻。皮尔洛场均一般完成81脚传球，平均成功率85.4%，但这场他只完成了73脚，成功率82%---这并不是个很大的差距，但皮尔洛的作用变得不那么明显了。

重要的是，当米兰控球时，埃玛纽尔森会快速插上越过皮尔洛，这意味着尤文在后方不再明显有一个多出的后卫了（孔蒂选择三后卫是因为平时会有一人空出用于保护）。米兰可以快速地拿球向前，把三个后卫带离防守位置（特别是由于罗比尼奥的回撤和拉边），并且利用空隙快速推进。

面对米兰前场三人组的移动，尤文的三后卫陷入困境，他们身前的皮尔洛几乎不能提供什么保护，而利希施泰纳和埃斯蒂加里维亚在进攻插上时成为尤文场上第三和第四靠前的球员，意味着他们无法防守快速反击。

（蒙塔里-诺切里诺和马尔基西奥-比达尔的中场二人组对决在中路进行，而米兰组合在拼抢中显得更强壮---尤其是蒙塔里，他完成了九次抢断。由于失去了中路，尤文在连接中场和攻击线时显得很困难。）

那么孔蒂到底哪儿错了？前锋二人组显然很可能是个错误。但尤文并不是拿到球后立即找前锋，所以这不能算个问题。问题出在更深的区域，有趣的是虽然派出三后卫对抗两前锋是合乎逻辑的，但考虑到场上队员的情况这很可能是个错误。米兰的九号半，不管是博阿滕还是埃玛纽尔森，都被要求通过不懈跑动来连接中场和攻击线，因此米兰实际上不只踢了两个前锋，可能得算2.5个。

下半场开始时的阵容

假如尤文的后腰更具防守属性---比如布茨克斯这样的，三后卫的阵型仍然可行。但皮尔洛完全是个创造者而且经常是散着步回防，三后卫就完全被暴露在对方火力下，尤其是对方反击时。

尽管我们看到过尤文在对阵其他球队时踢这样的三后卫阵型，皮尔洛在他们身前，但没见过在本场这样的情况下还这么踢的。乌迪内斯也在十号位置上有一个极具能量的球员（阿卜迪），尤文在对阵它们的时候踢得也是3-5-2，但对抗的是个3-5-1-1阵型---因此当阿布迪插上时尤文仍然有一个多出的后卫，可不能小看这个后卫的价值。

尤文的反攻

半场的时候孔蒂做了调整，佩佩替下埃斯蒂加里维亚踢右路，夸利亚雷亚踢一个左侧的前锋，从3-5-2变为了一个类似4-3-3的阵型。很有意思，结果是米兰的前场三人变得更宽了。埃玛纽尔森稍稍靠右，罗比尼奥更多靠左，艾尔沙拉维替下帕托，在前场提供更多活力。随着尤文后防线变得更宽且两个边后卫试图插上助攻，米兰在前场必须更加努力才行。

但尤文回到比赛的主要原因在于孔蒂对射手的调整。即使这次调整孔蒂也做得很奇怪---武西尼奇在54分钟时替下博列洛并且顶到锋线---而我们在70分钟的时候才等到马特里换下夸利亚雷拉。马特里顶到前面而武西尼奇去了左路。更符合逻辑的方式是马特里替下博列洛，然后武西尼奇替下夸利亚雷拉---武西尼奇显然不是个九号，而马特里的十个进球让他成为了尤文射手的不二选择。

结论

孔蒂这赛季很少犯错误---但这场他在阵型和首发前锋的问题上犯了错误。然而他还是赢得了赞许---首先是有风度地（同时聪明地）承认他犯了错误；第二，更重要的是，成功扭转了局面并抢到了1分。

米兰在前一个小时踢得非常好，得益于罗比尼奥的穿针引线和埃玛纽尔森对尤文后防的冲击---他扮演半中场半前锋角色的能力确实给对方制造了麻烦。一个来回奔跑的九号半角色并不能让米兰看起来踢得漂亮，但它确实是一个不常见的威胁，对手应对起来会很困难。

pedro

Arsenal 5-2 Tottenham: Arsenal complete an amazing comeback
阿森纳 5-2 热刺：枪手令人惊异完成主场大逆转
February 26, 2012


The starting line-ups

Tottenham went 2-0 up but then lost their shape completely and conceded five.

Arsene Wenger had something approaching his first-choice back four available. He used Tomas Rosicky in the Aaron Ramsey role in midfield, and Yossi Benayoun getting a start on the left.

Harry Redknapp picked two out-and-out strikers upfront, with Rafael van der Vaart and Aaron Lennon only on the bench and Niko Kranjcar making a surprise start on the right of midfield.

This was another ridiculously open Premier League game (and another North London derby with plenty of goals). Both back fours had poor games and Tottenham were unable to control the game at any point – even when they were playing well and 2-0 up. There were four major themes here:

(1) Tottenham play direct

This was a classic 4-3-3 v 4-4-2 match-up. In simple terms, the 4-3-3 is likely to dominate possession by virtue of having an extra man in the midfield, but the 4-4-2 can be more direct with two strikers.

That’s basically what happened early on. Tottenham played quick, direct balls towards Louis Saha and Emmanuel Adebayor, who battled with the Arsenal centre-backs. But the approach was slightly more complex than that – the two forwards drifted into wide and deep zones to split the Arsenal centre-backs and open up room for midfield runners. Kyle Walker made a clever off-the-ball run to drag Thomas Vermaelen into a poor position for the first goal, while the second came from a penalty won when Gareth Bale found space to drive into.

It was interesting that Adebayor worked the left side in particular, forcing Laurent Koscielny into difficult situations high up the pitch. As mentioned when Zlatan Ibrahimovic did the same, Kosicelny doesn’t like coming high up the pitch – he generally leaves that to Vermaelen and looks to get in covering positions.

But Arsenal’s problem was that they had no covering defender, leaving 2 v 2 at the back and telling both full-backs to push high up the pitch. This made them extremely vulnerable to quick breaks with no spare man and the full-backs not in a position to cover.

They aren’t used to having to play more conservatively at the back – this was only the second time in the Premier League this season that a side had come to the Premier League and played two upfront. The other side was Fulham, who also caused Arsenal problems and picked up a point having been 1-0 up, but at least that day Arsenal had a defensive-minded right-back in Johan Djourou to cover. (Manchester United also played two forwards, but Wayne Rooney was usually picked up by Alex Song to maintain a spare man).

(2) Arsenal pass well

Arsenal have been wider and more direct this season, and reliant upon their wide players for creativity – but this was a bit more like the Arsenal of a couple of seasons ago, with Yossi Benayoun coming inside from the left, and Rosicky moving forward from midfield without any defensive responsibilities. Those two actually played in similar positions, but this allowed them to work short passes, form triangles with van Persie or Arteta, and Benayoun drove well at the defence.

Arsenal had an extra man in this zone, of course, though Redknapp told Adebayor and Saha to drop onto the deepest Arsenal midfielder when Spurs didn’t have possession. This is one area where it works well for Arsenal to rotate their midfield trio, though – if Saha moves onto Song, then Arsenal tilt the triangle to bring Song higher up the pitch, Saha will have to move over and pick up Arteta instead. Not particularly difficult, but not natural for a centre-forward. Jermain Defoe, who was on the bench, has been very disciplined at playing this role in the past couple of years.

(3) Tottenham lack control

Tottenham were 2-0 up without playing particularly sparkling football – they just broke quickly and efficiently. At 2-0 up they were clearly in an excellent position, but they were unable to exert any kind of control upon the game, and invited pressure from Arsenal – Rosicky and van Persie both had good chances before Bacary Sagna got a goal back (and it’s important to note that the advanced positioning of the Arsenal full-backs did have positive effects despite the aforementioned problems at the back).


The second half line-ups

A side can control the game either in or out of possession – by keeping the ball and slowing the tempo, or by retreating into an organised defensive shape and soaking up pressure. Tottenham did neither – they were outnumbered in the centre and therefore unable to keep the ball. Modric’s pass completion ratio was down at 82% (compared to the usual 88%), and he couldn’t do it on his own anyway.

More surprisingly, their defensive shape wasn’t particularly good – previously against Arsenal they’ve defended well with two banks of four, but here the two wide players were particularly poor defensively, and there was also the problem with dropping a striker onto an Arsenal midfielder.

(4) Arsenal start to counter

At half-time Redknapp moved to a 4-1-4-1ish system – van der Vaart on the right in place of Kranjcar, but more significantly Saha off, and Sandro on. Tottenham lost their shape, became increasingly narrow and their gameplan was confused – it wasn’t clear whether they were trying to see more of the ball in the centre, or continue their direct attacking.

Either way, they gradually started to become very vulnerable to Arsenal counter-attacks. Rosicky got the third when Tottenham found six players ahead of the ball – Sandro wasn’t sitting as he was meant to, and Parker was now higher up – and Arsenal worked a 5 v 4 for the goal.

Then Walcott became involved in the game. Having been poor in the first half, he suddenly became excellent midway through the second half. But there was good logic to that – he’d been anonymous when Tottenham sat deep, he became useful when Tottenham pushed up and left space in behind. The away side’s offside trap was poor, and Walcott had the pace to take full advantage on two occasions.

Conclusion

On the face of it, this was a game that defied logic with how open it was…yet there were some fairly logical factors that contributed to the scoreline. In the first half, Arsenal left 2 v 2 at the back and were weak at the back, but dominated the midfield battle 3 v 2 and built pressure.

Redknapp’s changes at half time didn’t have the effect they did in this fixture last season, and in the second half Tottenham were extremely poor – lacking structure at the back and with no ideas going forward.

pedro

813楼参考译文
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阿森纳5-2热刺战术分析：枪手的逆转荡气回肠

2012-02-27 / maryantonia


托特纳姆热刺曾经2-0领先，随即阵型完全崩溃，被打进5球。
温格的首发四人防线是有一定目的性的。在中场他用罗西基代替了拉姆塞，贝纳永也得到了首发机会出现在左翼。
雷德纳普在前场派上两个纯前锋，他把范德法特和列侬放在了替补席，而克拉尼察首发出现在中场右路有点出人意料。
这是一场大开大合到几乎荒谬的比赛。两方四后卫的发挥都惨不忍睹，而热刺从头至尾都没有能控制住比赛——即使他们一开始打得很不错，甚至还一度2-0领先。主要有四个地方值得讨论。

（1）热刺打得很直接

这场比赛是经典的4-3-3与4-4-2之间的对决。简单来说，4-3-3一般会在控球上占上风，因为他们的中场人数占优，不过4-4-2拥有双前锋，所以在进攻方面更直接一些。
比赛刚开始的时候正是这样。热刺动作很快，直接传球至前场的萨哈和阿德巴约，而他们俩则与阿森纳的中卫们相对抗。不过实际情况要稍微复杂一些——双前锋的移动范围很宽，还会深入阿森纳的腹地去分开两名中卫，为中场的速度好手们打开空间。沃尔克做出了非常精彩的无球跑动，把维尔马伦引到了一个很尴尬的位置，从而造成了第一个进球，而第二个进球则来自贝尔找到突破点后制造出的点球。
有意思的是阿德巴约多在左路出现，迫使科斯切尔尼不得不上前去勉力招架。之前提到过伊布拉希莫维奇也是这么做的，而科斯切尔尼不是很喜欢出击到很前场的位置——一般他会让维尔马伦来应对，而自己则试图补位。
不过阿森纳的问题是他们没有补位的防守队员，而是任由后场形成2对2的情况，让两个边后卫都压在很前场的地方。这让他们的防线在面对快速反击的时候非常脆弱，因为并没有后场自由人的存在，而边后卫们也不在可以补位的位置。
阿森纳并不习惯相对保守些的防守方式——本赛季的英超联赛中，这还是第二次看到一支实行双前锋阵型的球队。另外一支是富勒姆，也给阿森纳造成了很大的麻烦，富勒姆曾经1-0领先，不过最后只带走1分，但至少在那场比赛中，阿森纳的右路有防守意识很强的朱鲁来补位。（曼联也是双前锋，不过鲁尼一般被宋盯得很紧，只能扮演自由人的角色。）

（2）阿森纳的传球很成功

阿森纳本赛季的阵型拉得很宽，打法也更加直接，他们很依赖拉边球员的创造性——这跟几个赛季之前的阿森纳很类似，贝纳永从左路进入中路，罗西基就可以从中场前移，不需要承担任何防守任务。其实他俩实际上的位置差不多，这样一来，两人之间可以做出许多短传配合，并与范佩西或者阿尔特塔组成三角形，而且贝纳永在防守方面做得很不错。
当然了，阿森纳在这个区域多一个人，尽管老雷也叮嘱了阿德巴约和萨哈，在阿森纳拿球的时候要退到阿森纳最后边的中场球员那里。即便如此，这仍然是阿森纳中场三人组运转最顺畅的区域——如果萨哈盯住了宋，阿森纳方就会稍微倾斜一下，让宋移到最前边的位置，那么萨哈就必须得挪开换盯阿尔特塔。其实这个任务不是特别困难，但对于一位中锋来说就不是那么自然了。板凳上的迪福更擅长这个角色，他过去的几年中在这个位置上的表现有如教科书。

（3）热刺缺乏控制力

热刺没怎么出招就已经2-0领先了——他们只是反击得很迅速而且有成效。局势对两球领先的热刺来说再好不过了，但是他们不但没掌控住比赛，还引来了阿森纳的攻击压力——在萨尼亚扳回一城之前，罗西基和范佩西也都有一次很不错的机会。（这里需要指出的是，之前提到过阿森纳的边后卫比较靠前的站位引起了后方的空虚，但确实也收到了正面的效果。）


下半场的阵型

一支球队不论是控球还是让对方控球，都可以对比赛有所控制——你可以持球减慢节奏，或者建立坚固的防线承担压力。结果热刺啥也没做——他们在中路寡不敌众，根本控不住球。莫得里奇的传球成功率降至82%（往常他一般有88%），不过他也没法子自己完成传球对吧。
更让人吃惊的是，热刺的防线也不怎么样——上一场对阵阿森纳的时候他们排出了两排4对4阵型，防的很不错，但这次两个边路球员防守很差，而且让前锋退后来盯防阿森纳的中场球员也造成了不小的问题。

（4）阿森纳开始反击

中场休息的时候老雷把阵型调整成有点类似4-1-4-1的样子——范德法特取代克拉尼察出现在右路，不过更重要的一个变化是桑德罗上场替下了萨哈。热刺的阵型完全崩溃了，变得越来越狭窄，战术计划也令人费解——看不出他们到底是想要控制中路，还是继续他们的直接进攻。
不管怎么样，热刺在面对阿森纳的反击时，逐渐开始脆弱起来。罗西基打入第三球的时候，热刺发现球的前边有6名球员——桑德罗没有卡住自己的位置，帕克现在也推得太靠前——阿森纳是在5对4的局面下打入的这一球。
接下来，沃尔科特也展现了自己的作用。他在上半场表现得很差，但是下半场中间的时候突然变得无懈可击。不过这也很合逻辑——热刺退守很深的时候他完全隐形，但当热刺推到前边后场空虚的时候，他就会发挥很大的作用。客队的造越位陷阱并不出色，沃尔科特有两次机会都靠速度完全甩开了对手。

结论

表面上看来，这场比赛开放到不合逻辑的地步……不过，从比分看来也是稍微有点逻辑因素的。上半场的时候，阿森纳在后场只有2对2的局面，防线很脆弱，但是在中场的3对2争斗中占据了优势并形成了压迫。

雷德纳普在中场休息时的调整并没有收到上赛季时候的那种效果，热刺下半场打得很差——防守缺乏结构性，进攻方面也是毫无办法。

pedro

[全场集锦]英超第26轮 阿森纳5-2热刺

pedro

Link between Premier League goalfests and poor European progress of English clubs?
February 28, 2012

The top English clubs continue to perform poorly in Europe, and serve up amazingly open games at the top of the Premier League.

Many have drawn a link between the two. I wrote a column for the Guardian yesterday along these lines:

None of the top sides want to be submissive, to be seen as the underdog and play reactive football. That is the major difference between England and other major European leagues, where the food chain is more established…in England, everyone wants to play (attacking) football…naivety has contributed, a refusal to change strategy to suit the situation…a separate problem for each individual side is the lack of control they are able to exert upon matches…it is this lack of control that is costing English teams in Europe. With a fluid Barcelona side the template for continental success, it’s an inconvenient truth that English clubs perform better in Europe when they are defensive, organised and functional…4.9 goals per game in matches between the top five isn’t indicative of great quality.

Towards the end I touched on a link between goals per game in the Premier League, and English club’s success in Europe:

When the Premier League enjoyed its best run in Europe, between 2004-05 and 2008-09, the goals per game average in the Premier League was down at around 2.5. In the previous five seasons, when England had no European Cup finalists, it was over 2.65. Since 2009, it has risen to 2.8.

I thought this was worth a proper look with the help of some graphs, comparing the openness of Premier League games (making the assumption that this is reflected in the goals per game average) with English club’s progress in Europe this century.

Goals per game was an easy figure to find.

For progress in the Champions League, a simple point scoring system was used:

Champions League winner = 5 points

Champions League runner-up = 4 points

Champions League semi-finalist = 3 points

Champions League quarter-finalist = 2 points

Champions League second round / second group stage = 1 point

No points were awarded if a side didn’t make it out of the group stage.

So, if four English clubs got to the final four (hypothetically, this has never happened), it would be 5+4+3+3 = 15 points. If all four reached the second round, where they were knocked out, it would be 1+1+1+1=4.

Here’s a graph plotting goals per game in the Premier League (blue) against progress in the Champions League (red):

Some points to note here:

(a) If the goals per game average stays the same – it might not – it will be a record this century. Even if it drops slightly, it confirms a medium-term rise.

(b) The English clubs’ increase in performance between 2005-09 was quite staggering.

(c) If Chelsea and Arsenal don’t progress, this is a huge failure by English clubs compared to previous seasons.

(d) Both figures are, obviously, undecided for 2011/12 – current figures are shown. That means English clubs are assumed as 0+0+1+1, with the Manchester clubs eliminated and the English clubs underdogs going into the second leg of the second round.

(e) The goals per game ratio often dips in the middle of a season, so taking that figure now may be inaccurate.

But variations from season to season make it difficult to find an overall pattern. This is a particular problem with the Champions League progress – after all, this figure is taken from a much smaller sample size, and considering a fair number of points will have been decided by penalty shoot-outs, we can’t take sudden drops or rises too seriously.

Therefore, the next step was to create a three-year average for both figures. So, for example, the 2003-06 period would be an average of the figures from 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2005/06.

This naturally created a smoother line, and a pattern is clearer:

(Note: It’s impossible to create a 2010-13 average with no data from 2012/13, so a two-year average of 2010/11 and 2011/12 was used for the final period)

This tends to suggest there is some kind of relationship – English clubs were doing better in Europe when the rate of goals in the league was very low. Or, if you like, the rate of goals in the league was very low when English clubs were doing better in Europe.

These are basic figures, but it’s probably worth further exploration.

pedro

816楼参考文献

Penelope

Tactical trends: Are the formations that employ a central midfield quartet making a come-back?

The history of tactics is the history of the manipulation of space. Space is created – or emerges – for one player, and he begins to have a disproportionate influence on the game- Jonathan Wilson

It’s hard to find a better definition of tactics and even though this might seem like an over simplification, it captures the basic premise which is simply creating space for your players.

Every couple of seasons, managers find new ways to create space and with the midfield trio dominating formations across Europe in the last decade, we could be witnessing a return of the central midfield quartet to combat this trend.
From AC Milan’s midfield diamond along with Napoli’s 3-4-3 (shown below-left) to Guardiola’s recent deployment of 4 midfielders in the Classicos and everything in between, it seems central midfield quartets are enjoying a new lease of life.

Over the last decade, we’ve seen a resurgence of the 4-2-3-1 and 4-3-3 mostly because of the advantage they provided over the classic 4-4-2 which would be a man light in central midfield. Mourinho explained as much in his time at Chelsea stating,

‘Look, if I have a triangle in midfield – Claude Makelele behind and two others just in front – I will always have an advantage against a pure 4-4-2 where the central midfielders are side by side. That’s because I will always have an extra man. It starts with Makelele, who is between the lines. If nobody comes to him he can see the whole pitch and has time. If he gets closed down it means one of the two other central midfielders is open. If they are closed down and the other team’s wingers come inside to help, it means there is space now for us on the flank, either for our own wingers or for our full-backs. There is nothing a pure 4-4-2 can do to stop things’.

In the aftermath of Chelsea’s early success and Barcelona’s dominance using the 4-3-3, many teams adopted a similar setting. Therefore, with a muckle of sides playing a trio in central midfield and with so much emphasis on winning the battle in that area of the pitch, the central midfield quartet is making a dramatic come-back.



Playing four in midfield however comes at the expense of one of two things; either the team sacrifices width upfront by playing the 4-2-2-2 /4-4-2 diamond or a defender makes way in which case a 3-4-3 suffices. Guardiola summed up the reasoning behind all this suggesting that midfielders are versatile and intelligent and they can provide cover in the areas that have been sacrificed.

Midfielders are intelligent players who have to think about the team as a whole. They’re selfless players who understand the game better than anyone and the more midfielders you have, the easier it is to slot them into other positions.- Pep Guardiola to FIFA.com

Now let’s take a look at some of Europe’s notable successful sides this season that employ a quartet in the center of the pitch.

Juventus’ 4-3-1-2

Antonio Conte took a bold move of freezing out Milos Krasic simply because there was no place for him in the formation that the Italian tactician thought would bring the best out of his squad. That decision has been vindicated as the Bianconneri are still unbeaten in all competitions and are still in the thick of the action towards a much needed Serie A crown after a long hiatus.

The Serie A giants have switched between formations of late and Conte seems to be veering towards a 3-5-2 formation but the early success of the 4-4-2/ 4-3-1-2 is still noteworthy. The uncanny ability of Pirlo to find a pass alongside the industry of players like Arturo Vidal can cause real problems for any three-man central midfield in world soccer.

Barcelona’s peculiar 4-4-2 and 3-4-3 diamond



No team has the potential to glamor up a formation like Barcelona do in today’s game and if Guardiola sticks to it then we should expect to see a lot more teams following suit. Barcelona’s transition is mostly down to the purchase of Cesc Fabregas. While it seems plausible that Guardiola had intended to adopt a 3-4-3 with the former Arsenal midfielder playing at the tip of a midfield diamond, the players seemed loathe to that formation because they felt it left them exposed in defence.

Coupled with Villa’s injury and the return of Carlos Puyol, the Catalans giants have gravitated towards a 4-4-2 (not really a diamond) with the quartet of central midfielders. Pep believes as mentioned above that central midfielders are versatile and they can stretch play when necessary making the need for out and out wingers somewhat obsolete.

Besides, Barcelona has kept an average of just over 65% of the ball this season which means that the majority of play is focused just ahead of the center circle in the opposition’s half, an area where central midfielders are in their comfort zone. To makes matter worse, Messi drifts from his half-nine role into central midfield to increase to the man-advantage in that area.

Ac Milan’s 4-4-2 diamond

The Rossoneri, who were the harbingers of a successful midfield diamond in the Champions league, have stuck with their 4-4-2 even when it wasn’t paying dividends. Their 4-0 clobbering of Arsenal at the San Siro after 7 failed attempts to beat English opposition says a lot about the re-emergence of this formation in Europe. Obviously, the Milan diamond is from a different planet than the one Barcelona play- it’s sort of a brawn v brains debate.

While Guardiola prefers guile, sleek one touch passing ability, Max Allegri has taken the opposite path letting Pirlo leave for a more combative approach in midfield. Van Bommel replaced the Italian maestro at the base of the diamond with Nocerino and Seedorf either side of him while Boateng plays at the tip.

Barcelona might have edged out the group stage Champions league tie at Milan’s own fiefdom but it would be interesting to see these two giants lock horns in the knock out rounds. Zlatan Ibrahimovic missed that game and even the ever-dwindling critics of the Swede would sagely acknowledge that his presence would lend an added spice to such a tie more so after his controversial biography hit the shelves.

Real Madrid, Napoli and the rest



Other sides that are veering towards a quartet in central midfield include Santos (4-4-2 diamond), Napoli (3-4-3), Brazil, Argentina as well as Real Madrid (All 3 teams playing a 4-2-2-2). Mourinho’s side have been playing a 4-2-3-1 formation since he took over at the Bernabeu but the absence of Di Maria, the return of Kaka and the need to cancel out Barcelona saw the special one go for a 4-2-2-2 formation in the second leg of the Copa del Rey quarter final tie which was one of Real’s better showings in the Classicos of late.

In conclusion, the time seems rife for the 4-midfielder formations, especially those that employ a diamond in midfield to make a comeback to combat the wave of midfield trios that have swept across the soccer world. Zambia just won the African cup of nations playing a 4-4-2 that didn’t really employ classic wingers and with Barcelona and Real Madrid gravitating that way, it wouldn’t be surprising if central midfield quartets start to sweep across Europe.

Penelope

818楼参考译文
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战术发展趋势：四中场阵型正在回归？

由 maryantonia 发表在GoalHi足球·足球场

战术的发展史其实就是对空间操纵的发展史。空间是由球员创造出来的——或者说是暴露在某位球员的面前——然后他的发挥就可以对比赛产生异乎寻常的影响。——Joanthan Wilson

战术究竟应该怎么定义一直都是个难题，也许这样会将问题过于简单化，不过也算是抓住了基本的前提——所谓战术，简单说来就是为你的球员们创造空间。

每隔几个赛季，主帅们都会发明新的方法来创造空间，而三角中场为基础的阵型已经在过去的十年里主宰了整个欧洲，因此，我们将会有很大的可能性目睹到四人中场的强势回归。

从米兰的菱形中场、那不勒斯的3-4-3，一直到瓜迪奥拉在最近的国家德比中打造的4人中场，还有处于这其中的另外几种阵型，看起来中场四重奏的正在享受新生。



在过去的十年里，我们看到的大多是4-2-3-1和4-3-3的振兴，这两种阵型在对阵传统4-4-2的时候大占上风，因为后者在中场少了一个人。穆里尼奥在执教切尔西的时候曾解释过这一点，

“你看，如果我在中场放一个三人组——比如让马克莱莱处于后面，另外两名球员就在他前面——这样我在对阵球员们站成一排的纯4-4-2阵型的时候就总是有优势。因为我们总是多一个人。从马克莱莱开始吧，他处于两条线之间。如果没有人去盯防他，那么他就可以顾及到整片场地而自由发挥。如果有人去盯他了，这意味着我的另外两名球员中有一位是自由的。如果他们俩也都被盯住了，那么对方的两翼就得内切进来帮忙，这就意味着这时候我们的边路，要么是边锋要么是边后卫，有了足够的空间。因此，纯的4-4-2根本无法阻挡我们。”

切尔西早期的成功以及巴塞罗那4-3-3阵型的摧枯拉朽，直接导致许多球队也开始采用相似的阵型。因此，鉴于目前大批量的球队都在中场摆出三人组合，而且越来越强调对这个区域的争夺，中场四重奏却悄然开始了一次激动人心的回归。

然而，排出四中场必然要在别的方面有所牺牲：要么是4-2-2-2或者4-4-2菱形阵型里前场的宽度，要么是3-4-3这样牺牲一个后卫。瓜迪奥拉总结了这一切的利弊之后，提出中场球员需要多功能性和较高的球商，这样他们就可以覆盖住被牺牲掉部分产生的影响。

中场球员们都很聪明，他们必须得将队伍当成一个整体来思考。他们很无私，比其他队友们更能看懂比赛的进程，因此中场球员越多，就越容易随时将他们填入别的位置。-佩普-瓜迪奥拉告诉FIFA.com

现在我们来看看本赛季以来，欧洲范围内使用了四人中场，并取得显著效果的球队。

尤文图斯的4-3-1-2

安东尼奥-孔蒂走了一步很大胆的棋，他把克拉西奇排除在了阵型之外，单纯只是因为在这位意大利战术大师打造的最优阵型里并没有克拉西奇的位置。事实证明，这个决定是正确的，斑马军团至今为止在各项赛事上保持不败，在历经很长一段低迷之后，他们正朝着渴望已久的联赛冠军稳步前进。

意甲巨人最近在几种阵型之间转换，看起来孔蒂正在朝着3-5-2的方向转变，不过早期4-4-2和4-3-1-2的成功也是非常显著的。在像比达尔这样的工兵型队友身边的皮尔洛拥有神秘莫测的传球能力，这可会引起不小的麻烦，让世界上任何一组三人中场都会非常头疼。

巴塞罗那别具一格的4-4-2和3-4-3菱形中场



在当今的比赛中，巴塞罗那的炫丽阵容独一无二，如果瓜迪奥拉坚持下去的话，也许今后会有更多的队伍来效仿这一切。巴塞罗那的这种阵型转换很大程度上源于法布雷加斯的加盟。所以，瓜迪奥拉想要采取3-4-3阵型，把前枪手球员安排在菱形中场的顶端，也是可以理解的，不过球员们似乎不太喜欢这种阵型，他们觉得后防完全暴露了。

比利亚的受伤和普约尔的回归，让加泰巨人逐步向4-4-2（非菱形中场）中场四重奏阵型转变。正如前文所说的，瓜迪奥拉认定中场球员们具有全能性，他们能够拓展比赛的空间，必要的时候也可以拉边作为边锋，这样在某种程度上就不用安排专门的边锋了。

另外，巴萨本赛季平均控球率只刚刚超过65%，这意味着他们主要集中于中圈之前刚刚进入对方半场的位置，而这正是中场球员们最能得到充分发挥的区域。更致命的是，本来是9号半角色的梅西也变成了中场的一员，进一步增强了这个区域在人数上的优势。

AC米兰的4-4-2菱形中场

红黑军团是欧冠联赛中成功打造菱形中场的先驱，只不过他们现在似乎过于沉溺4-4-2，不管是否有效也并不做出改变。在7次输给英国球队之后，米兰在圣西罗体育场以4-0大胜阿森纳，强势宣告了这种阵型在欧洲的回归。很显然，米兰的菱形中场跟巴萨来自不同星球——两者在某种程度上很像是肌肉和头脑的对决。

瓜迪奥拉更喜欢有些狡诈圆滑的一脚出球能力，而阿莱格里则反其道而行之，他赶走了皮尔洛，将中场改造得更有杀气。范博梅尔取代了意大利中场大师处于菱形的底部，诺切里诺和西多夫在他的两边，而博阿滕则位于顶端。



欧冠小组赛里，巴塞罗那在客战米兰的那场平局中，也许实力确实还是高出一筹，如果他们能在淘汰赛中再次相遇的话，这场强强对话应该会非常耐人寻味。伊布拉希莫维奇错过了那场平局，但即使是他的那些批评家们——尽管越来越少——也会承认，在他那本充满争议的自传上架之后，瑞典人的存在本会为这场平局添加不少的调料。
（注：巴塞罗那跟米兰的2-2平局是在诺坎普，并非是在圣西罗，那场比赛中伊布因伤缺阵。）

皇家马德里，那不勒斯以及其他一些球队

正在朝四人中场转变的球队还包括桑托斯（4-4-2菱形），那不勒斯（3-4-3），巴西国家队，阿根廷国家队以及皇家马德里（这3支队伍都是4-2-2-2）。自从穆里尼奥来到伯纳乌之后，他的球队就一直在打4-2-3-1，不过迪马利亚的缺阵、卡卡的回归以及击败巴塞罗那的渴望让“特殊的一位”在国王杯第二回合较量中排出了4-2-2-2阵型，并最终跟对手打成平局，而这也是皇家马德里在最近的国家德比中表现最高光的几场之一。

总之，4中场阵型流行的时代似乎已经来临了，尤其是用来对抗三角型中场的菱形中场的回归，已经横扫了整个足球界。刚刚赢得非洲杯的赞比亚国家队，他们的4-4-2阵型就并没有经典的边锋，而且，在巴萨和皇马的带领下，中场四重奏开始席卷整个欧洲也不会让人太过惊讶了。

Penelope

AC Milan v Juventus; Conte’s second half change in formation helps the Old lady maintain unbeaten run

The pre-game punditry was fixated on Andrea Pirlo for Juventus and Zlatan Ibrahimovic for Milan. As it turns out, the Swede’s ban was upheld and Pirlo had an average game by his very high standards. Still, the nature of this draw was such that Ac Milan will feel as if they lost two points while Juventus, who were eventually reduced to 10 men will carry the momentum.



While Milan was struggling with so many injuries and absentees- the most notable being Ibrahimovic, Seedorf and Boateng, Conte’s side had a clean bill of health. The Juventus boss, somewhat surprisingly, made many changes to his starting 11 leaving the likes of Pepe, Vucinic and Matri on the substitutes bench.

Starting line-ups and formations

AC Milan started in a 4-4-2 diamond formation with Abbiati in goal, a back four of Abate, Mexes, Thiago Silva and Antonini. Van Bommel, Nocerino and Muntari played just behind the trequartista Emanuelson while Robinho and Pato occupied the striker’s berths.



Juventus started out in a 3-5-2 shape that had Buffon in goal, a back three of Chiellini, Barzagli and Bonucci. Pirlo, Vidal and Marchisio played in central midfield with Lichsteiner and Estigarribia on the flanks. Borriello and Quagliarella started upfront.

4-4-2 diamond v 3-5-2

Antonio Conte maintained the 3-5-2 that he’s been employing in recent big clashes- for example against Napoli and Udinese. However, neither of those sides plays a diamond and in this game, his first half formation, especially away from home, handed the impetus to AC Milan. When the dust had settled and the formation match-ups became clear, Juventus’ spare man turned out to be a defender while Milan’s was in midfield- no prizes for guessing which spare man was more important to the outcome of the tie.

Defence 3 v 2

Robinho and Pato played against Bonucci, Chiellini and Barzagli which meant Juventus had a free man at the back. Allowing the opposition team a spare defender is fairly customary since that’s the area of the pitch least likely to hurt you.

Robinho’s movement was brilliant in the first half as he kept the back three on their toes, Pato on the other hand wasn’t having his finest display in a red and black jersey.

Chiellini is accustomed to playing at left back and he likes to go marauding forward so he seemed very uncomfortable. It was Conte’s unclear which juventus defender Conte had handed the responsibility of carrying the ball out from the back. Besides, none of the back three is particularly comfortable enough with the ball at his feet to cause real problems for the opposition- that was a risk Allegri was more than happy to take.

Midfield 4 v 3



This is where it got interesting, Pirlo had been the name on everyone’s lips and it was crucial for Allegri’s side to close down the space around the returning Midfielder. The AC Milan tactician down-played the need to man mark Pirlo as that would have an adverse effect on the home side’s overall shape.

However, Conte’s tactics played into Milan’s hands- with three in the middle, AC Milan had Emanuelson up against Pirlo without even distorting their diamond and while at the same time Van Bommel was free to play as a midfield sweeper.
Pirlo barely had space in the center and his influence on this game was limited. On the other hand, off the ball, Juventus allowed Van Bommel time and space and even though he is primarily a midfield destroyer, his passing is decent enough to hurt the opposition as Arsene Wenger’s men found out at the San Siro.

Attack 4 v 4

On the face of it, Juventus was supposed to have 2 central strikers attacking Silva and Mexes while Estigarribia and Lichsteiner would take on the fullback which would create a very interesting game as AC Milan would not have a spare defender to act as a sweeper.

In reality, that was far from the case- Max Allegri knew that cutting off supply from midfield would starve Borriello and Quagliarella of decent balls to lurch onto meaning that they would go wider and come deeper to try to get a piece of the action.

Secondly, Lichsteiner and Estigarribia are naturally defensive minded players, even though they were up against Milan’s fullbacks and they did a fantastic job off the ball, in possession, they didn’t join the strikers enough to cause much danger. As it turned out, Borriello and Quagliarella found themselves having to battle against 4 defenders as there was very little help from an already over stretched central midfield. Simply put, juventus’ 3-5-2 left them in a disadvantaged position.

Second half changes



Antonio Conte realized as much at half time and his changes added a spring into Juventus’ step. Pepe came on for Estigarribia and occupied the right attacking berth. The old lady switched to a 4-3-3 and Milan seemed to mirror their shape to some extent.

Still it was a bit bizarre that Conte didn’t bring on Matri till around the 70th minute even though he’d clearly switched to a 4-3-3. Instead Vucinic came on for Borriello with Quagliarella pushing forward into the central attacking berth. Conte finally brought on Matri and the sort of pressure Juventus heaped on Milan meant it was just a matter of time before they managed an equalizer.

In conclusion, even though hindsight might be 20/20, Antonio Conte will be the first to acknowledge that his shape in the first half allowed Milan to control the game and the Rossoneri could have gone 2 goals up if Muntari’s strike had stood. Juventus of course will claim that they also had a goal wrongly ruled out but in the end, Milan controlled one half and Juventus returned the favor in the other- a draw was probably a fair result on the balance of play.

PS: Apologies for the delay in this weekend’s game reviews

Penelope

820楼参考译文
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AC米兰vs尤文图斯：孔蒂下半场的变阵保住了老妇人的不败战绩

2012-03-02 / maryantonia

赛前的专家言论主要集中在尤文图斯的皮尔洛和AC米兰的伊布身上。结果，伊布因禁赛而无法出战，皮尔洛的表现在苛刻的标准之下也只能算是马马虎虎。而且，这场平局让米兰觉得自己丢掉了势在必得的两分，尤文图斯虽然在最后时刻只有10人应战，却一直保持着不灭的动力。

米兰饱受伤病和缺阵的困扰——最大的损失是伊布、西多夫和博阿滕，而孔蒂的球队则阵容齐整。但令人有点吃惊的是，尤文图斯主帅排出了一个不太常见的首发，他把佩佩、武齐尼奇以及马特里留在了板凳上。

首发阵容及排兵布阵


米兰的阵型是4-4-2菱形中场，守门员阿比亚蒂，四后卫是阿巴特、梅克斯、蒂亚戈-席尔瓦和安东尼尼。范
博梅尔、诺切里诺和蒙塔里位于前腰艾玛努尔森的身后，前锋线上则是罗比尼奥和帕托。

尤文图斯以3-5-2对阵，守门员布冯，三后卫是基耶利尼、巴尔扎利以及博努奇。皮尔洛、比达尔和马尔基西奥镇守中场，利希施泰纳和艾斯蒂加里维亚位于两翼。博列洛和夸利亚雷拉突在最前。

4-4-2菱形中场对阵3-5-2

安东尼奥-孔蒂保持了他在最近的几场硬仗中使用过的3-5-2——比如对阵那不勒斯和乌迪内斯的时候。然而，那些球队都不是菱形中场，在这场比赛中，他上半场的排兵布阵，再加上客场应战，完全将主动权交给了AC米兰。当开局的混乱尘埃落定，阵型之间的对抗逐渐清楚起来的时候，大家发现尤文图斯的自由人变成了后卫，而米兰的自由人还在中场——别猜到底是哪个自由人对这场平局的贡献更大了，反正也没有奖励。

后卫3对2

罗比尼奥和帕托对抗着博努奇、基耶利尼还有巴尔扎利，也就是说，尤文在后场多一个人。让对手有个额外的守卫其实是比较合乎常规的，因为对方的后场大概是对己方伤害性最小的区域了。

上半场的时候，罗比尼奥的跑动非常精彩，他让对方的三名后卫疲于应付，但是帕托的表现却不尽如人意，并没有处于加盟红黑军团之后的最佳状态。

基耶利尼习惯于处于后防左边的位置，他喜欢掠夺式的前插，因此在本场的表现看起来并不是很自然。孔蒂并没有交代清楚后场到底是谁负责出球。另外，后场的三个人都不太擅长通过把球控制在脚下来给对手造成真正意义上的麻烦——其实阿莱格里很愿意冒这个险。

中场4对3


这个区域的对抗很耐人寻味，皮尔洛正处于风口浪尖，而阿莱格里的球队把这位中场球员周围的空间完全封住了，这很关键。其实米兰的战术大师弱化了派专人去盯防皮尔洛的需要，因为那可能会影响到主队整体的阵型。

不过，孔蒂的战术安排正中米兰下怀——尤文图斯在中路有三个人，米兰的艾玛努尔森顶在最前对抗皮尔洛，与此同时，范博梅尔还在中场清道夫的位置上活动自如，这根本就没有破坏掉米兰的菱形中场。

皮尔洛在中路几乎没有活动的空间，他对比赛的影响微乎其微。反之，尤文图斯在没有球权的时候，却给了范博梅尔充足的时间和空间，尽管他主要是个中场绞肉机，但他的传球也足够对对手造成威胁了，温格手下的小伙子们经历了圣西罗一役之后，对这一点一定很有感触。

攻击4对4

表面上看来，尤文图斯本来打算用双中锋去袭击蒂亚戈-席尔瓦和梅克斯，同时让艾斯蒂加里维亚和利希施泰纳去对抗边后卫，这样的话就会带了一场有趣的比赛，因为米兰在后场就没有多余的防守队员来扮演清道夫的角色了。
理想跟现实的差距总是很大——阿莱格里很清楚，只要切断中场的输出，博列洛和夸利亚雷拉就会哑火，那么他们只好拉边或者回撤才能发挥点作用。

而且，利希施泰纳和艾斯蒂加里维亚其实更偏防守型，尽管他们上前来压迫米兰的边后卫，无球的时候表现很出色，但控球的时候，他们跟前锋间的配合却不够默契，无法形成很大的威胁。而实际的场面正是如此，博列洛和夸利亚雷拉发现自己其实对抗着4名防守队员，而且从已经被拉开的中场几乎得不到任何帮助。简单来说，尤文图斯的3-5-2让他们处于很不利的形势之下。

下半场的变化

安东尼奥-孔蒂在中场休息的时候充分认识到了场上形势，他的换人正如给尤文图斯的步子加入了弹簧。佩佩换下了艾斯蒂加里维亚充当右边翼，老妇人变阵为4-3-3，而米兰从某种程度上看只是对照尤文的阵型稍作调整。

虽然已经变成4-3-3，但孔蒂一直到第70分钟才换上马特里，这也有点奇怪。他先让武齐尼奇替下了博列洛，把夸利亚雷拉顶到前面位于中锋的位置。孔蒂换上了马特里之后，尤文图斯开始对米兰形成压力，破门扳平其实只是时间上的早晚而已。

总之，尽管只是事后诸葛亮，不过孔蒂倒是第一个承认他在上半场的阵型让米兰控制了比赛，而且如果蒙塔里的进球算数的话，红黑军团已经2球领先了。当然，尤文图斯也声明自己遇到了错判，但是最终，米兰控制了上半场，而尤文图斯在下半场扭转了局势——平局可以算是个公平的结果。

pedro

Benfica 2-3 Porto: pressing, transitions, set-pieces and substitutions
March 2, 2012


The starting line-ups

A stereotypically brilliant match between these two sides ended with a narrow win for Porto, who now have a crucial lead in the title race.

Benfica coach Jorge Jesus named the side that was largely as expected. In fact, it was exactly the same XI that played in the 2-2 draw in the reverse fixture.

Porto coach Vitor Pereira’s side was very different from that day, however. Marc Janko has since arrived to play upfront, Lucho Gonzalez has returned in the middle, while Djalma played on the left and Maicon was at the back.

This was a very attacking, aggressive game that went through various phases and was highly influenced by substitutions.

Early stages

Possession was pretty much even (51-49) in the first half, and the formation battle was as expected – 4-2-3-1 v 4-3-3. We know what to expect from these battles – the midfield triangles closely aligned, 1 v 1 battles on the flanks, and a spare man at the back. The key in positioning terms is to look for movement and fluidity.

We had this from both sides in the holding positions, though in different ways. Javi Garcia dropped into the back to push the Benfica centre-backs wider, the full-backs moved higher, and make Benfica roughly a 3-3-1-3 with the ball, once the wide players had moved forward and Axel Witsel had become the sole central midfielder. Porto, however, featured rotation in their midfield triangle, meaning Fernando stormed forward a couple of times, with Joao Moutinho becoming the deepest midfielder.

Pressing

More important than formations or movement when in possession was what the sides were doing without the ball. Both pressed heavily in midfield, with Porto doing this more effectively than Benfica, who suffered slightly from Pablo Aimar’s lack of work rate, and confusion about whether he was meant to be pressing one of the centre-backs or Fernando, plus the issue of Fernando’s forward movement.

Porto dominated the early stages because they were more energetic and more combative in midfield, with Gonzalez a key factor. When Benfica shifted briefly to three at the back with the ball, the Porto wide players tracked the Benfica full-backs, but the central midfielders continued to press Garcia and Witsel, meaning they actually ended up in advance of Hulk and Djalma. Porto went ahead through a Hulk thunderbolt – a freak goal, but one that reflected their dominance at that period.


The early second half line-ups, with the key changes highlighted

Fouls and high lines

The pressing from both sides meant three things for the game. First, it was played at a very high tempo. Second, there were lots of tackles, fouls and cards, which would prove crucial later on. Third, it meant both sides played with a high defensive line, which was not a huge problem because both Janko and Oscar Cardozo are both threats with their height and strength rather than raw pace.

However, Benfica did then create a couple of chances by lofting the ball over the top of the defence – Cardozo flicked a shot into the hands of the goalkeeper, then Aimar had a header saved.

Towards the end of the second half the pressing dropped in intensity, but both sides continued to do it. This meant the press was easier to get out of, transitions became more obvious, and Benfica grew into the game. They could get their wide players (and Aimar) involved in the game more easily to carry the ball forward, and again, while Cardozo’s equaliser didn’t arrive because of a particular tactical feature of the game, Benfica had looked strong at that point, and had forced three Porto players to go into the book after fouls.

Second half

This is when set-pieces started to become an obvious feature of the game (naturally, with so many fouls) – and Cardozo, unmarked in the centre of the goal, headed in a free-kick.

Jesus then made a substitution, with Aimar off and Rodrigo on to play slightly higher up the pitch. An Aimar injury may have contributed to Jesus’ decision, but although it left the midfield a little more open, the change made sense – Benfica wanted more energy high up the pitch, and Rodrigo could run a lot faster, and a lot further, than Aimar.

James and Djalma

But the crucial change came from Pereira, who made the extremely bold move of taking off centre-back Rolando, and bringing on wide forward James Rodriguez. This prompted a reshuffle – Maicon came into the centre, and previously anonymous left-winger Djalma moved all the way across to right-back.


Gaitan was moved to left-back

Djalma played brilliantly at right-back, and as Porto pushed forward, that was to become the key battlezone. That said, they were leaving space at the back for Benfica to counter into, and the game suddenly became a contest all about playing on the break. Porto’s goal actually came from a counter-counter-attack – Benfica had broken and left their midfield bare, so Porto went up the other end and James, playing narrower than Djalma, finished a sweeping move brilliantly. Pereira’s move was an inspired decision in that respect, but it could just as easily have been 3-1 as 2-2 at that point.

10 v 11

The substitution got even better, because Djalma continued to motor forward. Porto played predominantly down that side, and this may have contributed to Emerson fouling Hulk and picking up his second booking. He was off, and now Benfica had a real problem in the zone of the pitch they were already looking weak in. Jesus was made to pay for not having Joan Capdevila (hugely out of favour) on the bench, and instead he had to put creative midfielder Nico Gaitan there.

This was clearly not an ideal situation. Benfica sat back with two banks of four and Cardozo upfront, but Porto continued to get the ball out to Hulk. Eventually, the uncomfortable Gaitan dived in and conceded a free-kick in that left-back zone. Sure enough, Porto scored from the set-piece, with Maicon up from the back to head into the net. Porto were then comfortable for the final few minutes with 11 v 10.

Conclusion

Last season Benfica suffered one of their most humiliating defeats to Porto when they lost 5-0 at the Dragão. The problem there was a complete inability to defend in the left-back zone, with David Luiz terrible in particular. Hulk running riot, and all five goals coming from that zone. The same position turned out to be a huge problem tonight, and this may have a significant impact upon their title hopes.

That turned out to be the key factor in a game that featured pressing, counter-attacking and poor defending at dead ball situations. It was a fantastically open game, and Pereira came out on top with his brave substitution.

pedro

822楼参考译文

Alex2011

Liverpool 1-2 Arsenal: Liverpool see more of the ball, but Arsenal have the finishing touch
March 3, 2012


The starting line-ups

Robin van Persie had two chances and scored two goals, and the gap between the teams is now ten points.

Kenny Dalglish rewarded Stewart Downing and Dirk Kuyt for their good Carling Cup final performances with starts.

Steven Gerrard was unfit to start, Jay Spearing was used in the holding role, and Jamie Carragher replaced the injured Daniel Agger.

Arsene Wenger had fitness worries over Tomas Rosicky, Thomas Vermaelen and Robin van Persie, but all three started – so Arsenal were unchanged from the win over Tottenham last week.

Van Persie admitted after the game that Arsenal didn’t truly “deserve” to win the game, while Wojciech Szczesny says they were “killed” in the first half. Liverpool did more in the final third but consistently failed to hit the target.

Shapes

Liverpool’s team selection suggested they’d be playing 4-3-3 rather than 4-4-2, but it was more like the latter. Kuyt drifted around to the right of the pitch but close to Luis Suarez, while Jordan Henderson shuttled across the pitch on the right of a midfield four.

With Stewart Downing staying wide on the left, it meant Liverpool’s shape was lopsided. And the same went for Arsenal – they had Theo Walcott wide on the right, and Yossi Benayoun coming inside (though seeing little of the ball) on the left. That meant that the teams were playing down the same flank – Liverpool down the left, Arsenal down the right, summed up by the below graphic at half time, which also shows how dominant Liverpool were:



Battles

It was difficult to find a key area this game was contested in – the sides both looked too open and lacked structure in midfield. One interesting battle was Theo Walcott against Jose Enrique – Walcott got in behind for an early chance, but from then on the Spanish left-back kept him quiet by using his strength. Martin Skrtel played to the left of the centre-back duo, meaning Carragher’s lack of pace wasn’t exposed when Walcott came inside.

At the other end, Arsenal were pushing their defence high up the pitch, and Liverpool continually had problems with the trap, bringing attacks to a premature end. Suarez was the main danger, and although he won a penalty and went on a mazy run to create a good chance for himself, he often conceded possession when trying to beat an opponent, generally when picking up the ball in the channels.



But Liverpool were the better side, pressing well and making Arsenal’s passing sloppy. Henderson had a decent game by bringing energy high up the pitch, and the one area Arsenal should have capitalised on more was when Spearing moved forward to close down Alex Song or Mikel Arteta – that created space for Rosicky, but he didn’t have a great influence on the game.

Second half

What changed in the second half? In terms of personnel, very little. Dalglish surprisingly waited until the 88th minute to make his first change, while Arsenal’s substitutions didn’t have a key impact.

Arsenal were much improved in the second half, though, and Liverpool’s midfielders became wayward in possession – Charlie Adam tried too many of his long diagonals, Spearing seemed to be under more pressure when he got the ball, and Henderson simply wasn’t involved – attempting less than half the passes he did in the first half.

Alex Song’s game was a microcosm of his season – not great positionally, defensively suspect, but a couple of excellent passes through or over the defence – the assist for van Persie was reminiscent of his pass for the winner against Everton in December. Surprisingly, Song plays more successful through balls than any other player in the Premier League.

In the end, the game was decided by nothing more than efficiency in the box. Liverpool had more possession (54%-46%), more shots (12-10), played more passes in the attacking third (134-79), played more crosses (38-8) and won more corners (12-0). Yet Arsenal managed to get more shots on target (7-4). This is the story of Liverpool’s season, particularly at home – they dominate the game but fall down when it comes to goalscoring. Usually that’s been enough for a 0-0 or a 1-1, but van Persie’s sheer ruthlessness in the box meant they suffered their first home defeat of the season.



Conclusion

Not a game with much tactical interest. Both sides named their expected sides, and then neither coach made any key substitutions. Dalglish’s decision to go for more of a 4-4-2 shape was interesting, especially as Liverpool dominated possession early on, but they seemed to tire in the second half.

Arsenal have played better and lost this season – they didn’t do much particularly well here, aside from two excellent balls and two excellent finishes.

Alex2011

824楼参考译文
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利物浦1-2阿森纳战术分析：红军挥霍，枪手点杀

2012-03-04 / 锈着等

范佩西得到了两次机会，打入两球，赛后两队的差距被拉大到了10分。

由于联赛杯决赛中的良好表现，达格利什把唐宁和库伊特派上了首发。杰拉德由于身体状况没有完全恢复而没有首发，斯皮林出任后腰。此外卡拉格顶替了受伤的阿格。

罗西基、维尔玛伦和范佩西的身体状况也存疑，但温格还是让他们都首发了——因此同上周末战胜热刺那场相比，阿森纳没有做出任何人员调整。

赛后范佩西也承认，阿森纳并非完全配的上这场胜利。斯琴斯尼说球队在上半场被利物浦“杀死”了。利物浦在对方禁区的机会更多，但就是打不进门框范围。

阵型

从首发来看，利物浦似乎要打4-3-3，但实际上他们打的是4-4-2。库伊特向右路移动，但更靠近苏亚雷斯。而亨德森这次去到了球场另一端，成了4中场里靠右的那个。

唐宁仍然在左边路，因此利物浦本场排出了一个不对称的阵型。阿森纳的也是——沃尔科特在右边路，左边的贝纳永更靠中路（虽然他拿球机会不多）。也就是说，两队主打的是同一条边路——利物浦的左路，阿森纳的右路。下图反映的是上半场的情况，它可以说明这点，同时也说明了利物浦上半场的统治力：

赛况

很难说本场的关键区域在哪——双方都很开放，而且中场组织也不行。比较有意思的对决是沃尔科特对恩里克——开始沃尔科特有一次打到了他的身后，但随后西班牙左后卫就用其力量看死了沃尔科特。斯科特尔本场司职左中后卫，因此当沃尔科特内切时，卡拉格速度慢的弱点不会暴露。

而在另外一端，阿森纳本场防线前压，他们的造越位战术给利物浦带来了不少麻烦，导致后者的进攻早早就结束了。苏亚雷斯是利物浦阵中最有威胁的。虽然他本场制造了一个点球，之后还以风骚的跑位给自己创造了一个机会，但他在试图过掉对手时总是丢球，大部分是在边路拿球的时候。

但利物浦还是表现较好的。他们压迫很给力，让阿森纳无法传出好球。亨德森的表现还算不错，他给利物浦的前场带来了活力。斯皮林向前移动以封堵宋和阿尔特塔——这给罗西基制造了空间。阿森纳本可以更多利用这个的，但罗西基本场表现的机会并不多。

下半场

下半场和上半场有什么不同？从人员方面来看，基本没有。令人惊讶的是，达格利什直到第88分钟才换了第一个人。温格的换人也没有起到关键作用。

但阿森纳下半场的表现好了很多。利物浦中场在控球方面似乎缺乏变通——亚当有好几次都选择了斜长传，斯皮林拿球时似乎更加紧张了，亨德森则是基本在打酱油——他下半场的传球次数还不及上半场的一半。

宋本场的表现可以说是他本赛季表现的缩影——位置感不强，防守有待提高，但他的几脚精彩传球穿透了对方防线——给范佩西的那脚助攻和对埃弗顿那场的绝杀助攻如出一辙。惊人的是，宋的成功直塞次数是全英超最多的。

最终，决定比赛的有且仅有禁区内的效率。利物浦的控球（54%-46%）、射门（12-10）、在对方禁区的传球（134-79）、传中（38-8）和角球（12-0）数都比阿森纳多。但射正次数是阿森纳多（7-4）。本场比赛反映了利物浦本赛季，尤其是在主场的走势——他们统治了全场，但倒在了进球数上。此类比赛的结果通常是0-0或1-1，但范佩西在禁区内毫不留情的两脚给利物浦送上了赛季主场首败。

结论

本场在战术方面没什么可说的。两队排兵布阵都在意料之中，教练也没有做出什么关键换人。比较有意思的是达格利什更侧重于4-4-2了，尤其是他们开局阶段统治了全场，但下半场他们似乎已经累了。

本赛季阿森纳有几场打的比这更好但输球了——本场除了两个好球和两记临门一脚外，他们也没有什么特别值得称道的。