11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-1 16:13:07

马扎里功亏一篑，未能演好痛击三巨头的连续剧直播大戏的第三集

孔蒂后程发力保持不败，难能可贵

pedro · 发表于 2011-12-1 19:30:13

尤文连续两场客战硬仗，取得1胜1平，本赛季这势头不错

该反弹了，5年了

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-5 16:03:31

本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-12-5 16:05 编辑

An advantage to be in Group A or B for Euro 2012 – especially when it comes to the semis
December 2, 2011

It remains to be seen how the process of today’s Euro 2012 draw will be structured, although we can assume it will be convoluted and drawn-out – certainly with long speeches and explanations, and possibly cultural dances from the two host countries.

Often, the first draw involves deciding which groups the seeds go into – A, B, C or D – before determining which sides anyone will actually play. As it happens, this time around Poland have already been assigned to group A, whilst fellow hosts Ukraine have been placed in group D.

When this first draw is made, the commentators often say something along the lines of “At this stage the draw means nothing, it doesn’t really matter which group we’re in, it matters which sides we play.”

But is that true? There is surely a clear advantage (whether or not you’re the seeds) from being in Group A rather than in Group D. For this tournament, a side in Group A that progresses to the final will play six times in 24 days – for a side in Group D, it will be six times in 21 days.

In modern football, when players are frequently rested to give them extra time to recover for more important games, and when there’s a feeling that being in the Europa League significantly harms a side’s performance in the following league game, a difference of three days might be crucial.

Of course, the obvious counter-argument is that a side in Group D has extra time to prepare for the tournament, which is certainly true. But then, so will that team’s group opponents, so it’s no real advantage. Besides, whenever a player is interviewed before his first game of the tournament, he almost always speaks of the frustration of watching everyone else play whilst sitting around, and is desperate to go out there and get his own campaign underway.

Spain won Euro 2008 despite being in Group D (and did the same in World Cup 2010 from Group H) – which indicates that starting late isn’t a barrier to success. However, there’s too many variables to say that this disproves the theory that going first is better.

Semi-finals crucial

Because of the structure of this tournament, being drawn in Group A or B will be particularly important at the semi-final stage. The two sides that get to the semis from A and B (they could, of course, be from the same group) will face a side from groups C and D having had two extra days’ rest between the quarter-final and semi-final stage.

The first semi-final on the 27th June will be played between a side who played on the 21st against a side who played on the 23rd. Likewise, the second semi-final on the 28th of June will be played between a side who played on the 22nd against a side who played on the 24th. The tournament is structured this way to prevent it being spilt into two halves (which would mean certain combinations of finalists aren’t possible from the start, like in World Cup 2002 or Euro 2008), but two days’ extra rest is a huge difference at that stage.

In fact, no knockout games will be held with both sides having had the same amount of time to prepare. The graph below shows how many days rest each qualifier will have compared to their opponent going into each game.

Because of various changes to the structure of the tournament since a 16-team European Championship was introduced in 1996, there have only been two previous matches where a side enjoyed two days more rest than their opponents – the semi-finals of Euro 2004. Then, the two sides with more rest, Portugal and Greece, beat the two side with less rest, Holland the Czech Republic. We ended up with a final featuring two sides from Group A.

Summary

The semi-final stage is where rest will come into play, and there’s an advantage of being in either Group A or Group B.
If you win group A, you have, in total, four days rest against your three knockout opponents. If you win Group D, you’re always having to play catch-up.

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-5 16:06:24

603楼参考译文

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-5 16:13:01

本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-12-5 16:18 编辑

Newcastle 0-3 Chelsea: Blues take their chances
纽卡 0-3 蓝军：客队可逮着胜利的机会了（之前的联赛、欧冠和联赛杯的倒霉劲都赶一块儿）
December 3, 2011

The starting line-ups

The scoreline makes it look convincing, but Chelsea had to work extremely hard to get the three points.

Alan Pardew was without the suspended Jonas Gutierrez and the injured Cheick Toite, so Peter Lovenkrands started on the left, and Danny Guthrie in the middle. Fabricio Coloccini only lasted half an hour before being replaced by James Perch.

Andre Villas-Boas continued with Oriel Romeu at the base of midfield, and again Didier Drogba started over Fernando Torres upfront.

The game was an interesting tactical battle that could be separated into various categories, although it was so open and saw so many shots (many hitting the woodwork) that the game could have taken a very different course had various non-tactical features gone slightly differently.

Chelsea defensive line

The obvious place to start is with Chelsea’s high line, without question the most frequently discussed part of Villas-Boas gameplan this year. It didn’t take long before Newcastle very nearly prospered with a simple ball in beyond the defence for Demba Ba – David Luiz fouled him, and might have expected a red card. It was a similar incident – if closer to the goal – to Jose Bosingwa’s red card at Queens Park Rangers.

However, after that initial setback, Chelsea defended much deeper. They didn’t press a great deal later in the game, only won two offsides in the match, and were rarely troubled by pace in behind. It was more like the Chelsea approach under Carlo Ancelotti, of sitting deep and bringing the wide players back level with the two deeper midfielder. In fact, for much of the first half, Frank Lampard was higher up than Juan Mata and Sturridge when Chelsea didn’t have the ball.

Maybe Villas-Boas is slowly changing his mind and telling his side to be more conservative without the ball. It seemed that way here, although it’s debatable whether it was the correct choice against Ba and later Shola Ameobi, who were both physical threats. Luiz was as vulnerable in the air as he was on the ground, being beaten by Ba to a header which hit the post in the first half, and more comfortable late on when Ivanovic played narrower.

Midfield positioning

Newcastle’s use of Hatem Ben Arfa behind Ba meant they were 4-4-1-1 rather than 4-4-2, and there wasn’t an obvious numerical disadvantage in midfield – Ben Arfa dropped onto Romeu.

The problem in midfield was more the way Newcastle’s central midfielders tried to win the ball back. Yohan Cabaye was to the right and was more energetic in closing down – Danny Guthrie was sitting a little deeper. Frank Lampard had no space to work in because he was shut out by Cabaye, and was substituted, much to his disappointment, after an hour
But the positioning midfield created two issues – first, Ramires got time on the ball as no-one looked to close him down. He got space to pick up speed on the ball and breezed past Guthrie after three minutes. Second, it created a perfect pocket of space for Juan Mata, in behind Cabaye and in a position away from Guthrie. Mata was the key player in the first half, orchestrating the game between the lines.

Sturridge

The other issue for Newcastle was Daniel Sturridge, who was always going to be an important player in the game for two reasons. First, he had scored in his two previous appearances. Second, Chelsea attempt a higher proportion of their shots from the right – 25% – than any other side in the league. Third, Newcastle were without Jonas Gutierrez, who does a brilliant job in protecting Ryan Taylor and making Newcastle secure on that side of the pitch.

Sturridge had eight shots in the game, more than any other player, and shouldn’t have needed until his final attempt to score. The balance between Chelsea’s two wide players was perfect – one came into the centre of the pitch to retain the ball and create, the other went in behind the defence to add a goal threat.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Newcastle approach

Newcastle played quite a basic and direct style of football, but it resulted in chances and they were unfortunate not to score. They were probably more threatening early on when Chelsea weren’t sitting so deep – Ba was a force in the air, and with Peter Lovenkrands and Gabriel Obertan stretching the play, plus good support from the full-backs to push Chelsea’s wide players back, a goal following a cross looked likely.

Pardew saw that this approach looked promising, and at half-time he withdrew Ben Arfa and brought on Shola Ameobi for double the physical threat. Newcastle started going longer, with diagonal balls forward from the right of the pitch towards Ba or Ameobi up against Luiz. There’s an argument that they became too predictable and could have done with more invention in central positions to vary the threat – but having hit the woodwork three times, they can consider themselves highly unlucky, and Pardew should be given credit for bravely using his second substitution at half-time having identified where he thought Chelsea were weak.

Defensively, Newcastle simply missed important players. Gutierrez’s value has already been outlined, but Tiote would have patrolled the zone Mata worked in, and Coloccini wouldn’t have been beaten so easily for Didier Drogba’s opener – James Perch isn’t a centre-back, let alone a commanding one.

Newcastle’s success has come mainly from consistency of selection, particularly at the back, and although they have some decent squad players, many are in wide positions. They can’t afford to be without many of their excellent spine – Tim Krul, Coloccini, Cabaye, Tiote and Ba – and that contributed to them losing their record of the best defence in the league.

Conclusion

Credit to both sides and both managers. Villas-Boas’ selection of Romeu was a good move deep in midfield – he protected the defence, nullified Ben Arfa and allowed Ramires to move forward. His passing was solid, only giving the ball away when trying to prompt counter-attacks, and did a passable Lucas Leiva impression with his tackling across a horizontal line.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

The use of Mata and Sturridge, unquestionably Villas-Boas’ first choices in a team with many selection issues, also worked well – those two and Ramires combined very nicely throughout.

Newcastle put up a great fight, as they did against the two Manchester clubs – but fell short. They need their unavailable trio to return soon – and a fully fit Ben Arfa to provide another creative link would also be welcome, to become more of an all-round force.

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-5 16:13:35

本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-12-5 16:51 编辑

605楼参考译文
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纽卡斯尔0-3切尔西：博阿斯回收后防，切尔西中场出彩

2011-12-04 / Sulley

从比分来看，这似乎是一场令人信服的胜利，但实际上切尔西的三分得来殊为不易。

切尔西防线

中场站位

斯图里奇

喜鹊的另一心腹大患当属丹尼尔-斯图里奇，而他也注定将是本场比赛中的重要角色，原因有二。首先，他已经连续两轮联赛进球。其次，切尔西在尝试射门的次数上冠绝英超，领先其他球队至少百分之二十五。况且纽卡斯尔还失去了古铁雷斯，阿根廷人本可以为莱恩-泰勒提供很好的保护，从而巩固喜鹊这一侧的防守。

斯图里奇全场比赛射门八次，列两队所有球员之首，若非运气欠佳，他大可不必等到最后一脚才告得手。蓝军阵中两名边锋搭配得相得益彰——其中一人能够游弋到中路控制球权，担当创造者，另一人则擅长偷袭对方后卫身后，制造破门威胁。

by Guardian Chalkboards

喜鹊的战术安排

结论

by Guardian Chalkboards

马塔和斯图里奇的使用也起到了不错的效果，在这支多个位置悬而未决的队伍里，至少此二人无疑应是博阿斯的当然之选——他们与拉米雷斯的组合在全场比赛中几乎天衣无缝。

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-5 16:21:40

古铁缺阵的后果会这么糟吗？

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-5 16:23:52

本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-12-5 16:30 编辑

Borussia Mönchengladbach 1-1 Borussia Dortmund: compact sides and balls over the top门兴格拉德巴赫 1-1 多特蒙德：鹬蚌相争渔翁得利
December 4, 2011

The starting line-ups

2nd v 1st going into the game, but this draw allowed Bayern Munich to return to the top.

Lucien Favre was without Marco Reus, so Raul Bobadilla played alongside Mike Hanke. At the back, Martin Stranzl returned from injury and was in for Roel Brouwers.

Jurgen Klopp is still missing Sven Bender after he got injured against Arsenal, so Ilkay Gundogan played instead – otherwise, the side was as expected.

This wasn’t a particularly tactical match – the sides played their usual systems, there were no major switches in formation, and the first substitute entered the pitch in the 77th minute.

Mönchengladbach shape

This is the first time ZM has featured Mönchengladbach, so it’s worth outlining their system in detail. They play a 4-4-2ish shape – Reus is a key player, and having started the season on the right wing, he’s now moved forward and drops off the main striker. In his absence, Mönchengladbach were less nuanced and often lacked a link man. Bobadilla played as more of a conventional forward.

There is a clear division of responsibilities in midfield – the central midfielders are told to sit and protect the back four, the wide players move forward and link up with the front two, particularly on the counter.

The movement of the front two is interesting, both with and without the ball. When Mönchengladbach are in possession they strikers are happy to drift into the midfield zone and to move wide – and when the opposition have the ball, they drop deep, rarely pressure the defence, and create a ten-man barrier between the ball and Marc-Andre ter Stegen. They’re extremely compact (more on that here) the defence plays reasonably high up, the attackers play rather deep.

Squeezed middle

Dortmund also pushed up and playing a high defensive line in combination with their pressing in midfield. Therefore, the action took place in a small area of space in the centre of the defence. A little like in Dortmund’s win at Bayern, the space was always in behind the defences. Within two minutes, both Felipe Santana and Mats Hummels (the only two players on the pitch who weren’t being closed down quickly) had launched balls over the top of the Mönchengladbach defence.

The main chances came from this simple approach; Bobadilla and Shinji Kagawa both found themselves in good positions through on goal, and Robert Lewandowski made that run twice, on the second occasion managing to draw Stegen off his line into a poor position.

Pressing?

The main difference was the attitude without the ball – Mönchengladbach’s forwards dropped off towards the midfield, but Dortmund won the ball more quickly, using both their central midfielders high up to press energetically. Mönchengladbach were clever enough to get around this by dropping Havard Nordtveit, comfortable as a centre-back, into the defence to play out from the back.

Dortmund weren’t as fluent as we’ve come to expect – Mario Gotze drifted inside quickly but struggled to find space, as did Kagawa. The central midfield department was not as dynamic without Bender, and they needed more from that zone. Their goal came from a Lewandowski header from a corner.

Second half

At 0-1 down, Mönchengladbach’s wide players stayed higher up in the second half, not forming a second bank of four so readily. There was also more movement inside from the flanks – and this proved important. Juan Arango briefly took up a false nine position, brought both Dortmund centre-backs out, and Hanke darted into the space from the left flank and fired in the equaliser.

Neither side worked their transitions perfectly, though – Mönchengladbach because Dortmund pressed well, Dortmund because Mönchengladbach rarely left spaces at the back.

Both Gotze and Kagawa were removed in Klopp’s first change. Jakub Blaszczykowski came on, as did Lucas Barrios – pushing Dortmund to 4-4-2, making them more direct. Favre altered little, and though neither side shut up shop, a draw seemed likely after the equaliser.

Conclusion

Not a great example of a tactical extravaganza, but a good example of current German footballing ideology. Both sides play with two holding players, both look to play quick transitions from defence to attack, both remain compact. There was an element of the two sides cancelling each other out, but better finishing would have resulted in more goals – there was so much space behind the defences.

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-5 16:27:42

608楼参考译文

pedro · 发表于 2011-12-7 12:17:56

本帖最后由 pedro 于 2011-12-7 12:20 编辑

Chelsea 3-0 Valencia: Chelsea drop deep and progress to the second round
December 6, 2011

The starting line-ups

Chelsea are into the knockout stages after a surprisingly comfortable win over Valencia.

Andre Villas-Boas went for his usual 4-3-3, but sprung a surprise with the use of Raul Meireles on the left of the midfield triangle, meaning Frank Lampard dropped to the bench. Didier Drogba was in over Fernando Torres again upfront,

Unai Emery’s expected 4-2-3-1 featured Jonas as the central attacker, Sofiane Feghouli on the right, and Antonio Barragan at right-back. Ever Banega was out injured.

Chelsea were ahead after five minutes, and had the game sealed by half-time.

Chelsea approach

Andre Villas-Boas pretty much abandoned his approach of pressing in midfield and a high defensive line, completely switching strategy to the type of approach Chelsea were used to under Jose Mourinho or Carlo Ancelotti. The wingers dropped deep, level with the central midfielders to make a 4-5-1. The side didn’t close down Valencia’s centre-backs, nor the holding midfielders when they moved into deep positions, and the defence sat near the edge of the penalty area, not allowing balls to be played in behind.

The approach worked well – Valencia had the majority of the ball (69% is an incredible high figure) but rarely got it to Jonas or Roberto Soldado in space. Their best two efforts came from David Albelda – who unleashed a fine long-range strike as he wasn’t being closed down – and Jordi Alba, who got past Daniel Sturridge when the winger switched off, and hit the post.

It meant that the game was completely different from the previous meeting between the sides, which was extremely open. In that game, the fluidity meant that individual positioning was vital to the outcome of the game – here, with a 10-man barrier to try to break down, Valencia looked lost and the Alba-Mathieu combination was their only promising avenue early on. Even then, that was largely because of Alba’s skill rather than any real tactical brilliance, and Mathieu couldn’t get the better of Branislav Ivanovic.

Like in the second half against Newcastle at the weekend, Chelsea countered brilliantly. Juan Mata came infield with Sturridge staying wide and Ramires breaking from the centre – the Brazilian’s run resulted in the second goal. Drogba scored the other two and epitomised Chelsea’s approach, both in terms of the individual game and on a wider level – almost every Chelsea manager has, at some point, tried to build a side without him, yet every manager returns to him when the going gets tough. The balls played towards him were like the Chelsea of old – long balls from deep, rather than the shorter passes he’s been used to this season.

Another beneficiary of Chelsea’s change in approach was, oddly, Petr Cech. A goalkeeper isn’t usually considered to be directly affected by tactics, but Cech’s strengths don’t lie in saving one-on-ones (the Arsenal game showed that) which often occur when a side plays a high defensive line. Instead, with Chelsea sitting deep and Valencia having space to fire in a few long-range efforts, he was able to use his height to make some impressive full-length stops.

Changes

Emery went for a big change early in the second half – Alba surprisingly came off, Mathieu dropped to left-back (though the two had spent much of the second half switched anyway), Jonas moved to the left and Aduriz went upfront. Presumably, Emery thought that Valencia would dominate possession even with two strikers on the pitch, and wanted some extra poaching quality in the box. Aduriz isn’t tall, but has a good spring and is a good header of the ball.

It didn’t really work. If there are broadly three stages of turning possession into goals: (1) Having possession, (2) Turning the possession into chances, and (3) converting the chances, Valencia’s problem was (2) rather than (3) – they didn’t need another striker at that moment, they needed someone who could open up the defence and manufacture goalscoring opportunities. Pablo Piatti remained on the bench. Pablo Hernandez was introduced on the right, but came inside and struggled to find room.

Villas-Boas replaced Ramires with Jon Obi Mikel, meaning fewer counter-attacks and breaks from midfield, but more of a solid defensive base in midfield. Mikel sat alongside Romeu and helped close the game out.

Conclusion

Villas-Boas triumphed with a completely unVillas-Boas approach. Having insisted upon his philosophy for big Chelsea games so far this season – away at Old Trafford, at home to Arsenal – he suddenly reverted to the old Chelsea. If you’d been away for the past week and saw this performance, you’d have thought Villas-Boas had been sacked and replaced by Guus Hiddink or Ancelotti. The contrast in positions of interceptions between this game and the recent home defeat to Liverpool tells the story – they took place so much deeper tonight.

It’s irrefutable that these were the correct tactics for tonight, especially against a technically proficient Valencia side who would have thrived in spaces between the lines and in behind, but it probably provides more questions than answers. How often will Villas-Boas completely change his style? Why now, rather than in previous games when his strategy looked highly risky? Will they play this way in future, or just when Villas-Boas’ job was (allegedly) under threat?

And, most importantly, how much will displays like this harm the intention to play a proactive, high energy, attacking game in future?

Chelsea’s approach tonight was roughly equivalent to Arsenal’s Champions League run in 2005/06; a side whose manager insists on beauty and entertainment playing an uncharacteristically defensive style of football. For Arsenal it worked brilliantly in Europe – they made the final – but they couldn’t transfer to their old style of play for league matches, ending with the lowest number of points in Arsene Wenger’s 15-year spell, and the closest he’s come to not qualifying for the Champions League.

Wenger had already been at Arsenal for a decade, and had clearly put his stamp on the club, but this is a different situation. For a new manager trying to drastically change the style of football, there’s only so many times you can take a detour before you forget where you were trying to get to.

pedro · 发表于 2011-12-7 12:20:29

本帖最后由 pedro 于 2011-12-9 08:56 编辑

610参考译文
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切尔西3-0瓦伦西亚：蓝军稳守制胜，是缓兵之计还是长久之策？

2011-12-07 / 余文乐

在轻松得让人意外地战胜瓦伦西亚之后，切尔西进入了淘汰赛的阶段。

切尔西的战术

切尔西战术改变的另外一个受益者，竟然是，切赫。门将通常不被认为会受到战术的直接影响，但切赫的强项并不是化解单刀（对阿森纳的比赛就是明证）。而一旦球队采用高位防守，这样的情况会经常发生。当切尔西回收，瓦伦西亚有空位大力远射的时候，他就能利用他的身材作出一些舒展的扑救。

变阵

总结

Penelope · 发表于 2011-12-9 08:46:54

本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-12-9 08:51 编辑

Basel 2-1 Manchester United: United into the Europa League
December 8, 2011

The starting line-ups - Basel's wide midfielders frequently switched

Manchester United are out of the Champions League after a 2-1 defeat away in Switzerland.

Hieko Vogel was without his veteran central midfielder Benjamin Huggel because of a calf strain, so played Cabral instead.

Sir Alex Ferguson played Wayne Rooney upfront, supported by Park Ji-Sung, with Ryan Giggs and Phil Jones in the midfield.

United dominated possession and created more goalscoring chances – but Basel’s tactics were clever, and although they rode their luck on occasion, weren’t entirely flattered by the victory.

United dominate possession

Despite fielding a side with no recognised central midfielder, United were in control of the ball for long periods in the first half. Park played a deep role, coming short to get the ball from United’s other midfielders – which isolated Rooney, but meant United had a man extra in the midfield zone.

Jones stayed deep and to the right, Giggs was higher up to the left – either one was usually free, and United had 60% of possession in the first half.

Basel attack v United defence

Despite that dominance of possession, it was Basel who took the lead. Considering a 0-0 would have suited United and they started in a conservative fashion, it’s fair to look at the defensive side of United’s game first.

Despite having to hard-working players in Rooney and Park high up the pitch, United didn’t press. They let Basel have time on the ball at the back and in the midfield, and although this wasn’t a huge problem at the start of the game, it’s often difficult for sides to go from playing cautiously out of possession, to closing down and winning the ball back more quickly.

That was exactly what United needed to do having conceded the first goal, and after that Basel were excellent at slowing the tempo and cooling things down by passing calmly in midfield – although they had opportunities to break, they often turned down those opportunities and played keep-ball instead. Even Vogel denied his own side the chance to break quickly by delaying a Xherdan Shaqiri throw-in.

It seems likely that Vogel watched the tape of Manchester City’s 1-6 win over United – in that game, David Silva and James Milner caused problems by moving into the centre and switching flanks, movement replicated by Shaqiri and Fabian Frei here. They moved inside to combine and help Basel keep the ball, and a couple of times looked to overload United on either side with diagonal runs from one flank to another. Shaqiri moved from the right all the way over to the left early on, meaning both Basel’s wingers were on the same flank – this produced the early cross that David De Gea flapped at.

The first goal came when Shaqiri crossed from wide – although he had to move out there to retrieve the ball having found himself in a central position – again, De Gea didn’t look comfortable.

After United lost Nemanja Vidic to injury, they looked increasingly worried by the good hold-up play shown by Marco Streller, and didn’t have anyone to challenge him physically. Evans often stood off and allowed Basel to build attacks – another time he tried to get in front, fouled Streller, and conceded the free-kick which indirectly resulted in the second goal.

United attack v Basel defence

Streller and Alex Frei didn’t really seem to know what their job was defensively – they casually picked up Giggs and Jones but not strictly enough to prevent United having the ball. Jones still doesn’t look comfortable in midfield – certainly not when his side are in control of the ball (he did a fine job when England played ultra-defensively against Spain, but his job in that game was essentially the job of a centre-back) – he’s not silky enough on the ball, moving it too slowly. When Vidic got injured, Ferguson ought to have considered pushing Jones back to centre-back (he might have dealt well with Streller) in order to introduce a true midfielder.

Giggs, however, had a fine game. The above diagram shows he generally had no-one looking to pressure him in deep positions, which contributed to him completing more passes than any other player, and also creating more chances than any other player. There have been some claims United missed a Wesley Sneijder figure in this match – he was allegedly a target in the summer – but even without considering Sneijder’s extremely average form in the past 18 months, that was not the problem here.

Instead, the problem was three-fold. Basel were able to sit very deep, and United didn’t have the individuals to break them down. They lacked

(a) A target man who could provide a physical presence in the box, challenge for crosses, and dissuade Basel from sitting deep – that, in turn, would provide more space in behind for United’s other players.

(b) Quality attacking play from full-back. The movement of Basel’s wide midfielders meant they were often vulnerable to quick breaks down the flanks, and the narrowness of their side meant United needed to get their full-backs forward to stretch the play. Smalling is a willing runner but not a natural full-back, whilst Evra’s delivery was poor. Note the lack of balls in from wide areas below.

(c) A regista, or deep-lying playmaker. This is possibly the most vital component of a modern attacking football side – someone who can create from deep and provoke the opposition midfield out of position, switch the play from flank to flank, or provide a sudden forward pass into feet. Jones wasn’t particularly poor individually, he was just the wrong man for the occasion – a tackler when United needed a passer.

United changed in the second half, bringing on Danny Welbeck for Ashley Young, moving Park to the left and going 4-4-2. They suffered long spells without the ball, though, were still uncomfortable at pressing, and Basel were good at slowing the tempo.

Conclusion

Vogel’s tactics unquestionably worked well – Basel completed excellently with a side significantly superior on paper. They defended deep to prevent United getting space, knowing they had little ability to get around a packed defence, and attacked intelligently – bringing the wide players inside.

United defended poorly and (aside from Giggs) lacked quality with the ball. Their main tactical problem in Europe, like City’s, has been the lack of quality deep-lying midfielder, and that should be their next transfer target.

Penelope · 发表于 2011-12-9 08:47:25

本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-12-10 12:40 编辑

612楼参考译文
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巴塞尔2-1曼联战术分析：巴塞尔战术得当，红魔亟需中场灵魂
由制霸中轴线发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

曼联出征瑞士以1-2落败，也被从欧冠淘汰出局。

巴塞尔方面中场老将本杰明-胡格尔由于小腿拉伤缺阵，所以主帅福格尔选择让卡布拉尔首发。

弗格森则排出了鲁尼突前、朴智星在鲁尼身后支援、吉格斯和菲尔-琼斯司职中场的首发阵容。

曼联占据了控球优势，并且创造出了更多的进球机会——不过巴塞尔的战术很聪明，尽管数次被幸运女神眷顾的他们并未为这场胜利太过得意。

曼联占据控球优势

尽管球队的常规中前卫都因受伤或禁赛不能出场，但曼联在上半场的大部分时间里还是保持了控球优势。朴智星回撤得很深，经常主动去接应队里其他中场的短传——这虽然孤立了鲁尼，不过同时也意味着曼联在中场区域多出了一名球员。

琼斯站位很靠后，接近球场右侧，吉格斯则在他的左前方——两人中通常都有一人可以自由活动，而曼联也在上半场拥有着60%的控球率。

巴塞尔之矛 vs 曼联之盾

尽管曼联控球占优，但率先破门的却是巴塞尔。考虑到曼联只需一个0-0即可出线，而他们一开场也的确显得比较保守，我们可以先来看看曼联的防守端表现。

虽然前场有朴智星和鲁尼这样积极拼抢的球员，但曼联并没有选择压迫式的打法。他们允许巴塞尔在后场以及中场控球，尽管这在比赛一开始并不算一个严重的问题，但对于谨慎退防的球队来说，要想再转变为前场紧逼，快速反抢的战术往往是相当困难的。

而这恰恰是曼联在先丢一球之后最需要做的事情，在那之后巴塞尔在放慢节奏，控制比赛局面上做的棒极了：他们在中场的传递非常冷静———虽然有过反击的机会，但他们还是更多的选择了放弃这些机会，转而保持控球。福格尔甚至亲自阻止了谢尔丹-沙基里的快发界外球，没有让球队利用这次快速反击的良机。

福格尔似乎看过了曼联1-6输给曼城的录像带——在那场比赛中，大卫-席尔瓦和詹姆斯-米尔纳通过靠近中路和互相换边给曼联制造了麻烦，本场比赛沙基里和法比安-弗雷则复制了这样的跑动路线。他们向中路靠拢形成配合，帮助巴塞尔控球，还有好几次通过斜线交叉跑动来制造局部上的人数优势，从而威胁曼联防线。沙基里开场不久就有一次从右路一路来到了左路，使得巴塞尔的两名边锋都处在了球场的同一侧——这次跑动随即制造了当时那次被德赫亚拍出的传中。

第一个进球也是来自沙基里拉到边路后的传中——尽管一开始身处禁区的他不得不追到角旗附近才拿回皮球——而这一次的德赫亚看起来依旧很不自如。

在曼联失去受伤的维迪奇之后，他们看起来愈发受困于斯特雷勒在锋线上的支点能力，而且无人能用身体对抗来压制他的发挥。埃文斯通常会靠后站位，放任巴塞尔去组织进攻——随后他尝试前压了一次便被斯特雷勒造成犯规，而且正是这次犯规造成的任意球间接导致了第二个失球。

曼联之矛 vs 巴塞尔之盾

斯特雷勒和亚历山大-弗雷看起来并不清楚自己在防守端的分工——他们偶尔会盯防吉格斯和琼斯，不过并没有努力去阻止曼联拿球。琼斯在中场看起来还是不适应——尤其是当球队控球的时候（他在英格兰以全力防守挑战西班牙的比赛中表现得不错，不过那场比赛中他的角色实际上与中后卫无异）——他拿球时还不够流畅，出球也太慢。当维迪奇受伤之后，弗格森本应该考虑让琼斯回撤打中后卫（他也许能很好的对付斯特雷勒）然后换上一名正牌的中场。

在另一方面，吉格斯则踢了一场不错的比赛。上面的阵型图显示，他在后撤的时候并没有专人盯防，这帮助他传出了全场最高的传球次数，同时也创造了全场最多的射门机会。有些人声称曼联在这场比赛中缺少了一个韦斯利-斯内德这样的人物——据说他曾是曼联在夏天的引援目标——但就算不考虑斯内德在过去的十八个月里平庸的状态，这也并非是真正问题的所在。

事实上曼联存在三方面的问题。巴塞尔可以很舒服的收缩防守，而曼联却没有能撕破他们防线的个体。他们缺少的是：

（A）一名身体强壮，能够在对手禁区里形成威胁的中锋，他会争抢传中并且迫使巴塞尔不再后撤得那么深——这会给曼联的其他球员制造更多的打防线身后的机会。

（B）有质量的边后卫插上进攻。巴塞尔边前卫的跑位方式意味着他们很难去防范快速的边路反击，而他们阵型的相对狭窄意味着曼联必须让自己的两个边后卫前插以拉开进攻的宽度。斯莫林的奔跑相当积极，但他并不是正统边后卫出身，埃弗拉的传球则很差劲。注意下图中边路传中的稀罕程度。

（C）一个节拍器，或者说拖后组织核心。这也许是现代攻势足球中最为关键的因素——一个能在后场创造机会，吸引对方中场失位，把球从一边转移到另外一边，或者能突然一脚直传传到队友脚下的球员。琼斯在本场的个人表现并不是特别差，他只是没能在合适的场合担任合适的角色而已——曼联需要的是一个传球手，而不是绞肉机。

曼联在下半场做出了改变，达尼-维尔贝克替下了阿什利-杨，朴智星移到左路改打4-4-2。可他们对前场紧逼的打法还是不适应，在大段时间内无法得到球权，同时巴塞尔在降低节奏方面做得非常出色。

结论

福格尔的战术毫无疑问取得了成功——巴塞尔在对手纸面上看起来明显更加强大的情况下取得了极其漂亮的结果。他们事先知道曼联在对付紧逼防守时并没有很好的办法，因此将防线后撤，从而阻止了曼联利用身后空当，在进攻端，他们也采取了很聪明的战术——让两名边前卫回收到中路。

曼联的防守很糟糕，而且在拿球时缺乏进攻质量（除了吉格斯）。他们最主要的战术问题和曼城一样，就是缺少一个优秀的拖后组织者，这应该会成为他们的下一个转会目标。

乔治六世 · 发表于 2011-12-10 10:14:17

本帖最后由乔治六世于 2011-12-10 10:15 编辑

A look at the Performa Sports iPad app
December 9, 2011

Keeping track of in-game statistics and events is rather difficult with a pen and paper.

That’s where the new Performa Sports iPad app comes in handy. Built for football analysts to analyse their sides’ (and opponents’) performance without having to recruit outside agencies, it allows live data analysis, as well as long-term collection of data from various matches.

The app is highly customizable to allow users to record exactly what they want. There is a basic template for events – shots, passes, tackles etc – but this can be edited to include anything. For example, if you only want to record when your team closes down the opposition, you can. Alternatively, you can focus upon a particular player and log specific actions for his position.

The first step is to set up your team. The sample match we’re using is Newcastle v Chelsea from the weekend, focusing upon the away side. Therefore, the starting XI is entered along with their position and their squad number.

Pictures for individual players can also be uploaded:

Next, you enter which events you’re looking to track. We’re going to include everything Chelsea did in the first ten minutes of the Newcastle game, so have gone for a broad selection of the main events in a football match:

Then, you set up the game, and we’re into the main match screen. Here, once you’ve started the match, there are three simple steps to log events. First, the type of event – for example, a pass. Then, the condition of the pass – complete, incomplete, or whatever option you choose to make available. Finally, the squad number of the player – 8, in Lampard’s case, as shown below. This process is repeated for every event you want to record.

The whole point of the app, of course, is so you can analyse the statistics after the match. There are various ways to do this – for example, you can take the individual game, select a certain event (completed passes) and find out which players have contributed to them:

Or you can select an individual player and review his stats over a longer period – the whole season, if you’ve logged the stats:

And, best of all, if you have the video of matches to upload onto the iPad, you can sync the events with the video, then go through, select an individual event (or filter all events to be shown a succession of particular incidents) and be shown the video of it.

Analysts for football clubs will certainly find it useful, and since (with a little practice) you only need one person to log the data for each match, it should be easy to build up a good bank of actions for your team. The crucial part of the app is how customizable it is – being able to determine which events you want to log means it’s extremely adaptable. It’s also possible to use the app for rugby, Gaelic football and hurling.

Visit www.performasports.com for more information or download the app at http://bit.ly/performasports.

乔治六世 · 发表于 2011-12-10 10:16:14

614楼参考译文

乔治六世 · 发表于 2011-12-10 10:20:41

本帖最后由乔治六世于 2011-12-10 10:50 编辑

Real Madrid v Barcelona – El Clasico tactical preview
皇马 vs 巴萨 - 德比战术前瞻
December 9, 2011

Possible line-ups

Saturday night sees the seventh – and final – Clasico of 2011, and perhaps the one with the most tactical possibilities.
There are reasons for that on both sides. Real have played a more attacking game this season, and there’s less certainty that they’ll defend deep, park the bus, and invite pressure. Barca, on the other hand, play the same style of football as ever, but they’ve experimented with a new formation – 3-4-3, which they’ve used in over half of their league games this season. With few injuries and squads stronger than last year, it’s surprisingly difficult to predict the 22 players that will start this match.

This preview is divided into nine sections – four each looking at the two sides’ approach, formation, selection and specific tactics, and then a few key questions.

Real Madrid: approach

Tactics are determined by what you want from the game, and this is an extremely important consideration, especially for Real. They are currently three points clear of Barcelona with a game in hand, which will almost certainly become a six-point advantage once that game in hand is played. Jose Mourinho’s desire to establish Real as more of an attacking force this season is clear, but for this match, he might change, because a draw would do him nicely. It would preserve the theoretical six point gap; Real would still have the league title in their own hands, even if they lost to Barca in the return match.

Real’s assistant coach Aitor Karanka has denied they’ll settle for a draw – but then, of course he would. Real don’t want to be seen as negative, and they’re hardly likely to give away their gameplan. But unlike in the second league Clasico last year, or the Champions League, Copa Del Rey or Supercup matches (even if you count away goals, extra time or penalties) Real don’t have to win. A draw will be regarded as a positive.

Barcelona: approach

Logically, Barcelona’s situation is the exact opposite. Their players have been keen to stress the importance of winning this game to their season – Dani Alves says “our margin of error has gone.” Lionel Messi says “It’s vital we get a good result.” Pep Guardiola pointed out that saving the Euro is more important than the Clasico, but maybe that was because there was no way of avoiding how crucial this match is in pure football terms.

He isn’t used to going to the Bernabeu needing to win (even if they often have done). For the past three years the away leg of the Bernabeu was late in the season with Barcelona already in command of the title, whilst both the Champions League and Supercup first legs were away, with Barcelona knowing they could wait for the second leg to make the breakthrough. A win isn’t essential, but it’s more vital than usual.

Real Madrid: formation

Real's line-up at Valencia

Jose Mourinho has almost exclusively used a 4-2-3-1 formation this season, with the exception of the away trip to Valencia, when he compromised and selected a 4-3-3 shape instead. A 4-3-3 is not necessarily less attacking than the 4-2-3-1, but in Real’s case it is – it involves the removal of one of the front four and the insertion of another central midfielder, likely to be a physical, combative ball-winner.

It seems likely the 4-3-3 is his big game formation, and like last season, he won’t risk playing four attackers against Barcelona. The use of Mesut Ozil in the centre of the 4-2-3-1 for the 5-0 last season was a disaster and it seems highly unlikely Mourinho would risk being completely overrun in the centre again. Three disciplined, functional midfielders are required.

Barcelona: formation

The 3-4-3 or the 4-3-3? The 3-4-3 has been preferred this season, but might not get an outing here, for four main reasons. First, in Guardiola’s words, “If you don’t control the game, a defence with three can cause problems. And you can’t control 90 minutes against Madrid.”

Second, for reasons outlined previously on this site (and in combination with the first point), a back three is much better against two strikers than against one or three forwards. You want one spare man, and with Real likely to field a front three, that wouldn’t work.

Third, it hasn’t looked particularly convincing when Barcelona have come up against decent sides – against Valencia they reverted to four at the back, against Sevilla they didn’t score, against Milan they just about won, but looked troubled.

Barcelona's line-up against Milan

Fourth, there is the crucial fact that, midway through the Clasico series last year, Guardiola realised that Real were enjoying breaking quickly down the flanks, and ordered his full-backs to remain in position to stop those breaks. A back three might mean more space on the wings for Real to exploit, and although the system can be fluid to allow defenders to attack, it’s doubtful whether Barcelona want to be fluid in a zone where they’re up against Cristiano Ronaldo.

Real Madrid: selection

Ricardo Carvalho is injured which means Pepe, used as a forward-playing defender in a couple of the Clasicos last year, will be needed at the back alongside Sergio Ramos. That means there’s a space in the probable three-man midfield – Xabi Alonso and Sami Khedira will start, and might be joined by Lassana Diarra, who played when Real went 4-3-3 against Valencia.

There’s also a possibility Diarra could start at right-back, where Alvaro Arbeloa is returning from injury, but this is unlikely. Another very interesting factor is the use of left-back Fabio Coentrao at right-back in Real’s win at Sporting Gijon last weekend, and that could be very useful against a player like David Villa, who will look to come inside from that flank onto his right foot (if he starts) – in fact, he scored a cracker in the Supercup in that very situation.

Upfront, the choice is between Karim Benzema and Gonzalo Higuain. They’ve both started seven league games, but are very different players. As Sid Lowe outlines, “Benzema is far more technical, a better player in the absence of space, Higuaín applies greater pressure and is swifter on the break. The decision as to how Madrid play…will go a long way to deciding who Madrid play.”

But will either play? It’s entirely possible that Ronaldo could be used as the lone forward – that’s how he played when Real triumphed in the Copa del Rey final, and in the first leg of the Champions League semi (when Real lost, but the system worked well until Real went down to ten men). That would leave Angel Di Maria on the left up against Alves, and Ozil breaking from the right. If Real want to counter-attack, this might be a better solution than using Higuain.

Barcelona: selection

Guardiola has various options throughout his side, but arguably more fuelled by uncertainty than a plethora of impressive options. At the back he will want pace. There are fitness concerns with both Gerard Pique and Carles Puyol, and Javier Mascherano has been more of a regular at centre-back this season. It’s probably either Pique or Puyol alongside the Argentine, with fitness a greater factor than style.

In midfield, Sergio Busquets and Xavi Hernandez are sure starters, and Andres Iniesta will definitely play. But will it be in midfield? If Real are going with physicality in midfield, the use of Seydou Keita will interest Guardiola so Barca aren’t overrun, with Iniesta moving forward into the front three. From there, Iniesta would come deep and turn the midfield three into a midfield four, recreating a loose diamond, as in the 3-4-3.

The line-ups for the first leg of the Supercup

Only Messi is a certainty for the front three, and his position is uncertain – he could play as a false nine, or on the right, as against Milan. He will probably be used with one wide forward (Pedro Rodriguez, Alexis Sanchez, David Villa, Isaac Cuenca) and one deeper, more central converted midfielder (Iniesta, Cesc Fabregas, Thiago Alcantara). Three forwards might be too direct and not strong enough in midfield, whilst Messi and two midfielders wouldn’t offer enough penetration. Fabregas and Pedro is a decent bet – but Pedro might not be fit. Cuenca would be a bold move, but he’s the closest to what Pedro offers, in terms of excellent positioning and movement from wide.

Real Madrid: tactics

The key question, in the entire game, is this: will Real press high up and be aggressive, or will they sit back and invite pressure? The likely answer is a combination of both – in El Pais, Diego Torres predicts that Real will close down Barcelona early on, especially at goal kicks and throw-ins, and then revert to sitting deep after half an hour.

That seems a decent approach – Mourinho doesn’t want Barcelona to stamp their authority upon the midfield early on, like in the 5-0, but equally his players probably won’t have the capacity to press and close down for 90 minutes. If they take on Barca at Barca’s game, they’re likely to come off second best.

Dealing with Messi is the key question – in the Supercup Mourinho told Carvalho to stick to Messi when he dropped deep, meaning Real narrowed into a back three. Either Pepe or Sergio Ramos could conceivably do the same, and they’ll probably take it in turns to follow Messi depending upon which side of the pitch he works in.

In midfield, Alonso will sit deep and sweep up behind Diarra and Khedira, which will work well when Real win the ball – he should have time to spread the play to the flanks and prompt counter-attacks. Diarra should be tracking Iniesta, Khedira will close down Xavi and possibly look to pressure Busquets too.

The starting line-ups for last year's Champions League Clasico at the Bernabeu

With the ball, Real will break quickly from back to front, with combinations from the front three. Khedira will probably be given license to join them, and Marcelo will look to attack, especially if Barca field a narrow right-sided attacker – like against Milan, when they were vulnerable to attacks down that side.

Barcelona: tactics

Barca will dominate possession. That’s what they want – and it’s probably what Real want too, as Ajax coach Frank De Boer observed this week, to aid their counter-attacking. Guardiola last season declared that Real were the most effective counter-attacking team in Europe, and although they’re more varied in their approach play this season, they’ve also become even better at counter-attacking.

Therefore a cautious approach in possession is likely – Barcelona will look to hoard the ball whilst limiting forward runs. This will deny Real the opportunities to break into space, but will also tire Real if they look to press early on. Watch for the forwards dropping into the midfield to help retain possession, but how much will this hamper their ability to penetrate the defence?

Busquets is an extremely important player. It’s not immediately clear which Real player will close him down (if it’s Khedira than Xavi will either (a) be free, or (b) will be tracked by Alonso, which means he’ll drop deeper and pull Alonso a long way up the pitch, leaving space between the lines for Messi). Busquets should get the most amount of time on the ball of any midfielder or forward, and has to be intelligent and resourceful with his passing, looking for free players.

There must be both width and depth to their play. When Barca struggled against Real last season it was when Messi came too deep into midfield and Barca had no forward options. When they’ve struggled this year, it’s because they haven’t stretched the play and have funnelled everything through the centre.

Key questions:

Assuming Real switch to 4-3-3 and Barca also play 4-3-3, there are five key questions, or groups of questions, which will decide the game.
如果皇马变阵433而巴萨也打回433，那么以下5个问题将应运而生，它们关系到这场比赛走势。

1. Will Real press? And if so, for how long?
皇马将上前高压吗？当且是，将如何持久？能做多久？

2. Will Busquets get time on the ball? And if so, how well does he take advantage of this?
布斯克茨会控球吗？当且是，他能做得多好利用这一优势呢？

3. How much will Barcelona focus upon retaining possession, and how much will they look for penetration? And how will this change over the course of the game?
巴萨将如何集中力量在控球上？而且，他们将如何把握穿透的时机？从控球到穿透这一飞跃在比赛中如何演进呢？

4. To what extent can Alonso help to dictate the tempo and rhythm of the game, and prompt quick counters? Will Barcelona look to close him down?
阿隆索将在多大程度上有助于把握比赛速度和节奏的转换来以此促进皇马的快速反击呢？那么巴萨将及时阻止他吗？

5. Will Messi play on the right or in the centre? How will Real deal with him? Will it be enough to stop him?
终结者梅西将在右路还是中路出击？那么皇马如何来应对他呢？会用足够的力量去阻止他吗？

Five key issues, but this is a game with hundreds of questions, which should result in a fascinating contest.

乔治六世 · 发表于 2011-12-10 10:50:41

本帖最后由乔治六世于 2011-12-10 19:22 编辑

616楼参考译文
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国家德比战术前瞻：巴萨回归传统，皇马稳中反击
由 Sulley 发表在GoalHi足球·巴萨专区

可能排阵

周六晚，我们即将迎来二〇一一年的第七场，也是最后一场国家德比，或许还将是其中战术可能性最为丰富的一场比赛。

原因与两支球队皆有关系。皇马本赛季采取了更为积极的打法，很难说他们是否还会像以前那样收缩防守，摆出禁区大巴，将主动权让与对手。巴萨方面，尽管风格一如既往，但他们开发了新的阵型——三四三，并已在本赛季半数以上的联赛场次中付诸实践。考虑到两队比上赛季更少的伤病情况和更强大的阵容水平，想要预测出本场首发的二十二名球员殊为不易。

这篇前瞻将分为九个部分，每支球队的战略，阵型，阵容选择和独特的战术均在四个部分中分别予以讨论，最后则提供几个关键看点的预测。

皇家马德里：战略

战术的制定取决于你在一场比赛中的诉求，这一认识非常重要，尤其是对于皇马而言。他们目前在少赛一场的情况下领先巴塞罗那三分，且一旦场次追平，这一差距几乎必定会拉大到六分。本赛季，若泽-穆里尼奥加强皇马攻击性的意图非常明显，但这并不代表他在本场比赛中不会有所改变，因为一场平局便足以令他满意。那样的话，六分依然在握：争夺西甲冠军的主动权仍将在皇马手中，就算巴萨在下一次交锋中战胜他们也无济于事。

皇马助教卡兰卡已经否认他们会满足于一场平局——但若真的收获一分的话，他显然不会有更多奢求。皇马不希望在战前摆出一副消极的姿态，想必他们也不会轻易改变自己的既定打法。但与上赛季的联赛德比，欧冠，国王杯和超级杯比赛不同（即使将客场进球，加时赛和点球计算在内），这一次，皇马并不是非赢不可。平局将是一个足够积极的结果。

巴塞罗那：战略

逻辑上，巴塞罗那的处境恰恰相反。其阵中已经有球员迫不及待的强调了赢下这场比赛对于整个赛季的重要性——达尼-阿尔维斯说“允许我们犯错的余地已经不存在了。”里昂内尔-梅西说“取得一个好的结果对我们至关重要。”佩普-瓜迪奥拉则指出拯救欧元比国家德比更为要紧，但这或许正是因为他无法回避本场比赛在足球层面上的关键意义。

他并不习惯带着必须获胜的任务出征伯纳乌（尽管他们曾多次完成了这一任务）。过去三个赛季里，伯纳乌的客场回合都到来于争冠主动权已为巴塞罗那掌控的赛季后期，而欧冠与超级杯的两个首回合虽均为客场，但彼时的巴塞罗那尚有把握等到第二回合再锁定胜局。现在，三分固然谈不上事关生死，但它的意义无疑要比以往更加重大。

皇家马德里：阵型

皇马对阵瓦伦西亚的阵型

本赛季，若泽-穆里尼奥几乎是始终如一的坚持了他的四二三一阵型，罕有的一次例外出现在对阵瓦伦西亚的客场比赛中，当时他终于妥协，转而选择了以四三三迎敌。尽管四三三本身的攻击性未必弱于四二三一，但在皇马阵中，事实却的确是这样——此番变动包含撤掉前场四人组之一，同时增加一名中场中路球员，而这名球员很可能会是一名身体强壮的抢断型后腰。

看上去，四三三将是他的重要比赛专用阵型，且同上赛季一样，他不会在巴塞罗那面前冒险派上四名攻击手。上赛季五球惨败的比赛中将梅苏特-厄齐尔置于四二三一核心的布阵堪称灾难，而穆里尼奥恐怕也不会允许中场失势的局面再次发生。三名纪律严明，各司其职的中场中路球员应该是其所需的配置。

巴塞罗那：阵型

三四三还是四三三？虽然本赛季前者颇受青睐，但它在这场比赛中却很可能得不到展现自己威力的机会，其原因有四。首先，如瓜迪奥拉所言，“要是你无法控制比赛，三后卫的布阵就会存在风险。而你在对阵皇马的时候不可能完全控制九十分钟的比赛。”

其次，出于笔者以前讨论过的（和第一点一样）多方面原因，三后卫配置更适合防守两名前锋，而不是前场三叉戟。你需要比对方多出一名球员，而考虑到皇马很可能会使用三前锋，这一点将是三四三阵型所不能提供的。

第三，三四三在巴塞罗那本赛季迎战强队时的效果还不足以令人信服——对阵瓦伦西亚，他们换回了四后卫，对阵塞维利亚，他们没能进球，对阵米兰，他们勉强获胜，但其过程看起来很是艰险。

巴塞罗那对阵米兰的阵型

最后，一个很关键的因素是，早在上赛季的国家德比“系列赛”进行过半时，瓜迪奥拉就已意识到了皇马在两翼发起快速反击的威胁性，并命令两名边后卫坚守位置加以防范。而使用三后卫防线则无异于在两侧为皇马留出更多可供利用的空间，尽管这套体系具有在后卫插上助攻时运转更加流畅的优点，但在克里斯蒂亚诺-罗纳尔多游弋的区域，我们有理由怀疑巴塞罗那是否愿意去追求所谓的流畅。

皇家马德里：阵容选择

里卡多-卡瓦略的受伤意味着曾在上赛季的多场国家德比中出任前插型防守者的佩佩不得不退回到后防线，与塞尔吉奥-拉莫斯搭档。与此同时，中场三人组中也将随之出现一个空缺——哈维-阿隆索和萨米-赫迪拉会首发出场，而另一个位置则有可能留给拉萨纳-迪亚拉，在皇马以四三三迎战瓦伦西亚时，他就是其中的一员。

另一种可能是由迪亚拉出任右后卫，顶替还处于伤病恢复期的阿韦罗亚，但这种情况发生的几率并不大。此外，皇马在上周战胜希洪竞技的比赛中让左后卫法比奥-科恩特朗代打右后卫的安排也是一个很有意思的变数，该策略的妙处在于可以很好的防范大卫-比利亚这样的球员从边路内切后用右脚出球（如果他首发的话）——事实上，他在超级杯中正是借此打入了巴萨的第一粒进球。

锋线方面，主力人选将在卡里姆-本泽马和冈萨洛-伊瓜因之间产生。两人至今各自首发了七场联赛，但他们的特点却截然不同。正如Sid Lowe所总结的，“本泽马的技术远比伊瓜因细腻，在缺少空间时发挥更好，而伊瓜因能给对方制造更大的压力，在反击中速度更快。皇马的战术选择将在很大程度上决定执行战术的人选。”

可最终的结果会不会是此二人被一起留在板凳上？鉴于C罗纳尔多独当锋线的能力，这种可能性完全存在——而且在国王杯决赛和欧冠半决赛首回合（虽然皇马告负，但球队的体系在因红牌减员之前运转良好）中，他都曾出任过类似的角色。其连带效应将是安赫尔-迪马利亚在左翼单挑阿尔维斯，厄齐尔则在另一侧伺机反击。假若皇马真的采取反击打法的话，这可能会是一个比启用伊瓜因更好的策略。

巴塞罗那：阵容选择

瓜迪奥拉手中有着丰富的人员选项，但它们所带来的更多是举棋不定的犹疑，而不是幸福的烦恼。在后防线上，他需要速度的保证。而赫拉德-皮克和卡洛斯-普约尔的体能却都不能令人放心，同时，哈维尔-马斯切拉诺反而是本赛季中后卫位置上更稳定的人选。出于体能而非战术风格上的考虑，球队的防守核心可能会由阿根廷人与皮克和普约尔之一组成。

中场方面，塞尔吉奥-布斯克茨和哈维-埃尔南德斯是理所当然的主力，安德烈-伊涅斯塔也必然会首发出场。但他的位置会是中场之一吗？如果皇马在中场采用身体流的打法，则塞杜-凯塔将很可能成为瓜迪奥拉用于维持力量均势的一枚棋子，而伊涅斯塔就会随之被前提至锋线。那样的话，他可以回撤与其他三角组成一个四人中场，类似于三四三阵型中的松散菱形。

超级杯首回合排阵

唯一能确定在锋线三人中占据一席的只有梅西，且他的具体位置同样是一个悬念——他既可担任伪九号，亦可像对阵米兰时那样拉到右翼。与其搭档的或许会是一名边锋（佩德罗-罗德里格斯，阿莱克斯-桑切斯，大卫-比利亚，伊萨克-昆卡）和一名在更深，更靠近中路的位置上支援锋线的中场球员（伊涅斯塔，塞斯克-法布雷加斯，蒂亚戈-阿尔坎特拉）。三名前锋的攻击手段太过直接，并可能使中场强度有所削弱，而梅西与两名中场的组合则在突破方面欠缺锋芒。法布雷加斯和佩德罗会是一对理想的配置——然而佩德罗的身体状况尚存疑问。假若派上小将昆卡的话，尽管略显大胆，但以其出色的位置感和在边路的跑位意识，他可能将是场上作用最接近佩德罗的一个选择。

皇家马德里：战术

问题的关键在于，就整场比赛而言：皇马究竟会选择侵略性更强的前场压迫，还是放任对手施压的收缩防守？最可能的答案也许是两者兼有——根据国家报的Diego Torres的预测，皇马会在比赛初期，尤其是巴塞罗那开球门球和界外球时执行紧逼，继而在半小时之后回收防守。

这似乎是一个完美的战略——穆里尼奥不想看到巴塞罗那像那场五比〇一样，从一开始就展现出他们的中场统治力，但他手下的球员同样无法保证能在九十分钟的时间里坚持压迫和紧逼的策略。如果用巴萨的打法来挑战巴萨，他们恐怕将很难占据上风。

防守梅西是其战术中的重中之重——在超级杯上，穆里尼奥曾要求卡瓦略在梅西回撤时保持贴身，同时其他皇马后卫向中路收缩组成三人防线。现在，无论是佩佩还是塞尔吉奥-拉莫斯均可胜任这一角色，而他们可能会选择根据梅西活动的位置轮流上前盯防。

中场方面，阿隆索会落位于防线前方，在迪亚拉和赫迪拉身后扫荡，当皇马赢得球权时，这一安排就将显现出它的意义——阿隆索能够有充足的时间向两翼送出长传，或者推动快速反击。迪亚拉会负责跟住伊涅斯塔，赫迪拉则会紧逼哈维，并不时向布斯克茨施压。

上赛季欧冠在伯纳乌时的排阵

有球状态下，皇马的战术将是快速通过中场，由锋线三叉戟发起闪击。赫迪拉有可能会获准前插予以增援，同时马塞洛亦将伺机加入进攻，特别是当巴萨效仿对阵米兰的战术，在右翼派出一名内切型边锋时——那样的话，他们会很难应付从这一侧策动的突袭。

巴塞罗那：战术

巴萨将控制大部分球权。这是他们的诉求——或许也是皇马所希望的，因为这刚好有助于其反击策略，正如阿贾克斯主帅弗兰克-德波尔在周中所见识到的。上赛季，瓜迪奥拉曾表示皇马是欧洲足坛反击最为犀利的队伍，而本赛季的他们尽管战术打法更趋多样，但反击的威胁性却不减反增。

所以，我们最终看到的可能将是一种谨慎的控球流——巴塞罗那会更倾向于保护皮球，而非急于向前推进。这不仅能防止皇马获得反击的空间，也能在其采取开场压迫时消耗他们的体能。值得注意的是几名前锋回撤后对于控球的辅助作用，但问题是，那将在多大程度上削弱其突破的杀伤力？

布斯克茨是比赛中一个极其重要的角色。皇马会选择哪名球员来盯防他尚不明了（若此人是赫迪拉，则哈维或将『A』无人看管，或将『B』由阿隆索负责，从而可以通过回撤将其诱出本来的位置，留下中后场之间的开阔地带任由梅西发挥）。布斯克茨可能会比任何其他的中场或前锋拥有更为充裕的控球时间，而他也必须用足够聪明和多变的传球及时找到处于空位的队友。

他们的战术一定要做到宽度和纵深兼具。上赛季，巴萨被皇马遏制的主要原因是梅西回撤过深，导致球队没有向前突破的选项。而本赛季他们的困难则来自于一味固守中路，进攻缺乏宽度。

关键看点：

假设皇马真的改打四三三，同时巴萨亦采用此阵型的话，则将有五个，或者说五组问题能够决定本场比赛的走势。

1. 皇马会采取压迫吗？如果是，会坚持多久？

2. 皇马会放任布斯克茨拿球吗？如果是，他会如何利用这一优势？

3. 对于巴塞罗那而言，保持控球和寻求突破孰轻孰重？其选择随着比赛的进行会发生怎样的变化？

4. 阿隆索将在多大程度上主导比赛的速度和节奏，并推动快速反击？巴塞罗那会对他进行专门盯防吗？

5. 梅西会出现在右翼还是中路？皇马会如何应对他的发挥？他们能成功防住他吗？

以上即为五大关键看点，但本场比赛的悬念远远不止于此，精彩程度值得期待

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-10 10:57:23

zm分析，把布茨克斯看作巴萨“逗你玩”战术的关键棋子之一，同样的角色阿隆索将如何洞悉场上局势做出关键指挥呢？

当然梅西还是改变比赛比分的最关键人物，他将使得皇马对防守和进攻平衡把握上处在纠结中

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-10 11:02:02

昨晚凌晨，cctv5还播放了上赛季皇马0-2巴萨那场欧冠半决赛首回合比赛的录像，感觉布少丢球位置几次都很关键的

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-10 11:15:44

本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-12-10 11:17 编辑

zm预测双方首发阵容中，对巴萨预测似乎缺乏创新的，若安排小法在右路，如何协助阿尔维斯进行防守呢？而且迪马利亚也会出现在这一路的。欧冠半决赛首回合对皇马比赛中，迪马里亚频频冲击让a2防守很吃力的，对马赛洛也要小心的。

偶倾向这一路，安排一个能下底的角色，那么客战2-0取胜皇马的关键变化是，下半场阿菲莱替补受伤佩德罗上场后一次成功下底传中助攻梅西首开纪录，这时及以后马塞洛对此毫无办法，但是之前马塞洛防守佩德罗和阿尔维斯都很成功的。

偶倾向桑切斯或者昆卡打右边锋

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-10 11:26:44

大家预测一下，昆卡和桑切斯会不会出现在首发中？若是替补何时上场？他俩下底能力将对马赛洛防守制造很大压力以及对天使频频冲击阿尔维斯防守将是很大的制衡

佩德罗现在看来是个机会主义者，当哈维或小白能传出好球，他的把握时机能力还是不错的。但是自从上赛季几番战尤其5-0之后几场战役中，他创造机会能力等于零，他和阿尔维斯在右路对阵皇马马赛洛和天使并不占上风的

白与蓝之舞 · 发表于 2011-12-10 12:22:17

刚才看体育新闻皇马助教说会用343，瞎掰呢吧。

Penelope · 发表于 2011-12-10 12:33:38

刚才看体育新闻皇马助教说会用343，瞎掰呢吧。
白与蓝之舞发表于 2011-12-10 12:22

皇马也玩343？

colinfirth · 发表于 2011-12-11 07:00:36

上半场30分钟梅西助攻桑切斯扳平比分太重要了

这是巴萨第二次运动战中的有效打门，第一次梅西单枪匹马独创虎穴，差点破门，要不是卡西神勇的话

Alex2011 · 发表于 2011-12-11 10:16:30

本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-12-11 10:25 编辑

Real Madrid 1-3 Barcelona: Real press early on, but tactical switch gives Barca the upper hand
皇马1-3巴萨:主队早期施压虽得利，然给力的战术调整使得巴萨却后来居上
December 11, 2011

The starting line-ups

Jose Mourinho surprised many with his team selection, but Pep Guardiola adapted to guide Barcelona to victory.

The surprise was with the use of Mesut Ozil, who most expected to be omitted in favour of an extra defensive midfielder. In fact, it was Real’s usual front four in a 4-2-3-1 system. Lassana Diarra did start, but in place of Khedira, whilst Fabio Coentrao played at right-back.

Guardiola had faith in the fitness of Gerard Pique and Carles Puyol, and dropped Javier Mascherano. He went with Cesc Fabregas and Alexis Sanchez further forward.

Question number one in the preview was ‘Will Real press?’ – a question that was answered emphatically within the first thirty seconds. Barcelona tried to play out from the back, Victor Valdes got his pass wrong, and Benzema fired home for the earliest goal in Clasico history.

Pressing and Ozil

That was the best possible start for the home side, and Real’s pressing was, as expected, most obvious in the first 20-30 minutes of the match. They prevented Barca from constructing good moves from the back, although the Barcelona defence admirably remained committed to passing football throughout the match.

However, it was notable that Real’s attacking band of three had little impact when they won, even when given opportunities on the ball. Cristiano Ronaldo was a peripheral figure, Ozil created little and was removed early in the second half, Di Maria battled well but his end product was often poor. By asking his attacking players to work extremely hard without the ball, maybe Mourinho drained them of the energy they needed when attacking.

The big decision, the use of Ozil, was unsuccessful. Although he he saw a fair amount of the ball in the first half, he rarely played a key pass. Without the ball, he always seemed a couple of yards too slow to close down, and Real could have done with an extra holding player to congest the centre of the pitch – Messi came deep and got too much room.

Barcelona starting shape

Even taking into account the inevitable fluidity, Barcelona’s starting line-up was difficult to decipher. Taking the 4-3-3 as a base, Andres Iniesta was wider than usual, Messi was more of a number ten than a false nine, Cesc Fabregas wasn’t part of the forward line at all (as he often has been this season) but tucked into midfield and seemingly not really knowing what his job was, whilst Alexis Sanchez started on the left but made diagonal runs across the pitch into a centre-forward position.

The approach was reminiscent of the formation Guardiola used in Barcelona’s 2-0 win at the Bernabeu in April 2010, when he used Messi deep and right-of-centre, and Pedro Rodriguez as a left-sided forward. Sanchez did particularly well to occupy both centre-backs and often Coentrao too – with Iniesta always coming from deeper to try and overload the Portuguese full-back.

After around 20 minutes Guardiola switched players around
20分钟后，巴萨改打4411阵型

Barcelona

And, perhaps recalling that 2-0 win, Guardiola moved his side even further towards that system after around 20 minutes. He ordered Dani Alves forward to a right-wing position, Carles Puyol out to right-back, Gerard Pique moved across, and Sergio Busquets dropped to left centre-back. Fabregas moved deeper to help out in midfield, and Barcelona were broadly 4-4-1-1.

The precise reason he decided upon this change is unclear, but it had various benefits:

1) It meant that Busquets, identified as key in the preview of the match because of his ability to prompt good attacking moves, was away from the press of Ozil and could start to feed balls into midfield. He also bravely continued to step out of the back when Barcelona attacked – he got tight to Ozil so Xavi could move forward to the edge of the box.

2) Ronaldo had been a threat early on with a couple of decent chances, but by putting Puyol on him, and often doubling up with both Puyol and Pique (plus the occasional help of Alves), Guardiola almost completely nullified Ronaldo’s threat. Ronaldo had a very quiet game, and Mourinho tried to spark him into life by moving him to the right in the second half, summing up how effective Guardiola’s change had been.

3) It gave Barcelona more width with the use of Alves, something that was desperately lacking in the early stages. He enjoyed the large amount of space between Marcelo and Ronaldo and was constantly an out-ball on the break, most obviously getting down the flank to cross for Fabregas’ header, the third goal.

4) Least crucially, but nevertheless a factor, Fabregas dropped deeper and seemed to know what he was doing more, particularly in the second half.

It was after the switch that Ozil really should have had more of an impact – there was theoretically plenty of space between the lines for him, but Busquets continued to close him down and prevented him being key in the transitions. As the average position diagram shows, even in the second half when part of the back four, he often moved up much higher than the other three defenders, so there was an element of Guardiola’s three-man defence.

Messi
梅西的10号而不是伪9号的作用

Unlike in the Supercup when Mourinho ordered Ricardo Carvalho to stick tight to Messi, this time he went free. There was a good reason for the centre-backs staying in place – Messi was playing as a number ten (and often even deeper than that) rather than a false nine, but with Diarra and Alonso taking on Fabregas and Xavi in the centre, it meant Messi often got an amazing amount of time on the ball, despite a good battling performance from Diarra.

Barcelona's average positions in each half. Source: Opta's @OptaJose twitter account

For the first goal Messi was able to pick up speed before beating both Alonso and Diarra and slipping the ball through for Sanchez, for the third he passes the ball out to Alves on the break after receiving the ball in space. For all the other tactical factors in this match, Messi not being accounted for was very important. He simply got too much room.

Latter stages and changes

Real were extremely unfortunate with the second goal, but the third seemed to kill the game, even after 66 minutes. Mourinho’s side went flat and Barcelona now became focused upon ball retention. This was probably the stage when Real were hoping to sit deep and remain compact (whether winning or drawing) but with a two goal deficit they had to be more proactive.

Kaka had already replaced Ozil (and did OK), the other changes saw Khedira on for Diarra after the Frenchman had been booked, and then Gonzalo Higuain on for Di Maria, who had probably contributed more than Ronaldo. Higuain went upfront and Benzema went left, going close on one occasion after beating Puyol. The changes weren’t particularly inspired, but they did give Real extra energy.

Barcelona slowed the tempo of the game well, and could have added a fourth on the break. Guardiola’s changes were all after 80 minutes and all roughly like-for-like – Seydou Keita, David Villa and Pedro all came on, but the game changed little with their introduction.

Conclusion

Mourinho has often been criticized for not being brave enough against Barcelona – but here he went with an attack-minded side featuring his usual front four, and also looked to press from the front early on. The pressing broadly worked, the use of Ozil broadly didn’t.

The minimal benefit Real gained from playing a central attacking playmaker was more than cancelled out by the amount of space Messi often found; space he surely wouldn’t have enjoyed had Real played an extra (more defensive-minded) midfield player. It’s impossible to know if the alternative formation would have worked – and it might have meant space for another Barcelona elsewhere on the pitch, but giving space to any other player is preferable to allowing Messi to thrive.

Mourinho will point to elements of bad luck, and the fact that Guardiola needed to change formation for Barcelona to exert dominance. But Guardiola did so successfully, and Real didn’t counter-adapt. The Barcelona players who changed position all had excellent games – Busquets played the centre-half role superbly well, a job few other players could do; Puyol was seldom beaten by Ronaldo in one-on-one situations, and Alves motoring up and down the right was crucial in the second period. A tactical victory for Guardiola.

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