11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

Alex2011

罗马还在调整和磨合期

午时靡深蓝

意甲就是被雷亚这种喜欢用窄阵型，保守算计的教练给搞坏了。

北极海

意甲就是被雷亚这种喜欢用窄阵型，保守算计的教练给搞坏了。
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-10-17 15:38

扯吧你就

午时靡深蓝

雷亚我还不清楚？现在就连我这个被意甲启蒙的老意甲迷都不爱看意甲了，看看今天早上的比分
Cesena 0 - 0 Fiorentina
FT Atalanta 0 - 0 Udinese
FT Cagliari 0 - 0 Siena
FT Chievo Verona 0 - 0 Juventus
FT Genoa 0 - 0 Lecce
这算嘛事么

北极海

现在看意甲的人越来越少了，这是事实

90年代每周看甲A和意甲是中国球迷的习惯，现在这两项赛事都衰得差不多了

DanielCraig

西超 大马拉加 瓦伦西亚 恩  英超三强 恩。。。 欧冠四强+拜仁 莉莉+黑马

盖坦

雷亚我还不清楚？现在就连我这个被意甲启蒙的老意甲迷都不爱看意甲了，看看今天早上的比分
Cesena 0 - 0 Fiorentina
FT Atalanta 0 - 0 Udinese
FT Cagliari 0 - 0 Siena
FT Chievo Verona 0 - 0 Juventus
FT Ge ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-10-17 15:45

意甲那边的一大帮混球教练也是向西蒙尼学的，这哥们在竞技队早已经搞了4场双簧蛋了，意甲那边明显是侵权加盗版的

午时靡深蓝

话说竞技这几年的牌面不错啊，连我这个阿甲盲都认识不少人：萨哈、卡艾斯、皮尔鲁德、里希特、雅库布、托兰佐、莫雷诺，好切，古铁雷斯...不比大学生，贝莱斯差啊，怎么成绩一直上不去？

rolex

意甲多年来有一点精髓还是保留了下来，就是能看到足球中战术的力量。

午时靡深蓝

意甲的战术还是有看头的，不过大宗师级的像卡佩罗，里皮，安胖都不在了，剩下的就是拉涅利这样的器局较小的二流人物了。

红酥手

最近打实况比较喜欢选意甲的小球队和西甲的马拉加。

DanielCraig

458# 午时靡深蓝

像哥伦比亚两高 托兰佐 奥切 萨哈 皮鲁德都是去年买进的 再加上鲁索这等倒霉的教练。。。哎  还好西蒙尼接收的不错

午时靡深蓝

最近打实况比较喜欢选意甲的小球队和西甲的马拉加。
红酥手 发表于 2011-10-18 16:05

握手！实况里大马拉加相当好用，实力西甲第一，床单蝙蝠塞维都不如它

午时靡深蓝

462# DanielCraig
希望西蒙尼带好竞技，解放者杯里接上贝莱斯的班

飞鹰战士

握手！实况里大马拉加相当好用，实力西甲第一，床单蝙蝠塞维都不如它
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-10-18 17:00

西超已经被排斥出来了么

Penelope

Napoli 1-1 Bayern: all the action in the first half
October 18, 2011


The line-ups until the 81st minute. Lavezzi and Cavani often switched.

These two sides seemed to settle for a draw in the final stages – they remain in the top two positions in Group A, the toughest in the competition.

Walter Mazzarri went with his first choice XI with one caveat – Juan Zuniga played instead of Andrea Doessena as the left wing-back, although he is seeing a lot of playing time this season anyway.

Jupp Heynckes’ selection was also his most-used players this season with a single exception – Jerome Boateng played instead of Rafinha.

This was a peculiar match – a very interesting tactical battle in the first half with the two goals both owing much to the formations and positioning of the sides, and then (in tactical terms) a completely dead battle in the second.

General formations

Both sides played their usual formations and in their usual style. Napoli sat back and looked to play predominantly on the counter-attack, although the early goal meant they had to come out of their shell and press much more, which they did reasonably well. Bayern were all about keeping the ball, something they did much better in the second half – at 1-0 up they weren’t patient enough with the ball, and could have tried to slow the tempo a little more.

3-4-3ish played 4-2-3-1, though Napoli were frequently more like 5-4-1 without the ball. Clearly, the issue in terms of the formation match-up was Napoli having three centre-backs marking one striker. They did that well – Mario Gomez was poor – but the problem game higher up the pitch, as Napoli had one less player in midfield.

Problems tracking Kroos

The man who enjoyed space as a result of Napoli’s midfield disadvantage was Toni Kroos, who drifted into deep positions, and then made dangerous runs to the edge of the box. Bayern went ahead after barely three minutes because literally no-one was watching him – the midfielders watching others, the centre-backs not switched on to the threat from deep.

Napoli then tried to readjust in two ways. They had to be more proactive at winning the ball back (as discussed many times before, a counter-attacking side can’t afford to concede the first goal unless they are prepared to change their style) but they also had to find a way to track Kroos. The man given the task was Hugo Campagnaro, and though he wasn’t completely moving up into the midfield zone when Kroos moved deep, it worked reasonably well. After all, he’s the Napoli centre-back who is used to moving higher up the pitch anyway, so the fact Kroos played left-of-centre in this regard played into Napoli’s hands. Had he moved over to the right, and forced Salvatore Aronica up, there may have been more problems.


Kroos came very deep to get the ball, and won four free-kicks when Campagnaro was uncomfortable tracking him into the opposition half

Problems tracking Maggio

The other issue happened in a related area of the pitch. When Napoli won the ball, they pushed the wing-backs forward, and in particular Christian Maggio down the right. This made sense – he’s more of a natural on that side than Juan Zuniga is on the left, so was more likely to provide good overlapping runs. Furthermore, Thomas Mueller does a decent amount of work defensively, whilst Franck Ribery tends to do little.

Kroos usually moved deep into midfield without the ball, so Campagnaro didn’t need to watch him. Instead, he could move out and pick up Ribery, whilst Maggio motored on. And then, who was watching Maggio? Not Ribery – the responsibility fell to Philipp Lahm, but since his man was Marek Hamsik, he was overburdened down that flank.

Hamsik, in keeping with his performances in big games recently, was quiet on the ball, but did good work with movement to open up space for Maggio. Eventually, Maggio created the equaliser – Lahm defended poorly and was beaten far too easily – although it was an own goal, turned in by Holger Badstuber.


Maggio received the ball in more attacking positions than Zuniga on the other flank

Second half

The game changed little for the second half, with the same formations and the exact same line-ups until the 81st minute, an extremely long period into a match without a substitution. This summed up the mentality of the managers, more than happy with a point – although the value of a draw was perhaps reduced with Manchester City’s late winner – and they also ordered the sides to play more defensively.

Our two key man from the first half both played deeper. Kroos focused on helping Bayern keep the ball, which they did very well, whilst Maggio was more defensive-minded. Both sides had chances, but a draw was coming from a long way off.

Conclusion

A nice, logical game where both the goals came (at least partly) because of tactical reasons.

Unfortunately, the game was a victim of context – a group game where the two sides were happy to preserve the status quo in the second half in order to remain first and second in the group. This was a shame, as the game could have turned into an excellent encounter.

Had the game remained open – let’s say both sides had needed a goal to go through to the next round – where would it have been won? Probably in the Kroos-Campagnaro-Maggio-Ribery-Hamsik-Lahm zone, and – at a guess – maybe when Maggio moved high up and Campagnaro became exposed to the forward runs of both Ribery and Kroos at the same time. Alternatively, the game could have been decided by discipline – we had nine bookings, but surprisingly no red.

Penelope

466楼参考译文
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那不勒斯1-1拜仁战术分析：精彩尽在上半场由 lapdot 发表在GoalHi足球·拜仁专区


直到81分钟的首发，拉维奇和卡瓦尼经常交换

在比赛的最后阶段，双方似乎都满足于一场平局，他们依然在A组这个死亡之组占据前两名。

马扎里的首发只有一个变化，胡安.祖尼加替换了安德列-多赛纳作为左后卫，尽管他这个赛季很多时候都是看客。

于普·海因克斯选择了他这个赛季最常用的球员，只有一个变化，杰罗姆-博阿滕换掉了拉菲尼亚。

这是一场独特的比赛——一场非常有趣的战术对抗，上半场的两个球很大程度上和双方的阵型和位置有关，但下半场（在战术上）却变得死气沉沉。

总体阵型

双方以他们通常的阵型和风格来比赛。那不勒斯后撤并寻求反击，尽管早早的丢球意味着他们不得不压出去，他们做的还行。拜仁注重控球，下半场他们做的更好。1-0领先的时候他们不够耐心，他们本可以把节奏再降低一点。

3-4-3对抗4-2-3-1，尽管那不勒斯无球的时候经常像是5-4-1。明显的，这样的阵型对抗的关键在于那不勒斯的三中卫盯一个前锋。他们做得不错，马里奥-戈麦斯表现差。但是问题在于那不勒斯在中场少一个人。

盯防克罗斯的问题

那不勒斯的中场劣势让托尼-克罗斯利用了空间。他撤到深处，再危险地跑到在禁区边缘。拜仁仅仅三分钟就领先了，因为没人盯他，中场球员互相盯防，中后卫关注没有来自纵深的威胁。

随后那不勒斯试图在两个方面调整，他们不得不更积极地去抢球（正如以前多次讨论的，反击的一方不能承受先失球除非他们准备改变风格），他们也不得不寻找去盯防克罗斯。接受这个任务的人是坎帕尼亚罗，尽管当克罗斯后撤时他没有完全前移到中场，这样做的还行。他是那不勒斯中卫中通常前移的那一个，所以克罗斯在左边活动正中那不勒斯下怀。假如克罗斯移动到了右边，从而迫使-阿罗尼卡上前，可能会导致更多的问题。


克罗斯来到深处来接球，当坎帕尼亚罗不舒服地盯他到另外一边时赢得了四个任意球

盯防马乔的问题

另一个问题发生在相关的区域。当那不勒斯获得球权，边后卫前压，特别是克里斯蒂安-马乔在右侧下底。这很合理，他在这一侧比祖尼加在左侧更适应，更有可能提供好的前插。另外，托马斯-穆勒做了很多防守工作，而弗兰克-里贝里基本不防守。

克罗斯经常无球后撤，所以坎帕尼亚罗不需要盯他。他可以在马乔上前时出去盯里贝里。那么谁在盯马乔？不是里贝里，这个责任落到菲利普-拉姆头上，但是因为他盯的是马里克-哈姆西克，他在侧翼承担了过多的责任。

哈姆西克，表现和他在最近的重要比赛中一样，有球时很安静，但是做了不错的移动来为马乔提供打开空间。最终，拉姆过于轻易地被击败，马乔制造了扳平的进球，尽管它是巴德斯图贝尔打进的乌龙球。


马乔接球的位置比另一侧的祖尼加更有威胁

下半场
下半场比赛没什么变化，极长的时间中没有换人，相同的阵型和阵容保持到了81分钟。这体现了教练的精神，不仅是满足于一分——尽管曼城的制胜球降低了平局的价值——他们让双方踢得更保守。

上半场的两个关键人物撤得更深。克罗斯关注于帮助拜仁控制球，他们做的很好。同时马乔更关注防守。双方都有机会，但漫长的过程后是一场平局。

结论

这是一场漂亮的、有条理的比赛，两个球都（至少部分）来源于战术原因。

不幸的是，这场比赛是内容的受害者——双方在下半场都为了排名而乐于保持现状的小组赛。这是个耻辱，这场比赛本可以是场精彩的对抗。

假如比赛保持开放，例如双方都需要一个进球来晋级，那么哪里会出现进球？可能在克罗斯-坎帕尼亚罗-马乔-里贝里-哈姆西克-拉姆区域，（猜测）或许在马乔前移，坎帕尼亚罗同时暴露在里贝里和克罗斯面前的时候。然而，这场比赛早就被双方的纪律决定了，九张黄牌，却奇怪地没有红牌。

Alex2011

对于拿波里1-1拜仁之战，zm对双方评价都较高

Alex2011

坎帕尼亚洛开局盯防克罗斯不力，使人想起了10世界杯上穆勒那个头球给阿根廷一上来就是迎头一击

午时靡深蓝

马扎里其实可以尝试拿下一名中卫比如实力稍逊的阿罗尼卡，上一名中场，不过他似乎并不喜欢4后卫。

Penelope

Shakhtar Donetsk 2-2 Zenit St Petersburg: open, attacking, attractive and plenty of chances. Why?
October 20, 2011


The starting line-ups

The simple answer to this question lies in the situation within Group G. It is a tremendously tight group that, amazingly, sees APOEL at the top after three games – despite them having played two games away from home so far. A draw wasn’t a particularly good result for either side.

Then again, you’d be able to say that about many Champions League group games, and few are as attacking as this. Shakhtar and Zenit are two of the more counter-attacking sides in this season’s competition, and therefore a tight, cagey game was expected, with neither wanting to make the first move.

However, we had an early goal – score by Shakhtar, the side who had started with more proactive attacking intent. That was good for the game – it meant that Zenit had to come out of their shells and press (a little like Napoli the previous night) and we had an all-out attacking feast. Had Zenit’s Roman Shirokov not missed penalty five minutes earlier, the game would have had a completely different feel.

As a result, much like the Manchester United v Chelsea game earlier this campaign, it was so attacking that the usual tactical analysis becomes difficult to write. The interesting feature was not about specific factors, but about the overall pattern.

Positioning

There were individual positional reasons for the openness. Even more so than usual, Shakhtar’s full-back duo of Darijo Srna and Razvan Rat pushed very high up, stretching the play and allowing William and Douglas Costa into the middle. Danny and Viktor Fayzulin tracked back, but not particularly well, and so the full-backs got goalside of them, becoming options for crosses into the box.

On the other hand, of course, it meant that Danny and Fayzulin were now in a position to break quickly – and they did, to good effect. Zenit were the more dangerous side in front of goal – 23 shots to Shakhtar’s 14, and 9 on target to Shakhtar’s 5. If either side can feel that they ’should’ have won the game, it was the away side.

(It might be the case that in a match between two sides who play on the counter-attack (in Europe at least – Shakhtar are more proactive within Ukraine, but last year they recorded their most impressive European results on the break), it was the side who were less hasty in throwing players forward who then profited on the break – Zenit had more spaces to exploit than Shakhtar. In turn, Shakhtar were more likely to get a (fortunate?) goal by the ball falling to a player inside the box, as happened just before half time for Luiz Adriano’s goal. In rational choice terms, though, Zenit were better off – more likely to benefit from attacking in the fashion both sides preferred.)

Another factor was Shakhtar’s use of Fernandinho in central midfield alongside Tomas Hubschmann, rather than Henrikh Mkhitaryan. Fernandinho is more of a shuttler than Mkhitaryan and spent much of the game moving forward to link up with Jadson. As a result, Hubschmann was often stranded in front of his back four on Zenit counter-attacks, reminiscent of Javier Mascherano’s problems against Germany in the World Cup. As soon as two Zenit attackers broke, he was caught out – often it was Danny and Roman Shirokov (who constantly made excellent forward runs that went untracked). One of these instances, when Danny was brought down by Srna in a promising position, led to Mircea Lucecu summoning Mkhitaryan from the bench.

Defences unsure

That Argentina v Germany game is relevant in another way, because Germany profited on the break mainly because of Argentina’s lack of compactness. The same was obvious for both sides here, and it is another result of counter-attacking sides trying to press, and being unaccustomed to it. The defences are used to defending deep, with protection from the midfield ahead. So what happens when the midfield (and attack) plays high up when out of possession? The defence has two options – either to move forward and stay compact – which then concedes space in behind, which they are not used to, and might not be suited to in terms of pace. Alternatively, they can stand off, play deep and then make it easy for the opposition to play between the lines.

They have to make a decision; Shakhtar didn’t, and ended up doing both at various stages – sometimes they were too high up, sometimes they were too deep. Either way they were vulnerable to pace, and Luciano Spalletti’s introduction of Danko Lazovic (in place of Aleksandr Bukharov, who had tired) gave yet more pace and looked like it might finally settle the game in Zenit’s favour.

It was a bit like a basketball game: one side attacked, then the other, and so on – often with little midfield battle inbetween. Often when this happens in the first half of games, managers go defensive and the second half is much quieter. This didn’t happen here, but then the ’second half’ is in two weeks in Russia. A tight, cagey 0-0 wouldn’t be a surprise, after some corrective instructions from both managers that subdue any attacking threat.

Penelope

471楼参考译文

Alex2011

Antonio Conte’s system isn’t a 4-2-4, but it still provides excitement
October 23, 2011

The starting line-up in the 2-2 draw with Genoa

The 4-2-4 is a mythical formation, immediately bringing to mind the Brazil side of 1970, maybe the greatest international side in history.

It is seldom used in modern football at the top level, and therefore the arrival of Antonio Conte at Juventus this summer excited many – he was set to play the system, and perhaps bring all-out-attack football to Turin.
It’s surprising that so many thought this would bring about a revolution (in pure formation terms), for if there was any other manager in Europe that could vaguely be described as using a 4-2-4, it would be Juve’s manager from last year, Gigi Del Neri. He made his name with a similar system at Chievo, then re-established himself with the formation at Sampdoria, and last year tried to make it work with Juve.
Therefore, it’s hardly been complete departure from the way Juventus played last year. And, in reality, Conte doesn’t use a 4-2-4, as he freely admits.

“There’s been too much talk on this particular way of playing. In actuality it’s a 4-4-2. I know of course novelty makes sometimes a great topic of discussion. If instead of saying ‘4-2-4′ I had said ‘4-4-2′ from the very beginning, we wouldn’t be discussing this ‘innovation’. Maybe all it is is just a normal idea of play. It is a normal 4-4-2. I think in England most teams that are winning are applying this type of module, which enables you to cover the playing field in the best possible way I think.”

(via Juventiknows)

His comments about ‘covering the playing field’ are interesting, reminiscent of Arsene Wenger’s comments (albeit now five years ago):

“I think it’s simply the most rational formation in most cases. In fact, it’s the essence of reason. With a 4-4-2, 60% of your players are occupying 60% of the pitch. No other formation is as efficient at covering space.”

(The Italian Job)

4-4-2 / 4-2-4

As a side note, Conte’s comments on the definition of the formation are very interesting. It has been termed as a 4-2-4 for reasons of pure ‘branding’, rather than because of the actual positioning of the side. OK, the wingers play high up the pitch, but they drop back level with the midfielders when out of possession. It isn’t too much more of a 4-2-4 than Manchester United’s shape at the start of the season with Nani and Ashley Young playing high up – although they tended to come inside slightly more, making 4-2-2-2 more appropriate.

It’s funny that there can be so little difference between 4-2-4, perhaps the most exciting realistic formation imaginable, and the bog standard 4-4-2, arguably the least interesting shape.

In fact, it’s probably less of a 4-2-4 than the system Pep Guardiola briefly used at the start of 2010. That shape was very similar to the Brazilian shape of 1970, in that it had the left-winger (Andres Iniesta) deeper like Rivelinho, and one striker (Thierry Henry) starting highest up but then moving towards the ball, like Tostao. However, if we’re accepting that in all these formations the wide players are level with the midfielders when out of possession and closer to a line with the forwards when the side has the ball, Barcelona’s unprecedented dominance of possession means that they’ll naturally look more like a 4-2-4 than any other the other sides.

Central midfield zone

It’s also interesting that Conte wants to ‘cover the space’ with his formation. The battle of formations in recent years has generally revolved upon ball retention rather than spatial distribution of players (more on this in a couple of weeks) – Jose Mourinho famously outlined why his 4-3-3 always beat a natural 4-4-2 because of the spare man in midfield to keep possession. Playing only two central midfielders rather than three, with two natural wingers and two strikers, indicates a more direct style of football. So, even if it’s not a 4-2-4, the reasons for Conte playing the system are intriguing.

The game against Genoa last night – which Juventus dominated but twice lost the lead – showed off their system well. The most interesting feature – far more so than the formation – is the use of his two midfielders in deep positions. Andrea Pirlo was superb against Genoa, and whilst Claudio Marchisio was more quiet, he was the hero in Juve’s previous home game, a 2-0 win over Milan.

The use of two ball players in a two-man central midfield zone is rare. Pirlo made his name at Milan when his role was possible because he had hard-working runners around him – most obviously Rino Gattuso, but also Massimo Ambrosini and (to a certain extent) Clarence Seedorf. Marchisio is more of a battler, a hard working tenacious player, but he used to be a trequartista in Juve’s youth sides before being converted to a midfielder, and he is far from a holding player.

A Pirlo-Marchisio central midfield is very positive. If there are two basic functions of being a central midfielder – keeping the ball and winning the ball – a manager has to make a decision about the style of players he wants in a two-man central midfield rather than a three. A negative manager would think immediately about his side being overrun in the 4-4-2 shape and therefore field two defensive-minded scrappers. Conte is much more positive, and instead addresses the lack of a midfield triangle to play around the opposition by turning to two players comfortable in possession.

Juve will, at times, need a third player in there. Against Milan and Chievo the energetic Arturo Vidal was added to make a 4-1-4-1ish shape, whilst late in the Genoa game Michele Pazienza came on for Marcelo Estigarribia, with Mirko Vucinic dropping to the left.

Other individuals

There remain question marks about the suitability of other players for the system. Vucinic was playing a relatively static role upfront alongside Alessandro Matri (who was excellent). It made Juve one-dimensional with the ball, and didn’t suit Vucinic’s quality – which is picking up the ball before running at speed.

It has been rumoured that Vucinic could play as the left-winger, in place of Estigarribia, but it might be wiser to use him to the left of the forward duo and let him drift wide from there. Estigarribia has to do a lot to cement his place in the side – this was his first league start, but he was peripheral and there remains a feeling that his impressive displays at the Copa America, themselves brief moments of skill, flatter a player who struggled at Le Mans in France.

Left-back is another area of weakness. Paolo De Ceglie, Fabio Grosso and now Giorgio Chiellini have all been used. Chiellini was terrible against Genoa – ponderous on the ball, beaten in the air for both goals and guilty of wasting good chances at the other end.

Cohesion

These issues can be solved through selection, but Conte remains keen to focus upon the unit. “As far as we’re concerned, we are fortunate enough to have players in the team that may permit us to change and use something different. The idea how we should play remains essentially the same, though.”

The key is cohesion, and this appears to be lacking down the flanks. With the wingers immediately moving forward when Juventus win the ball, it is difficult for the full-backs to make contact with them, even more difficult to overlap. Gael Clichy admits he struggled when Arsenal started playing their wingers higher up, for example.

But the cohesion was most obviously lacking for the first goal Juve conceded. Simone Pepe pressed, but Stephane Lichsteiner didn’t – Genoa had a large gap to play in down the left, and a clever pass resulted in Bosko Jankovic and Alexander Merkel combining, with the German crossing for Marco Rossi at the far post.

For a manager so keen to play a specific system because it ‘covers the space well’, errors like that are a big problem, but Conte’s project remains one of the more compelling experiments in Serie A this season.

Alex2011

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Alex2011

Man United 1-6 Man City: City turn a dominant performance into a historic thrashing
October 23, 2011


The starting line-ups

City crafted a clever first half advantage over United, then were rampant after half time.

Sir Alex Ferguson went with the 4-4-2ish shape he’s favoured this season (but moved away from last weekend at Liverpool). There was no Nemanja Vidic, nor Phil Jones at the back. Danny Welbeck was alongside Wayne Rooney.

Roberto Mancini had to replace Nigel de Jong with Yaya Toure (though this might have contributed to the fluidity of his side), and used Mario Balotelli rather than Edin Dzeko as the main striker.

City were the better side throughout the match, using the ball more efficiently in the final third and creating more opportunities. The scoreline of 6-1 overstates Mancini’s tactical triumph over Ferguson – three goals came in stoppage time, five came after Jonny Evans was sent off and the six came from ‘only’ seven shots on target.

But that should not detract from the fact that Mancini got his decisions right, and City were by far the better side against a team who had previouly gone 19 home games without defeat.

Formations

Both managers opted for the more attacking of their two potential formations – both broadly in a 4-4-1-1 shape, rather than the defensive-minded 4-5-1 / 4-3-3 that Ferguson used at Liverpool and Mancini switched to against Villarreal. The result was a game that was much more open than previous Manchester derbies – remember the dreadful 0-0 at the City of Manchester Stadium when both used three central midfielders?

There were obvious battles across the pitch – centre-backs against forwards, full-backs against wingers, central midfielders (in theory) against each other – it was pretty much a battle you’d expect from a 4-4-2 against a 4-4-2. Rooney and Sergio Aguero were dropping off, but both central midfield partnerships sat deep, denying them space between the lines.

Midfields

However, the midfield duos sitting deep meant that there were rarely challenges between them. They often had time on the ball – although Rooney and Welbeck dropped deeper and tried to stop service into Toure and Gareth Barry early on, letting the City centre-backs have the ball.

There was no creativity from this zone, though – Toure was more subdued than when he plays as the most advanced midfielder, whilst Darren Fletcher and Anderson is a combination that never looks right in a two-man central midfield duo, and United missed a deep-lying playmaker. In the first half of last season Ferguson clearly favoured a runner-passer model in a 4-4-2 – the only time he played Fletcher and Anderson together, United lost 4-0 in the Carling Cup at West Ham. He missed the presence of a Paul Scholes or a Michael Carrick, the two ‘passers’ from last season, who are both clever users of the ball, and Tom Cleverley could also have made an impact were he fit.

City had the same problem, but were cleverer higher up the pitch with their wide players. United’s stayed wide against the City full-backs and lost individual battles – Micah Richards was one of the best players on the pitch, and Gael Clichy coped with Nani well.

City, on the other hand, looked to overload the United full-backs, most obviously for the opening goal when James Milner came over from the right to link up with David Silva, and pulled the ball back for Balotelli’s cool finish. Milner was crucial in creating an extra man in key positions on both wings (see below) and at half-time that was the only difference between the sides, neither of whom had played well in the first half.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Evans off

It was impossible to tell if United had adjusted for the second half – Evans fouled Balotelli just a minute in, and was dismissed. United now had a problem – they trailed and had a man less. They couldn’t come out and press the ball to win it back quickly for fear of being overrun, but sitting back and letting City play keep-ball wasn’t an option either.

Strangely – but in the end, crucially – City didn’t play keep-ball. They kept trying to thread passes through the United defence, and Silva found room to become the game’s key player. Ferguson reacted to the red card by moving Smalling into the centre, Fletcher to right-back and Rooney to the centre of midfield. With Young, Rooney, Nani and Welbeck all on, still offered an offensive threat – but were open defensively. Milner again provided the extra player to square for Balotelli’s second.

Ferguson brought on Jones for Anderson and Hernandez for Nani, but they were hopelessly open in midfield, with no central midfielder (other than Jones) available on the bench to keep it tight in front of the defence. The defence was dragged all over the place, with Patrice Evra’s positioning again highly questionable, and City recreating their second goal, with Aguero finishing – also similar to his midweek goal at Villarreal.

Ferguson had essentially gambled at 2-0. He could have brought on Fabio, Park Ji-Sung or Antonio Valencia for more structure and hoped to get back into the game on the break, but felt the need to be more proactive with Hernandez. The gamble backfired – City showed no sign of letting up, and the number of chances late on was astonishing.

Silva was involved in everything, Dzeko came on to provide a renewed goal threat – and United either tired or gave up in stoppage time. 1-3 as we went into the 90th minute became 1-6 by full-time – the difference between a sound beating and a historic thrashing.

Conclusion

In tactical terms, City were not five goals better. However, they were still better. Nothing of note came from the central midfielders or the forwards early on, and it was all about bringing the wide players inside and across the opposite flank to overload the opposition. City did it well, whilst United appeared much more like the linear, functional side of last season than the fluid, creative side that started this season.

The most significant element of the second half was not any clever decision making, but the sheer ruthlessness with which City opened up United. There was no intention of keeping the ball, frustrating United and bringing out the olés from the visiting supporters – they tore United’s defence apart in a manner the Premier League has rarely, if ever, seen.

Embarrassment aside, United’s problems are not nearly as serious as a 1-6 home defeat would suggest. There needs to be a serious think about how the central midfield zone works, however. There was no creativity from that zone, nor much defensive protection for the back four. No-one expected six goals to be conceded here, but the statistics did indicate that United were vulnerable to a sudden heavy defeat.