[ZM欧洲杯英法篇] 32L呆梨0-0三狮：皮尔洛主导比赛

乔治六世

France 1-1 England: France dominate possession but creativity stifled by England sitting deep
June 11, 2012


The starting line-ups

A match with little invention, played at a very slow pace.

Laurent Blanc chose his expected side in a 4-3-3, with Florent Malouda shuttling forward from the midfield.

Roy Hodgson’s side contained one surprise name – Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, who started on the left. James Milner started on the other flank, and Danny Welbeck got the nod over Andy Carroll upfront.

As expected, France dominated possession (65%) and had 21 shots compared to England’s 5, but many were from long-range, as Blanc’s side struggled to create clear-cut chances.

Formation battle

This was a fairly simple battle. England had two banks of four, with Ashley Young and Welbeck paired upfront – a mobile, energetic duo that looked to work the channels with support from the two wide players. Steven Gerrard and Scott Parker sat much deeper.

Blanc asked Alou Diarra to stick tightly to Ashley Young when Young came deep, and play deep in front of Young when he moved forward to partner Welbeck. Yohan Cabaye was higher up near Gerrard, and Malouda tried to drift past Parker into space. But there was little space for France, as England packed their own half with eight very narrow players. The space was generally in the wide zones, and although Mathieu Debuchy and Patrice Evra got forward well, they rarely caused significant danger. Playing the ball out wide tended to result in lots of corners, which England sometimes defended nervously.

France attacks

France’s front four (ie including Malouda) were very fluid. While Ribery generally stayed on the left, Samir Nasri had license to wander infield and play where he wanted (which opened up space for Debuchy). It was Nasri who was the game’s key player – he played more passes than anyone else, also played the most in the final third, and created eight chances – the second-most in the tournament so far, after Wesley Sneijder.



Nasri was the only man using space intelligently, moving into a zone between the lines where England didn’t know how to deal with him: whether to bring a defender out from the back, drop the midfield deeper, or ask Ashley Cole to track him inside. That confusion resulted in his large influence on the game in general, while his goal came when England’s two central midfielders both moved too deep – Nasri got space on the edge of the box and fired in, equalising Joleon Lescott’s earlier header.

Aside from Nasri’s movement, England coped well with France’s attacks. Blanc’s side were patient on the ball and didn’t over-commit players into the final third. Cabaye, for example, only seemed to become an attacking force in the final quarter of the game, and the full-backs tried to make sudden powerful runs rather than permanently placing themselves high up, which would risk counter-attacks at transitions.

England attacks

England’s game was about soaking up pressure, then breaking quickly – they’d done this well in the two pre-tournament friendlies, but today they were much less fluent in their attacking play. The main reason was Young’s lack of influence upon the game – he completed only twelve passes, the fewest of the 20 outfield players that started the match.



A lot of credit should go to Diarra, who was extremely clever with his positioning and simply prevented Young from being an option when England got the ball. Statistically, Diarra was immense – 100% pass completion rate, and all five of his tackles were successful.



The only clear-cut chance England created in open play (when James Milner missed after rounding Hugo Lloris) came from a rare occasion when England overloaded Diarra. Oxlade-Chamberlain had moved into a central position, Diarra got drawn to him, which then left Young free for the first time – he slipped the ball through the defence for Milner coming off the other flank. England probably didn’t do this often enough – although, of course, they had to get the ball first. Welbeck ran the channels well, and would have been a greater goal threat if Young had seen more of the ball.

Young and Welbeck played very intelligently without the ball. They didn’t chase and press the French centre-backs – instead, they stood off and prevented passes being played forward into the midfield. Philippe Mexes and, in particular, Adil Rami’s passes were extremely horizontal, and France found it difficult to get the ball forward. As a result, the game was played at a very slow pace – which probably suited England.



Second half

There was absolutely no progression in this game. England continued to sit very deep, while France didn’t significantly increase the number of players they attacked with. The tempo of the passing was still slow, and both sides seemed to tire quickly and recognise that a draw was a decent result.

Perhaps the only significant development was Karim Benzema’s movement, as he became frustrated with the lack of service – he only received the ball in the penalty area once . Instead, he dropped into deeper zones, the type of positions Nasri was playing in, and had a couple of long-range attempts saved by Joe Hart.

It was highly surprisingly, especially considering the heat, that neither coach made a substitution until the 77th minute. England brought on Jermain Defoe for Oxlade-Chamberlain, with Young going left, while Jordan Henderson replaced the exhausted Parker. This was broadly attack-minded, but really just about fresh legs.

Blanc brought on Hatem Ben Arfa and Marvin Martin for Cabaye and Malouda, but on 85 minutes it was too late to have a significant impact on the game.

Conclusion

On the whole, the first round of Euro 2012 matches have been relatively open and entertaining, but this was a slow game. The two sides wanted to ‘not lose’ more than they wanted to win, so a draw seemed likely from early in the second half, with only France’s long-range shots threatening.

England’s shape was good, but their transitions were disappointing because of Young’s anonymity. He’s a key player for this system, and France did well to nullify his influence. Hodgson will also be concerned about the space between the lines, and the Parker-Gerrard combination needs to be a little more disciplined, and make sure one of them is occupying that zone, rather than chasing the ball or being drawn to opponents.

France were certainly the more positive side, but moved the ball too slowly to draw England’s players out of shape, and maybe needed more variety and movement from their midfield triangle. They put England’s defensive unit under persistent but never particularly strong pressure, and seemed to be waiting for the other two group matches.

乔治六世

32楼参考译文
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来自虎扑
意大利0-0英格兰：皮尔洛神级表现主宰比赛
2012-06-25


双方首发

尽管在120分钟内都统治了比赛，意大利还是无法攻破对手的大门，但他们还是通过点球大战的胜利淘汰对手。

普兰德利派出了蒙托利沃担任菱形中场之中前腰的位置，因为他觉得莫塔的身体状况还不能参赛。

霍奇森则依旧沿用小组赛中1-0击败乌克兰的首发十一人。

意大利在整场比赛都是表现较好的一方——只是在射门上比较令人失望。

战术比拼

这是一场简单的比赛——在比赛中，两边都没有改变踢法和阵型，也没有关键的换人和节奏的转变。这场比赛就是2小时内单纯的两个阵型的对抗。

意大利的阵型希望能够统治中场中路，因此他们在菱形中场的后腰和前腰分别派出了善于传球的皮尔洛和蒙托利沃，而在左右中场派出了体能充沛且能够提供前插跑动的工兵。英格兰的阵型在理论上则能提供更多的进攻宽度。

这场比赛有两个关键之处：1. 两个边后卫能够提供的阵型宽度。2. 英格兰允许皮尔洛主宰整个中场。

阵型狭窄性与边后卫的关系

意大利比英格兰拥有更多控球。无论从双方阵型的选择还是双方教练的布置上看，这都是完全可以期待的。因此，意大利在这场阵型比拼中完全占据上风，而英格兰则被拖进一个他们并不愿意使用的阵型之中。

换句话说，他们（指代英格兰）的阵型变得非常狭窄。米尔纳被德罗西的跑位吸引到更靠近中路的位置，而阿什利-杨最终却只能跟着马尔基西奥一起在非常中路的地方活动。米尔纳非常适应这个新位置，而且出色地完成了他的防守工作，但是杨对于防守工作非常不适应，而且他也很少向前的跑动。霍奇森应该可以在占领中场的安排上做得更好一点，他可以让米尔纳、杰拉德和帕克一起联合对付德罗西以及蒙托利沃，然后让阿什利-杨成为一个无须担心防守的左侧接球点，这让英格兰能及时组织反击。

由于英格兰的中场被收得很窄，因此他们的阵型宽度全部来自两个边后卫。英格兰的这个安排在比赛初始阶段实施得不错，格伦-约翰森沿着右路下底并且在禁区内不太顺畅地停下皮球时，他获得了全场第一次黄金机会。他还贡献了几次不错的传中，而英格兰似乎在控球的时候都知道应该怎么做。但在30分钟之后，格伦-约翰森的助攻就被严重限制了。



随着比赛的深入，英格兰的控球权越来越少，这意味着意大利的两个边后卫能够更有自信地向前助攻拉开进攻宽度，而且增加了意大利的活跃区域。同时，他们也让英格兰需要覆盖更大面积的防守区域。意大利的两个边后卫在比赛中位置非常靠前，这让他们对比赛形势影响更大。而且尽管他们对意大利在对方禁区产生威胁并没有提供太多实质性的帮助，但他们迫使英格兰退后。

皮尔洛

然而，比赛中更重要的是皮尔洛可以完全自如地掌控着中场。有些时间英格兰的阵型还是保持得不错，两个前锋都会回撤到中场。这让英格兰的阵型保持紧密，而且Welbeck_123.html" target="_blank" style="color:#336699;">维尔贝克和鲁尼也会相继出现在皮尔洛的面前进行防守。当维尔贝克在非常靠近尤文图斯中场的区域活动时，总体上他的工作完成的很出色。

鲁尼在防守上相对更懒，而且在30分钟后之皮尔洛开始掌控中场时，连乔-哈特都能清楚地听到有人大声呼唤鲁尼盯防皮尔洛的声音。霍奇森其实非常希望鲁尼能够紧盯皮尔洛，因为在比赛的大部分时间，鲁尼都是心有旁骛而且慢慢悠悠地走向皮尔洛进行防守。这让人想起2011年欧冠决赛，当鲁尼不再专心防守Busquets_134.html" target="_blank" style="color:#336699;">布斯克茨的时候，曼联就开始渐渐地在中场失势。

很奇怪，现在鲁尼的战术纪律反倒成了一个问题，因为就在几年之前鲁尼为了球队整体利益甘愿牺牲自己担任箭头的事情被誉为他身上一个良好的战术素养。鲁尼的队友朴智星曾经在2009/2010的欧冠中出色地完成了防守皮尔洛的任务，AC米兰的埃曼奴埃尔森也曾经在今年早些时候做过类似的事情，如果英格兰拥有上述2人，他们今天的工作会更出色一点。让皮尔洛可以自由发挥完全是自杀行为，而皮尔洛在这场比赛中也完成了比其他任何一个球员多30次的传球。



而这些传球不仅仅是分边的调度性质传球，尽管这些给前插边后卫的传球令意大利在进攻上更有宽度。皮尔洛的大部分传球都是整场比赛的点睛之笔——他在开场初段先尝试给让特里非常头疼的卡萨诺传球，但随后他发现巴洛特利才是今天意大利的主要威胁。比赛中的其中一个镜头能说明一切问题——皮尔洛在自己的半场拿到皮球，然后带球前进30码，再挑传前插的巴洛特利，但巴洛特利最后的挑射被回追特里封堵。在这过程中皮尔洛没有受到任何压力，随后他又在另一次机会中找到了远门柱的卡萨诺，而卡萨诺则头球回做给小禁区的巴洛特利。

英格兰由始至终都没有对皮尔洛进行直接盯防，但据我估计，为了在不经意间防止皮尔洛制造威胁，他们加大了回撤的幅度。在上半场，英格兰令人意外地将防线压得非常靠前，因此他们经常被皮尔洛的过顶长传找到防守漏洞。但是随着意大利的控球越来越多，英格兰就越来越害怕离开自己的禁区边缘。

因此，英格兰的后场防守阵型消失了。在加时赛中英格兰在一次进攻中防线前压，鲁尼在意大利的禁区被断球，随后皮尔洛得球后又像上半场给巴洛特利传球那样灵光一闪制造威胁。但是，英格兰今天的进攻十分稀少，因为如果英格兰更多投入进攻，他们的后防左路空隙会更加暴露，意大利人将会在进攻上获得更大利益。实际上，在最后60分钟英格兰在僵持的情况下整体防守不错，他们的狭窄阵型也使得他们能够大量封堵对方的射门。

替补球员的情况

双方的替补球员在这场比赛中的作用都不大。普兰德利用迪亚曼蒂换下了卡萨诺，用诺切里诺换下了德罗西，最后用马乔换下了阿巴特。这三个人都是因为场上球员体能不支或者无法坚持才做出的调动，因此意大利的整体阵型并没有太多改变。

霍奇森的连换两人更多是基于战术的考虑，尽管换人后英格兰的阵型还是保持不变。用沃尔科特换下米尔纳理论上可以提供更多的反击能力，但沃尔科特似乎从未得到一次舒服的传球，因为帕克几次传给小老虎的球都力量过大。卡罗尔换下维尔贝克是为了提供更多空中的传球线路——这会帮助英格兰缓解防守压力，但英格兰的球员们与卡罗尔的距离总是太远。



卡罗尔和沃尔科特的出场是一个合理的选择，但米尔纳和维尔贝克被换下存在争议。米尔纳至少能够完成他在防守上的工作，维尔贝克的表现则明显比鲁尼要好，而且维尔贝克在防守皮尔洛上能够做得更多。另外，在卡罗尔身后搭档第二前锋，维尔贝克在与瑞典的比赛中的表现也值得称赞(尽管他成功射门的次数非常少)。

亨德森换下帕克是为了加强中场跑动。这很合理——帕克已经筋疲力尽了，杰拉德也已经抽筋而且回撤非常深，而亨德森此前也曾经作为替补出场加强跑动能力，那一次他做得不错。

但意大利是120分钟里表现更好的一方，而且在点球大战中，皮尔洛也是那一位创造最精彩瞬间的球员。



结论

意大利的菱形中场控制了比赛，而皮尔洛是全场比赛的明星——他控制了比赛节奏，也创造了不少破门良机。英格兰没有安排专门防守皮尔洛是一个极大的失策，而且鲁尼在防守方面的态度值得被质疑。在两个边后压上助攻之前，意大利把英格兰的阵型压缩得非常狭窄，而且意大利应该在90分钟内赢下这场比赛的。

我们还在期待意大利能够打出一场完全展现真实实力的比赛——尽管他们主宰了今天的比赛，但他们的射门实在太糟糕了。他们在本届的比赛只打进了一个运动战进球，而且也仅仅赢下了一场——对手是已经出局的爱尔兰。他们的控球战术令人印象深刻，而皮尔洛也已经成为本届比赛中一名有巨星级表现的球员。但是，他们仍然需要在进攻三区中更加冷酷无情（译注：意思是不要浪费太多机会）。

英格兰其实只是实力不够，而且今晚的每一个战术上的决定都可以被质疑（对皮尔洛的处理、换人调整），但霍奇森对这场比赛的整体战术是正确的。当接手一支球队时间不长，尤其是一支与大赛中其他球队相比缺乏技术的这么一支英格兰队时，霍奇森把焦点集中在球队的阵型和球队的组织上是一个合理的选择。尽管球队的防守并不是总是那么出彩，但英格兰并没有输掉任何一场比赛。带着像阿什利-杨和鲁尼这么一批球员，英格兰也许已经超额完成任务了。尽管这样会埋没球员的才华，但在使用功能性的防守阵型中，创造型中场不能置之不理（译注1）。英格兰没有一个明确清晰的传球路线，这一点在今晚非常明显。当边路球员被吸引到中路之后，他们就再也没有空间组织反击了。

对于霍奇森，真实的考验现在才开始。这种消极应对风格的足球在短期的比赛中是可以完全接受的，但如果英格兰要成为更加有力的竞争者而非只靠运气的草根球队，他们必须要打出更加积极主动、灵活变化的足球。

乔治六世

Italy 0-0 England: Pirlo dictates the game

June 25, 2012


The starting line-ups

Italy somehow failed to score despite dominating for 120 minutes, but won the resulting penalty shoot-out.

Cesare Prandelli brought in Riccardo Montolivo to play at the top of the diamond, because of concerns over Thiago Motta’s fitness.

Roy Hodgson made no changes from the XI that narrowly defeated Ukraine in the group stage.

Italy were the better side all over the pitch here – only finishing let them down.

Tactical battle

This was a simple game – there was no progression midway through, no switch in systems, no key substitutions, no sudden change of pace. It was one system against another for two hours.

Italy’s system wanted to dominate the centre of the pitch, with two passers at either tip (Andrea Pirlo and Riccardo Montolivo) and two shuttlers along the sides providing energy and forward runs. England’s system, at least in theory, offered more width.

There were two key parts to the game – first, the width coming from full-back. Second, England allowing Pirlo to dominate the game.

Narrowness and full-backs

Italy had much more of the ball than England. This was entirely expected, whether you look at it from the point of view of systems or coaches. As a result, the formation battle was essentially on Italy’s terms, and England got dragged into a system they didn’t really want to play.

In other words, they became too narrow. James Milner was drawn inside and played close to Daniele De Rossi, while Ashley Young also ended up in a very central position near Claudio Marchisio. Milner was suited to this role and performed his defensive duties well, but Young was uncomfortable defensively and also offered little going forward. Hodgson may have been better making his side lopsided, asking Milner, Steven Gerrard and Scott Parker to deal with De Rossi, Montolivo and Marchisio, allowing Young to remain free for an out-ball on the left, to prompt counter-attacks.

As England were dragged narrow, all the width came from full-back, from both sides. England started brightly in this respect, as Glen Johnson attacked down the right and had the game’s first clear chance, when he got the ball stuck under his feet in the penalty box. He also put in a couple of good crosses, and England seemed to have the right idea when they had the ball – but after half an hour, Johnson was much more restricted in his movement.



The more the game went on, the less of the ball England enjoyed. And that meant Italy’s full-backs had much more license to get forward, stretch the play and increase the active playing zone, making England work harder to cover a large amount of ground. The Italian full-backs played significantly higher up the pitch and influenced the game more, and although they rarely provided great service into the box, they forced England back.

Pirlo

More important, however, was the freedom Andrea Pirlo enjoyed. At times England’s shape was good, bringing both strikers back into the midfield zone, remaining compact and getting both Danny Welbeck and Wayne Rooney goalside of Pirlo. When Welbeck was in a position to close down the Juventus midfielder, he generally did his job excellently.

Rooney was much sloppier, and after half an hour when Pirlo’s dominance had become clear, Joe Hart was clearly heard shouting at Rooney to pick him up. Hodgson clearly wanted Rooney to do this, because for much of the game Rooney could be seen half-heartedly jogging towards Pirlo. It was reminiscent of the 2011 Champions League final, where he started off marking Sergio Busquets, before gradually leaving Manchester United outnumbered in midfield.

It’s odd that Rooney’s tactical indiscipline has become such a problem – only a few years ago his willingness to sacrifice his own attacking game for the good of the team was reagrded as one of his main qualities. England could have done with someone like Rooney’s club teammate, Park Ji-Sung, who did a superb job on Pirlo in 2009/10 – Urby Emanuelson did something similar for Milan earlier this year. Leaving Pirlo free was suicidal, and he completed over 30 more passes than any other player.



And these weren’t just sideways balls, either – though he did help to spread the play to the full-backs. Many of them were the game’s best passes – he started off by trying to find Antonio Cassano, who was causing John Terry problems, but it soon became clear that Mario Balotelli’s pace was Italy’s main threat. One situation summed it up – Pirlo got the ball in his own area, jogged forward with the ball for 30 yards before thumping it over the top for Balotelli, who was denied by a last-ditch block from Terry. There was no pressure on Pirlo, and he subsequently created another fine chance for Cassano at the far post, who knocked the ball towards Balotelli in the six-yard box.

England never dealt with Pirlo directly, but they (presumably) inadvertently stopped him being such a threat by dropping increasingly deep. In the first half England had kept a surprisingly high line and were caught out by balls over the top, but the more Italy dominated possession, the more England were scared to leave the edge of their own penalty box.

Therefore, the space in behind had vanished, and Pirlo’s only great moment of creativity in extra-time was a similar pass to his earlier ball for Balotelli, shortly after Rooney had lost possession in the Italy box, when England were high up the pitch. But England attacked so rarely, and Italy might have benefited if England had come into the game more and left gaps at the back. England actually defended well as a unit in the final hour of the tie, with their narrowness allowing them to make plenty of blocks.

Few changes

The benches played little part in the game. Prandelli brought on Alessandro Diamanti for Cassano, Antonio Nocerino for De Rossi, and Christian Maggio for Abate. All three were influenced by fitness concerns over the departing players, and the shape of the game changed little.

Hodgson’s double substitution was slightly more about strategy, even if the formation remained the same. Theo Walcott on for Milner theoretically offered more counter-attacking ability, but Walcott never seemed to get the right pass, with Parker noticeably overhitting a couple towards him. Andy Carroll replaced Welbeck to provide more of an aerial route – this helped relieve pressure, but England rarely got players close to him.



Carroll and Walcott were the logical players to introduce, although taking off Milner and Welbeck was debatable - Milner was at least suited to the defensive challenge, while Welbeck was playing better than Rooney and would have done more to shut down Pirlo, if asked to play behind Carroll as he did commendably (albeit without attacking success) against Sweden.

Jordan Henderson replaced Scott Parker to provide energy. That made sense – Parker was exhausted, Gerrard had cramp and was sitting deep, while Henderson has previously done well as a substitute simply by providing fresh legs and mobility.

But Italy were the better side for the vast majority of the 120 minutes, and it was right that Pirlo provided the most thrilling moment in an Italian shoot-out victory.



Conclusion

Italy’s diamond controlled the game, and Pirlo was the star player – he set the tempo and created chances. England’s failure to deal with him was criminal, and Rooney’s defensive role must be questioned. Italy also dragged England narrow before attacking through the full-backs, and they really should have won the game in normal time.

We’re still waiting for Italy to produce completely convincing display – for all their dominance here, their finishing was dreadful. They’ve only scored one goal from open play in the competition, and have only beaten one side, Ireland, who had already been eliminated. Their possession play is impressive and Pirlo has been one of the competition’s star players, but they’ll surely need to be more ruthless in the final third to win the competition.

England simply weren’t good enough here, and while individual decisions can be questioned tonight (the handling of Pirlo, and the substitutions), Hodgson’s overall approach was right for the competition. When inheriting a side at such short notice, particularly a squad without great technical quality compared to either sides in the competition, it made sense to focus upon organisation and shape. The defensive performance wasn’t always impressive, but England didn’t lose a game. With more from the likes of Young and Rooney, England might have overachieved – although the non-performance of talented, creative attackers can’t be divorced from the use of a functional, defensive system. There was rarely a clear transition plan – that was evident tonight, with the wide players dragged inside and in no position to launch an attack.

For Hodgson, the real test starts now. Such a reactive style of football is entirely forgiveable for a short-term project, but England have to be in a position to play a more proactive, flexible brand of football if they want to be genuine contenders, rather than organised underdogs hoping to get lucky.

乔治六世

30楼参考译文

乔治六世

England v Italy preview

June 24, 2012


Possible starting line-ups

After three one-sided quarter-finals, this should be a much tighter, tenser tactical battle.

Roy Hodgson will name a standard 4-4-2 / 4-4-1-1 formation, and although there’s a chance that a more direct winger could start on the flanks, it’s probable that he’ll stick with the starting XI that overcame Ukraine in the final group game.

Cesare Prandelli’s formation is much less clear. Having used a 3-5-2 for Italy’s opening two games against Spain and Croatia, he switched to a 4-4-2 diamond for the win over Ireland.

Italy formation

Which formation will Prandelli play here? Prandelli has been keen to keep his starting shape a secret throughout the competition. First, he was annoyed that Italian journalists leaked his plan to switch to the diamond against Ireland. Then, he told off Andrea Barzagli in a press conference, when the Juventus defender told the media that Italy would “defend with four defenders”. Could this be an elaborate hoax, with Italy trying to trick Hodgson?

It’s not impossible, but it seems much more likely that Italy will play the diamond. Of course, they could switch between the formations within the match, as Daniele De Rossi played at centre-back in a back three, then in central midfield in a diamond. “We used Daniele De Rossi at centre-back in emergency situations, when using the three-man defence,” says Prandelli. “Now he is returning to midfield because we need his quality there.”

Wing play

The 3-5-2 arguably makes more sense in theory – it would allow a spare man at the back. But Italy were caught out with two-versus-one situations down the flanks against Croatia, and the system worked better against a Spanish side that had no proper wingers (or striker).

England will attack with width, and while the diamond doesn’t offer great protection for the full-backs, it should be able to shift laterally across the pitch to close down the England full-backs – who generally only attack one at a time. (With the diamond sliding from side to side, crossfield balls and switching the point of attack is theoretically the right approach for England, but unlikely unless Ashley Cole and Glen Johnson play higher up.)

Wide defenders

A more telling sign will be the selections of the wide defenders. For a back three Prandelli prefers natural wing-backs Christian Maggio and Emanuele Giaccherini, for a back four he wants Ignazio Abate and Federico Balzaretti. Prandelli has been intelligent in recognising the differences between playing as full-back and playing as wing-back, and has changed players accordingly.

Maggio is a fine wing-back for Napoli, but uncomfortable as a full-back. Giaccherini is a winger and can adapt to playing at wing-back, but full-back is too deep for him. As it happens, despite being more comfortable in a four, Abate and Balzaretti are better at going forward themselves, so England must attack them.

False ten?!

The other decision for Prandelli to make is at the top of the diamond. Thiago Motta played that role against Ireland, but is an injury doubt and Riccardo Montolivo may take his place. This position is a very interesting role within the context of the rest of the diamond, especially when Motta, more of a holding midfielder, plays. This man isn’t playing as a traditional Italian trequartista (like, for example, Francesco Totti). He isn’t directly connecting the midfield and attack. Instead, they tend to drop back into deeper positions and create space for the two shuttlers on the sides of the diamond to break into, while Pirlo also moves forward to become Italy’s true playmaker.

In the game against Ireland, Motta passed to Pirlo more frequently than any other player, showing that the Juventus man is the main creative threat despite being positioned twenty yards deeper.

Upfront, Mario Balotelli will probably start rather than Antonio Di Natale.

Hodgson decisions

For England, the first seven places in the side are assured – the goalkeeper, back four and two central midfielders have started all three games so far, and are set in stone. Ahead of that, Wayne Rooney will also play and Danny Welbeck is highly likely to be the main striker.

On the wings, there are question marks. Whichever way Italy play, they’ll be most vulnerable down the sides of the pitch – either England can create two-versus-one situations against the wing-backs in a 3-5-2, or (more likely) they can get their wingers to take on the full-backs, who will lack protection.

Hodgson likes James Milner because of his defensive awareness, and because England’s wide midfielders might get sucked inside to cope against Italy’s four central midfielders, Milner is well-suited to this game. Looking at the graphic above, he might be asked to pick up De Rossi. On the other side, Ashley Young has been disappointing so far, and because he tends to drift inside with the ball, Hodgson might be concerned he doesn’t have a direct winger to take advantage of Italy’s weaknesses on the flanks. Theo Walcott and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain will, in all probability, be substitutes – but either would be a great addition to the side, in order to stretch the play.

If Milner does pick up De Rossi, with Gerrard and Parker dealing with Montolivo (or Motta) and Marchisio, plus Rooney dropping back on Pirlo, the left-winger might be the out-ball.

Possession and Pirlo

Italy will dominate possession.They will flood the centre of the pitch with four good ball-players, and around 60%-40% is realistic. For their part, England’s approach without the ball will be particularly interesting. Hodgson insists on strict zone play, so Steven Gerrard and Scott Parker won’t be dragged around too much – but Italy’s midfield layout is peculiar, as Montolivo (or Motta) is essentially a decoy, with Marchisio looking to slide forward to the edge of the box, De Rossi powerfully storming forward, and Pirlo lurking in deeper positions. England could simply be outnumbered in that zone if Gerrard and Parker try to close down, but could allow Pirlo too much time if they don’t (which is far more likely).

This means Rooney will probably be asked to drop back on Pirlo and help out in the midfield zone, and Pirlo’s long distribution into the channels is very dangerous. The trouble with playing against Italy (as Spain demonstrated) is that opponents are keen to get their full-backs forward to capitalise on Italy’s weakness on the flanks – but this leaves them vulnerable to Cassano and Balotelli working the channels and dragging the centre-backs wide. If those get a couple of yards of space in wide positions, Pirlo will find them with diagonal balls.

Finally, set-pieces and crosses might be England’s best chance of scoring. Italy are the smallest squad at this tournament (although they’ll be taller than in previous matches) while Gerrard has been in superb crossing form when moving out to the right, having assisted goals for Joleon Lescott, Andy Carroll and Wayne Rooney from that flank.

北极狐

英法都挂了，鲁小胖植发效果不明显啦

colinfirth

小组赛最佳进球！伊布惊世天钩KO巴神

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France - Sweden Full highlights 法国 vs 瑞典 集锦

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Euro2012四分之一决赛：英格兰VS意大利震撼预告片

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England - Ukraine Full highlights 英格兰 vs 乌克兰 集锦

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鲁小胖绝杀破门秀新发型

乔治六世

22楼参考译文

乔治六世

England 1-0 Ukraine: cagey game

June 20, 2012


The starting line-ups

Wayne Rooney returned to head in a simple goal, and England finish top of Group D.

Roy Hodgson dropped Andy Carroll to bring in Rooney, so Danny Welbeck returned to his position as the primary centre-forward.

Oleh Blokhin made various changes – Andriy Shevchenko wasn’t fit enough to start, and Andriy Voronin was dropped, so there was an all-new centre-forward partnership of Artem Milevskiy and Marco Devic. Serhiy Nazarenko was replaced by Denys Harmash, and Yaroslav Rakitskiy came in at the back.

Like all three of England’s matches, this was poor technical game lacking in quality, and many of the chances came from set-pieces and crosses.

Flanks

This was a clash between two similar sides – 4-4-1-1, with one forward dropping off into midfield. It created a cagey, frustrating game that saw little creativity from the centre of the pitch, and both sides looking to work the ball into wide positions.

The most interesting battle was Oleh Huisev against Ashley Young. The Ukrainian right-back played extremely high up the pitch, pushing Young back towards his own goal. At the start of the game Young appeared surprised by Husiev’s attacking intent (he shouldn’t have been, based upon Ukraine’s two games), and Ashley Cole moved out wider and allowed too much space between himself and Joleon Lescott. When Young adjusted his positioning and played deeper, however, Husiev was no longer a threat. Blokhin later tried to get Husiev into more space by moving him to the right of midfield.

It was crucial that England stopped Husiev, because they’ve looked vulnerable to crosses in this tournament, and Husiev was the main threat in that respect. The two wingers came inside, though Andriy Yarmolenko sometimes looked to receive long diagonals up against Cole.

On the other flank, Yevhen Konoplyanka stayed wide initially, then cut inside suddenly to have long-range shots. One tested Joe Hart, forcing him into an awkward save, but four were off target. England were probably happier with a winger coming inside rather than one charging down the outside and crossing, but they must be careful in that zone ahead of the back four, having conceded from that position against France.



England on ball

England were disappointing on the ball, with little invention from the midfield zone. Steven Gerrard and Scott Parker play flexibly and switch sides depending on where Gerrard ends up after attacking, but Gerrard tended to stay more to the right of the pitch in this game, having previously spent more time to the left – though this may have been unintentional.

Rooney found space in deep-lying positions, but England couldn’t get the ball to him via the midfielders, who were closed down quickly. Instead, England looked better when the defence hit ambitious balls forward, bypassing the midfield completely. Their best chance of the first half came after a long diagonal from John Terry to Young, followed by a cross that should have been headed in by Rooney.

Corners

Either side of half-time, it became a game of set-pieces. England built pressure with corners in the first half, and while they went ahead following a right-wing corner (Gerrard’s third right-wing assist of the tournament, which might hint at why he spent more time towards that side), they then became penned in by a succession of Ukraine corners.



In truth, the game never developed into a truly exciting spectacle. England were content with their 1-0 (in fact, with news from the other game, they would have topped the group with a draw) while Ukraine were disappointingly tame in front of their home crowd, needing a win to progress – though they probably would have rallied had Milevskiy’s deflected shot been given as a goal.

The substitutions changed little, with only one significant re-structuring by either coach. Blokhin introduced right-back Bohdan Butko for Milevskiy – on paper a very defensive change, but Blokhin moved Husiev forward and Yarmolenko inside, and Ukraine played in roughly the same system.

Hodgson called upon Theo Walcott, Andy Carroll and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, who have all played previously in the tournament, to give a renewed attacking threat – but they completed five passes combined, and their introduction was irrelevant to the feel of the game.

Conclusion

4-4-1-1 versus 4-4-1-1, and two naturally reactive teams. As in England’s previous matches, set-pieces were crucial to England’s goalscoring, although they still don’t appear comfortable defending them at the other end. Still, England have their back four and two central midfielders sorted, and Hodgson has options in the other four positions, with players who offer different attributes and tactical variety. Regardless of how England fare in the knockout stage, Hodgson’s performance as coach has been quietly impressive.

Ukraine rarely played well in this tournament. Even their win against Sweden was down to brilliance from Shevchenko rather than great overall play, and Blokhin may regret that unnecessary half-time substitution against France. Still, the Shevchenko-inspired turnaround against Sweden will be remembered forever in Ukraine – and in the absence of a realistic chance of winning the competition, that was probably the best possible outcome.

乔治六世

法国队出线形势较佳吧，不过面对瑞典队，其压力不小于英国队面对乌克兰队的

thewall

19楼参考译文
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来自虎扑足球

英格兰3-2瑞典：长传冲吊与定位球破门凸显两队防守弊端

2012-06-17

首发阵容

这场比赛的技术含量非常低，但却很具有观赏性。

霍奇森对首发做出了一处调整，张伯伦被放在板凳上，阿什利-杨来到左路，安迪-卡罗尔突前成为进攻核心。

哈姆伦则换了三个人——埃尔曼德突前，斯文森来到中路，奥尔森镇守后防，不过瑞典的阵型与对阵乌克兰时相比并没有很大的变化。

整场比赛节奏激烈大开大合，结局很具有开放性——两支球队领先之后的表现都很糟糕。

阵型之争

基本上来说是4-4-2与4-4-2之间的对抗。瑞典的阵型经常是4-2-3-1，但这次伊布拉希莫维奇在很前场的位置活动，本质上是个二前锋。英格兰这边则是维尔贝克在前场搭档卡罗尔。维尔贝克在英格兰丢掉球权的时候会后撤至中场，但是作用却有些模糊，而且在这么深的位置他也无法像在对阵法国一役中那样在对方肋部活动。他唯一一次带球突破是在上半时将近结束的时候，周围还围了五个瑞典的防守球员。

卡位的关键程度并不仅仅在于阵型之争，还决定了防线的位置。英格兰这次推得非常靠前，比对阵法国的时候上前很多。他们有的时候压迫得不错，能迫使瑞典后撤，但同时经常被打身后球。伊布在一次直接对抗中几乎完爆了特里，致使格伦-约翰逊不得不在球来到英格兰防线之后的时候做出门前的最后铲断。

瑞典的防线可能推得不够靠前。他们的防守缺乏速度，但是却稳固地守在禁区附近，面对卡罗尔的空中优势显得有些脆弱。卡罗尔大多在场地左侧活动，对抗梅尔贝里和格兰奎斯特。他的进球来自于杰拉德凭借直接任意球从后方送出的斜传，不但证明了自己的作用，还肯定了英格兰的战术。

卡罗尔与长传

不过，有了卡罗尔之后，英格兰的问题就变成过于依赖长传——虽然对对方禁区造成了很大的压力，但这也在一定程度上归结于英格兰控球能力的缺乏。与对阵法国时相比，虽然对手变弱，他们推得也很靠前，但是传球完成率几乎没有进步，而霍奇森的球队在1-0领先之后本来应该在传球方面力争做到更加冷静和稳定。

然而，这场比赛的主角是头球和定位球，阵地之争也远远显得比控球更加重要，对于这两支球队来说倒也很正常。英格兰丢掉球权的趋势意味着他们被压回到了自己的半场，还不断送给对方任意球，让瑞典队有机会进入他们的禁区。不过两支球队在运动战中都没有什么创造性。



下半场

瑞典队在下半场早早地就凭借两个定位球机会以2-1反超比分。英格兰却似乎进入了疲劳期，不能保持控球，比上半场退得更靠后了。

沃尔科特的上场对英格兰重新振作起来至关重要。舆论一直在诟病沃尔科特除了速度之外一无是处，然而正是他的速度给英格兰的这场阵地之争加上了一个重重的砝码。他很轻易地就引领球队回到了前场，迫使瑞典防线后撤。虽说英格兰的踢法怎么也称不上精彩，不过另一个定位球（直接任意球造成的头球攻门被瑞典门将伊萨克森扑出造成角球）带来的进球让他们重新与对手回到了同一起跑线上。

沃尔科特的射门有一点折射（拉尔森在球经过的时候有进行阻挡），而且这个射门本身并没有显示出他给比赛带来了什么因素（直接性和宽度），但是他作为得分手来说再适合不过了。

比赛后期

沃尔科特的上场是唯一一次起到关键作用的换人。瑞典因球员受伤而替换了前锋和右后卫，边锋威廉森的上场本来可以起到与沃尔科特相似的作用（他在对阵乌克兰的时候替补上场很有作为），但却并没有奏效。沃尔科特是最后20分钟里的关键先生，他还助攻维尔贝克以一记精妙的脚后跟勾门将比分反超。

不过下半场最值得一提的是糟糕的防守——不管是对定位球还是运动战都惨不忍睹。这两支球队在无球状态下本该保持住阵型，结果却全都乱七八糟——边锋回追抢球太慢，中场中路球员本该保护好身后的四人防线，却一直在贸然前插，定位球造成的失球也太多了。
总之，由于两支球队在领先后在控球上都表现极差，再加上双方都对比赛势在必得，这才造成了进球大战——不过两支球队表现都不好，技战术方面均无亮点。

结论

战术上来看，这是本届欧洲杯开赛以来最乏善可陈的一场比赛——不过，看到对于这两支球队来讲，阵地之争比控球优势更为重要，倒也挺耐人寻味。（控球比正好为50%对50%）

瑞典在两场令人失望的比赛之后已被淘汰，而且他们恐怖的定位球头球失球纪录仍在继续，虽然英格兰也只比他们稍微强一点而已。
尽管赢了球，但这场比赛给霍奇森带来的失望应该大于得意。英格兰踢得并不好——他们控不住球，也没有保持好防守阵型，只是沃尔科特的上场收到了奇效。鲁尼会在下一场比赛中回归，这意味着三位得分手——维尔贝克、卡罗尔和沃尔科特——中有一位将要失望了。

thewall

England 3-2 Sweden: long balls, set-pieces and terrible defending

June 16, 2012


The starting line-ups

A scrappy game low on quality, but high on entertainment.

Roy Hodgson made one change. Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain was dropped with Ashley Young moving to the left, and Andy Carroll coming upfront as a target man.

Erik Hamren brought in three players – Johan Elmander upfront, Anders Svensson in the middle, and Jonas Olsson at the back, though Sweden played pretty much the same formation as against Ukraine.

This was a crazy, open match that could have gone either way – both sides had spells when they were on top.

Formations

This was basically 4-4-2 against 4-4-2. Sweden’s formation is often described as a 4-2-3-1, but here Zlatan Ibrahimovic played high up the pitch, basically as a second striker. Welbeck, meanwhile, played high up the pitch close to Carroll. He often dropped into midfield when England didn’t have the ball, but his role was a little confused, and this deep position meant he couldn’t work the channels as he’d done against France. The only time he got running with the ball was towards the end of the first half, when five Sweden defenders surrounded him.

The key in terms of positioning was not necessarily the formation battle, but how high the defensive lines were playing. England were pushing very high up, much further up the pitch than against France. Sometimes they pressed well and forced Sweden back, but often they were exposed with passes in behind. Ibrahimovic nearly embarrassed John Terry in a straight race, while Glen Johnson had to make a last-ditch tackle after a ball in behind England’s back four.

Sweden probably didn’t defend high enough. Their defence lacks pace, but they dropped into the penalty box readily and were vulnerable to Carroll’s aerial threat. He tended to work the left of the pitch, against Olof Mellberg and Andreas Granqvist. His goal, after a superb Steven Gerrard cross from deep, justified his selection and England’s approach.

Carroll and long balls

But the problem with playing Carroll is that the side becomes too focused upon playing long balls – and while that obviously had a decisive impact in the penalty box, it must also be partly blamed for England’s inability to keep the ball. Their pass completion rate didn’t improve from the France game, despite playing against weaker opposition and higher up the pitch, and Hodgson’s side could have done with calmer, steadier passing to hold the advantage at 1-0.

But the game was largely about headers and set-pieces, and territory was more important than possession – maybe typical, for a game involving these two nations. England’s tendency to lose the ball meant they were forced into their own half, and they kept giving away free-kicks, giving Sweden a chance to get the ball in the box. There didn’t seem to be much creativity from open play.



Second half

Sweden scored from two early second half set-pieces, and at 2-1 up were clearly on top. England looked shellshocked, unable to keep the ball for long periods and retreating much deeper than they’d been in the first half.

The introduction of Theo Walcott was crucial to England’s recovery. The standard criticism of Walcott is that he had little more than pace, but his raw speed was absolutely crucial for England in this battle of territory. He simply drove England up the pitch and forced Sweden to defend deeper. At no point did England play good football, but a goal from another set-piece (a corner, which came after Isaksson had saved a header from a preceding free-kick) got them back in the game.

Walcott’s strike was deflected (look at Sebastian Larsson’s sock when the ball goes past it) and the nature of the strike didn’t illustrate what he was bringing to the game (directness and width), but he was the appropriate goalscorer.

Closing stages

Walcott was the only crucial substitute. Sweden made changes upfront and at right-back due to injury, and the introduction of winger Christian Wilhelmsson (who came off the bench to good effect against Ukraine) could have done for Sweden what Walcott did for England. It didn’t, and Walcott was the most important player in the final twenty minutes, setting up Welbeck for a clever finish for the winner.

But the second half’s main feature was simply terrible defending – both at set-pieces and in open play. For two sides expected to retain great shape without the ball, they were both were all over the place – the wingers were slow to get back into position, the central midfielders scampered forward when they should have been protecting their back four, and too many free-kicks were conceded.

All that, combined with (a) poor possession play when either side was ahead and (b) the fact that, realistically, both needed a win, meant a goalfest – but neither side actually played well, in tactical or technical terms.

Conclusion

Tactically, one of the least impressive games of the tournament – though it was interesting how territory was so much more important to both sides than possession, (which, for the record, was 50-50).

Sweden are eliminated after two very disappointing performances, and their terrible record of conceding headed goals from set-pieces continued, though England did their best do out-do them at the other end.

Hodgson will find more negatives than positives in this display, despite the win. England didn’t do much well – they didn’t retain the ball nor have a good defensive shape, though the Walcott change was vital. With three different scorers, Wayne Rooney’s return will mean disappointment for at least one of Welbeck, Carroll and Walcott.

thewall

17楼参考译文
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来自虎扑

法国2-0乌克兰战术复盘：里贝里与古谢夫的对抗决定比赛走势

2012-06-16


首发阵容

比赛因为大雨延迟了一小时开球，法国队刚开局就占据了优势，轻松赢下了比赛。

布兰科在首发阵容中做出两点变动：首先是一个对位调整，左后卫的位置上他用克里希代替埃弗拉；然后在前场用梅内替下马卢达，这就意味着纳斯里的位置要移到中路，法国队变阵为4-2-3-1。

布洛欣曾经说过他没有固定的首发十一人人选，而是每场比赛都会有所不同。但是在乌克兰表现强势2-1战胜瑞典之后，布洛欣在这场比赛中派出了相同阵容。

比赛的上半时因为大雨延迟而受到了很大影响，双方回到球场上之后缺乏进取心，比赛节奏非常缓慢。下半时比赛更加开放也更加好看。

阵型之战

法国队变阵4-2-3-1之后表现有了很大起色，纳斯里坐镇中路负责协调，边路两翼齐飞。这与他们首场对阵英格兰的表现截然不同，虽然上一场比赛纳斯里也从右路移动到中路，但是这在右翼就留下了一个很大的空当，马卢达也对自己的任务一头雾水。

纳斯里在本场比赛中受到季莫什丘克的重点照顾，后者在上一场比赛中也是这样盯防瑞典队的箭头人物伊布拉希莫维奇。伊布的解决方案是向前插上充当二前锋的角色，以此摆脱季莫什丘克；纳斯里则是更深地后撤，使得季莫什丘克有所忌惮，无法继续跟随防守。

而纳扎伦科的任务是盯防卡巴耶，后者开场时的站位比较深，但是随着比赛的进行，他逐渐前移，并在进攻腹地对比赛产生了深远的影响。沃罗宁防守迪亚拉，并与季莫什丘克以及纳扎伦科组成中场三角，以保证乌克兰的中场不要被法国队控制。

战略战术

乌克兰尝试以高位防守对付法国队，这一决定令人吃惊，因为乌克兰的防守球员速度并不快，而法国队的三名攻击手就埋伏在乌克兰防线之后，随时准备对对手球门造成威胁。虽然第一次开场四分钟就因大雨被叫停，但乌克兰的高位防守意图已经非常明显，不过布洛欣决定上半时要坚持这种打法。

乌克兰的战术基本上就是打反击，但是他们的两翼很难融入比赛，法国队两名边后卫完美地冻结了乌克兰的边锋。然后乌克兰尝试以长传球找前锋，但是沃罗宁被防守任务牵扯了很大精力，难以分心找到空当接球反击；舍甫琴科在拉米一侧的肋部活动，他接到来自身后的斜传球之后创造过一些五五开的机会。

本泽马移动到左路与里贝里配合之后，法国队看上去更接近破门了。本泽马与里贝里组合的威力在欧洲杯前的热身赛上就已经初露端倪。里贝里的的高速冲刺以及与本泽马的撞墙式配合令法国队占据优势，而他们创造出的射门机会通常由梅内从对方后卫的人丛中快速杀出后完成。



里贝里与古谢夫之战

但是本场比赛中的关键对抗来自里贝里与古谢夫。简单地说，里贝里几乎没有回防意识（这一点在4-2-3-1阵型中比在4-3-3中更危险），而古谢夫喜欢插上，而当乌克兰丢失球权之后，他通常无法及时归位。

这有点像周三时C罗与雅各布森之间的较量，而法国队的第一个进球，暂且不说是以什么方式打进的，恰恰就是来自于里贝里与古谢夫所在的区域。

乌克兰的转换

双方的场面有些僵持不下时，比赛需要打得更开放一些。布洛欣用德维奇换下沃罗宁的决定有些出人意料，德维奇相比较而言更是一个比较纯粹的前锋，而沃罗宁虽然比赛中虽然进攻端贡献不大，但是他对迪亚拉的防守限制了法国队在中场占据的优势。此外，乌克兰也应该对0-0的比分满意，他们根本没有必要进行赌博式换人。

德维奇并没有迅速地跟上盯防迪亚拉，比赛一度变得更加混乱。乌克兰对于在前场获得机会更有信心，舍瓦在下半时开场之后几次接近破门；而法国队则从中场打起反击，迅速将球分到左路。

里贝里表现一流

里贝里与古谢夫的对抗仍然是比赛的关键，而原本双方胜负难料。古谢夫经常充满活力地套边插到亚尔莫连科身前，但他在无人盯防的情况下却很难得到传球。如果乌克兰在最后半小时打得更聪明一点，古谢夫的勇猛很可能为球队赢下比赛。



乌克兰没有及时利用能够拉扯出空间的球员做文章，而里贝里的带球突破则是一大威胁。在第一个进球中，他没有回追协防古谢夫，正因此他处在一个绝好的反击位置上，季莫什丘克将球交出，里贝里衔枚疾进，传给中路的本泽马，本泽马从容转身将球交给右路内切的梅内，梅内冷静地打近角得手。

1-0领先之后，法国队打出了他们在本届欧洲杯上的最好表现，比赛踢得十分灵活流畅，一次进攻中卡巴耶突入禁区想要再下一城，在经过20次左右流畅娴熟的传球之后，纽卡斯尔中场遗憾地将球打在立柱上。

从比赛形势看，法国队很可能收获更多进球，但是布兰科在第68分钟用姆维拉换下卡巴耶，这是他想要结束比赛的信号。法国队在比赛的最后20分钟表现出色，最终轻松赢得了比赛。

结论

本场比赛的看点有两个，首先是里贝里与古谢夫的对抗，双方都没有完成各自教练在防守方面的战术要求，因此两人反而都获得了相当大的自由，可以在对方的后卫线一带跑动。里贝里的有球技术非常好，但是他的疏于回防没有被乌克兰抓住机会，可以说是运气不错。

而布洛欣在下半时的换人则值得商榷，也许他希望更有野心，也许他并没有看到沃罗宁在前场的贡献，但乌克兰并不需要一定赢下这场比赛。德维奇防守上的不积极虽然不是球队失球的直接原因，但这次换人使得比赛更加开放，显然这对于技术更好的球队更有利。

thewall

France 2-0 Ukraine: Ribery v Husiev battle decides the game

June 16, 2012


The starting line-ups

After a long rain delay, France took the initiative and went onto win the game comfortably.

Laurent Blanc made two changes. One was a straight swap, with Patrice Evra dropping out and Gael Clichy starting at left-back. Higher up, the introduction of Jeremy Menez at the expense of Florent Malouda meant Samir Nasri moved into a permanent central position, and France switched to a 4-2-3-1.

Oleg Blokhin had said before the tournament that he didn’t have a set first choice XI, and would switch from game to game, but after Ukraine’s famous 2-1 victory over Sweden on Monday, he stuck with the same side.

The first half was heavily affected by the rain delay – the teams returned to the pitch and played very slow football that lacked ambition. In the second half, the game was much more open and interesting.

Formation battle

France’s shift to 4-2-3-1 seemed to make them a better side, with a central orchestrator in Nasri, but also thrust from both flanks. That was very different from in the first game against England, where Nasri was moving inside from the right flank to play that role anyway, but leaving the right flank bare, and making Malouda’s job unclear.

Nasri was marked by Anatoliy Tymoshchuk, who had done a similar job on a very different player, Zlatan Ibrahimovic, against Sweden. Whereas Ibrahimovic tried to escape Tymoshchuk by moving forward to become a second striker, Nasri naturally dropped deeper into midfield, into a position where Tymoshchuk was scared to follow.

Meanwhile, Serhiy Nazarenko was given the job of tracking Yohan Cabaye, who started in a deeper role but increasingly moved forward and influenced the game in the final third. To complete the clash of midfield triangles, Andriy Voronin dropped onto Diarra, making sure Ukraine weren’t overrun in the middle.

Strategies

Ukraine tried to play a high line against France, a surprising move considering they don’t have great pace at the back, and France’s three attackers all threaten by getting in behind the defence. That high line was clear even in the four minutes before the rain delay, but Blokin persisted with it throughout the first half.

Ukraine’s strategy was basically to play on the break, although they struggled to get the two (very) wide players involved in the game – the two French full-backs won both those battles. They started playing longer balls to the strikers, and while Voronin was often too concerned with his defensive duties to find space, Andriy Shevchenko worked the channel next to Adil Rami and created a couple of half-chances after diagonal balls.

France looked most likely to score when Benzema moved to the left and linked with Franck Ribery, a combination which had looked promising throughout France’s pre-tournament friendlies. Ribery’s burst of pace combined with Benzema’s simple wall passes got France into good positions, and these moves usually ended with a chance for Menez, who was making runs in behind the defence.



Ribery v Husiev

But the key battle here was Ribery against Oleg Husiev. Put simply, Ribery didn’t want to track back and help defend (which is even more dangerous in a 4-2-3-1 than in a 4-3-3), while Husiev continually made forward runs and then was out of position when Ukraine lost the ball.

This was a little like Cristiano Ronaldo against Lars Jacobsen on Wednesday, and the opening goal – whichever way it went – seemed destined to come from this area of the pitch.

Ukraine switch

But first, the game needed to become more open, and Blokhin’s decision to replace Voronin with Marko Devic was a big surprise. Devic is more of a natural striker, and while Voronin wasn’t contributing much going forward, his defensive job on Diarra was nullifying France’s midfield advantage. Besides, Ukraine should have been happy with 0-0 – there was no need to gamble.

Devic didn’t drop onto Diarra so quickly, and the game became much more frantic. Ukraine were more confident about their chances going forward, and Shevchenko went close shortly after half-time. France were able to break more swiftly through the centre of the pitch, and down the left.

Ribery comes out on top

That Ribery v Husiev clash was still key – and it could have gone either way. Husiev often overlapped Andriy Yarmolenko energetically, only to not receive a pass when totally unmarked. Had Ukraine been cleverer in the final third, Husiev’s bravery would have won the day.



Instead, Ukraine failed to take advantage of having a man in space, and Ribery’s running with the ball was a huge threat. For the first goal, he hadn’t bothered to track Husiev back, and therefore was in a great position to launch a counter-attack – Tymoshchuk was dragged across, Benzema had time to turn when Ribery slipped him in, and Menez was calm enough to cut inside from the right and finish inside the near post.

At 1-0 up, France played their best football of the tournament. There was a great deal of fluidity about their play – shown by Cabaye venturing into the box for the second goal, and the superb 20-pass move that ended with the Newcastle midfielders hitting the post.

It felt like France could have gone onto score more, but Blanc replaced Cabaye with Yann M’Vila on 68 minutes, a sign he wanted to shut the game down. France were very professional in the final 20 minutes, and won the game comfortably.

Conclusion

Two major parts to this game – first, there was the Ribery v Husiev battle. With neither showing anything like the required defensive discipline, both got freedom to run at the opposition defence. Ribery was excellent with the ball at his feet, but was lucky Ukraine didn’t punish his laziness.

But Blokhin’s half-time change must also be questioned – maybe he wanted to be more ambitious and wasn’t impressed with Voronin’s contribution upfront, but Ukraine didn’t need to win the game. Devic’s lack of defensive work didn’t impact directly on the goal, but the switch made the game much, much more open. That generally favours the better technical side.

累赘

我的负RP是国家免检，你就放心吧

北极海

我相信在球王鲁尼第三场回归后，英格兰必将勇夺本届冠军
累赘 发表于 2012-6-13 11:36

你确信你的负RP好使吗？我怎么有点慌啊...

小豆丁梅西

掌声响起来，楼主辛苦鸟！！

累赘

我相信在球王鲁尼第三场回归后，英格兰必将勇夺本届冠军

thewall

11# 弗爵爷

介个大夏天欧洲杯，就在家看了

但不宜进行剧烈体力活动

劳逸结合嘛

弗爵爷

10# 乔治六世



90哥把自己的全部都交给欧洲杯了，可歌可泣

但还是要留点时间陪陪女友啊

乔治六世

笔译好辛苦啦

木有人鼓掌吗