11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

南纬33°

我不明白98年的时候雅凯在后腰组合上为什么不上维埃拉和马克莱莱，当时是德尚和佩蒂特的组合吧，前面是齐秃、杜加里和德约卡夫。
难道是后方线上的德塞利布兰科图拉姆等个人防守能力太强大了？

弗爵爷

我不明白98年的时候雅凯在后腰组合上为什么不上维埃拉和马克莱莱，当时是德尚和佩蒂特的组合吧，前面是齐秃、杜加里和德约卡夫。
难道是后方线上的德塞利布兰科图拉姆等个人防守能力太强大了？ ...
南纬33° 发表于 2011-10-14 16:41

马克莱莱第一次打大赛是02年世界杯，他自从被皇马引进后才走上国家队的星光大道，之前一直是边缘人

维埃拉那时已经是国家队替补，但是地位不如两位主力，而且当时珀蒂在阿森纳的地位也高于刚20出头的维埃拉

事实证明，德尚和珀蒂的组合在98年世界杯是绝对的黄金双后腰

rolex

427# 弗爵爷


没错，冠军本身已经铁一般的证明了一切，德尚、佩蒂特、德约卡夫、齐祖的中场配备是完美的。

那时的马克莱莱和维埃拉还很嫩，远未成熟，属于法国队的后备力量。

弗爵爷

428# rolex

是的，当时法国队的中场还有一个人，卡雷姆布

弗爵爷

其实齐达内在那届大赛之前还不能称之为顶级巨星，但是决赛的两个头球改变了他的一生

梅西需要爱

记忆中马克莱莱最初是打右边前卫的，不是后腰。去皇马之前在什么队来着

showfun

小马打了大半年巴萨中卫后，中场出球能力反倒不如刚来巴萨偶尔替补上场打后腰那阵子，现在基本上只能靠长传进行由守转攻的策划，萨巴莱塔和罗霍还经常追不上他的长传落点。这俩边后卫真是无语，萨巴莱塔防守合格，进攻基本上是起哄，罗霍攻防皆差

pedro

其实齐达内在那届大赛之前还不能称之为顶级巨星，但是决赛的两个头球改变了他的一生
弗爵爷 发表于 2011-10-14 17:48

在国米的德约卡夫都比他名气大

WLSOUTMAN

其实齐达内在那届大赛之前还不能称之为顶级巨星，但是决赛的两个头球改变了他的一生
弗爵爷 发表于 2011-10-14 17:48

话说他那届是世界杯踢了几场啊？
红牌停的是淘汰赛？

thewall

话说他那届是世界杯踢了几场啊？
红牌停的是淘汰赛？
WLSOUTMAN 发表于 2011-10-15 08:44

是对沙特那场比赛吧?

不过同样有此恶行的博格坎普则逃过一劫

弗爵爷

是对沙特那场比赛吧?

不过同样有此恶行的博格坎普则逃过一劫
thewall 发表于 2011-10-15 09:12

对沙特拿的红牌

小组赛对丹麦  16强赛对巴拉圭  停赛两场

1/4决赛对意大利复出

弗爵爷

小马打了大半年巴萨中卫后，中场出球能力反倒不如刚来巴萨偶尔替补上场打后腰那阵子，现在基本上只能靠长传进行由守转攻的策划，萨巴莱塔和罗霍还经常追不上他的长传落点。这俩边后卫真是无语，萨巴莱塔防守合格，进 ...
showfun 发表于 2011-10-14 22:51

目前，马斯切拉诺是巴萨三后卫阵型中拖后中卫的第一人选，本赛季巴萨只要是三后卫的比赛，马斯切拉诺全部首发

瓜迪奥拉正是看中其防守覆盖面积大，铲抢精确的特点

但是，本赛季在巴萨，马斯切拉诺没有打过中场，而在国家队，他几乎不可能离开中场堕后的位置

乔治六世

No longer underdogs, Ghana need to become a more complete attacking force
October 13, 2011


Ghana line-up in friendly v Nigeria

When you’re an unfancied side, playing reactive football is natural.

It’s how successful underdogs at international level have set out over the past decade, with Greece in 2004 the obvious example. In aesthetic terms they were mundane, but their strategy of defending solidly and breaking quickly was clearly extremely useful. Their key goals came from set-pieces, but they did have an emphasis upon direct football in open play. Venezuela and Paraguay both overachieved at this summer’s Copa America with a not dissimilar style of play, and for various reasons, it makes sense for the underdogs to play this way.
Ghana impressed with a similarly counter-attacking style of play at last year’s Africa Cup of Nations, reaching the final by sitting deep, then launching the ball forward for Asamoah Gyan on the break. Their showing at the World Cup was also extremely impressive – they were placed in probably the toughest group of the tournament, but progressed to the quarter-final – and it would have been further were it not for Luis Suarez’s controversial late handball. No African team has ever got further in the World Cup, and Milovan Rajevac was arguably the best tactician in the tournament.
Rajevac has gone, and Ghana’s style of football needs to change. They are no longer unfancied outsiders after strong showings at two consecutive tournaments, plus the natural boost in reputation that comes with having successful players at club level like Kevin-Prince Boateng, Andre Ayew and Sulley Muntari. They are now a true international force.

Contenders

There’s a change in mentality that comes with the progression from underdogs to an established force, but also a tactical change too, particularly if you’re a counter-attacking side. Ghana are experiencing this problem now – whilst they’ve easily qualified from their weak African Cup of Nations group, they’ve scored just twice in their past five games against (with respect to Swaziland, Sudan and Congo) serious opponents, albeit in friendlies. Brazil, England and South Korea were tough opponents, but 0-0s against Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, both games where Ghana were the favourites, confirms their struggle to become a proactive side.
The main problem is obvious – if you rely on breaking quickly and exploiting space in the opposition when they’re high up the pitch, you need the opposition to come onto you. If they don’t, your gameplan is null and void, and you need more creativity and guile to unlock the opposition’s packed defence. You reach a point where the opposition respects you, they see you as the favourites, neither side takes command and the game is a stand-off (as demonstrated by the Venezuela v Paraguay game linked above). When the favourites bow out early and underdogs dominate the latter stage of a competition, you get pitifully low-scoring games, as the 2002 World Cup and the 2011 Copa America showed.

Provoking

So, what can be done? First, the side has to be clever with the ball in deep positions. As Andre Villas-Boas puts it, against a side sitting deep and controlling space in behind, you have to ‘provoke’ the opposition with the ball. “It’s the ball they want, so you have to defy them using the ball as a carrot.” Ghana are not good enough at doing this. Their holding midfielders are decent on the ball, but they lack the technical quality or imagination to cause the opposition problems. In a counter-attacking side they simply break up play, or play direct forward passes. There is no thought of having to help unlock defences themselves.
Through balls to Gyan are much more difficult, with the pass in behind having to be very accurate

Playmaking

There’s also the need for a central playmaker. Ghana essentially have three options in the attacking midfield role in their 4-2-3-1 system – Kevin-Prince Boateng (who was unavailable for the Nigeria game), Sulley Muntari and Kwadwo Asamoah. None are true playmakers – Muntari is an all-round, primarily physical, combative midfielder. Boateng is often used as a number ten for Milan, but his role there is to simply connect the midfield and the attack through energy and force, to prevent a broken team. Asamoah is arguably the closest thing to a playmaker, but considering the required change in nature of Ghana’s play, he couldn’t play for a worse club side – Udinese are extremely counter-attacking and Asamoah plays a role suited to the Ghana of underdogs.

Gyan

Considering how crucial he was to the success in 2010, the role of Gyan is the most important feature of Ghana’s play. With space in behind (right, 1) he was excellent – he runs the channels and can either burst in behind for through ball, or get the ball to feet and knock the ball past the opposition defence himself. Against Nigeria, he was making these movements against a deep defence (right, 2) with the result that the pass either crossed the goalline, or he ran out of room when he had the ball himself. And even if he did manage to get possession, he was doing so in an acute angle not conducive to goalscoring.
Gyan actually started the match on the bench, with Prince Tagoe starting instead. He is taller, stronger, better at shielding the ball with his back to goal, more adept at holding it up and waiting for midfield runners. In pure stylistic terms, Tagoe is the better bet for Ghana against a deep defence, though Gyan’s raw natural ability means he is likely to be first choice upfront. He will have to vary his game – and in fairness, he showed an ability to drop off the front, receive the ball to feet and look for midfield runners, though the pass always has to be very precise.
But these are individual situations – the reality is that a move from counter-attacking to proactive football concerns the whole side. Centre-backs have to be cleverer on the ball, full-backs have to stretch the play and deliver crosses. Passing has to be more patient, more angled and slicker.
It’s difficult to judge how well they’re progressing at the moment – qualification games have been against weak sides, friendlies are, well, friendlies. But the idea of the transition is interesting in itself, and it’s a journey that other ‘emerging’ sides based around a solid defence and quick attacks – Uruguay, Montenegro, Paraguay, arguably even Germany – will have to make. The more you rely on counter-attacking, the less opponents will allow you to do it.

乔治六世

438楼参考译文

乔治六世

Liverpool 1-1 Manchester United: little technical quality in open play, goals from set-pieces
October 15, 2011


The first half line-ups

A poor first half was followed with a more positive second, but neither side stamped their authority on the game.
Kenny Dalglish went with the expected side – Steven Gerrard returned to play just behind Luis Suarez, with Dirk Kuyt in the side on the right.

Sir Alex Ferguson’s line-up was far from expected – he used Phil Jones in midfield, with Wayne Rooney, Javier Hernandez and Nani all on the bench.

Liverpool probably had the better of the game – 15 shots (to United’s 11), five on target (to United’s two) and more clear-cut chances. The overall tactical battle was uninteresting, however – static, pedestrian and cautious for the majority of the 90 minutes.

Formations

A high-tempo start resulted in many passes going astray. Liverpool’s pass completion ratio in the first ten minutes was was 68%, compared to 75% in the rest of the game, whilst United’s was 64% early on, and 73% thereafter.

Formations and positioning had much to do with the lack of creativity from both sides. The central midfield battle saw obvious individual clashes – Lucas Leiva was close to Ryan Giggs, Charlie Adam was closed down by Phil Jones, and after a spell of freedom early on, Darren Fletcher was marshalled by Steven Gerrard from around the 15 minute mark. Giggs probably had the most space of any of the midfielders, since Lucas was keen to occupy a space in front of the defence rather than track his man across the pitch, but Giggs’ impact upon the game was negligible.

The interesting early feature concerned Gerrard and Kuyt. The Dutchman would drift inside into the centre of the pitch, and then Gerrard would drift wider to the right (see below) meaning Darren Fletcher and Patrice Evra had to pass players on rather than follow them and get dragged out of position. This combination aside, there was little movement to develop passing angles or get players into space, and the first half was static.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Jones

One feature of the line-ups that did provide interest – in theory rather than in the game – was the use of Jones in midfield. He was expected to be used as the holding role in front of the back four, but instead played higher up to the right, told to stick tight to Adam. It was slightly surprising that he and Fletcher played this way around – if you want someone to do a job on Adam, you’d expect the energy of Fletcher to be more appropriate than the physicality of Jones, who looked uncomfortable positionally and prevented United’s attacks from flowing forward. At least Fletcher had some time on the ball in deeper positions when Gerrard moved to the right, and played some decent forward passes. Jones’ role was similar to Pepe’s against Barcelona at points in the Clasico series last year – a nominal centre-back fielded high up the pitch.

The battles on the flanks rarely looked like contributing to a goal. Park Ji-Sung was tracking Jose Enrique rather than looking to take him on, Martin Kelly remained defensive and in position against Ashley Young, Stewart Downing couldn’t outpace Chris Smalling, and Kuyt was coming inside. Downing sometimes drifted to the right, but Liverpool became lopsided and too compressed into one zone.

The strikers had to fend for themselves. Danny Welbeck’s movement and link-up play was good, but no-one ever ran in behind him. Luis Suarez was a handful and stereotypically won lots of free-kicks (five, from Liverpool’s 12 won overall) but could never quite beat both United centre-backs on his own.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Second half

The second half continued in similar fashion, although the game was less frantic and passing was crisper – this contributed to a more enjoyable game, and more goalscoring chances.

Tactically, the first change was Dalglish removing Lucas and bringing on Jordan Henderson, who played the Gerrard role with Gerrard dropping deeper alongside Adam. Gerrard-Adam is not an ideal central midfield partnership – it lacks structure with both players naturally moving forward and leaving space between the lines – but against Giggs and Jones it was hardly like to be an issue. It did seem to invite the introduction of Rooney to play in the number ten role, however.

By the time Rooney arrived, United were 1-0 down after Gerrard’s free-kick, and it seemed that Ferguson had left it too late to exploit Liverpool’s weakness behind their midfield. At 1-0 up, the home side could play a defensive-minded game and leave Suarez to cause problems on the break.

In truth, there didn’t seem to be much invention or imagination in the way Ferguson got United back into the game, it simply involved bringing on the three obvious attacking options – Rooney, Hernandez and Nani – with Park, Young and Jones off. United went to 4-2-3-1ish, or maybe 4-2-1-3ish, since Rooney was very deep in midfield and Welbeck and Nani were high up on the wings. Sheer weight of attacking numbers pushed United forward, but they created little and like Liverpool, relied on a set-piece for their equaliser.

Liverpool didn’t attempt a shot between the two goals, but then stormed forward again and took advantage of the lack of structure in United’s midfield. Henderson, their only substitute, was the brightest player and got himself into good positions, but maybe Andy Carroll could have come on to provide an aerial option for their late corners.

Conclusion

This game lacked a creator. There were functional midfielders and those trying to direct the game from deep, but no-one to provide a threaded through ball. The players in that zone were all too occupied with nullifying their opponents rather than creating; when Henderson came on, the question about his role was not ‘Which position will he play in?’ but ‘Which opponent will he track?’

It wasn’t an attractive game, nor a fascinating tactical battle.

乔治六世

440楼参考译文
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利物浦1-1曼联战术分析：破坏多于建设，定位球是关键
2011-10-16 / 余文乐


双方首发阵容

相比糟糕的上半场，下半场要更加积极，但双方都没有能够掌握比赛的主动权。

达格利什的首发名单并不让人意外。杰拉德回归首发在苏亚雷斯身后出任影锋，而库伊特出现在右路。

但弗格森的出场阵容则相当出人意料-他使用菲尔琼斯担任中场，而鲁尼、埃尔南德斯和纳尼都在板凳席上。

利物浦也许表现更好，15次射门5次中框，而曼联只有11次射门2次中框。利物浦也有更多机会。然而总体来说这场比赛的战术对抗并不有趣。

阵型

比赛开始之后节奏很快，这导致了双方都有大量的传球失误。利物浦在开场阶段的传球成功率只有68%，而随后的比赛这一数据变成了75%。曼联则分别是64%和73%。

阵型和站位是缺乏创造力的重要原因。中前卫的各自对战很明显，卢卡斯紧追吉格斯，查理亚当压迫菲尔琼斯。连开场被放任自由的弗莱彻，在15分钟后也有杰拉德专门伺候。吉格斯很可能是所有中场中最自由的，因为卢卡斯更倾向保护防线前面的位置，而不是全场追防，但吉格斯在场上的影响几乎可以忽略不计。

比较有趣的是杰拉德和库伊特。荷兰人会移动到中路，而杰拉德会出现在右边路。这意味着埃弗拉和弗莱彻要换防而不是跟着他们走从而被扯离防守位置。除了这个换位，很少有其他跑位去创造传球角度或者空位，上半场就像一潭死水。


by Guardian Chalkboards

琼斯

首发阵容的让人产生兴趣的一点是用菲尔琼斯打中场，虽然更多的是理论上的而不是在比赛中。人们预计他会成为四人防线前的拖后防守中场，但琼斯却是右边的中前卫，前压紧盯着查理亚当。他和弗莱彻如此的分工的确让人有点惊讶，因为如果要开放亚当，人们更自然地会想到利用弗莱彻的跑动而不是琼斯的强壮体格。琼斯看起来对位置并不是很熟悉，曼联的流畅进攻到他这里经常断掉。反而弗莱彻因为杰拉德的右移而有更多的时间拿球，送出了几个不错的直传。琼斯的角色有点像去年西班牙国家德比上佩佩的角色，一个名义上的中卫，但却出现前场。

双方在边路的争夺，让人很难相信进球会从这里产生。朴智星更多是盯防恩里克，而不是尝试突破他。凯利全力防守，在自己的位置上顶住阿什利扬的进攻。唐宁无法突破斯莫林，而库伊特内切了。唐宁有时会换位到右路，但利物浦变得不平衡，在右路过于拥挤了。

前锋们也不得不自力更生。维尔贝克的跑位和串联很好，但没有人会在背后跟进接应他。苏亚雷斯为球队赢得了很多的任意球（5个全队一共12个任意球）。但他没有办法一个人打败两个曼联中卫。


by Guardian Chalkboards

下半场

下半场情况和上半场差不多，但比赛没那么乱了，而且传球也更清晰。这让比赛变得好看，而进球机会也随之增多。

战术上来讲，第一个变化是达格利什换下卢卡斯，换上亨德森来到杰拉德的位置。杰拉德则后撤和查理亚当搭档中路。这不是一个理想的中前卫搭档，他们缺乏层次感，而且他们会不自觉的往前跑这样两条线之间就会漏出空当。但看看对面是吉格斯配菲尔琼斯，这就不是什么问题了。但这好像在邀请鲁尼上场的似的。

但鲁尼上场的时候，曼联已经0-1落后了。似乎弗格森的动作有点太迟了。一球领先的主队可以全力防守，只留苏亚雷斯在前场反击。

老实说，弗格森重掌占据的方法并不新鲜，鲁尼、小豌豆、纳尼换下朴智星、扬和琼斯。曼联的阵型变成4231甚至是4213，鲁尼后撤到中场，而维尔贝克纳尼在两翼压得很靠前。进攻人数的增加了，但他们创造的机会并不多。就像利物浦，他们依赖定位球来完成了他们的扳平。

在两个进球之间的这一段时间，利物浦一次射门都没有。但随后他们利用曼联中场的问题再次疯狂前插进攻。亨德森是非常聪明的球员，他能跑到好的位置。但也许卡罗尔应该上场提供空中的进攻。

总结

这是一场缺乏组织者的比赛。有的只是功能性的中场球员还有那些大脚直接往前开的后卫，但没有人提供有威胁的直塞球。场上的球员更多地是破坏对手而不是自己创造机会，当亨德森上场，问题不是他踢哪个位置，而是他会顶哪个球员？

这不是一场吸引人的比赛，也不是一场迷人的战术对抗。

Alex2011

曼联能拿1分也很不错了

Alex2011

曼联11次打门2次射正，主队15次射门5次射正

colinfirth

zm的小结说得很有意思，从数据上看，主队好于客队，不过整场来看两队缺乏吸引人的地方，跑动不积极、散步等充斥90分钟。

鲁尼、纳尼、小豌豆不首发，估计弗格森再为欧冠做打算：曼联2连平，积分暂时排第三

北极海

zm的小结说得很有意思，从数据上看，主队好于客队，不过整场来看两队缺乏吸引人的地方，跑动不积极、散步等充斥90分钟。

鲁尼、纳尼、小豌豆不首发，估计弗格森再为欧冠做打算：曼联2连平，积分暂时排第三 ...
colinfirth 发表于 2011-10-16 10:29

比赛缺乏进攻亮点是真的，但是“散步”绝对不存在
争夺非常激烈，但是技战术含量欠奉

鲁尼等人不首发，应该说各有原因，主要还是归因于刚过去的国际比赛日
周中欧冠的对手是加拉茨钢铁，红魔绝对不会以全主力阵容应战的

elite

比赛缺乏进攻亮点是真的，但是“散步”绝对不存在
争夺非常激烈，但是技战术含量欠奉

鲁尼等人不首发，应该说各有原因，主要还是归因于刚过去的国际比赛日
周中欧冠的对手是加拉茨钢铁，红魔绝对不会以全主力阵容 ...
北极海 发表于 2011-10-16 15:20

从红军身上拿1分，不错了

对阵欧冠小组最弱的对手，曼联必须拿下3分了

弗爵爷

从红军身上拿1分，不错了

对阵欧冠小组最弱的对手，曼联必须拿下3分了
elite 发表于 2011-10-16 21:54

下周日将迎来德比，德比之前保持不败，这样的成绩很满意

周中对钢铁，必须胜，否则本季的欧冠可以不用考虑了

elite

Lazio 2-1 Roma: Full-backs give Roma the early advantage but Lazio nick it late on
October 16, 2011


The first half line-ups

A game that turned on a red card and penalty decision – Luis Enrique won the early battle, but Eddy Reja’s side came through for him in stoppage time.

Reja chose his usual shape, a cross between a 4-3-1-2 and a 4-2-3-1. Hernanes was the playmaker, Djibril Cisse a left-sided forward, and Alvaro Gonzalez deeper on the right.

Enrique was without Francesco Totti and David Pizarro started on the bench, so Miralem Pjanic played as the number ten in, broadly, a 4-3-1-2.

A victory for Lazio, then – they had the better of the game overall, but great credit should go to Enrique for his bravery throughout the fixture.

Roma lead

Roma went ahead early on, and were more imaginative with their formation, positioning and movement. The 4-3-1-2 is often an extremely static, boxey formation (especially in Italy over the past couple of years) but Enrique’s version of it was attack-minded and fluid, and pushed Roma forward early on.

The main feature was the positive running from both full-backs. Jose Angel moved very high up the pitch down the left, whilst Aleandro Rosi did similar down the right. But it was the cohesion and movement across the team that made this so confusing for Lazio. First, Daniele De Rossi dropped deep, almost into the defence (as he has throughout this season) to make something of a three-man defence, allowing the full-backs to motor forward at will.

Equally crucial was the positioning of the forwards. When Roma didn’t have the ball, Bojan Krkic and Pablo Osvaldo moved wide near to the Lazio full-backs. Then, when the possession was turned over and they moved into centre-forward positions, the full-backs started to track them, narrowing and leaving space for Angel and Rosi to overlap.

This meant Gonzalez and (to less of an extent) Christian Brocchi were forced wide, and Roma could often work the ball across the pitch in the middle – Angel, Fernando Gago, Simone Perrotta and Rosi could outnumber Gonzalez, Cristian Ledesma and Christian Brocchi.

Lazio breaks

The downside to this attack-minded display was that Roma were vulnerable on the break. De Rossi, whilst playing deep, was watching Hernanes rather than creating an extra man at the back, so when Lazio’s transitions were quick, Djibril Cisse could get 1 v 1 against Simon Kjaer. Lazio would win both centre-forward v centre-back battles in a pure sprint – Cisse is quick, Heinze is slow.

Lazio also got back into the game by being more positive – no longer able to stand off and wait for Roma to attack, they pressed high up the pitch, forced mistakes and won possession in the Roma half. De Rossi still isn’t quite a natural primary holding player and gave Hernanes too much space for long shots, whilst at the back Abdoulay Konko pushed higher up the pitch on the right, often leaving a 3 v 2 situation with Stefan Radu playing more defensively. This meant there were only three defenders being occupied by Osvaldo and Bojan’s drifts, rather than four, and obviously an extra attacking player as Lazio played well in the final stages of the first half.

Lazio turn it around

It’s worth remembering that whilst a lot of interest came from the full-backs getting free, the lack of true width high up the pitch meant that all three goals came through the centre. The first and the last goal were reasonably similar – a chip through from an attacking midfielder to a striker – and the second goal also originated from a straight ball, for Brocchi storming forward. Kjaer brought him down and was off, Hernanes scored the penalty.

11 v 10 then, and Roma had to readjust with Kjaer off. Enrique was once again brave – most would have taken off one of the front three, but he removed Perrotta (who was poor) and moved Pjanic deeper into vaguely a 4-3-2ish system.

Lack of Lazio width

Lazio had already gone more attacking at half-time with Senad Lulic on for Radu, but it’s fair to question why Reja didn’t stretch the game more laterally when he had a man advantage. If anything, Lazio seemed to get narrower and narrower as the game went on, with Hernanes the man expected to drift to the left to provide width. He had a very good game, but why leave it to him?  Roma were being extremely aggressive with the use of three attacking players when they had only ten men – it would have made sense to make their midfield work harder with the use of width, forcing them from side to side.

There was the occasional cross and Lazio had some good attempts, but they never quite seemed certain of getting back into the game. Klose’s late goal means Reja will get the praise, but even with a man extra for much of the game, he struggled to overcome Roma.

Conclusion

Can you give more credit to the defeated manager? Enrique got the better of the early stages and readjusted admirably when reduced to ten men. Lazio may have eventually done enough to merit the victory, but with the momentum and an extra player from 50 minutes, it was surprising it took until the 94th to get the second goal.

It was Enrique’s shape that provided more interest individually – at last, a 4-3-1-2 from a big Serie A club with fluidity and movement! With the movement of the forwards an the full-backs, plus De Rossi so deep, it was more like the 4-3-1-2 of, say, Santos than of Milan or Inter in recent years. Enrique needs time, but shouldn’t be criticised following this defeat.

elite

448楼参考译文
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拉齐奥2-1罗马战术分析：蓝鹰宽度不足，红狼仍需磨合
由 Andre.Ranocchia 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团


双方首发阵容

这是一场被红牌加点球所逆转的比赛。路易斯-恩里克的球队占得先机，但是雷亚的球队在补时阶段上演致命一击。

本场比赛雷亚采用了常用的战术体系，在4-3-1-2与4-2-3-1之间切换。埃尔纳内斯组织串联，西塞攻击左翼，冈萨雷斯在右侧站位靠后。

而恩里克的球队缺少了托蒂和皮萨罗，所以采用了一个标准的4-3-1-2，皮亚尼奇扮演10号球员的角色。

最终的胜利属于拉齐奥。基本上他们是表现更棒的一方，但是恩里克大胆的排兵布阵同样值得称赞。

罗马取得领先

罗马早早就打破了僵局，而他们在阵型、站位以及跑动上都显得更有想象力。中场菱形站位的4-3-1-2一直都是一个比较死板的战术（尤其是这些年意大利足坛采取的打法），但是恩里克的版本更富有攻击性以及流动性，让罗马队率先压上。

这个打法最主要的特色就是两个边后卫的积极跑位。何塞-安赫尔在左路非常积极，而右路的罗西也同样如此。而一切取决于全队的协作跑位，从而能一度让拉齐奥显得一筹莫展。首先，德罗西回撤，差不多回到了一个中后卫的位置（就像这赛季他一直做的那样），从而组成一个类似三中卫的防守，让两个边翼随心所欲的前插。

而前锋的跑位也至关重要。当罗马不控球的时候，博阳和奥斯瓦尔多会拉到边路靠近对手的边后卫。而当球队拿回控球的时候，他们又向中路靠，拉齐奥的边后卫会被他们的跑位所扯动，这就给安赫尔和罗西的边路套上创造了空间。

这种情况就意味着冈萨雷斯（覆盖面积有限）和布罗基被迫要去到边路补防守位置，而罗马可以轻松的在中场掌控皮球：安赫尔+加戈+佩罗塔+罗西PK冈萨雷斯+莱德斯马+布罗基，罗马占据人数上的优势。

拉齐奥求变

比赛进行到中段，攻击性的下降让罗马变得有些风雨飘摇。德罗西长时间后撤，专职负责看守埃尔纳内斯而不是在后场扮演自由人的角色，所以当拉齐奥加快球的传递速度，西塞可以获得与西蒙-凯尔一对一的机会。在拉齐奥前锋与罗马中卫的纯速度PK中拉齐奥一方完全占优。西塞太快了，而海因策太慢。

同时拉齐奥改用一种更积极的态度投入比赛——不再是留在原地等待罗马进攻，而是阵型整体前压，在前场逼迫罗马失误并占据控球权优势。德罗西依然不适合担任盯人防守的角色，实在是给了埃尔纳内斯太多远射的空间。同时右路的孔科在右路大胆前插，左路拉杜则更多的参与防守，拉齐奥在后场保持3名后卫防守罗马2名前锋情况。这意味着只有三名后卫专心防守奥斯瓦尔多和博阳这两名游动的前锋，而不是之前的四名后卫了，攻击线上多出一个人让拉齐奥在上半场最后阶段的表现有了明显起色。

拉齐奥扭转局势

值得注意的是，虽然解放边卫带来了不少好处，但边路空间并没有被真正充分的利用，以至于整场比赛的三个进球其实都来自于中路。第一个和第三个进球表现得非常清晰明白：一个直接从前腰到前锋的直塞，第二个进球同样是由中路直传球创造的，布罗基前插，克亚尔放倒了他并被罚下，埃尔纳内斯罚进点球。

11打10，罗马因为克亚尔的罚下被迫作出调整。恩里克又勇敢的玩了一把。大多数教练会选择撤下前场三人组中的一个，而他选择撤下了佩罗塔（表现差强人意），同时让皮亚尼奇后撤，从而大致上形成一个4-3-2的站位。

拉齐奥缺乏对宽度的利用

下半场拉齐奥曾用卢利奇换下拉杜加强进攻，但是有个问题要问雷亚，为什么在占据人数优势之后不加强边路进攻？原本期待着埃尔纳内斯会被安排游动到左路去加强对球场宽度的利用，但随着比赛的进行拉齐奥却踢得越来越集中在中路。埃尔纳内斯确实踢了一场很棒的比赛，但为什么不利用他做出改变呢？罗马10人迎战的时候仅依靠3名攻击手依然踢得很具有侵略性。这就说明拉齐奥应该充分利用球场宽度让罗马处于人数劣势的中场踢得更难受，从两侧对对手施加压力。

拉齐奥偶尔会尝试传中，并有过一些不错的射门机会，但他们看上去并没有展现出对比赛势在必得的霸气。克洛泽的绝杀将让雷亚备受赞扬，但是即使长时间处于人数领先，他们依然是很艰难的才拿下罗马。

总结

能否给予落败一方的主教练更多的肯定呢？恩里克在比赛前半段做得更出色，在罚下一人比赛的情况下也对球队做出了出色的调整。拉齐奥的努力足够获得胜利。但有着强大的获胜欲望并且从第50分钟开始就占据人数优势的他们，却直到94分钟才获得第二个进球，有点出乎人的意料。

恩里克的战术总是很有新意。如今，一个意甲豪门玩出了充满流动性和动感的4-3-1-2！看着前锋和边后卫的快速移动，德罗西深度后撤，这个4312看上去更像桑托斯，而不是最近这些年AC米兰和国际米兰玩的那一套。恩里克还需要时间，这场失利之后不应该过多被指责。

Alex2011

试着翻译一下448楼技术贴
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Lazio 2-1 Roma: Full-backs give Roma the early advantage but Lazio nick it late on
拉齐奥 2-1 罗马： 后卫们给罗马带来早期优势，但拉齐奥却在此撕破一个缺口而后来居上（指凯尔染红被罚点球）

A game that turned on a red card and penalty decision – Luis Enrique won the early battle, but Eddy Reja’s side came through for him in stoppage time.
一个比赛，因为裁判给出的红牌和点球处罚决定而改变 — — 路易斯·恩里克赢得了这场战斗开局，但艾迪 ·雷亚的球队在伤停补时抓住时机绝杀而赢得比赛结果。

Reja chose his usual shape, a cross between a 4-3-1-2 and a 4-2-3-1. Hernanes was the playmaker, Djibril Cisse a left-sided forward, and Alvaro Gonzalez deeper on the right.
雷亚选择了他一贯的阵型，这是一种介于 4-3-1-2 和 4-2-3-1的打法。埃尔纳内斯作为前腰，德贾布里· 西塞出任左边锋， 而阿尔瓦罗·冈萨雷斯在其右侧回撤较深。

Enrique was without Francesco Totti and David Pizarro started on the bench, so Miralem Pjanic played as the number ten in, broadly, a 4-3-1-2.
恩里克没有让弗朗西斯科·托蒂和大卫·皮萨罗首发而是坐在替补席上，所以米拉雷姆·皮亚尼奇出任10号位置，广义地说，这是一个4-3-1-2阵型。

A victory for Lazio, then – they had the better of the game overall, but great credit should go to Enrique for his bravery throughout the fixture.
那么，拉齐奥的胜利 — — （是因为）他们总体来看打得好一些，但是还是应该给予恩里克巨大信任，就其整场所表现出的勇气。