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11-12 ZM专贴(拜仁1-1蓝军:客队赢得点球大战)

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226#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-19 21:06:33 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-9-19 21:12 编辑

208-9楼补充资料5
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Chelsea's tactical approach correct, but Man United's finishing decisive

Jonathan Wilson
Posted: Sunday September 18, 2011 3:01PM ; Updated: Sunday September 18, 2011 3:06PM

Story Highlights
Chelsea lost despite controlling midfield and creating more chances

Chelsea's Fernando Torres and Ramires were both guilty of glaring misses
Ashley Young' set-piece delivery has enhanced United's play


Despite a penalty miss by Wayne Rooney, United ran out comfortable winners.
Phil Noble/Landov

In many ways, soccer is the simplest sport: it requires minimal equipment, and the laws are readily understandable. Even offside, the most difficult of the laws, is uncomplicated beside rugby's laws on the breakdown or the lbw law in cricket. And yet, at the same time, soccer evades statistical analysis like no other game. There is no statistic that, taken in isolation, will tell you who has dominated. Even the score line can be deceptive; over a series of games, the best team will usually prevail. In a one-off, though, anybody can beat anybody. That is the beauty of soccer, but it is also what must make it a desperately frustrating game for coaches. In most respects Chelsea was the better side; but it was Manchester United who won, 3-1.

At halftime at Old Trafford, one side had created 12 chances (5 on target) to the other's 4 (3 on target) and that side trailed 3-0. It's usual, in tactical reviews, to talk about dominating the center or the pitch and/or the ball; usually the side that does that will control the game. Yet in the first half, Chelsea had clear control of the center, its three-man central midfield dominating United's two, despite Wayne Rooney's forays back to help out.

It wasn't even, as often happens when a midfield three meets a midfield four, that the three dominates the ball because of its extra man in the center, but the four looks dangerous when its able to work the ball wide. Counterintuitively, United even had more of the ball in the first half, although notably not in the attacking third; by the second half, Chelsea had the edge even in that statistic. This was a game won in the other details, by a combination of brilliance and fortune. It won't come as much consolation, but if the game at Stamford Bridge follows a similar pattern in terms of the broad strokes, Chelsea should be confident of a win.

United's first goal stemmed partly from the excellence of Ashley Young's delivery and partly from a mistake from the linesman. It had hardly been a major deficiency, but his arrival has given United a top-class deliverer of a set-play, and thus an additional weapon, something that was apparent even on his debut, in the Community Shield. Young's free kick was excellent, as was Chris Smalling's header, but the United right back was offside. Given there was nobody close, it's debatable whether he would have been adequately marked even had he been onside, but Chelsea can point out that its rear guard did its job properly, and that it's impossible to mark a player who is offside; then again, relying on a linesman to get a call correct when the margin is no more than a foot is always going to be a gamble.

At first glance, the second goal appeared to be a simple moment of genius from Nani, and to an extent it was, as he drifted by Juan Mata and thrashed a shot into the top corner. Replays, though, showed that he came back from an offside position to receive Jonny Evans' long diagonal pass; another combination of brilliance and an official's error on a tight call. Although Nani deserves credit for his persistence, United's third goal was even more fortunate; John Terry's clearance cannoning off his shins to leave Wayne Rooney with a tap-in.

Chelsea manager Andre Villas-Boas has spoken frequently since his arrival of the need to play "vertical" soccer and, while United's second and third goals both came from just the sort of direct (NOT here a synonym for long-ball) approach he favors, there were also signs of his thinking starting to manifest. Most notably, there was the pass Mata slipped through for Fernando Torres after 26 minutes; exactly the sort of quick ball he was demanding in the infamous interview in which he suggested Chelsea's slow buildup was partly responsible for his poor form. The forward opted to square the ball rather than attempt a shot with his left foot -- his astonishing miss late on, having rounded David De Gea, perhaps explains why -- but a stretching Ramires stubbed his shot into De Gea's body with United's goal gaping.

Torres' confidence is now so low it seems almost cruel to highlight his deficiencies, but his hesitancy in front of goal represents the flip side of Young's set-play ability. A coach with his tactical setup can, to an extent, control the shape of a game, in which parts of the pitch its played, and how much possession each side has. What the players do with that possession and in those positions, though, is beyond his control. Put in its simplest terms, Torres at the moment needs more chances to score the same number of goals as Rooney.

Yet to highlight the two glaring misses from Chelsea; chances that if taken would at least have placed United under pressure, feels misleading given Nani hit the bar, Rooney hit the post and missed a penalty, and Dimitar Berbatov wasted a late sitter. It was a crazy, chaotic game, exhilarating to watch but lacking much in the way of pattern.

To a large extent Villas-Boas won the tactical battle: his side did, after all, have 21 chances to United's 12. Perhaps the use of Raul Meireles rather than a more defensive holder left Chelsea more open than they might have been, but it also gave his side a zest and fluency in possession that has been largely absent so far this season.

Even his halftime change, bringing on Nicolas Anelka for Frank Lampard, and switching Mata from the flank to operate as a playmaker in from of Meireles and Ramires, worked to the extent of exploiting space between United's defensive and midfield lines. In the end, the result came down to nothing more complex than United making more of its chances than Chelsea did of its. As Rabbie Burns noted, the best laid schemes of mice an' men gang aft agley; Villas-Boas may reflect that the schemes of coaches go even more often awry. Players can be annoyingly fallible.

Jonathan Wilson is the author of Inverting the Pyramid; Behind the Curtain; Sunderland: A Club Transformed; and The Anatomy of England. Editor of The Blizzard.
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227#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-19 21:15:37 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-9-19 21:18 编辑

上楼参考译文
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Jonathan Wilson:切尔西掌控中场,屡造杀机,但还是输了

由 johnwoostanly 发表在GoalHi足球·英超专区


鲁尼罚丢点球还伴随一个屁蹲摔,但这无关大碍

从很多方面来说,足球都是最简单的运动:需要的装备最少,规则也很容易懂,即使是最复杂的越位规则,也不比橄榄球中的突破受阻期规则和板球中的IBW规则复杂。但是同时,更任何其他运动不同,统计分析对足球总是无效。没有任何一项单独的统计数据可以告诉我们哪一方占优。即使是比分也具有欺骗性;当然,在系列赛中,最好的球队通常最终获胜。但是在单场比赛中,任何一方都可能击败任何球队。这就是足球之美所在,但是这也是足球比赛常常让教练彻底挫败的原因。在大多数方面,切尔西比曼联踢得好,但是获胜的是曼联,而且是3比1。

在老特拉福德的上半场,创造了12次射门的球队(5次门框内)以0比3落后于只有4次射门的球队(3次门框内)。从战术角度来说,我们常常讨论要控制中场,或掌控局面,或追求控球率,而做到这些的球队通常都能掌控比赛。然而,在上半场切尔西明显的控制了中场,他们的3人中场中路球员(兰帕德,拉米雷斯,梅雷莱斯,不包括左路的马塔)彻底压制了曼联的2人中场中路球员(弗莱彻,安德森,不包括左右边路的纳尼和杨),尽管鲁尼常常回撤拿球支援中场,还是切尔西中场占优。

并且这不是因为人数上多一人而带来的优势,就像3人中场对阵4人中场(因为有2人是在边路的,所以中路只有2人比对方的3人中路少1人)时常常出现的那样,而是因为切尔西的中场确实踢得不错。然而4人中场的危险之处在于他们能充分利用球场的宽度从边路进攻。跟我们的直觉相违背的是,曼联在上半场控球更多,尽管很明显在进攻三区控球不多,而在下半场,切尔西甚至在控球率这一项数据上也占优了。但是足球比赛并不是靠控球率决出胜负,而是靠机智和运气的综合。我不是有意安慰切尔西,但是如果比赛是在斯坦福桥也按照利用球场宽度的方式来踢,恐怕切尔西更有信心获胜。

曼联的第一个进球部分来自阿什利-扬的绝妙传球,另一部分则是因为边裁的误判。尽管曼联不缺乏定位球高手,但是阿什利扬的到来的确给曼联带来了世界级的定位球传中,这成了曼联的一项额外武器,而这一点甚至在杨的曼联首秀中就展露无遗(社区盾比赛)。阿什利扬的任意球很棒,而斯莫林的头球同样很棒,但是,这个右后卫越位了。但斯莫林身旁无人看守,所以如果他没越位的话,切尔西有没有人盯紧了他是值得商榷的,但是切尔西可以说他们的后卫是在造越位,毕竟,越位位置上的队员你是不用盯也盯不了的。所以,我们再次看到,足球比赛仅仅靠一个边裁来对不到一英尺的差距作出判罚,这是多么的冒险。

看起来第二个进球仅仅是纳尼个人才华的展现,当然了,在某种程度上是这样的,因为他摆脱了马塔的防守,将球射入球门上角。但是慢镜头告诉我们,纳尼是从越位位置回接埃文斯的对角长传的,纳尼越位了。这个进球同样由于机智和高节奏比赛中的误判造成。尽管纳尼的持续闪耀值得表扬,但是曼联的第三球其实更是运气好到爆,特里的跪地解围球竟然从他的小腿弹到了鲁尼脚下,后者在小禁区直接轻松推射入网。

切尔西主帅博阿斯从上任开始就屡次说切尔西需要踢更具纵深的足球,他的想法在切尔西也有开始显现的迹象,尽管曼联的第二球和第三球正是他所赞同的那种更直接(不是长传冲吊的意思)的传球方式。最明显的证据是,马塔26分钟给托雷斯传出直塞球,并且正是托雷斯在一次非正式采访中说他需要的那种快速传球,他认为正是由于切尔西缓慢的进攻组织导致他状态不好。托雷斯接球作了一下调整,而没有起左脚射门--他随后那个令人震惊的错失良机也许解释了他的犹豫:球绕过了德赫亚但偏出球门。可是随后跟进的拉米雷斯由于身体已经够出去了,他面对空门的射门被德赫亚没收。

托雷斯的自信已经跌到谷底了,所以现在强调他的过失似乎有点残酷,但是他在门前的犹豫在杨的定位球能力面前确实显得弱爆了。教练通过战术布置,在一定程度上确实可以控制比赛的大概,比如场上的哪些区域要力争,控球率如何。但是球员在那些控球时间里,在他们的位置上怎么表现却是教练无法控制的。简单点说,托雷斯现在需要比鲁尼更多的机会才能进跟鲁尼一样多的球。

切尔西错失的绝好机会如果把握住了的话,至少会给曼联带来压力。然而继续强调切尔西两次错过必进球的机会,似乎会带来误导--好像是天亡切尔西,非战之罪。但是其实曼联的纳尼击中横梁一次,鲁尼击中立柱一次,罚失点球一次,贝巴后来也错失一次机会。这是场疯狂混乱看起来很hi的比赛,但是比赛进展的方式上来看似乎欠缺了很多。

很大程度上,博阿斯赢得了战术上的较量:他的球队有21次机会,曼联只有12次。也许启用劳尔-梅雷莱斯而不是派上一个更偏重防守的中场拦截者不会让切尔西踢得这么比以往要开放,但是这样的布置同样给他的球队带来了更多的控球和激情,而这些在至今为止本赛季的切尔西身上是从未看到过的。

即使他中场休息的调整--用阿内尔卡换下兰帕德,马塔从边路换到梅雷莱斯和拉米雷斯身前作为一个中场组织者--都极大的利用了曼联后防和中场两条线之间的空间。但是最后,结果没什么改变,曼联相对切尔西更好地利用了他们的机会。就像诗人拉比-布恩斯写道:不管是老鼠还是人,做出的最好的安排也往往会出错。博阿斯也许会想,足球教练做的安排更有可能出错。球员们总是容易犯错,教练烦死也没办法。
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228#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-19 21:27:40 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-9-19 21:48 编辑

208-9楼补充资料6
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Torres is sinking into his own private hell after open-goal gaffe

By Martin Samuel
Last updated at 10:24 AM on 19th September 2011

[size=1.2em]The greatest miss in the history of the Premier League? Probably.

[size=1.2em]Oh, there will have been similar howlers, some poor unfortunates whose nightmares contain dark memories of the day they hit rock bottom, but not the back of the net. Even so, they will not be as horrible as this.

[size=1.2em]Given the stage, the occasion, the state of the game, the cost of the man, nothing in recent years quite compares to Fernando Torres’ miss against Manchester United in the 83rd minute on Sunday.


Cool as you like: Torres lifts the ball over De Gea

[size=1.2em]He read the pass, he shimmied, he left goalkeeper David De Gea in his wake, the goal opened up like the arms of a loved one; then closed with the snap of a venus fly trap.

[size=1.2em]Torres, his shape all wrong, seemed to be falling sideways as he attempted the simplest conversion into an unguarded goal. The ball spewed wide.

[size=1.2em]As one, the majority in the stadium rose, united in derision and mirth yet, stepping outside the moment, it felt spiteful to feel any emotion beyond pity. Even those on Merseyside may believe Torres has suffered enough now.

[size=1.2em]Seriously, what is to be done with him? He did not play badly. His movement, his link play, his work rate, all were good. Yet, as a goalscorer who missed two, perhaps three, outstanding chances his profligacy was the difference between the sides.

[size=1.2em]Had Torres been in the form he showed here for Liverpool in March 2009 — when he single-handedly cost Nemanja Vidic the accolade of Footballer of the Year — Chelsea would have won. They had enough chances to do so and a draw would not have flattered them.

[size=1.2em]Yet Torres’ performance raises more questions than answers. His confidence seemed hugely affected by the ebb and flow of the game and he looks to have lost the defining ability to stay detached when faced with goal.




Cruel as you like: Torres has left De Gea for dead but fluffs his finish

[size=1.2em]The one chance he dispatched comfortably came when Manchester United led 3-0 and all seemed lost; when Chelsea were in contention, the pressure unnerved Torres.

[size=1.2em]Had he found that empty net, Chelsea would have had 12 minutes including injury time, to level the score.

[size=1.2em]In the first half, with Manchester United a Chris Smalling goal in front, Torres made two clear runs against the goalkeeper. On the first occasion, after a mistake by Anderson, he scuffed his shot, which bobbled wide; for the second, he chose to square the ball instead to Daniel Sturridge, only for the stretching Ramires to get in the way, allowing De Gea to recover. The Torres of old would have scored, twice.

[size=1.2em]Even if his attempted pass was an act of noble unselfishness, it was also an indication of a striker who is not fully confident in his finishing ability.

[size=1.2em]Soon after, Torres attempted a spectacular overhead kick from the edge of the penalty area.


Taking the lead: Chris Smalling gives Manchester United the lead as Torres watches on

[size=1.2em]What to make of this juxtaposition? There is little pressure when attempting the fantastic. Had Torres scored with his aerial volley, he would have been a hero. Missing the target, however, made him no villain. Nobody expected a goal from there. It was a free hit.

[size=1.2em]Through with only the goalkeeper to beat is a very different matter. On those occasions, Chelsea were relying on Torres and he failed to deliver.

[size=1.2em]Fast forward to the first minute of the second-half, by which time United were three goals clear and most considered the game dead. Put through by an exquisite ball from Nicolas Anelka, Torres was — to coin a phrase from Paul Merson — as cool as the other side of your pillow.


The same? Chelsea boss Andre Villas-Boas said Wayne Rooney's penalty miss was the same as Torres' miss

[size=1.2em]He dinked the ball over De Gea, a lovely piece of skill and exactly what Roman Abramovich thought he would be getting every week when he made Torres the most expensive purchase in the history of the English game.

[size=1.2em]In putting Chelsea back in the game, the striker seemed to put himself out of it. Not that he was reluctant to get involved, more that, with the outcome once again at stake, confidence deserted him.

[size=1.2em]He forced a good save from De Gea, but struck the far easier rebound over the bar; and then came The Miss.

[size=1.2em]Ferguson helpfully compared it to one by Diego Forlan in a pre-season friendly with Juventus and we all know what happened to him. The Uruguayan is a fine player and subsequently enjoyed many successful years in Spain, but his Manchester United career was blighted by mental frailty in front of goal and mockery from visiting fans.


Howler: United boss Sir Alex Ferguson compared Torres' miss to one of Diego Forlan's in a pre-season friendly against Juventus in 2003

[size=1.2em]Some would argue Ferguson was merely being empathetic. Those who see his every utterance as a mind game, would say he was turning the screw, ever so gently, planting the seed that Torres was to Chelsea what Forlan was to United, except more expensive. Much, much more expensive.


Nightmare: Fernando Torres has struggled to make a major impact at Chelsea since his £50m move

[size=1.2em]English football was not for Forlan, but Torres does not have that excuse. He thrived at Liverpool, so what has gone wrong here?

[size=1.2em]‘Wayne Rooney missed a penalty, which is the same really,’ said Villas-Boas, but that is not true, either. Rooney has been prolific this season and his John Terry-style slip on the spot was a momentary aberration.

[size=1.2em]By contrast, it was Torres’ goal that was the exception and his misses came as no surprise.

[size=1.2em]This is his own private hell: weighed down by hope and a £50m price tag, he has become a rich man’s Ronnie Rosenthal.

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2038929/Fernando-Torres-sinking-private-hell-open-goal-miss--Martin-Samuel.html#ixzz1YPAoKjGJ
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229#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-19 21:45:41 | 只看该作者
上楼参考译文
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马丁-萨穆埃尔专栏:匪夷所思失空门,托雷斯直坠地狱

由 风绯雨 发表在GoalHi足球·英超专区


这会是英超史上最著名的错失空门吗? 很有可能。

嗯,也许确实曾经还有过那么几个类似的倒霉鬼,他们的梦魇中充斥着无法将简单机会转化为进球的黑色记忆。不过他们之前的表演都及不上这次这么糟糕。看看这场比赛的背景吧,争冠的舞台上两支顶级劲旅的对撞,再加上主角昂贵的身价,近些年来的滑稽失误都比不上托雷斯周日对阵曼联时在第83分钟错失的这一个如此令人瞩目。



要多冷静有多冷静:托雷斯将球挑过德赫亚

他很好的看清了传球路线,晃过了门将,将德赫亚甩在身后,进球机会如此唾手可得,大门洞开,就像张开双臂迎接他的爱人,然而却在一霎那后突然关闭,如同捉到猎物后的捕蝇草一样。托雷斯整个的身形都没有调整好,在尝试将球以最普通的方式推入空门之际,他看起来像要侧身滑倒,于是球不幸滑门而出。

这一刻全场观众都站了起来,窃喜和嘲笑皆而有之。然而事后回想,一切同情以外的情感都显得有些过分。即便是默西塞德郡(利物浦所在地)的球迷们,也觉得托雷斯感受到的痛苦实在是够多的了。说实在的,还能对他更多要求些什么呢?他踢得并不坏,无论是站位,传接球或者无球跑动都做得很不错。然而,作为一名错失了两三个绝佳良机的射手来说,正是他肆意浪费掉的机会决定了这场比赛两队的比分差。

如果托雷斯仍然能够保持2009年3月他尚在利物浦时的状态 - 那时他单打独斗干掉了当年英超最佳球员维迪奇 - 切尔西就应当能够取得胜利。他们有着足够多的机会,甚至平局都不能让他们真正满意。然而事实上托雷斯的表现确是疑问重重。他的信心随着比赛的流逝渐渐消失,失去了面对进球机会时必须的冷静。






要多残酷有多残酷:托雷斯干掉了德赫亚,却踢飞了空门

他轻易浪费的第一个机会是在曼联3:0领先,看起来输球不可避免的时候。当切尔西全队都在挣扎的时候,压力也找上了他。

而最后如果他打进那个空门,大致算上补时一共还有十二分钟留给切尔西去试图扳平比分。

上半场,在斯莫林踢进一球,曼联领先之后,托雷斯有两次面对门将的良机。第一次出现在安德森传球失误之后,他一脚低射,不幸偏出。第二次他将球横传中路,使得德赫亚有时间做出反应,斯图里奇和拉米雷斯两点接应,后者抢点射门被扑出。如若换成旧日的托雷斯,必定已经梅开二度。尽管他的传球体现出了高贵的无私精神,但同样体现出他对自己的射门能力并没有百分百的自信。

随后,他在禁区边缘尝试了一脚高难度倒勾。这脚射门体现了什么?很明显,尝试高难度动作的时候通常不会有什么压力。如果托雷斯将这脚空中接力踢进,他就会成为英雄;踢偏了,也没有任何人会怪他,因为本来就不是什么明显的进球机会。他可以尽情踢上一脚。但在出现面对门将的单刀良机时,
故事却大不相同,切尔西全队都指着他将其转化为进球,可他却没能做到。


比分领先:斯莫林为曼联首开纪录,托雷斯目送球入网

就在下半场刚开场的第一分钟,曼联3:0领先,大多数人都觉得比赛已经差不多失去悬念的时候,托雷斯将阿内尔卡的直传球打进。借用保罗·默森(退役英格兰国脚)的一句话,他冷静得像枕头背面的温度一样,将球轻巧挑过德赫亚的头顶。这粒进球所展现出来的技巧正是阿布拉莫维奇为他一掷千金打破英格兰转会记录之后期望每周都能看到的。


一样吗?切尔西主教练博阿斯声称鲁尼的点球miss和托雷斯的一样纱布

在将切尔西拉回比赛之后,托雷斯自己却似乎慢慢从场上消失了。并不是他自己不愿意投入比赛,而是随后的进程摧毁了他的信心。他首先迫使德赫亚做出了一次精彩的扑救,随后却将相对来说更容易的反弹来球射高,接着则是那次纱布miss。

弗格森将这次miss和当年季前友谊赛弗兰面对尤文图斯射失的一球进行了对比(两者确实非常相似),我们都知道后来在弗兰身上发生了什么(被转卖)。乌拉圭人是一名好球员,随后在西班牙成功的踢了很多年。然而他的曼彻斯特生涯却相当黯淡,其中一部分要归咎于由那记错失空门之后产生的面对进球良机时的极度不自信,以及对方球迷对此的不断嘲讽。


倒霉催的:曼联主教练弗格森将托雷斯的miss与2003年弗兰在季前赛与尤文的比赛中的miss相提并论

有些人会说弗格森只是感同身受想到了过去的一幕。然而对那些看着他经常进行语言心理战的人们而言,他可能是在试图轻轻种下一颗不安分的种子,将托雷斯之于切尔西和弗兰曾经之于曼联相比,但前者显然要更加昂贵,许多,许多。


梦魇:托雷斯在五千万磅转会切尔西后一直没能做出重要贡献

英格兰足球可能不适合弗兰,但托雷斯并没有同样的借口,他在利物浦踢得很出色。那究竟是什么地方不对劲了?

“鲁尼错失的点球看起来也差不多糟糕”,博阿斯这样说,但这并不正确。鲁尼本赛季势不可挡,状态上佳。这记特里式的摔倒只不过是小小的一时失误而已。

相比之下,托雷斯的进球才是不寻常的事件,考虑到他这赛季的状态,错失的空门也不怎么令人惊讶。

这正是专属于他一人的地狱时刻:背着五千万英镑的标价辜负了人们的期望之后,他正在成为富人版的Ronnie Rosenthal。(前以色列国脚,第一名在英国踢球,身价超过一百万英镑的非英国球员,以1.1m英镑加盟利物浦后表现差强人意。)
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230#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-19 21:49:29 | 只看该作者
有人说,托雷斯老了,果真如此吗?

他有比利亚老吗?
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231#
发表于 2011-9-19 22:04:04 | 只看该作者
2011-09-18 匪夷所思的空门不进 托雷斯vs曼联个人集锦

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232#
发表于 2011-9-19 22:06:28 | 只看该作者
托雷斯空门不进之风,最后也传染给了鲁尼和贝巴

他俩在最后时刻反击中有绝好良机,却发扬风格“互相推诿”而错失良机
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233#
发表于 2011-9-20 12:43:19 | 只看该作者
PSV 2-2 Ajax: PSV press, Ajax fight back
September 19, 2011


The first half line-ups (PSV in white/red, Ajax in blue)

PSV twice took the lead by exploiting a clear weakness in the Ajax defence, but the away side managed to claim a point.
Fred Rutton made two changes from PSV’s previous league game. Wilfred Bouma and Zakaria Labyad dropped out, with Timothy Derijck and Tim Matavz coming in.
Frank de Boer was without Miralem Sulejmani and chose to bring Vurnon Anita into the side as the holding player.
This match was open and entertaining, largely because there were two attack-minded midfields who wanted to play the ball rather than win it back.

PSV start strongly
For the first few minutes there was a huge difference in the two sides’ attitude without the ball – PSV pressed Ajax strongly from the first whistle, winning the ball quickly and putting them in command of the game. Ajax, however, were happy to sit back in their own half, showing a surprisingly passive approach when out of position.
The first goal resulted directly from the pressing – Ajax were high up the pitch when Gregory van der Wiel was dispossssed, and some neat passes down the PSV left eventually resulted in Tim Matavz finishing well. The battle in that part of the pitch – Ajax’s right-back zone – turned out to be the key battleground of the game.
Midfield battle
PSV’s pressing didn’t last long, however, and the game settled down into a fairly tame, free-flowing midfield battle based around movement rather than tackling. PSV’s two attack-minded central midfielders, Ola Toivonen and Georgino Wijnaldum, showed a decreasing amount of interest in defending as the game progressed, and it was a surprise that Theo Janssen didn’t influence the game more when breaking forward from central midfield.
There was some confusion in the way Ajax played to the right of the pitch. Cristian Eriksen played as a narrow right-winger, tucked into the midfield, whilst Siem de Jong started to the right of the triangle and burst forward. In addition, van der Wiel tried to motor forward on the overlap, and presumably there was the intention of making a triangle on that flank to overload PSV – but it never quite worked, and the main outcome was the leave the flank ripe for PSV counters, through Erik Pieters and Dries Mertens.
Ajax step it up
The injury to PSV goalkeeper Przemysław Tytoń, which stopped the game for 15 minutes at the end of the first half, was a key factor in the game. PSV’s momentum was broken up, and after that stoppage Ajax regrouped and started to press much more. They played the game in PSV’s half and eventually found an equaliser through Kolbeinn Sigþórsson – for all their attempts at intricate play, it was Sigþórsson doing a battering ram act that eventually got them the goal.
PSV then recovered after half time and started pressing more, and it’s tempting to conclude that the concession of a goal, and the return to a deadlock in the game, suited their natural game more – in particular, their midfield. They were much more positive and worked good situations down their left. This was the period when van der Wiel was exposed – he made a crazy tackle on Mertens to concede the penalty for the second goal, then got caught too high up the pitch for a chance Mertens wasted when one-on-one.
Late on
Van der Wiel partly atoned for his poor defensive performance with a good run down the right for the equaliser. By this stage, Frank de Boer had introduced the physical threat of Dmitri Bulykin for Sigþórsson, and this prompted more direct balls into the box – Bulykin tucked home Sigþórsson’s ball.
The final stages were exciting but not frantic – both teams tired, and though the midfields basically gave up defending, there was a feeling that both managers were content with a point.
Conclusion
There is an interesting pattern to many Eredivisie games in terms of tactics – they’re rarely won by a change of formation, but the game goes through many separate phases – often revolving around whether the sides are pressing. This was the case here – especially in the first half, when both teams were on top when they pressed.
Ultimately, this was a battle between two teams who aren’t built to play against each other – they’re built to convincingly beat more lowly sides. Both wanted to dominate possession, to play the ball gently through midfield and to construct clever attacks, when a bit of organisation wouldn’t have gone amiss. Still, it was a good game, and the nature of the final scoreline – PSV making the running, Ajax just about catching up – summed up the game well.
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234#
发表于 2011-9-20 12:44:51 | 只看该作者
233楼参考译文
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235#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-21 14:24:28 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-9-21 14:27 编辑

Rubin 2-3 Zenit: Rubin blow a two-goal lead thanks to Spalletti’s Plan B
September 20, 2011


The starting line-ups

Danny scored twice to give Zenit St Petersburg an important win over Rubin Kazan.

Kurban Berdyev changed things around after the previous week’s defeat to FC Krasnodar, with Obafemi Martins and Nelson Valdez both dropping out. In came Vladimir Dyadyun upfront, with Gokdeniz Karadeniz on the right.

Luciano Spalletti made widespread changes after an embarrassing collapse against Lokomotiv Moscow, with four players coming into the defence and midfield, though the forward trio remained the same.

This wasn’t so much a game of two halves as one of three thirds – first Rubin deservedly took a two-goal lead, then Zenit battled back well to turn the game around, and then the final 25 minutes consisted of Rubin trying to get back into the game, but ultimately being unable to find a goal.

First half

Both of these sides are known for their counter-attacking approach, which can result in a stand-off in midfield – neither wanting to attack for fear of being exploited on the break. For the game as a spectacle, the best thing that can happen in this situation is an early goal, which arrived after eight minutes for Rubin from the penalty spot.

The penalty was awarded after good work down the left from Salvatore Bocchetti, who was shoved in the back by Danko Lazovic. This was the key battle of the opening period, with Lazovic being forced back by the Italian left-back, and rarely having an impact with the ball at his feet. On the other side, Sergey Kislyak did a similarly good job getting forward, with Danny slow to get back and right-winger Alexander Ryazantsev showing good awareness to come inside and open up space.

As always with Zenit, their midfield was something of a puzzle – all three central midfielders have license to break forward, which can take the opposition by surprise, especially as Rubin’s attacking central midfielder, Roman Eremenko, only wanted to track back a certain distance. This meant that Igor Denisov could break forward into the attack unmarked, usually leaving Konstantin Zyryanov to cover.

Rubin’s striker Vladimir Dyadyun, played an interesting role, coming deep, holding the ball up, and forcing Bruno Alves out of the back. The centre-back dived in and made some needless tackles to concede free-kicks, but what Rubin needed was a runner in behind to exploit the space created. Eremenko was rather peripheral, and overall Rubin weren’t a great threat on the counter. They were better when they built up play more gradually through the full-backs, although this risked Zenit pouncing on the counter.

Second half

Having got one goal back to make it 2-1, Spalletti made a substitution at half-time and turned to his Plan B. That Plan B was former Rubin striker Aleksandr Bukharov, who played as a central striker with Aleksandr Kerzhakov going wider, usually to the right. Zenit’s approach changed completely from the first half – they played longer balls for Kerzhakov to challenge for in the air. Presumably, Spalletti decided that with Rubin ahead, they would come forward less and leave fewer spaces at the back, so Zenit could no longer afford to rely on counter-attacking for their chances.

Kerzhakov created the equaliser – although it was by using his strength in a wide area and then teeing up Danny, rather than through an aerial approach. At 2-2, Rubin somewhat self-destructed tactically – moving forward to launch attacks, but being sluggish in getting back into shape, the one thing you can usually guarantee from Berdyev’s side. A great transition from Zenit saw Alves win the ball, play it forward to Danny, who played a one-two with Kerzhakov to motor into space. Kerzhakov had drawn Cesar Navas out of the back which made space for Kerkhakov, who Danny played a second one-two with, to score an empty goal. It was a perfect counter-attacking goal, and a fine goal to win a good contest.

Conclusion

How come this fixture is suddenly so open? This 2-3 followed two 2-2s, which doesn’t seem to make sense when two counter-attacking sides come up against each other. The results of 2009 – two 0-0s – were what we expect.

The opening goal coming within the first 20 minutes of each game has helped, but perhaps the truth is that the two sides are not as reliant on the counter-attack as previously thought. Rubin’s first two goals came when Zenit had men behind the ball, and then Zenit played to a big man upfront.

The key in the victory was Danny – the game’s best player so far, and one who makes consistently good decisions with the ball at his feet. He seemed more comfortable when Zenit brought on Bukharov, able to play one-twos and find space in the opposition defence.
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236#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-21 14:28:32 | 只看该作者
236楼参考译文
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237#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-21 14:36:08 | 只看该作者
两位斑竹,熟悉荷甲和俄超的来说说吧
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238#
发表于 2011-9-22 11:12:12 | 只看该作者
zm也是,对巴萨8-0大赢奥萨苏纳不感兴趣,却对巴萨2-2平瓦伦很感兴趣
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239#
发表于 2011-9-22 11:12:32 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 colinfirth 于 2011-9-22 11:16 编辑

Valencia 2-2 Guardiola: Emery gets the better of Guardiola early on, but Barca fight backSeptember 22, 2011


The first half line-ups

Cesc Fabregas’ goal secured a point for Barcelona, but they were the weaker side in the first half.

Unai Emery tried his trick from last season against Barcelona, fielding two left-backs in Jeremy Mathieu and Jordi Alba down the left, in order to deal with the forward runs of Dani Alves. Jonas dropped out accordingly, and Bruno Saltor was replaced by Miguel.

Pep Guardiola went for a 4-3-3ish shape, albeit with Alves pushed very high up the pitch. David Villa was only on the bench.

Valencia dominated the first half by doing two things well – first, pressing Barcelona, squeezing the play and forcing the away side into errors in possession. Second, by attacking Barca in behind Alves and creating three good chances through this route.

The battle down Alves’ side

This was the key factor in the game. Emery’s double left-back strategy had worked well at the Camp Nou last year – Valencia scored with a break through Mathieu, and were 1-0 up at half time until Barca staged a second half comeback. The idea, of course, is that because Alves’ runs are so dangerous, by fielding a defensively-aware player on the left of midfield, you have a player who is comfortable tracking back to his own defensive line.

Of course, if you’re Alves, you’re going to test this as much as possible to try and force Valencia’s players towards their own goal. Therefore, Alves played high up the pitch, on the right-hand touchline, to push Mathieu deeper and deeper. The problem was, Mathieu was Valencia’s biggest threat going forward. He constantly broke forward and exploited the space in behind Alves, setting up two goals and producing a third great chance, where Roberto Soldado missed an open goal. But how could he do this, if he was meant to be tracking Alves?

Guardiola’s error

Well, as it turned out, he wasn’t. Pedro seemed to start on the right wing but quickly switched the left, and the rest of Barcelona’s fluid front three consisted of Lionel Messi playing a false nine role, and Cesc Fabregas buzzing about between the lines. Barcelona were essentially playing with no right-winger, and therefore Alves didn’t need to be watched by Mathieu – Jordi Alba could deal with him perfectly well. After all, it’s not like you particularly need to double up on Alves, you simply need someone who can track his run. Barcelona had no winger to bring Alba inside, and therefore he could track Alves.

Mathieu, then, was free to bomb forward. This dragged almost Barcelona’s entire team out of shape. Javier Mascherano had to come across to right-back, then Carles Puyol had to shuffle over, then Eric Abidal had to move to centre-back, from where he scored an own goal, then made an error for the second, scored by Pablo Hernandez coming in at the back post. With Abidal coming inside, Hernandez had to be dealt with by Seydou Keita, whilst Sergio Busquets tried to drop in and help out in the centre of defence too. Barcelona were essentially having a chain of four players (plus Busquets) all trying to cover the position vacated by another.

This had an impact higher up – Xavi Hernandez was left on his own (and what is Xavi without short passing options?) and there was no connection from defence to midfield. Barcelona’s only hope of a goal was a Messi ball through to Fabregas or Pedro, and that’s where their first goal arrived from, through the latter.

Elsewhere, Valencia were coping well in midfield. Hernandez tucked in and played narrow, picking up Keita to make up the numbers in midfield, safe in the knowledge Abidal wouldn’t be attacking much. Adil Rami was fortunate not to get a second booking for bringing down Messi, but was otherwise impressive in coming up the pitch to him and Fabregas, largely keeping them quiet.

Second half


The second half line-ups

Guardiola had to change things for the second period, and he did. Pedro came to the right, with Fabregas initially floating in from the left. Alves was told to stay at right-back and not attack at all, and Barcelona kept it tight for the first ten minutes of the second half. Emery brought on Tino Costa to replace David Albelda, who had been excellent but had picked up an injury.

The story of the second half is best told through substitutions and the resulting formation changes.

1. Guardiola made two substitutions. Adriano came on for Pedro, playing on the right-hand side. This was a slightly surprising move, and meant that there were four full-backs (Adriano, Alves, Mathieu, Alba) all down the same flank. Villa also came on for Keita, with Fabregas dropping deeper.

2. With Barca enjoying more possession than in the first half, Guardiola felt able to make a more attacking move. Thiago Alcantara came on for Puyol. This could have meant Busquets going to centre-back, but in fact he shuttled between a centre-back position and a holding role. When Barca had the ball, he was in midfield, with a lopsided back three of Alves, Mascherano and Abidal behind.

3. Seeing that Busquets was attempting to play ahead of the defence, Emery took off Canales and brought on a support striker, Jonas, who could get forward and link up with Soldado, therefore pushing Busquets back. Jonas wasn’t particularly good at this role, however, and Barca dominated possession to allow Busquets into midfield.

4. Now Barcelona were using Alves very deep – almost as a right-sided centre-back – plus had Adriano ahead, not the greatest attacking threat (although he was key in this fixture last year) Emery could put on a true winger down that side. Pablo Piatti arrived, in place of Mathieu who had tired. Valencia were trying to win the game.

The formations then looked like the diagram above. Barcelona in a 3-4-3 diamondish shape like they used against Villarreal, with Valencia a 4-2-3-1 with an offensive tilt.

How did Barcelona get back into the game? Their dominance of possession was key, with a slight overload in the centre of midfield. Messi came into that zone unmarked and played some superb passes, including the assist for Fabregas, and later slid a great ball out to Villa on the left. Valencia tired, as they have done a couple of times this season, and failed to put pressure on the man on ball late on, allowing Barcelona to pass their way through the defence. In the final moments, it was the home side hanging on.

Conclusion

Emery won the pre-match tactical battle, but Guardiola used his substitutions more wisely to get back into the game.

It was surprising to see Barca so vulnerable early on, and maybe Guardiola got a little carried away with Alves’ abilities. He has the energy to cover the flank by himself, but that doesn’t mean he can be used 2 v 1 – because one of the players will get goalside of him and break quickly. He needs a wide player ahead of him who will come inside and open up space.

Emery should be praised for his starting tactics, as well as some brave substitutions late on to try and force Barca back. Ultimately Messi’s quality was the biggest factor in getting the away side back into the game – and there’s no shame in that. Ultimately, this was a tactical victory for Emery.
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240#
发表于 2011-9-22 11:13:30 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 colinfirth 于 2011-9-22 11:22 编辑

上楼参考译文
-----------------

瓦伦西亚2-2巴塞罗那:埃梅里赢得开局,巴萨逆袭保一分

由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球


上半场的阵型
法布雷加斯的进球为巴塞罗那保住了一分,而在上半场他们处于劣势之中。

埃梅里用了上赛季他对付巴萨的法子,在左翼安排了马蒂厄和阿尔巴两个左后卫,以限制阿尔维斯的前插助攻。与此相应地乔纳斯未能出场,米格尔顶替萨尔托首发。

瓜迪奥拉排出了433的阵型,但实际上阿尔维斯的位置非常靠前。比利亚并没有首发。

蝙蝠军团上半场有两件事完成得相当不错,他们也藉此掌控了比赛:一是压迫巴萨,挤压他们活动空间,逼迫客队控球时出现失误;二是打阿尔维斯身后的空当,并凭这一招就创造了3个绝佳的机会。

阿维尔斯一侧的对抗

这是本场比赛的关键之处。在去年的诺坎普球场,埃梅里的双左后卫战术效果相当不错——马蒂厄的突破为瓦伦贡献1球,保持1-0的领先结束上半场,而下半场则是巴萨的逆袭。他采用这种战术明显是因为阿尔维斯的前插非常有威胁,那么在左翼安排一个注重防守的球员,就能有一个人很舒服地守住他负责的防区。

当然,要是你是阿尔维斯,你也会尽可能挑战对手下的套儿,并把瓦伦的球员逼向己方球门。于是乎阿尔维斯位置很靠前,在右翼边线活动,逼得马蒂厄不断退后。问题却是,马蒂厄成了对巴萨威胁最大的人。他不断地突破,利用阿尔维斯身后的空间,策划了两个进球,并制造了第三个绝好的机会,可惜索尔达多错失空门。如果他的任务是跟住阿尔维斯,那他又是如何做到这些的呢?

瓜迪奥拉犯的错

好吧呀,就像我们所见到的,他并没有去跟阿尔维斯。佩德罗首发好像是在右翼,但他很快就换位到了左边,而巴萨前场三叉戟中梅西踢伪9号的位置,法布雷加斯则在锋线与中场间游弋。巴萨实际上没有右边锋,于是马蒂厄也没必要盯防阿尔维斯——阿尔巴就能很好地对付他了。毕竟球队的布局并不是要你特别留心给阿尔维斯上个双保险,你只要有人能跟着他就可以了。巴萨没有边锋吸引阿尔巴,于是他就能守住阿尔维斯了。

于是马蒂厄就能自由地上前助攻了,这也使得巴萨整个阵型变得七零八落。马斯切拉诺得去右后卫的位置补位,于是普约尔也得平移过去,之后阿比达尔移到了中卫位置,也就是在这个位置他进了那第一个乌龙球,并在处理第二个进球时犯了个错误,那是巴勃罗在远点插上打进的。阿比达尔去中路后,巴萨得靠凯塔应对巴勃罗,同时布斯克茨回撤来加强中路的防守。巴萨实际上有一串儿4个人(加上布斯克茨)来一个接一个地填补空当。

这对他们的前场有不小的影响——哈维落单了(没了传球目标的哈维有什么用呢?),防线和中场的联系也断了。巴萨想进球就只能指望梅西分个球给法布雷加斯或者佩德罗,而他们第一个进球也确实是这么来的,由佩德罗打进。

另外瓦伦的中场也运转得很流畅。巴勃罗打入敌阵,活动区域狭长,对位凯塔以确保中场的人数优势,在清楚阿比达尔助攻不多的前提下他的位置很安全。拉米很幸运,他没有因为放到梅西而吃到第二张牌,而他在场上对阵梅西和法布雷加斯时的表现给人留下不错的印象,很大程度上是他让这俩儿一对巴掌也拍不响。

下半场

瓜迪奥拉必须在下半场做些变化,他也确实这么干了。佩德罗来到右路,而法布雷加斯则一开始从左翼游荡到中路。阿尔维斯被交代乖乖留在右后卫的位置,完全不助攻了,而巴萨整体在下半场前十分钟保持了较为紧密的阵型。埃梅里用科斯塔换下阿尔贝尔达,他表现出色但不幸受伤。

下半场值得注意的关键是几个换人,以及由此导致的阵型上的改变。

1.瓜迪奥拉换了两个人。阿德里亚诺换下佩德罗,在右翼活动。这一招有点儿让人意外,意味着在同一侧有4个边后卫出场了(阿德里亚诺,阿尔维斯,马蒂厄和阿尔巴)。比利亚换下凯塔,法布雷加斯位置后撤。


2.巴萨在上半场控球更多,瓜迪奥拉觉得可以采取更具攻击性的手段了。他用蒂亚戈换下普约尔,这意味着布斯克斯回撤到中卫位置,但实际上他在中卫和后腰间徘徊。当巴萨拿球时他在中场,身后是阿尔维斯、马斯切拉诺和阿比达尔三人组成的并不均衡的后防线。

3.看到布斯克茨试图参与中场的组织,埃梅里换下卡纳莱丝,换上一个支援型前锋乔纳斯,他能前插并将索尔达多和中场连接起来,藉此将布斯克茨逼回去。但乔纳斯任务完成得并不好,巴萨控制住了球权,使得布斯克茨能参与到中场组织中来。

4.现在巴萨把阿尔维斯摆得非常靠后——基本上是一个在右边的中卫了——再加上阿德里亚诺顶在前面,这边不再是一个极具威胁的攻击点了(尽管去年他是这阵型中的关键人物),埃梅里可以在这边放一个真正的边锋了。皮亚蒂换下了体力不济的马蒂厄,瓦伦想要拿下比赛。

下半场的阵型

现在的阵型就如同上图所示了。巴萨是343的钻石型阵型,就像他们对阵比利亚雷尔时的那样,而瓦伦则是带有攻击箭头的4231

巴萨是如何重新掌控比赛的呢?关键是他们的控球,并在中场有稍稍的人数优势压制。梅西回撤到这个区域,无人盯防,而他传了好几个好球,包括助攻法布雷加斯的那个,之后又给左侧的比利亚送去一记妙传。瓦伦体力下降,他们本赛季已经好几次这样了,面对巴萨拿球队员无力再紧逼,使得对手能用传球洞穿己方防线。在比赛最后时刻
苦苦坚持的变成了主队。


结论

埃梅里赢得了赛前的战术布置,但瓜迪奥拉用他明智的换人将巴萨带回比赛的正轨。

比赛刚开始时巴萨如此不堪一击真是让人吃惊,也许瓜迪奥拉有点儿过于相信阿尔维斯的能力了。他有足够的能量可以在那一侧来来回回,但这不意味着可以拿他12——因为有1个人可以找他的空当并迅速突破他。阿尔维斯需要一个活动范围广的人顶在他前面,那人可以内切来为他打开空间。

我们得赞埃梅里的初期战术布置,还有之后他采取的一些大胆的,试图逼迫巴萨退守的换人。最终梅西的个人能力成了带领客队扳平的最大因素——这就没有什么值得自己反省的了。最后一句,这是一次属于埃梅里的战术胜利。

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241#
发表于 2011-9-22 11:27:02 | 只看该作者
呵呵,上赛季我就说过爱美丽有战术大师的潜质
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242#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-22 11:32:46 | 只看该作者
241# 午时靡深蓝

其实三后卫可以打的,不过要把普约尔和小马调一下位置,小马打中卫,普队打右边卫就好了

下半场用蒂亚戈换下普队,小马打中卫,阿尔维斯回归右边卫,反而好多了

小马防守和助攻皆有起色

但小马打边卫无所适从的

不过,中场凯塔的使用是有问题的
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243#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-22 11:35:40 | 只看该作者
轮子上半场拼劲足,巴萨中前场处处受阻,哈维别拗,梅西也别拗,到处都是轮子在反抢

应该说轮子占上风那段时间,也是反抢比巴萨反抢强
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244#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-22 11:37:08 | 只看该作者
呵呵,上赛季我就说过爱美丽有战术大师的潜质
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-9-22 11:27


对前面几楼,zm关于阿甲和俄超各一场比赛评述怎么看?

俺不太熟悉的
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245#
发表于 2011-9-22 11:37:55 | 只看该作者
三后卫阵型的三个后卫应该全是中卫,而阿尔维斯和小阿德应该是中场的两翼wing-back。比赛我准备回去看,但是从ZM给出的图来看,瓜自黄潜一战后显然有点玩过头了,非常规阵型出奇兵可以,但是漏洞不是一点点,爱美丽无论是用兵能力还是可供调遣的人员都比黄潜的加里多充分多了,足以击破巴萨。
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246#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-22 11:39:29 | 只看该作者
三后卫阵型的三个后卫应该全是中卫,而阿尔维斯和小阿德应该是中场的两翼wing-back。比赛我准备回去看,但是从ZM给出的图来看,瓜自黄潜一战后显然有点玩过头了,非常规阵型出奇兵可以,但是漏洞不是一点点,爱美丽 ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-9-22 11:37


轮子机会很多的,上半场就有可能打成3-1

索尔达多还乌龙防守一次
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247#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-9-22 12:00:35 | 只看该作者
三后卫阵型的三个后卫应该全是中卫,而阿尔维斯和小阿德应该是中场的两翼wing-back。比赛我准备回去看,但是从ZM给出的图来看,瓜自黄潜一战后显然有点玩过头了,非常规阵型出奇兵可以,但是漏洞不是一点点,爱美丽 ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-9-22 11:37


看巴萨上下半场的这阵型变化,还都是3-4-3

不过下半场的靠谱多了,

小法似乎都在中路,但只有下半场才是真正意义上的,上半场他常去佩德罗后边活动

这阵型变化,一个人解说的贺炜后来都说,谁能告诉他,这到底是个神马阵型?
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248#
发表于 2011-9-22 12:14:46 | 只看该作者
2011-9-22 西甲第五轮 巴塞罗那vs瓦伦西亚 上半场录像

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249#
发表于 2011-9-22 12:16:00 | 只看该作者
2011-9-22 西甲第五轮 巴塞罗那vs瓦伦西亚 下半场录像

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250#
发表于 2011-9-23 10:57:25 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 乔治六世 于 2011-9-23 11:00 编辑

Manchester United v Chelsea video analysis

September 22, 2011



This is a new feature on ZM for 2011/12 – in partnership with Yahoo!, each Thursday we’ll be looking at a particular feature of a game from the previous weekend’s Premier League action.

This week, the focus is Manchester United v Chelsea, and the home side’s use of long diagonal passes throughout the match.

For rights reasons, the video is only available in the UK – sorry!

<video>

Here’s a chalkboard of Jonny Evans’ passing in that game:

<flash>

by Guardian Chalkboards
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