11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

Alex2011

475楼参考译文
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由 余文乐 发表在GoalHi足球·英超专区

曼联 1-6 曼城: 曼城把场面上的优势变成了一场历史性的大胜


双方首发阵容

曼城上半场很矜持地小幅领先，下半场就彰显出狂暴的本性。

弗格森爵士采用了本赛季最常用的442阵型（上一场对利物浦不是）。后防线上没有维迪奇，没有菲尔-琼斯，而维尔贝克和鲁尼搭档锋线。

曼奇尼不能不用图雷替换德容（尽管这倒可能增加了球队的流畅度），并使用巴洛特利而不是哲科担任中锋。

纵观全场，曼城都是更好的球队，他们在进攻三区的用球更有效率。但6-1的比分有点夸张，这并不是曼奇尼和弗格森战术差距的真是反映。3个进球来自于补时阶段，5个出现在埃文斯被罚下场之后，而他们全场只有7脚射门打中门框内。

曼奇尼做了正确的决定，这不应该被这些数据迷惑。而目前曼城的确是更好的一支球队，要知道曼联之前的19场主场比赛都没有输过。

阵型

两边的教练都选择了更加具有攻击性的阵型—开放的4-4-1-1阵型，而非之前比赛的偏向防守的阵型：弗格森在对阵利物浦时采取的4-5-1，和曼奇尼在对阵黄潜时使用的4-3-3。结果本次德比要比之前的几次都来得开放—还记得那场双方都使用3后腰的枯燥无比的0-0平局吗？

场上的拼抢很激烈。中卫对抗前锋，边后卫对抗边锋，中前卫（理论上的）互相对抗—基本上就是当4-4-2遇上4-4-2时的战斗。鲁尼和阿圭罗回撤，双方中前卫拖后，从而压缩了中场后卫两条线之间的空间。

中场

然而，中场组合站位靠后意味着他们较少受到逼抢。他们经常有时间控制球，鲁尼和维尔贝克在初段后撤尝试切断对图雷和巴里的供应，任由曼城的中卫拿球。

但是，这个区域并没有多少创造性。图雷比他打前腰的时候收敛了很多，而弗莱彻和安德森的搭配看起来并不像一个组合，曼联缺少一个拖后的组织核心。在上个赛季的前半程，弗格森喜欢用一个传球型的中场和一个跑动型的中场来组成442阵型的中前卫组合。而唯一一场用安德森搭档弗莱彻的比赛，他们在联赛杯中以0-4输给了西汉姆。他想念斯科尔斯和卡里克的，这是去年的两个传球型中场，他们能把球用好，而克莱维利健康的时候也不错。

曼城也有同样的问题，但边路球员前压的做法比较聪明。曼联坚持主打边路挑战曼城的边后卫，结果输了。理查兹是场上其中一个表现最好的球员，而克里希防守纳尼做得很好。

另一方面，曼城也在寻求攻击曼联的边后卫，最明显的就是打破僵局的一球。当时米尔纳从右路跑过来接应席尔瓦，然后低传巴洛特利，后者冷静推射空门。米尔纳的关键作用在于他可以在两个边路和队友形成多打少的局面。这是上半场双方唯一的区别，而其他球员有没有谁表现特别好的。


by Guardian Chalkboards

埃文斯出局

很难说曼联是否为下半场进行了调整，重新开球仅1分钟埃文斯就对巴洛特利犯规被罚下。曼联现在有了大问题：他们落后，还少一个人。他们既害怕被反击而不能倾巢而出，大举压上，但也不能坐视曼城控球。

奇怪而关键的是，曼城并没有选择控球而是继续尝试穿透曼联的防线，席尔瓦寻找着空档并成为了比赛的关键球员。弗格森对红牌作出的调整是把斯莫林放到中卫，弗莱彻到右后卫，鲁尼变成中前卫。这样仍然可以在进攻上有所威胁：杨，鲁尼，纳尼和维尔贝克都在场上，但是防守很薄弱。米尔纳再次成为那个多出来的球员而助攻了巴洛特利的第二球。

弗格森用琼斯和小豌豆换下安德森和纳尼，但他们的中场缺口无望修补。他们在替补席上没有可用的中前卫以保护防线前的位置。后卫被扯到全场到处跑，而埃弗拉的位置感尤其要被质疑。结果曼城复刻了第二个进球，由阿圭罗完成破门，这和周中进比利亚雷亚尔的球一样。

在0-2落后的时候，弗格森开始了他的赌博。他本可以用法比奥、朴智星或者瓦伦西亚使阵形更加紧密，并寄望通过反击扳回比分，但他换上了埃尔南德斯，采用更主动的战术。结果这赌博事与愿违。曼城没有丝毫退让的意思，他在比赛最后时刻的机会数非常惊人。

席尔瓦无所不在，无所不能。哲科替补出场提供了一个全新的攻击武器，而曼联在补时阶段非常疲倦，或者是想要放弃了。进入补时阶段的时候，比分是1-3，全场结束的时候，比分就是1-6了。这是完胜和历史性屠杀的区别。

总结

在战术方面，曼城并有没有好到可以5球大胜。然而，他们还是做得比曼联好。初段中前卫和前锋都没什么值得一提的，都是边路球员的内切和边后卫的插上助攻。曼城在这方面做得很好，而曼联看起来更像上赛季那个功能性的线性的球队而不是赛季初那种流动的创造性的球队。

下半场最有意义的元素并不是人和聪明的决定，而是曼城无情地撕碎了曼联。他们无意保持控球，让曼联感到沮丧，并争取客队球迷的欢呼。想反，他们以一种英超很少看到的方式撕碎了曼联的防线。

抛开尴尬不谈，曼联问题远没有一场主场的1-6惨败显示的那么严重。但依然需要认真考虑中场中路应该怎样布置。在这一区域没有任何的创造力，也缺乏对后防提供足够的保护。没有人会预计到曼联会在这里丢掉6球，但数据显示，曼联容易受到突然的重创。

Alex2011

曼联没腰可能是问题所在

风之子90

曼联没腰也不是1 2年的事情了。。
这次总算来了个爆发~~

WAYGEE

曼联没腰可能是问题所在
Alex2011 发表于 2011-10-24 10:35

事实证明隔壁的英超四神不堪大用啊

DanielCraig

479# WAYGEE

穷死 死马林 杨/猥儿贝壳/鲁胖子？

showfun

事实证明隔壁的英超四神不堪大用啊
WAYGEE 发表于 2011-10-24 18:54

安德森本来就是他们四个里排末尾的，拉米雷斯还是挺有实力的，卢卡斯最近也比较开窍，桑德罗的身体素质比较吓人。但是巴西也缺中场分球者，好在他们有边后卫来带动一下进攻。

盖坦

拉米雷斯实力还在，车子的买卖并不亏。安德森已经成为英超笑柄了

盖坦

479# WAYGEE

穷死 死马林 杨/猥儿贝壳/鲁胖子？
DanielCraig 发表于 2011-10-24 21:55

隔壁应该是巴西吧？不列颠人还排不上号

鸽子

爵爷看来这次伤得不轻啊  哎  这个RP攒的太悲剧了

pedro

The effects of Chelsea’s pressing game in 2011/12
October 26, 2011


Chelsea's first-choice starting XI so far this season

Amongst all the nonsense about Andre Villas-Boas being the new Jose Mourinho, the irony is that he’s done more to move Chelsea away from Mourinho’s overall playing style than Avram Grant, Felipe Scolari, Guus Hiddink and Carlo Ancelotti. In particular, the way they play without the ball.

Though not as much of a purely defensive manager as often made out, Mourinho was a fan of defending deep at Chelsea. The 4-3-3 looked more like a 4-5-1 in the defensive stage, with players asked to get behind the ball quickly and retreat into a deep, compact unit. This idea was more or less continued by his successors – Hiddink was a little more attack-minded but in the biggest games (notably against Barcelona) Chelsea were Mourinho-esque, whilst Ancelotti’s Chelsea were often rampant with the ball, but sat very deep without it – Florent Malouda and Nicolas Anelka were asked to move back and become wide midfielders.

Villas-Boas is different. His Porto side featured heavy pressing and a much more proactive strategy when it comes to winning the ball back. In this respect, he shares much more in common with Pep Guardiola (a man he hugely admires) than Mourinho.

Pressing

Frustratingly, pressing is a very difficult thing to prove statistically – at least with freely available statistics, anyway. It’s not as simple as pass completion ratios or number of shots attempted: ideally we’d have the data concerning how high up the pitch the defence plays and how much running the forwards get through, for example. Because pressing can result in various outcomes – interceptions won, tackles won, opposition passes misplaced, it’s difficult to come up with an individual statistic that answers the question – are Chelsea pressing more this season?

A decent place to start, though, is offside figures. Because pressing involves closing down high up, and because any side (regardless of whether they defend high or deep) has to stay compact to prevent being played through between the lines, a high defensive line is a natural consequence of pressing. Chelsea have notably struggled with this at some points – the home game against Norwich in particular, where Grant Holt kept getting in behind the defence.

But they’re still playing high up, trying to catch the opposition offside. As a result, a comparison of their nine games so far this season and their first nine games of last season indicates a significant increase in the number of times the opposition are caught offside.



An average of 4.33, up from 1.67; that’s an increase of 160%.

This doesn’t prove that Chelsea are pressing more, but it does indicate that their defence is playing higher up the pitch – and there’s a clear link between those two concepts.

Fouling

One of the drawbacks with pressing is discipline. Your forwards are closing down and making more tackles, your midfielders are doing the same and sometimes forced into ‘cynical’ fouls to prevent the opposition breaking, and the defenders are leaving space in behind, making them prone to being sent off for denying clear goalscoring opportunities, as happened with Jose Bosingwa at the weekend (when, incidentally, Villas-Boas coped very well when down to nine men, as David Pleat articulates).

An obvious example of this is the Chilean side at last summer’s World Cup. They pressed more than any other side, but ended with more bookings than any other team in the tournament (with the exception of Holland, who played two games more and racked up most of their bookings in the final). They had two players suspended for the Spain match, an three from the Brazil match, and averaged 3.4 bookings per game, compared to the tournament average of 2.04. On the other hand, the side that defended the deepest, the North Koreans (with their odd five/six-man defence), picked up the fewest bookings in the tournament, just two from three games.

As for Chelsea, they are indeed conceding more free-kicks than in the equivalent spell last season.



An average of 12.8, up from 9.1 – an increase of 40%.

And that’s not all – Chelsea aren’t just conceding more fouls than last year, they’re picking up more bookings than any other Premier League side, even if a large number came on one game, against QPR. That’s quite a turnaround from last season, when they were given an award for having the best disciplinary record in the league.

The bookings can be linked to a more proactive approach without the ball, as can all three red cards they’ve suffered this season. Bosingwa, as mentioned, fouled when he was the final defender forced to cover a lot space in behind. Didier Drogba and Fernando Torres got red cards for terrible tackles in the opposition half, but would they have been making those fouls last year? Probably not – they’ve been told to close down and help defend high up the pitch, rather than just dropping back and forming part of a deep barrier that opponents can’t break down. Both tackles were more about a lack of tackling technique than pure dirtiness.

Are Chelsea conceding fewer shots?

In a word – yes:

From 12.7 to 10.1 per match, a 21% decrease.

And, more than that, they’re conceding fewer shots than any other side in the league. They may not have a particularly good record at keeping clean sheets, but if Manchester United’s tendency to concede a lot of shots hinted at a heavy defeat, Chelsea’s tendency to concede few hints at an upcoming decent run defensively.

But…

This doesn’t take account of the type of shots Chelsea are conceding, and their record of conceding the least number of shots can also be attributed to having the highest average percentage of possession so far.

A deep defence is likely to concede lots of shots but a high proportion of them will be long-range efforts, whilst a higher defence is more prone to one-on-ones, which are naturally very good goalscoring opportunities. As mentioned earlier, this is a particular problem for Chelsea at the moment.

This will be of interest against Arsenal this weekend. Arsenal may have their own problems, but if there’s one thing they do have, it’s pace. Theo Walcott and Gervinho can come inside from the flanks to get on the end of balls over the top, whilst Robin van Persie is in good goalscoring form, and is an expert at dragging centre-backs high up the pitch. This will be an interesting test for Villas-Boas – should he continue to press and risk being caught out, or ask his side to defend deeper?

pedro

485楼参考译文
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控球压迫：博阿斯的战术改造初探

2011-10-28 / 单泽sz

这是本赛季到目前为止切尔西首选的主力阵容。

现在有很多博阿斯会成为新穆里尼奥的荒谬言论，令人讽刺的是博阿斯现在所带领的切尔西相比于格兰特，斯科拉里，希丁克和安切洛蒂，越来越远离魔力鸟的战术风格。

虽然穆里尼奥不是完全被认作是一名防守型教练，但在切尔西的他是深度防守的追随者。他的4-3-3阵型在防守时看上去更像是4-5-1，球员们被要求在丢掉球权后迅速撤到本方后场支援防守，并且让阵型紧凑起来。这个观念或多或少被他的继承者沿袭-希丁克有意的增加了些进攻，但在重大比赛中（尤其是对阵巴塞罗那）切尔西重新踢起了穆里尼奥足球，而安切洛蒂的切尔西经常踢出奔放的足球，但无一例外后防站得非常的深-马卢达和阿内尔卡时而会被要求回撤到中场。

博阿斯非常不同。他波尔图时代就开始打压迫性进攻并且采取更主动的战术。在这方面，相对于穆里尼奥，他和瓜迪奥拉有更多的相同点。

压迫性

令人沮丧的是，压迫性打法很难用数据去证明，尽管赛后有大量可利用的数据统计。可无论如何，这不像统计传球成功率或者射门次数的数据一样简单。理想化来说，我们已经得到了关于如何高球冲吊和传球到前场需要的跑动距离，例如，因为压迫性打法可以导致不同的结果—断球成功，对手传球不到位，这很难给出一份个人的数据回答这些问题-切尔西这个赛季更具压迫性？

切尔西的压迫性打法有一个很好的开始，尽管经常受到造越位失败的困扰。因为压迫性包括对高球冲吊的防守，任何一边（不管他们的防线位置是提前或者靠后）不得不保持紧凑去切断对方进攻球员间的联系，防止他们起高球或者反越位。防线位置提前是压迫性打法带来的必然结果。切尔西在某些时刻明显要和这些去斗争-特别是在主场对阵诺维奇的比赛中，霍尔特突破了切尔西的后卫线。

但是诺维奇仍然在尝试高球冲吊的打法，试图去抓住反越位的机会。结果，切尔西这个赛季的九场比赛和上个赛季的九场比赛相对比表明，他们让对手抓住反越位的次数有所增加。



现在平均是4.33，增长了1.67；这是160%的涨幅。

这不能证明切尔西更具压迫性，但可以体现他们对于防守高球冲吊时的表现。这两个概念有非常清晰的联系。

犯规

压迫性打法的另一个缺点是缺少纪律性。你的球队逼抢对手并且制造更多的拦截，你的中场队员做同样的事情并且有时迫不得已用犯规来阻挡对手，防守者失去了原来的位置，冒着被驱逐出场的可能去防止对手获得射门机会，就像博辛瓦上周所做的。（顺便说一下当切尔西以9人应战时博阿斯处理的非常的好）

一个明显的例子是去年夏天参加世界杯的智利队。他们比其他球队更具压迫性，但却以更多的红黄牌而结束世界杯的征程。（除了荷兰队，他们比智利多参加了两场比赛并且在决赛中获得了很多的红黄牌）在同西班牙比赛中他们有两位球员被禁赛，3人是同巴西的比赛，平均每场得到3.4张牌，而本届比赛平均是2.04.另一方面，朝鲜的防守站位是最靠后的，他们古怪的有5、6名后卫，是本届杯赛获得红黄牌最少的球队，三场比赛只有两张。

至于切尔西，相比于上赛季他们的打法确实更加的开放。



平均是12.8，增加了9.1，—增幅为40%

但这并不是全部-切尔西不仅仅是犯规多余去年，他们比其他英超球队得了更多的红黄牌，即使许多来自对阵女王公园巡游者的一场比赛中。这和上赛季是完全不同的转变，他们上赛季是英超纪律最好的球队。红黄牌可以和更主动的战术联系起来，本赛季目前为止他们已经吃到了三张红牌。博辛瓦，已经提到过了，他犯规的时候是球队最后一个防守队员。德罗巴和托雷斯因为他们在对方半场糟糕的铲球得到红牌，但他们去年有这么多犯规么？去年并不是的—球员们现在已经被告知要努力上前切断对方传球路线并且注重对高空球的防守，而不是拖在后面，这样做并不能阻断对手。要知道，铲球技术的缺乏并不是纯粹的肮脏踢法。

去年女王公园巡游者并不在英超，所以无法和切尔西进行对比，但对比上上周德罗巴在对阵埃弗顿的比赛中犯规的位置，可以表面这赛季切尔西阵型提的更靠前了。

切尔西承认射门更少了？

总之，是的。



每场比赛从12.7到10.1，下降了21%

并且不仅如此，他们确实比其他球队的射门更少。并且他们几乎场场都有失球。但假如曼联用更多的射门来重挫对手，切尔西会用坚固的防守来阻挡对手。

但这不应当作是切尔西射门少的原因，他们射门最少的原因可能是因为迄今为止超高的控球率。深层次的防守可能是因为对方更多的射门但超高的控球率是长期努力的结果。同时更提前的防守意味着需要球员更多的一对一防守，也意味着对方会获得更多很好的射门机会。想之前提到的，这是现在切尔西非常关键的问题。

本周对阵阿森纳将是非常有趣的比赛。阿森纳有他们自己的问题，但假若他们拥有速度。沃尔科特和热尔维尼奥可以从两翼突破到切尔西禁区，为范佩西提供很好的射门机会，并且有专门拖后的中后卫。这将是对博阿斯很有趣的测试—继续压迫性打法并且发现问题，或者让他的球队加强防守？

pedro

Napoli 2-0 Udinese: 3-4-3 against 3-5-1-1, and Mazzarri beats Guidolin
October 26, 2011


First half line-ups

An interesting first half, and ultimately a convincing win for Walter Mazzarri’s side.

Mazzarri was without Walter Gargano, so played Blerim Dzemaili alongside Gokhan Inler in the centre of midfield.

Francesco Guidolin had Antonio Di Natale, Mauricio Isla and Maurizio Domizzi unavailable, meaning there were plenty of changes, resulting in a disjointed side. Antonio Floro Flores played upfront against his hometown club.

This was tactically exciting and yet also very basic – Napoli were the clear winners.

Midfield stalemate

First, this might be an odd way to start, but the two bands of four (the two central midfielders and the wing-backs on either side) should be disregarded from the analysis. As so often when wing-backs face wing-backs, they spent the game running up and down the touchlines tracking each other, rarely finding space or time on the ball. Something similar happened in the centre – Emmanuel Badu tracked Dzemaili, and Kwadwo Asamoah was on Inler.

It was a stalemate, and none of those players did anything notable – it was like four pawns lined up against each other during a chess game, none able to move forward.

Difference at either end

The sides were similar in midfield, but different at the back. Napoli had 3 v 2 at the back, Udinese only 3 v 3, because Marek Hamsik played reasonably high up on the right for Napoli, though the front three did rotate. The obvious result of this was that Napoli were more secure at the back, but with the slow start to the game, the more pertinent feature was how Napoli’s defenders had more time on the ball to play it around before hitting a clever pass forward – with the midfield battle null, it was usually more direct to the forwards.

Napoli, on the other hand, pressed 3 v 3 high up the pitch, although it was sometimes 3 v 4, with Hamsik getting through a good amount of work in closing down both Damiano Ferronetti and sometimes Giampiero Pinzi. Napoli worked as a unit upfront, though, with the trio all closing down and forcing Udinese into poor passes. This was key in a game of two counter-attacking sides – Napoli could force the issue at the front, whilst Udinese only wanted to play on the break.

Pinzi and Torje

The one missing player in all this was Pinzi, the only man with time on the ball – aside from Hamsik’s pressure. Naturally, he wanted to sit deep and play good searching forward passes, but with no player ahead in space to pass to, he had few options. Instead – and Hamsik’s presence in that zone helped push him higher up away from the Slovakian – he moved up the pitch, playing one-twos to get into good positions. In the 37th and 39th minutes he launched decent attacks but was unable to play an incisive pass.

Napoli were on top, and they eventually got a couple of goals. The first was excellent, with both Edinson Cavani and Ezequiel Lavezzi moving deep and combining, and the second was from a clever set-piece. They deserved their 2-0 lead at half time.


Late on, Guidolin went with three upfront in a 4-3-3 / 3-4-3 system, so Mazzarri responded with a back four, in a rough 4-4-2 with the forwards closing down

The way for Udinese to get into the game would have been for Gabriel Torje to be cleverer with his movement – to move further away from the Napoli centre-backs into deeper positions and the channels. Indeed, that’s what Asamoah did so well in this fixture last year, one of the key features. Guidolin’s disappointment with this aspect of Torje’s game was probably why he was removed at half time, with Diego Fabbrini on (although Torje has been subbed in every Serie A game this season).

Spare man retained

There was only one interesting feature of the second half. After 63 minutes Guidolin accepted that Napoli were enjoying having a spare man at the back, so moved to a 4-3-3 shape, with Brazilian Neuton on down the left for Asamoah, and Armero pushed upfront. Napoli now had 3 v 3 at the back.

Mazzarri’s response? To move Christian Maggio deeper, Salvatore Aronica over to left-back and Andrea Dossena higher up. Hamsik came to right midfield, but then was replaced by more of a winger, Mario Santana. Napoli went 4-4-2ish – keeping the spare man at the back, and seeing out the game.

Conclusion

Simple numbers here – Napoli with a spare man at the back, Udinese without one, but with an extra man in midfield. That extra man, Pinzi, had time on the ball but failed to provide incisive passes, and Hamsik played as a half-midfielder, half-forward, putting pressure upon different players with and without the ball.

That’s a Guidolin tactic – used in this fixture last year and also against Inter last season, with Alexis Sanchez. He’ll be disappointed that Torje couldn’t play that role, and also that his second half tactical was covered immediately by Mazzarri.

pedro

487楼参考译文
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那不勒斯2-0乌迪内斯：3后卫对决，马扎里更胜一筹

2011-10-27 / 阿尔德里奇

经过一个出色的上半场，沃尔特-马扎里的球队取得了令人信服的胜利。

由于本场比赛加尔加诺不能出场，所以马扎里用泽马伊利和格克汗-因勒镇守中场。乌迪内斯方面，圭多林轮换了迪纳塔莱，伊斯拉，多米齐，这意味着他们有一个很大的组合上的变化，这也是造成在场面上一些不连贯情况出现的原因。值得一提的是，弗洛雷斯面对他的故乡球队。

这些战术上的改变令人兴奋，但基本上，那不勒斯是明显的赢家。


(上半场分布图)

中场的僵持：

首先，这是一个很奇怪的首发，双方都是两个边前卫和2个中前卫构成中场的两个部分，不过这一部分在实战中，基本是可以忽视的。尤其是两翼经常形成面对面的直接交锋。无论是向上亦或是向下的运转，双方都很少有足够的空间。同样的事情发生在中央地带，巴度对上泽马伊利，而阿萨莫阿负责因勒。

这是一个明显的僵持局面，在这些球员里，没有任何人可以脱颖而出，形成威胁。他们像是4个马前卒，不停地相互钳制，没有可以向前推进的空间。

双方的差异所在：

双方在中场的配置类似，但是后场则有所不同。那不勒斯是3个后卫对2名攻击手;乌迪内斯则必须要用3个后卫对阵对方的3个攻击型球员。因为，哈姆西克在进攻中提到右路很靠前的位置，令前场形成了3人的运转。这样的后果就是，那不勒斯在后场显然更安全，但是比赛的节奏会因此而变得缓慢。对那不勒斯的裨益在于，他们的后卫有更多处理球的时间，环顾四周可以从容巧妙地将球直接输送至前场----架空中场，更加直接地同前锋链接。

另一方面，在前场的3v3局面中，那不勒斯提升了攻击强度。虽然有时3v4，但哈姆西克出色的表现，压制了费罗内蒂和平齐。在前场，那不勒斯三人组的逼抢，迫使乌迪内斯的后卫进行被动的传递。这就是双方在对抗中的关键，那不勒斯的前场显得更有力量和压迫感，而乌迪内斯只能想着将对方的进攻破坏(组织不起有效攻势)。

平齐和托尔热：

平齐在这场比赛中处于失踪状态，他是唯一可以拿得住球的人----在哈姆西克没有施压的情况下。当然，他想向前推进，想更好地找到本方前锋，但是他没有多少选择。相反，哈姆西克在该区域(如图)的存在，有助于他位置的提升，斯洛伐克人通过移动和前提，进行一些二过一配合切入到一个理想位置。第37和39分钟，他都发起了有效攻击，只是传递上没有那么精确。

那不勒斯取得了一些不错的成效：首先，卡瓦尼和拉维奇的纵深，移动非常漂亮，两人的配合非常好(第一个进球);其次，通过一个很聪明的任意球配合，他们在中场休息时取得了2-0的领先。

乌迪内斯找到节奏的关键，应在于托尔热更聪明的跑位，但他本场比赛回撤太深，远离了那不勒斯的中后卫。事实上，他做得没有去年阿萨莫阿那么好。这也导致了圭多林对托尔热感到失望，在中场休息时用法布里尼将他换下。(虽然本赛季每一场意甲联赛，托尔热都会被换下)。

备选：


(下半场圭多林变阵433，而马扎里以442应对)

下半场出现了一个有趣的现象，圭多林在第63分钟做出调整，用纽顿换下了阿萨莫阿，将巴斯塔后撤，形成了一个4-3-3的阵型。纽顿在左边，阿尔梅洛提到前场，这时，那不勒斯在后场形成了3v3的局面。

马扎里的反应是什么呢?将马乔回撤，阿罗尼卡回到左后卫位置，多塞纳打前卫。哈姆西克回到右中场，后被桑塔纳换下，用一个4-4-2的阵型应对。

结论：

单纯以数字例举----那不勒斯在后防线上有后备，而乌迪内斯在中场多一人，平齐，但是在他缺无法提供精确的传递，而哈姆西克则因时而前锋，时而中场的打法，在无球跑动的情况下也施加了足够的压力。

在圭多林的战术体系中，他希望有人可以复制上赛季对阵国际米兰时，桑切斯所起到的作用。但他会很失望，托尔热无法发挥这一作用。在下半场，他的战术也被马扎里所遏制。

Alex2011

马扎里的343专治强敌，3-1击败国米、3-0击败米兰、2-0击败曾经的领头羊乌鸡

pedro

拿波里的中场几位球员本赛季几场硬仗都表现不错的，印象较深的有因勒、马乔、哈姆斯克

因勒，在欧冠客战曼城时被欧足联官方网评为全场最佳

午时靡深蓝

因勒是好腰，乌鸡这次迪纳塔莱没有上，桑切斯走人，中场核心因勒又卖给了那不勒斯，此消彼长，输球也在情理之中

pedro

因勒是好腰，乌鸡这次迪纳塔莱没有上，桑切斯走人，中场核心因勒又卖给了那不勒斯，此消彼长，输球也在情理之中
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-10-28 14:26

这场球没看的

萨塔纳下半场替补上去后表现如何？

pedro

另外有个问题，坎帕尼亚诺这赛季在拿波里稳坐主力后卫

国家队有关注吗？

pedro

费德里克·费尔南德斯倒是入选最新国家队集训名单了

colinfirth

Chelsea 3-5 Arsenal: Chelsea’s high line ripped to shreds in amazingly open game
October 29, 2011


The starting line-ups

Chelsea had a clear weakness coming into the game – their defence plays high up the pitch and are prone to pace in behind – and Arsenal exploited it to great effect.

Andre Villas-Boas brought Branislav Ivanovic into the side for David Luiz, who was poor at QPR. Jon Obi Mikel played rather than Raul Meireles in the holding role – the rest of the side was as expected.

Arsene Wenger continued with Johan Djourou at right-back and Thomas Vermaelen was fit only for the bench.

This was a game with plenty of chances and some terrible defending – Arsenal were better at exploiting the weaknesses of their opponent.

Change in roles

The most interesting feature of the game was the difference in pattern from the usual matches between these two. For the last two or three seasons, the storyline was predictable: Arsenal dominated possession and Chelsea sat back, then played on the break (and often won).

Here, the roles were reversed. Chelsea had the majority of the ball, Arsenal were more direct. Wenger admitted in his pre-game interview that Chelsea had ‘a little more creativity’ than his side due to the presence of Juan Mata, which would have been unthinkable at any point over the last few years. Villas-Boas has clearly changed how Chelsea play.

High line

That brings us to the second point, and the key factor in the scoreline – Chelsea’s high defensive line, which ZM looked at in midweek.

This was always going to be a problem – Arsenal exploited this continually throughout the match, and whilst it wasn’t responsible for all five goals, Arsenal could have had five goals based solely upon knocking the ball in behind and using the pace of Theo Walcott and/or Gervinho. The Ivorian’s first half miss at 0-0, for example, was shocking.

It was a a continual problem – the first goal came with Gervinho slipping through unchecked, Walcott’s came when he had space to exploit by bursting through. Individual mistakes contributed to the second goal (Daniel Sturridge not tracking Andre Santos) and the fourth (Florent Malouda’s poor pass and John Terry’s stumble), whilst Villas-Boas wrote off the fifth one, saying that his side were pushing forward to get a fourth game and therefore were always going to concede space at the back, a plausible explanation.

Still, it can’t be refuted that the majority of Arsenal’s chances came by exploiting space in behind, and working a one-on-one with Petr Cech. There is, really, no further analysis needed of such an obvious issue in the match, and something that was covered in great depth in midweek.

Chelsea movement

It shouldn’t be forgotten that Chelsea created a lot themselves – in addition to the three goals, they wasted other chances – particularly at 0-0. It would appear that Villas-Boas knew the threat of Arsenal’s pace from their wingers, but rather than deciding to defend deeper (more on why he didn’t do that later), he instead tried to aggressively push Gervinho and Walcott back.

A key feature of the matches between these two in recent years has been Ashley Cole tearing past Arsenal’s right-winger to stretch the play and provide crosses. It happened twice in the first five minutes – Djourou looked lost at full-back, Walcott switched off and two Cole cut-backs were intercepted by Arsenal centre-backs.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

There was a further subtlety to pushing the full-backs forward, though – Jon Obi Mikel often dropped into the defence to form a back three, allowing the full-backs higher up. To as not to lose the 3 v 3 in midfield, Juan Mata moved inside. On the other wing, Daniel Sturridge moved higher up and got in behind Arsenal – Andre Santos’ positioning is very suspect, and Sturridge had two good chances. Santos was also at fault for Frank Lampard’s goal, being beaten too easily by Mata when the Spaniard moved to that flank. In fact, it’s difficult to say that any of the full-backs got the better of their respective winger – the Arsenal full-backs were poor positionally, Chelsea’s were outpaced.

The midfield battle wasn’t particularly crucial in getting the upper hand. As already mentioned, Chelsea had more possession but lost the game.

Progression of the game

How did the game change over time? From 0-0 to 2-3, not much. Part of the reason for the openness was the relentless speed at which the game was played – only when Arsenal were ahead (and even then only in brief spells) did Aaron Ramsey and Mikel Arteta put their foot on the ball and try and control the tempo. The rest of play was frantic, direct and goal-hungry.

The situation did change at 2-3, though – the longest the game remained at any particular scoreline. Villas-Boas made three positive substitutions and Chelsea moved the ball a little quicker. How much did the changes actually impact the match? Looking purely at the way the goals went in, hugely: Chelsea got back in it, yet made themselves susceptible to Arsenal breaks.

Yet in reality, Chelsea didn’t create much at 2-3 until Mata’s long-range effort – and Arsenal only scored their crucial fourth due to an individual mistake, at a time when removing Walcott for Tomas Rosicky looked like they may have lost their attacking thrust and consigned them to getting men behind the ball. Amongst all the tactical problems and substitutions, Malouda’s misplaced pass was crucial.

Conclusion

Arsenal’s defensive problems are still evident. They conceded three goals and this is still an issue that must be addressed. But they won, and they won intelligently. Pace was going to be a factor, they played direct football and created plenty of excellent openings, enough to win any game of football.

This is potentially a very important win for Arsenal, because of the nature of the goals they’ve scored. So far this season there hasn’t been the obvious, logical move towards a more direct style of football that should come when you go from being based around passers like Cesc Fabregas and Samir Nasri, to quick wide forwards like Walcott and Gervinho.

Too often in 2010/11, even when they have won, Arsenal have built up play too slowly and been rescued by van Persie. This is surely the answer – a cohesive, quick style of play that suits all their forwards. A return to more of a tiki-taka approach in the next game would be a disappointment (although of course, most sides will play much more negatively against them, and it may not be possible to be so counter-attacking).

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Villas-Boas will defend his high line. On the basis of this game, it’s a ludicrous decision. But consider his long-term goal at Chelsea – to bring in a more positive, proactive, aggressive style of football – and he’ll argue, with some justification, that such an overarching change in ideology is not compatible with suddenly switching to a more defensive mindset for a one-off occasion. Chelsea have suffered from short-termism in recent years and lacked finesse. Villas-Boas wants to give them more of an identity, and for that he should be praised.

That said, one has to question whether the individuals in his backline can cope with this strategy. A side cannot be so amazingly prone to one particular approach that it’s possible to accurately identify where they’ll lose in the days before the game. Villas-Boas has a great vision for Chelsea, but he can’t be blind to his players’ failings.

colinfirth

495楼参考译文
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切尔西3-5阿森纳战术分析：切尔西的前压防线被撕成碎片
由 余文乐 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球


The starting line-ups

切尔西的战术有一个明显的缺陷，他们的防线压得很靠前，容易被速度打身后。而阿森纳把这一点利用得非常的好。

博阿斯用伊万诺维奇轮换了上轮对QPR时表现不佳的鲁伊斯。而米克尔才成为了首发的防守中场，而不是梅雷莱斯。其余的阵容选择一如众人所料。

温格继续使用朱鲁出任右后卫，状态尚未完全恢复的维尔马伦在替补席上候命。

这是一场有着很多机会和不少可怕防守的比赛，而在利用对手弱点方面，阿森纳做得更好。

角色互换

比赛最引人注目的特征就是，比赛的场面和之前两三年的比赛完全不一样。过去，故事大多会这样发生：阿森纳主导了控球，而切尔西后撤防守，然后打反击（然后经常获胜）。

今天，双方的角色互换了。切尔西拥有大部分的控球时间，阿森纳踢法更加直接。温格在赛前的访谈中承认在创造力方面，切尔西比他的队伍稍微强一点，因为他们有马塔。这在过去几年也是不可想象的。博阿斯已经明显地改变了切尔西的比赛模式。

防线前压

这就引出了第二点，也是决定最终比分的关键因素-切尔西防线前压，我们在周中就说过这个问题。

这个问题一直存在。在整场比赛中，阿森纳都在利用这一点。尽管并非5个进球都和这一点有关，但他们本可以在单单在这一点上就打进5球，他们可以一脚长传过顶，然后利用沃尔科特和热尔维尼奥的速度。科特迪瓦人在0-0时候的射门偏出，让人惊讶。

这个问题持续不断地出现，第一个进球在于热尔维尼奥在没有盯防的情况下中间突破了防线，沃尔科特的进球则因为他有空间去突破防线。第二个（斯图里奇没有紧追桑托斯）和第四个（马卢达的糟糕回传，特里滑倒）进球跟个人失误有关。而第五个，博阿斯说他的球队在尝试追平比分，这样后面空位多是很正常的事情，这只是一个冠冕堂皇的解释而已。

阿森纳大部分的机会都来自利用防线身后的空间，然后和切赫一对一，这你无法反驳。而且我们也不需要为比赛中如此明显的现象作更多的分析，况且，我们周中已经很认真地分析过了。

切尔西的移动

我们不能忘记切尔西也创造了很多的机会，尤其是0-0的时候。但除了那3个进球，其他的都被他们浪费了。似乎博阿斯知道阿森纳边锋速度对他们的危险，但博阿斯没有选择后撤防守，他选择坚持侵略性的踢法，试图把热尔维尼奥和沃尔科特压在后场。

近年来，这两队的比赛的一个关键特征就是，阿什利科尔越过阿森纳右边锋的防守前插支援进攻并提供传中。而这在开场的5分钟内就出现了2次。朱鲁看起来在右后卫的位置上摸不着头脑。沃尔科特没有回追，科尔两次的传中都被阿森纳的中卫解围。


by Guardian Chalkboards

切尔西边后卫助攻还有一个很微妙的安排。米克尔经常后撤，形成防线三人组，这样边后卫可以大胆前插。而为了在3v3的中场争夺中不落下风，马塔经常内收。在另外一边，斯图里奇压得更靠前，在阿森纳身后寻求机会。桑托斯的位置感不能让人放心，而斯图里奇有两个很好的机会。桑托斯在兰帕德的进球中也有犯错的地方，他太轻易地让换位到这边的马塔传中了。事实上，没有一名边后卫是做得好的。阿森纳的边后卫位置感差，切尔西的边后卫速度不给力。

中场争夺并不是关键的因素。就像前面说的那样，切尔西有更多的控球，但他们输掉了比赛。

比赛的进程

这场比赛是怎样随着时间转移的？从0-0到2-3，原因并不多。比赛如此开放的部分原因是比赛以从不间断的高速进行，只有当阿森纳领先的时候（这段时间非常短），拉姆塞和阿尔特塔才会拿球控制节奏。在其余的时间中，比赛处于一种狂乱的、直来直往、渴望进球的状态。

但在2-3的时候，情势的确变化了。这是比分定格时间最长的一段。博阿斯做了三个主动换人，而切尔西转移球速度变快了一点。这些换人对比赛又有多大影响呢？?单纯从进球来看，影响很大：虽然切尔西扳平了比分，但让他们更加容易被阿森纳的反击。

然而事实上，切尔西在2-3之后并没有创造什么机会，直到马塔的远射。而阿森纳的第四个进球仅仅是来自于一次个人失误，当时他们已经用罗西基换下沃尔科特，看起来他们可能已经开始准备放弃进攻，开始死守。说了那么多战术问题和状况，最致命的还是马卢达的回传失误。

总结

阿森纳的防守问题依然明显。他们丢了3个球，这依然是一个需要解决的问题。但他们赢了，他们赢得很聪明。速度是一个因素，他们踢出了快速简洁的足球，创造了许多缺口，这足以让他们赢得任何比赛。

基于他们进球的性质，这很可能是阿森纳的一场非常重要的胜利。这个赛季到目前为止，他们还没有打过这样一场快速简洁的比赛，阿森纳本来就应该这样打。要知道，他们的战术重心已经由小法和纳斯里这样的传球手转移到沃尔科特和热尔维尼奥这样的速度型边锋身上。

在上赛季，阿森纳组织经常是组织进攻太缓慢，就算是赢球的比赛也是如此。他们常常需要范佩西的拯救。一个快速的、配合默契的踢法适合他们的前锋。如果他们在下一场比赛再次回归到tiki-taka的话，会让人失望的（当然，大部分球队对阵阿森纳的时候都会踢得较为保守和注重防守，那也许不能得到如此多反击的机会）。


by Guardian Chalkboards

博阿斯会为他的防线前压战术辩护。但就这场比赛来看，这是一个荒谬的决定。但考虑到他在切尔西的全盘计划是带来一种更加积极主动，更具侵略性的足球，他会找一些理由为自己辩护，一个在理念方面如此重大的转变，不会为单单的一场比赛突然转换为一个更防守型的战术。切尔西近年来有点短视，缺乏长期策略。而博阿斯想要为他们塑造一直风格印记，他应该为此受到赞誉的。

那意味着，现在的问题是，他防线上的那些人是不是已经满足这种战术的要求。一支球队有一个如此明显的弱点，而且这个弱点在这场比赛之前已经暴露无遗。对于切尔西，博阿斯有着伟大的蓝图，但是他们不能对球队的过错视而不见。

Alex2011

本赛季对阵曼联和枪手两场重头戏，蓝军表演的结果却令人失望，显示博阿斯斯入主坦福桥第一个赛季其征程路漫漫兮

也就是蓝军的博阿斯时代尚未真正到来

colinfirth

枪手经历了赛季那几场梦魇般比赛后，从欧冠小组赛上开始找感觉，直到最近联赛连胜，逐渐恢复强队本色

Alex2011

Three main problems for Inter in 2-1 home loss to Juventus
October 30, 2011


The starting line-ups

This was another amazingly open match – all the goals came in the first half. Juventus move top of the table.

The away side weren’t completely dominant. Their first goal came against the run of play as Inter started strongly, but Juve had plenty of opportunities and for a brief spell midway through the first half, they were able to open up the Inter defence at will.

Claudio Ranieri’s side lacked compactness and their defence still seems to be recovering from the early season experiment with a back three under Gian Piero Gasperini – their positioning is frequently poor despite the return to their favoured four-man defence. Lucio seems uncomfortable on the turn and Cristian Chivu isn’t a great partner for him, whilst he full-backs are both stronger going forward than they are defensively.

That wasn’t the main problem in tactical terms, though – the problem was that the back four received little protection from the men ahead of them, and Juve were able to create chances in an entirely predictable fashion. 4-3-1-2 remains a formation vulnerable against sides playing with width – as Inter found out in embarrassing circumstances in the Champions League last season.

It is a particular issue when the front three do little work defensively. In South America, Santos are the Copa Libertadores champions with a 4-3-1-2, but their front three seeks to track, occupy and nullify relevant opponents. Too often in Italy, a 4-3-1-2 means the front three switch off when defending, and that was part of Inter’s problem. That created problems in midfield and also at the back, which combined to make Inter ragged and lacking structure.

It should be noted that Inter had plenty of opportunities themselves – whereas they had a spare man at the back, Juve didn’t. Crosses played towards Giampaolo Pazzini and Mauro Zarate were a threat, whilst Maicon bombed forward from right-back well throughout, often untracked by Mirko Vucinic – and he got their goal. A draw certainly wouldn’t have been a scandalous scoreline, but in the interests of tactical value, the focus here will be on how Juve unlocked Inter.

Problem 1 – Pirlo freedom


Pirlo freedom

Inter played this situation particularly badly. Andrea Pirlo has been in fabulous form this season, and is their real creative fulcrum. The two midfielders ahead – Claudio Marchisio and Arturo Vidal – are very good footballers but are both energetic first, creative second. Pirlo is the brains behind the side – stopping him must be a real priority for opponents.

He was too deep for any of Inter’s midfield trio to pick up, so the responsibility fell to Wesley Sneijder. The Dutchman isn’t very disciplined or defensively disciplined – he does most of his work high up the field, and even when he was playing under Jose Mourinho, generally enjoyed a free role in behind the main striker.

Sneijder was clearly told to keep an eye on Pirlo, as he sometimes tried to move goalside of him. But often this was done lazily, a few yards behind Pirlo and not really preventing him picking up possession. He was in a halfway house that didn’t really suit Inter defensively or offensively – if his defensive play was slack, he may have been better off simply ignoring Pirlo and focusing upon getting into a position to get the ball in space for counter-attacks.

In the end, he did neither. Pirlo (on the ball, highlighted blue) had lots of time to switch the ball out to Inter’s full-backs (highlighted in purple), who were free.

Problem 2 – full-backs with no direct opponent


Full-backs with no direct opponent

This is an inherent problem with the 4-3-1-2 – the opposition full-backs are not up against a winger, and are free to get forward. There is a caveat to this – the full-backs generally have to offer their centre-backs help. Juve’s centre-backs had no spare man and therefore depended upon the full-backs for cover, which made it slightly risky to push both full-backs high up the pitch at the same time – especially with the risk of Sneijder becoming a third forward and creating a 3 v 2 on the break.

Juve had the perfect combination, though – a converted centre-back on one side (Giorgio Chiellini) who often stayed in defensive positions and helped out Leonardo Bonucci and Andrea Barzagli. Indeed, at one point in the first half he moved all the way to a centre-right defensive position to tackle Sneijder.

On the other side, they had Stephane Lichsteiner (highlighted in blue), who played a very attacking role. He moved forward into the opposition half, and was always looking to receive a lateral ball from Pirlo.

That meant that Joel Obi (highlighted in red) had to move all the way out from a central midfield position to close him down – often he was 30 yards away and therefore Lichsteiner, arguably man of the match, could advance forward into the orange space for a cross.

Problem 3 – midfield runners


midfield runners

When Obi went out to the flank, Esteban Cambiasso and Javier Zanetti would pick up Marchisio and Vidal. Of course, there was also the possibility of Pirlo switching the ball to the left, although this happened less frequently.

When that happened, the Inter midfield trio had to shuffle all the way over to the other side – Javier Zanetti would go to the flank, whilst Esteban Cambiasso and Obi would then pick up Machisio and Vidal.

Inter’s ‘outside’ midfielders were also expected to provide width in attacking positions, and therefore spent much of the time on the flanks – too often they left the centre of the pitch bare and Cambiasso (highlighted in purple) was overrun by Vidal and Marchisio (highlighted in red) These players went forward and linked up with Matri.

So there were three main problems – Pirlo given time on the ball, Lichsteiner given space to attack down the right, and the midfielders allowed to break into the box.

Those factors combined perfectly for Juve’s winning goal – an isolated moment in the game, but one that sums up much of Inter’s problems throughout. (Excuse the poor quality, but it shows the goal all the way through which other videos don’t!)

Alex2011

499楼参考译文
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国际米兰1-2尤文图斯战术分析：3点制胜，老妇人瓦解蓝黑军团
由 rhapsodia 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

国际米兰主场1-2负于尤文图斯的三个主要问题


双方首发阵容

又是一场大开大合的比赛——所有进球都发生在上半场。赛后尤文图斯上升到了积分榜首位。

客队并不是完全占有优势，他们的第一个进球是在顶着对方攻势的情形下打进的。国米开场表现强势，但尤文有很多机会，在上半场中间的一小段时间里，他们能够随心所欲地突破国米的防线。

拉涅利的球队缺乏紧致性，他们的防线似乎还没从赛季初加斯佩里尼的三后卫试验中恢复过来，尽管换回了惯用的四后卫，他们的站位经常还是很差。卢西奥的转身看上去相当别扭，齐沃和他搭档也不合拍，而两名边后卫都是攻强守弱。

不过这在战术上并不是主要问题——问题在于四名后卫从他们身前的队员所得到的保护很少，尤文能够以一种完全可以预知的方式创造出机会来。4-3-1-2阵型在对阵主打边路的球队时还是容易遇袭——正如国米上赛季在冠军联赛里所发现的窘境那样。

而当前场三人很少参与防守的时候，问题就特别大了。南美解放者杯冠军桑托斯队也是用4-3-1-2阵型，但他们的前场三人会盯防、对位和阻截相应的对方球员。而在意大利，4-3-1-2经常意味着在防守时就没前场三人的事了，这就是国米的问题之一。这一问题在中场和后场都导致了更多问题，这些问题结合到一块让国米破碎得不成形。

应该注意到国米本身也有很多机会：他们在后防线上多一个富余的人手（译注：双中卫对阵对方的单前锋），而尤文没有。传中给帕齐尼和萨拉特的球制造了威胁，而麦孔从右后卫位置的插上也一直很有威胁，通常武齐尼奇都未对他加以盯防——正是他为国米打进了一球。平分当然不会丢脸，不过从战术价值的角度来看，本文的侧重点在于尤文是如何瓦解国米的防守的。

问题一：皮尔洛可以不受限制自由活动


皮尔洛的活动不受限制

国米在这方面处理得尤其糟糕。皮尔洛本赛季状态出色，是尤文实际上的创造力轴心。他身前的两名中场，马尔基西奥和比达尔，都是很棒的足球运动员，但两者都是运动力多于创造力。皮尔洛是球队的大脑——从对手方的角度来说，对他的封锁肯定是一项重要的任务。

他的位置太过靠后，国米中场三人组中的任一人要对位他都有困难，因而责任就落到了斯内德头上。但荷兰人不是很有纪律性，或者说在防守上不太有纪律性——他的工作大多是在前场完成，即便是在穆里尼奥手下效力的时候，他通常也是在中锋身后扮演自由人的角色。

斯内德肯定是被告知要留意皮尔洛了，他有时也有去对位防守皮尔洛。但他经常是懒洋洋的，站在皮尔洛身后几码的地方，没有真的去阻止皮尔洛接球。他处于一个不上不下的位置，攻防两端都没法给国米带来多少贡献——如果他防守松散的话，干脆他就忽略掉皮尔洛，将注意力放在寻找位置拿球发动反击上，那样或许还更好些。

但最终，他两样都没做到。皮尔洛（上图持球的蓝色高光点）有充分时间将球分给边后卫（上图的两个紫色高光点），而后者无人盯防。

问题二：边后卫没有遭遇直接的敌手


边后卫前插时没有遭遇直接对手

这是4-3-1-2阵型的内在问题——对方的边后卫没有边锋对位，可以自由插上。不过对方对此也得有所警惕——边后卫通常需要协助中后卫。尤文中后卫没有富余人员（译注：双中卫对位对方的双前锋），从而需仰仗边后卫的补位，这使得两个边后卫一起压上有点冒险——尤其是反击时斯内德会变成第三个前锋，形成3打2的局面。

不过尤文有一对完美的边后卫组合（译注：针对本场比赛的情况而言……）——一边是中后卫转型而来的基耶利尼，他通常都留在防守的位置上，协助博努奇和巴尔扎利。事实上，上半时有一刻他甚至横穿场地到中间靠右的防守位置上去拦截斯内德。

而在另一边，他们有利希斯泰纳（上图的蓝色高光点），作为一个攻击性很强的角色。他插上到对方半场，时刻等着接应皮尔洛送出的横向传球。

这意味着奥比（上图的红色高光点）不得不从中前卫位置上拉出来对他进行阻截——通常他是在30码的距离开外，因此利希斯泰纳——可说是本场比赛的最佳球员，可以插上到图中的橙色区域送出传中。

问题三：中场队员的前插


中场攻势者

当奥比移到边路时，坎比亚索和萨内蒂将对位马尔基西奥和比达尔。当然，还有一种可能是皮尔洛把球分到左边去，虽说这种情况发生的频率要少一些。

但当这发生的时候，国米的中场三人组就不得不朝另一边移动——萨内蒂移到边路，而坎比亚索和奥比对位马尔基西奥和比达尔。

国米“外围”的中场队员还需要在进攻时拉边，因而多数时候呆在边路——这就经常在中路留出空当，使得坎比亚索（上图的紫色高光点）被比达尔和马尔基西奥（上图的红色高光点）的攻势淹没。这两人会插上与马特里配合。

因此有三个主要问题——皮尔洛有时间控球，利希斯泰纳在右路有空间插上助攻，还有中场队员可以前插到禁区里。

尤文的制胜球恰好就是这些因素结合到一块的成果——那只是比赛单独的一个片刻，但那一刻浓缩了国米整场比赛的问题。