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楼主: 乔治六世
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[ZM欧洲杯英法篇] 32L呆梨0-0三狮:皮尔洛主导比赛

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26#
发表于 2012-6-22 13:35:49 | 只看该作者
Euro2012四分之一决赛:英格兰VS意大利震撼预告片

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27#
发表于 2012-6-22 13:41:34 | 只看该作者
France - Sweden Full highlights 法国 vs 瑞典 集锦

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28#
发表于 2012-6-22 13:42:44 | 只看该作者
小组赛最佳进球!伊布惊世天钩KO巴神


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29#
发表于 2012-6-25 06:49:21 | 只看该作者
英法都挂了,鲁小胖植发效果不明显啦
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30#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-27 23:30:57 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 乔治六世 于 2012-6-27 23:32 编辑

England v Italy preview

June 24, 2012


Possible starting line-ups

After three one-sided quarter-finals, this should be a much tighter, tenser tactical battle.

Roy Hodgson will name a standard 4-4-2 / 4-4-1-1 formation, and although there’s a chance that a more direct winger could start on the flanks, it’s probable that he’ll stick with the starting XI that overcame Ukraine in the final group game.

Cesare Prandelli’s formation is much less clear. Having used a 3-5-2 for Italy’s opening two games against Spain and Croatia, he switched to a 4-4-2 diamond for the win over Ireland.

Italy formation

Which formation will Prandelli play here? Prandelli has been keen to keep his starting shape a secret throughout the competition. First, he was annoyed that Italian journalists leaked his plan to switch to the diamond against Ireland. Then, he told off Andrea Barzagli in a press conference, when the Juventus defender told the media that Italy would “defend with four defenders”. Could this be an elaborate hoax, with Italy trying to trick Hodgson?

It’s not impossible, but it seems much more likely that Italy will play the diamond. Of course, they could switch between the formations within the match, as Daniele De Rossi played at centre-back in a back three, then in central midfield in a diamond. “We used Daniele De Rossi at centre-back in emergency situations, when using the three-man defence,” says Prandelli. “Now he is returning to midfield because we need his quality there.”

Wing play

The 3-5-2 arguably makes more sense in theory – it would allow a spare man at the back. But Italy were caught out with two-versus-one situations down the flanks against Croatia, and the system worked better against a Spanish side that had no proper wingers (or striker).

England will attack with width, and while the diamond doesn’t offer great protection for the full-backs, it should be able to shift laterally across the pitch to close down the England full-backs – who generally only attack one at a time. (With the diamond sliding from side to side, crossfield balls and switching the point of attack is theoretically the right approach for England, but unlikely unless Ashley Cole and Glen Johnson play higher up.)

Wide defenders

A more telling sign will be the selections of the wide defenders. For a back three Prandelli prefers natural wing-backs Christian Maggio and Emanuele Giaccherini, for a back four he wants Ignazio Abate and Federico Balzaretti. Prandelli has been intelligent in recognising the differences between playing as full-back and playing as wing-back, and has changed players accordingly.

Maggio is a fine wing-back for Napoli, but uncomfortable as a full-back. Giaccherini is a winger and can adapt to playing at wing-back, but full-back is too deep for him. As it happens, despite being more comfortable in a four, Abate and Balzaretti are better at going forward themselves, so England must attack them.

False ten?!

The other decision for Prandelli to make is at the top of the diamond. Thiago Motta played that role against Ireland, but is an injury doubt and Riccardo Montolivo may take his place. This position is a very interesting role within the context of the rest of the diamond, especially when Motta, more of a holding midfielder, plays. This man isn’t playing as a traditional Italian trequartista (like, for example, Francesco Totti). He isn’t directly connecting the midfield and attack. Instead, they tend to drop back into deeper positions and create space for the two shuttlers on the sides of the diamond to break into, while Pirlo also moves forward to become Italy’s true playmaker.

In the game against Ireland, Motta passed to Pirlo more frequently than any other player, showing that the Juventus man is the main creative threat despite being positioned twenty yards deeper.

Upfront, Mario Balotelli will probably start rather than Antonio Di Natale.

Hodgson decisions

For England, the first seven places in the side are assured – the goalkeeper, back four and two central midfielders have started all three games so far, and are set in stone. Ahead of that, Wayne Rooney will also play and Danny Welbeck is highly likely to be the main striker.

On the wings, there are question marks. Whichever way Italy play, they’ll be most vulnerable down the sides of the pitch – either England can create two-versus-one situations against the wing-backs in a 3-5-2, or (more likely) they can get their wingers to take on the full-backs, who will lack protection.

Hodgson likes James Milner because of his defensive awareness, and because England’s wide midfielders might get sucked inside to cope against Italy’s four central midfielders, Milner is well-suited to this game. Looking at the graphic above, he might be asked to pick up De Rossi. On the other side, Ashley Young has been disappointing so far, and because he tends to drift inside with the ball, Hodgson might be concerned he doesn’t have a direct winger to take advantage of Italy’s weaknesses on the flanks. Theo Walcott and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain will, in all probability, be substitutes – but either would be a great addition to the side, in order to stretch the play.

If Milner does pick up De Rossi, with Gerrard and Parker dealing with Montolivo (or Motta) and Marchisio, plus Rooney dropping back on Pirlo, the left-winger might be the out-ball.

Possession and Pirlo

Italy will dominate possession.They will flood the centre of the pitch with four good ball-players, and around 60%-40% is realistic. For their part, England’s approach without the ball will be particularly interesting. Hodgson insists on strict zone play, so Steven Gerrard and Scott Parker won’t be dragged around too much – but Italy’s midfield layout is peculiar, as Montolivo (or Motta) is essentially a decoy, with Marchisio looking to slide forward to the edge of the box, De Rossi powerfully storming forward, and Pirlo lurking in deeper positions. England could simply be outnumbered in that zone if Gerrard and Parker try to close down, but could allow Pirlo too much time if they don’t (which is far more likely).

This means Rooney will probably be asked to drop back on Pirlo and help out in the midfield zone, and Pirlo’s long distribution into the channels is very dangerous. The trouble with playing against Italy (as Spain demonstrated) is that opponents are keen to get their full-backs forward to capitalise on Italy’s weakness on the flanks – but this leaves them vulnerable to Cassano and Balotelli working the channels and dragging the centre-backs wide. If those get a couple of yards of space in wide positions, Pirlo will find them with diagonal balls.

Finally, set-pieces and crosses might be England’s best chance of scoring. Italy are the smallest squad at this tournament (although they’ll be taller than in previous matches) while Gerrard has been in superb crossing form when moving out to the right, having assisted goals for Joleon Lescott, Andy Carroll and Wayne Rooney from that flank.
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31#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-27 23:33:41 | 只看该作者
30楼参考译文
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32#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-27 23:44:53 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 乔治六世 于 2012-6-28 16:02 编辑

Italy 0-0 England: Pirlo dictates the game

June 25, 2012


The starting line-ups

Italy somehow failed to score despite dominating for 120 minutes, but won the resulting penalty shoot-out.

Cesare Prandelli brought in Riccardo Montolivo to play at the top of the diamond, because of concerns over Thiago Motta’s fitness.

Roy Hodgson made no changes from the XI that narrowly defeated Ukraine in the group stage.

Italy were the better side all over the pitch here – only finishing let them down.

Tactical battle

This was a simple game – there was no progression midway through, no switch in systems, no key substitutions, no sudden change of pace. It was one system against another for two hours.

Italy’s system wanted to dominate the centre of the pitch, with two passers at either tip (Andrea Pirlo and Riccardo Montolivo) and two shuttlers along the sides providing energy and forward runs. England’s system, at least in theory, offered more width.

There were two key parts to the game – first, the width coming from full-back. Second, England allowing Pirlo to dominate the game.

Narrowness and full-backs

Italy had much more of the ball than England. This was entirely expected, whether you look at it from the point of view of systems or coaches. As a result, the formation battle was essentially on Italy’s terms, and England got dragged into a system they didn’t really want to play.

In other words, they became too narrow. James Milner was drawn inside and played close to Daniele De Rossi, while Ashley Young also ended up in a very central position near Claudio Marchisio. Milner was suited to this role and performed his defensive duties well, but Young was uncomfortable defensively and also offered little going forward. Hodgson may have been better making his side lopsided, asking Milner, Steven Gerrard and Scott Parker to deal with De Rossi, Montolivo and Marchisio, allowing Young to remain free for an out-ball on the left, to prompt counter-attacks.

As England were dragged narrow, all the width came from full-back, from both sides. England started brightly in this respect, as Glen Johnson attacked down the right and had the game’s first clear chance, when he got the ball stuck under his feet in the penalty box. He also put in a couple of good crosses, and England seemed to have the right idea when they had the ball – but after half an hour, Johnson was much more restricted in his movement.



The more the game went on, the less of the ball England enjoyed. And that meant Italy’s full-backs had much more license to get forward, stretch the play and increase the active playing zone, making England work harder to cover a large amount of ground. The Italian full-backs played significantly higher up the pitch and influenced the game more, and although they rarely provided great service into the box, they forced England back.

Pirlo

More important, however, was the freedom Andrea Pirlo enjoyed. At times England’s shape was good, bringing both strikers back into the midfield zone, remaining compact and getting both Danny Welbeck and Wayne Rooney goalside of Pirlo. When Welbeck was in a position to close down the Juventus midfielder, he generally did his job excellently.

Rooney was much sloppier, and after half an hour when Pirlo’s dominance had become clear, Joe Hart was clearly heard shouting at Rooney to pick him up. Hodgson clearly wanted Rooney to do this, because for much of the game Rooney could be seen half-heartedly jogging towards Pirlo. It was reminiscent of the 2011 Champions League final, where he started off marking Sergio Busquets, before gradually leaving Manchester United outnumbered in midfield.

It’s odd that Rooney’s tactical indiscipline has become such a problem – only a few years ago his willingness to sacrifice his own attacking game for the good of the team was reagrded as one of his main qualities. England could have done with someone like Rooney’s club teammate, Park Ji-Sung, who did a superb job on Pirlo in 2009/10 – Urby Emanuelson did something similar for Milan earlier this year. Leaving Pirlo free was suicidal, and he completed over 30 more passes than any other player.



And these weren’t just sideways balls, either – though he did help to spread the play to the full-backs. Many of them were the game’s best passes – he started off by trying to find Antonio Cassano, who was causing John Terry problems, but it soon became clear that Mario Balotelli’s pace was Italy’s main threat. One situation summed it up – Pirlo got the ball in his own area, jogged forward with the ball for 30 yards before thumping it over the top for Balotelli, who was denied by a last-ditch block from Terry. There was no pressure on Pirlo, and he subsequently created another fine chance for Cassano at the far post, who knocked the ball towards Balotelli in the six-yard box.

England never dealt with Pirlo directly, but they (presumably) inadvertently stopped him being such a threat by dropping increasingly deep. In the first half England had kept a surprisingly high line and were caught out by balls over the top, but the more Italy dominated possession, the more England were scared to leave the edge of their own penalty box.

Therefore, the space in behind had vanished, and Pirlo’s only great moment of creativity in extra-time was a similar pass to his earlier ball for Balotelli, shortly after Rooney had lost possession in the Italy box, when England were high up the pitch. But England attacked so rarely, and Italy might have benefited if England had come into the game more and left gaps at the back. England actually defended well as a unit in the final hour of the tie, with their narrowness allowing them to make plenty of blocks.

Few changes

The benches played little part in the game. Prandelli brought on Alessandro Diamanti for Cassano, Antonio Nocerino for De Rossi, and Christian Maggio for Abate. All three were influenced by fitness concerns over the departing players, and the shape of the game changed little.

Hodgson’s double substitution was slightly more about strategy, even if the formation remained the same. Theo Walcott on for Milner theoretically offered more counter-attacking ability, but Walcott never seemed to get the right pass, with Parker noticeably overhitting a couple towards him. Andy Carroll replaced Welbeck to provide more of an aerial route – this helped relieve pressure, but England rarely got players close to him.



Carroll and Walcott were the logical players to introduce, although taking off Milner and Welbeck was debatable - Milner was at least suited to the defensive challenge, while Welbeck was playing better than Rooney and would have done more to shut down Pirlo, if asked to play behind Carroll as he did commendably (albeit without attacking success) against Sweden.

Jordan Henderson replaced Scott Parker to provide energy. That made sense – Parker was exhausted, Gerrard had cramp and was sitting deep, while Henderson has previously done well as a substitute simply by providing fresh legs and mobility.

But Italy were the better side for the vast majority of the 120 minutes, and it was right that Pirlo provided the most thrilling moment in an Italian shoot-out victory.



Conclusion

Italy’s diamond controlled the game, and Pirlo was the star player – he set the tempo and created chances. England’s failure to deal with him was criminal, and Rooney’s defensive role must be questioned. Italy also dragged England narrow before attacking through the full-backs, and they really should have won the game in normal time.

We’re still waiting for Italy to produce completely convincing display – for all their dominance here, their finishing was dreadful. They’ve only scored one goal from open play in the competition, and have only beaten one side, Ireland, who had already been eliminated. Their possession play is impressive and Pirlo has been one of the competition’s star players, but they’ll surely need to be more ruthless in the final third to win the competition.

England simply weren’t good enough here, and while individual decisions can be questioned tonight (the handling of Pirlo, and the substitutions), Hodgson’s overall approach was right for the competition. When inheriting a side at such short notice, particularly a squad without great technical quality compared to either sides in the competition, it made sense to focus upon organisation and shape. The defensive performance wasn’t always impressive, but England didn’t lose a game. With more from the likes of Young and Rooney, England might have overachieved – although the non-performance of talented, creative attackers can’t be divorced from the use of a functional, defensive system. There was rarely a clear transition plan – that was evident tonight, with the wide players dragged inside and in no position to launch an attack.

For Hodgson, the real test starts now. Such a reactive style of football is entirely forgiveable for a short-term project, but England have to be in a position to play a more proactive, flexible brand of football if they want to be genuine contenders, rather than organised underdogs hoping to get lucky.
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33#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-27 23:50:48 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 乔治六世 于 2012-6-28 15:58 编辑

32楼参考译文
-----------
来自虎扑
意大利0-0英格兰:皮尔洛神级表现主宰比赛
2012-06-25


双方首发

尽管在120分钟内都统治了比赛,意大利还是无法攻破对手的大门,但他们还是通过点球大战的胜利淘汰对手。

普兰德利派出了蒙托利沃担任菱形中场之中前腰的位置,因为他觉得莫塔的身体状况还不能参赛。

霍奇森则依旧沿用小组赛中1-0击败乌克兰的首发十一人。

意大利在整场比赛都是表现较好的一方——只是在射门上比较令人失望。

战术比拼

这是一场简单的比赛——在比赛中,两边都没有改变踢法和阵型,也没有关键的换人和节奏的转变。这场比赛就是2小时内单纯的两个阵型的对抗。

意大利的阵型希望能够统治中场中路,因此他们在菱形中场的后腰和前腰分别派出了善于传球的皮尔洛和蒙托利沃,而在左右中场派出了体能充沛且能够提供前插跑动的工兵。英格兰的阵型在理论上则能提供更多的进攻宽度。

这场比赛有两个关键之处:1. 两个边后卫能够提供的阵型宽度。2. 英格兰允许皮尔洛主宰整个中场。

阵型狭窄性与边后卫的关系

意大利比英格兰拥有更多控球。无论从双方阵型的选择还是双方教练的布置上看,这都是完全可以期待的。因此,意大利在这场阵型比拼中完全占据上风,而英格兰则被拖进一个他们并不愿意使用的阵型之中。

换句话说,他们(指代英格兰)的阵型变得非常狭窄。米尔纳被德罗西的跑位吸引到更靠近中路的位置,而阿什利-杨最终却只能跟着马尔基西奥一起在非常中路的地方活动。米尔纳非常适应这个新位置,而且出色地完成了他的防守工作,但是杨对于防守工作非常不适应,而且他也很少向前的跑动。霍奇森应该可以在占领中场的安排上做得更好一点,他可以让米尔纳、杰拉德和帕克一起联合对付德罗西以及蒙托利沃,然后让阿什利-杨成为一个无须担心防守的左侧接球点,这让英格兰能及时组织反击。

由于英格兰的中场被收得很窄,因此他们的阵型宽度全部来自两个边后卫。英格兰的这个安排在比赛初始阶段实施得不错,格伦-约翰森沿着右路下底并且在禁区内不太顺畅地停下皮球时,他获得了全场第一次黄金机会。他还贡献了几次不错的传中,而英格兰似乎在控球的时候都知道应该怎么做。但在30分钟之后,格伦-约翰森的助攻就被严重限制了。



随着比赛的深入,英格兰的控球权越来越少,这意味着意大利的两个边后卫能够更有自信地向前助攻拉开进攻宽度,而且增加了意大利的活跃区域。同时,他们也让英格兰需要覆盖更大面积的防守区域。意大利的两个边后卫在比赛中位置非常靠前,这让他们对比赛形势影响更大。而且尽管他们对意大利在对方禁区产生威胁并没有提供太多实质性的帮助,但他们迫使英格兰退后。

皮尔洛

然而,比赛中更重要的是皮尔洛可以完全自如地掌控着中场。有些时间英格兰的阵型还是保持得不错,两个前锋都会回撤到中场。这让英格兰的阵型保持紧密,而且Welbeck_123.html" target="_blank" style="color:#336699;">维尔贝克和鲁尼也会相继出现在皮尔洛的面前进行防守。当维尔贝克在非常靠近尤文图斯中场的区域活动时,总体上他的工作完成的很出色。

鲁尼在防守上相对更懒,而且在30分钟后之皮尔洛开始掌控中场时,连乔-哈特都能清楚地听到有人大声呼唤鲁尼盯防皮尔洛的声音。霍奇森其实非常希望鲁尼能够紧盯皮尔洛,因为在比赛的大部分时间,鲁尼都是心有旁骛而且慢慢悠悠地走向皮尔洛进行防守。这让人想起2011年欧冠决赛,当鲁尼不再专心防守Busquets_134.html" target="_blank" style="color:#336699;">布斯克茨的时候,曼联就开始渐渐地在中场失势。

很奇怪,现在鲁尼的战术纪律反倒成了一个问题,因为就在几年之前鲁尼为了球队整体利益甘愿牺牲自己担任箭头的事情被誉为他身上一个良好的战术素养。鲁尼的队友朴智星曾经在2009/2010的欧冠中出色地完成了防守皮尔洛的任务,AC米兰的埃曼奴埃尔森也曾经在今年早些时候做过类似的事情,如果英格兰拥有上述2人,他们今天的工作会更出色一点。让皮尔洛可以自由发挥完全是自杀行为,而皮尔洛在这场比赛中也完成了比其他任何一个球员多30次的传球。



而这些传球不仅仅是分边的调度性质传球,尽管这些给前插边后卫的传球令意大利在进攻上更有宽度。皮尔洛的大部分传球都是整场比赛的点睛之笔——他在开场初段先尝试给让特里非常头疼的卡萨诺传球,但随后他发现巴洛特利才是今天意大利的主要威胁。比赛中的其中一个镜头能说明一切问题——皮尔洛在自己的半场拿到皮球,然后带球前进30码,再挑传前插的巴洛特利,但巴洛特利最后的挑射被回追特里封堵。在这过程中皮尔洛没有受到任何压力,随后他又在另一次机会中找到了远门柱的卡萨诺,而卡萨诺则头球回做给小禁区的巴洛特利。

英格兰由始至终都没有对皮尔洛进行直接盯防,但据我估计,为了在不经意间防止皮尔洛制造威胁,他们加大了回撤的幅度。在上半场,英格兰令人意外地将防线压得非常靠前,因此他们经常被皮尔洛的过顶长传找到防守漏洞。但是随着意大利的控球越来越多,英格兰就越来越害怕离开自己的禁区边缘。

因此,英格兰的后场防守阵型消失了。在加时赛中英格兰在一次进攻中防线前压,鲁尼在意大利的禁区被断球,随后皮尔洛得球后又像上半场给巴洛特利传球那样灵光一闪制造威胁。但是,英格兰今天的进攻十分稀少,因为如果英格兰更多投入进攻,他们的后防左路空隙会更加暴露,意大利人将会在进攻上获得更大利益。实际上,在最后60分钟英格兰在僵持的情况下整体防守不错,他们的狭窄阵型也使得他们能够大量封堵对方的射门。

替补球员的情况

双方的替补球员在这场比赛中的作用都不大。普兰德利用迪亚曼蒂换下了卡萨诺,用诺切里诺换下了德罗西,最后用马乔换下了阿巴特。这三个人都是因为场上球员体能不支或者无法坚持才做出的调动,因此意大利的整体阵型并没有太多改变。

霍奇森的连换两人更多是基于战术的考虑,尽管换人后英格兰的阵型还是保持不变。用沃尔科特换下米尔纳理论上可以提供更多的反击能力,但沃尔科特似乎从未得到一次舒服的传球,因为帕克几次传给小老虎的球都力量过大。卡罗尔换下维尔贝克是为了提供更多空中的传球线路——这会帮助英格兰缓解防守压力,但英格兰的球员们与卡罗尔的距离总是太远。



卡罗尔和沃尔科特的出场是一个合理的选择,但米尔纳和维尔贝克被换下存在争议。米尔纳至少能够完成他在防守上的工作,维尔贝克的表现则明显比鲁尼要好,而且维尔贝克在防守皮尔洛上能够做得更多。另外,在卡罗尔身后搭档第二前锋,维尔贝克在与瑞典的比赛中的表现也值得称赞(尽管他成功射门的次数非常少)。

亨德森换下帕克是为了加强中场跑动。这很合理——帕克已经筋疲力尽了,杰拉德也已经抽筋而且回撤非常深,而亨德森此前也曾经作为替补出场加强跑动能力,那一次他做得不错。

但意大利是120分钟里表现更好的一方,而且在点球大战中,皮尔洛也是那一位创造最精彩瞬间的球员。



结论

意大利的菱形中场控制了比赛,而皮尔洛是全场比赛的明星——他控制了比赛节奏,也创造了不少破门良机。英格兰没有安排专门防守皮尔洛是一个极大的失策,而且鲁尼在防守方面的态度值得被质疑。在两个边后压上助攻之前,意大利把英格兰的阵型压缩得非常狭窄,而且意大利应该在90分钟内赢下这场比赛的。

我们还在期待意大利能够打出一场完全展现真实实力的比赛——尽管他们主宰了今天的比赛,但他们的射门实在太糟糕了。他们在本届的比赛只打进了一个运动战进球,而且也仅仅赢下了一场——对手是已经出局的爱尔兰。他们的控球战术令人印象深刻,而皮尔洛也已经成为本届比赛中一名有巨星级表现的球员。但是,他们仍然需要在进攻三区中更加冷酷无情(译注:意思是不要浪费太多机会)。

英格兰其实只是实力不够,而且今晚的每一个战术上的决定都可以被质疑(对皮尔洛的处理、换人调整),但霍奇森对这场比赛的整体战术是正确的。当接手一支球队时间不长,尤其是一支与大赛中其他球队相比缺乏技术的这么一支英格兰队时,霍奇森把焦点集中在球队的阵型和球队的组织上是一个合理的选择。尽管球队的防守并不是总是那么出彩,但英格兰并没有输掉任何一场比赛。带着像阿什利-杨和鲁尼这么一批球员,英格兰也许已经超额完成任务了。尽管这样会埋没球员的才华,但在使用功能性的防守阵型中,创造型中场不能置之不理(译注1)。英格兰没有一个明确清晰的传球路线,这一点在今晚非常明显。当边路球员被吸引到中路之后,他们就再也没有空间组织反击了。

对于霍奇森,真实的考验现在才开始。这种消极应对风格的足球在短期的比赛中是可以完全接受的,但如果英格兰要成为更加有力的竞争者而非只靠运气的草根球队,他们必须要打出更加积极主动、灵活变化的足球。
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