A match with little invention, played at a very slow pace.
Laurent Blanc chose his expected side in a 4-3-3, with Florent Malouda shuttling forward from the midfield.
Roy Hodgson’s side contained one surprise name – Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, who started on the left. James Milner started on the other flank, and Danny Welbeck got the nod over Andy Carroll upfront.
As expected, France dominated possession (65%) and had 21 shots compared to England’s 5, but many were from long-range, as Blanc’s side struggled to create clear-cut chances.
Formation battle
This was a fairly simple battle. England had two banks of four, with Ashley Young and Welbeck paired upfront – a mobile, energetic duo that looked to work the channels with support from the two wide players. Steven Gerrard and Scott Parker sat much deeper.
Blanc asked Alou Diarra to stick tightly to Ashley Young when Young came deep, and play deep in front of Young when he moved forward to partner Welbeck. Yohan Cabaye was higher up near Gerrard, and Malouda tried to drift past Parker into space. But there was little space for France, as England packed their own half with eight very narrow players. The space was generally in the wide zones, and although Mathieu Debuchy and Patrice Evra got forward well, they rarely caused significant danger. Playing the ball out wide tended to result in lots of corners, which England sometimes defended nervously.
France attacks
France’s front four (ie including Malouda) were very fluid. While Ribery generally stayed on the left, Samir Nasri had license to wander infield and play where he wanted (which opened up space for Debuchy). It was Nasri who was the game’s key player – he played more passes than anyone else, also played the most in the final third, and created eight chances – the second-most in the tournament so far, after Wesley Sneijder.
Nasri was the only man using space intelligently, moving into a zone between the lines where England didn’t know how to deal with him: whether to bring a defender out from the back, drop the midfield deeper, or ask Ashley Cole to track him inside. That confusion resulted in his large influence on the game in general, while his goal came when England’s two central midfielders both moved too deep – Nasri got space on the edge of the box and fired in, equalising Joleon Lescott’s earlier header.
Aside from Nasri’s movement, England coped well with France’s attacks. Blanc’s side were patient on the ball and didn’t over-commit players into the final third. Cabaye, for example, only seemed to become an attacking force in the final quarter of the game, and the full-backs tried to make sudden powerful runs rather than permanently placing themselves high up, which would risk counter-attacks at transitions.
England attacks
England’s game was about soaking up pressure, then breaking quickly – they’d done this well in the two pre-tournament friendlies, but today they were much less fluent in their attacking play. The main reason was Young’s lack of influence upon the game – he completed only twelve passes, the fewest of the 20 outfield players that started the match.
A lot of credit should go to Diarra, who was extremely clever with his positioning and simply prevented Young from being an option when England got the ball. Statistically, Diarra was immense – 100% pass completion rate, and all five of his tackles were successful.
The only clear-cut chance England created in open play (when James Milner missed after rounding Hugo Lloris) came from a rare occasion when England overloaded Diarra. Oxlade-Chamberlain had moved into a central position, Diarra got drawn to him, which then left Young free for the first time – he slipped the ball through the defence for Milner coming off the other flank. England probably didn’t do this often enough – although, of course, they had to get the ball first. Welbeck ran the channels well, and would have been a greater goal threat if Young had seen more of the ball.
Young and Welbeck played very intelligently without the ball. They didn’t chase and press the French centre-backs – instead, they stood off and prevented passes being played forward into the midfield. Philippe Mexes and, in particular, Adil Rami’s passes were extremely horizontal, and France found it difficult to get the ball forward. As a result, the game was played at a very slow pace – which probably suited England.
Second half
There was absolutely no progression in this game. England continued to sit very deep, while France didn’t significantly increase the number of players they attacked with. The tempo of the passing was still slow, and both sides seemed to tire quickly and recognise that a draw was a decent result.
Perhaps the only significant development was Karim Benzema’s movement, as he became frustrated with the lack of service – he only received the ball in the penalty area once . Instead, he dropped into deeper zones, the type of positions Nasri was playing in, and had a couple of long-range attempts saved by Joe Hart.
It was highly surprisingly, especially considering the heat, that neither coach made a substitution until the 77th minute. England brought on Jermain Defoe for Oxlade-Chamberlain, with Young going left, while Jordan Henderson replaced the exhausted Parker. This was broadly attack-minded, but really just about fresh legs.
Blanc brought on Hatem Ben Arfa and Marvin Martin for Cabaye and Malouda, but on 85 minutes it was too late to have a significant impact on the game.
Conclusion
On the whole, the first round of Euro 2012 matches have been relatively open and entertaining, but this was a slow game. The two sides wanted to ‘not lose’ more than they wanted to win, so a draw seemed likely from early in the second half, with only France’s long-range shots threatening.
England’s shape was good, but their transitions were disappointing because of Young’s anonymity. He’s a key player for this system, and France did well to nullify his influence. Hodgson will also be concerned about the space between the lines, and the Parker-Gerrard combination needs to be a little more disciplined, and make sure one of them is occupying that zone, rather than chasing the ball or being drawn to opponents.
France were certainly the more positive side, but moved the ball too slowly to draw England’s players out of shape, and maybe needed more variety and movement from their midfield triangle. They put England’s defensive unit under persistent but never particularly strong pressure, and seemed to be waiting for the other two group matches.作者: 乔治六世 时间: 2012-6-12 12:39 本帖最后由 乔治六世 于 2012-6-12 21:17 编辑
Whatever happens at this tournament, Euro 2012 will be an improvement on the sheer embarrassment of World Cup 2010 for France. The off-field problems meant it was almost impossible to determine how good a side France could have been, and therefore it’s difficult to judge how well Laurent Blanc has performed. But then, repairing the morale of the squad was key, and Blanc seems to have handled that well; his side are now on a 21-match unbeaten run.
On the field, there are still problems to solve. In his three pre-tournament qualifiers, Blanc was either indulging himself in widespread experimentation, or he was a little lost. France have a great number of good players, particularly attacking midfielders, but those players are all of a vaguely similar standard – only Franck Ribery seems undroppable – and all are highly versatile.
Blanc seems to have too many options, and while it feels like there’s a winning combination somewhere, France haven’t yet found it (although the 4-0 win over Estonia on Tuesday night was impressive). As a result, they are highly unpredictable – if it all comes together they could win the competition. If Blanc keeps changing things, it could be a disaster.
Backline
Hugo Lloris is the undisputed number one, and a fine goalkeeper. Ahead of him, though, there are problems. The centre-back duo, Philippe Mexes and Adil Rami, don’t seem to function well together – they play high up the pitch but seem vulnerable to balls played in behind, and neither seems to be particularly adept at covering for the other, which was particularly obvious in the 3-2 friendly win over Iceland, when France were 2-0 down in the opening half. They play high up the pitch, and don’t have the pace to cover the space in behind.
Laurent Koscielny has been given a brief chance to impress, and because his game is all about pace and covering space in behind at Arsenal, he seems like a good alternative at the back – either centre-back is droppable. However, Blanc’s decision to go with Mexes-Rami in the final friendly against Estonia indicates that they’ll start against England. Strangely, Blanc has only brought three centre-backs to the tournament, none of the full-backs have experience of playing in the middle, and Diarra would be an uncomfortable makeshift centre-back. Koscielny came on as a substitute against Estonia in a holding midfield role, though this was probably simply to give him playing time, rather than a serious tactical option.
Patrice Evra and Mathieu Debuchy will play at full-back. Evra has had an inconsistent two years at Manchester United and is prone to lapses in concentration for his national side too, but has shaken off the challenge of Gael Clichy. Debuchy would have battled the injured Bacary Sagna for the right-back position, although he was probably favourite to start anyway, having played well throughout Sagna’s previous injury. He might surprise opponents with his forward running – he’s a bigger attacking threat than Evra.
Midfield
Blanc has chopped and changed in the midfield zone, playing a 4-2-3-1, a 4-3-3 and something in between, trying to find the right combination in the centre. He’s basically settled upon a 4-3-3, which means one ball-winner, one passer and one attacking player.
In the first role, Alou Diarra has benefited from Yann M’Vila’s fitness concerns and will play directly ahead of the defence. He’s a solid player – good positionally and decent on the ball, but he can suffer from being stranded ahead of the defence when the other two midfielders move forward, and you get the impression that he’s much more comfortable when paired with another holder, as he is for Marseille, or even simply a ‘passer’ playing deep in a 4-2-3-1, rather than in the Makelele role.
Yohan Cabaye plays ahead of Diarra and plays an efficient, busy role – he’s energetic but patient on the ball, generally looking to supply another creator rather than play the killer ball, as he increasingly did for Newcastle towards the end of 2011/12. He’s essentially an all-rounder.
The third midfielder will be, slightly surprisingly, Florent Malouda. He performed excellently in the friendly against Bosnia, and shuttles forward to link midfield and attack. He’s benefited from the use of a 4-3-3 rather than a 4-2-3-1. Whereas Jeremy Menez and Mathieu Valbeuna would have been candidates for the third slot in an attacking band of three in a 4-2-3-1, they’re not able to play as a midfielder in a 4-3-3. Malouda is the obvious choice, although it’s a shame Marvin Martin didn’t get a start in the pre-tournament friendlies, as he seemed suited to that role and would have brought more guile to the midfield.
Front three
Further forward, Ribery plays higher up the pitch than he does for Bayern, and has found form at the Euros by combining with the striker whilst cutting inside and driving towards goal. His form for the national side has been inconsistent, but he has a habit of scoring the opening goals in games. On the other side, Samir Nasri’s place is less secure. Valbuena and, in particular, Menez could challenge him for that spot – Menez would be a more direct option, although maybe Blanc wouldn’t want to replicate Ribery’s immediacy on the ball, and wants balance. Valbuena had a disappointing season at Marseille, so Nasri remains first-choice, coming inside and looking for passes from midfield.
Upfront, Karim Benzema has been in superb form at Real Madrid and will start as the lone striker. He’s a terrific all-round forward, able to lead the line with force as well as score goals. There was a brief chance that he would have to play deeper, with Olivier Giroud playing highest up the pitch – Giroud’s hold-up play against Iceland was sensational – but now it seems the Montpellier striker will be a (very good) substitute. He’ll join Valbuena, Menez and Hatem Ben Arfa on a strong bench.
At least, that’s how it will probably be in the opening game. Blanc really doesn’t seem to have a firm idea of what he wants from his side, and it’s very possible that he could change multiple players, and even his formation, between the group games.
Expect a France side that plays out from the back and looks to dominate possession in the centre of the pitch. The difficulty comes in the final third – the transfer of the ball from midfield to attack must be swift and purposeful.
Conclusion
Arguably the most unpredictable side in the competition. In the final two pre-tournament friendlies there was a hint of cohesion and understanding between Malouda, Ribery, Nasri and Benzema, but as a unit these players are yet to be tested against major opposition. France need a couple of attackers to have excellent tournaments.
Quick guide
Coach – Laurent Blanc
Formation – 4-3-3, at least from the start
Key player – Karim Benzema
Strength – plenty of attacking options, lots of creativity
Weakness – a poor centre-back partnership compared to the rest of the side
Key tactical question – What is France’s Plan B?
Key coach quote – “I like passing the ball around and I like to keep the ball. I like it when the ball is played out from the back, and I also like my teams to be efficient.”
Possible starting line-up before Rooney's return. Carroll could start ahead of Welbeck.
Roy Hodgson was the right choice as England coach – at least in the short-term – but realistically, you can’t expect a side to play good football when their coach is appointed a month before the tournament.
Besides, even without considering the managerial situation or England’s terrible record of injuries in the last couple of weeks, England have their weakest set of players for many years. The alleged ‘golden generation’ (though this phrase has been used more frequently in a sarcastic tone than in praise of the players) are now slightly over the hill – Frank Lampard, Steven Gerrard, Ashley Cole, John Terry and Rio Ferdinand are all still doing a good job for their clubs, but their peak was a few years ago, and they never combined to great success then. There is a decent young generation coming through, but for various reasons they haven’t established themselves in the side yet.
Hodgson is left with an uninspiring squad that isn’t really one thing nor the other – it’s not blessed with great technical quality, nor does it have the feel of a settled, organised squad who will be defensively disciplined. Some of Hodgson’s decisions have been questionable – the biggest one might have been taken by the FA, rather than him – but he doesn’t have much to work with.
Organised and counter-attacking
Hodgson, of course, will play a certain style of football. His sides always play with two banks of four sitting deep behind the ball, and then two attackers – either two out-and-out strikers, or a target man in combination with a trickier player just behind – staying upfront. He wants a direct style of football – and ‘direct’ doesn’t mean thumped long balls towards the centre-forward (though that can hardly be ruled out if Andy Carroll starts), but simply passing the ball forward quickly, attacking the opposition defence before they have time to get themselves organised, and before the opposition midfield forms a secure barrier ahead of them.
Just as Hodgson has huge belief in the value of a defensively aware midfield for his own side, he wants to bypass the opposition midfield immediately. In the two friendlies England have played under Hodgson, against Norway and Belgium, they’ve won 1-0 with two very ‘Hodgson’ goals – scored by Young and Danny Welbeck. Young’s goal, in particular, was stereotypical of a Hodgson side – it came after a direct attack with a long accurate pass from defence, then the forwards attacked the defence quickly while they were positionally unbalanced.
This strategy means England won’t be overly concerned with dominating possession, and the first pass out of the defence will often be wayward. There’s a similarity here with the Zambia side that won this year’s African Cup of Nations tournament – two banks of four, two wide players that break directly towards goals from the flanks, one ‘passer’ and one destroyer in the midfield, and two forwards. Zambia recorded the lowest pass completion rate in the tournament, but they didn’t play bad football – it was just that they had such a commitment to get the ball to attackers quickly, that the first pass was often misplaced. If the first pass was accurate, the attacking quartet would break quickly and combine wonderfully.
First bank of four
Hodgson’s priority in training will have been the defence. Unfortunately, with Chelsea players joining up with the England camp late after their Champions League success, and with Gary Cahill now ruled out of the tournament, England haven’t had much time to get settled at the back. Cahill would have formed a solid Chelsea connection along with Terry and Cole (even the right-back, Glen Johnson, used to play for Chelsea) but his place will instead go to Joleon Lescott.
Lescott probably had the best season of any English centre-back, but he disturbs an existing partnership (he personally enjoyed a good partnership with another player in the squad, Phil Jagielka, at Everton) and also wants to play to the left of the two centre-backs, which is where Terry plays. This shouldn’t cause too much of a problem, but Terry always seems oddly disorientated when asked to play on the right – as demonstrated in the 4-1 defeat to Germany two years ago, when Matthew Upson was alongside him. At least the back four will be playing in front of Joe Hart, who has been one of the finest goalkeepers in Europe over the past two seasons.
Second bank of four
Ahead of the defence, Scott Parker will play the most disciplined role in central midfield, with Steven Gerrard having license to push on, and allowed to knock long passes out to the flanks. This is the zone that looked least impressive in the two qualifiers, partly because Parker still doesn’t look 100% fit, following a couple of niggling injuries towards the end of the season. A large part of Parker’s game is about chasing, and if he can’t chase, he’s much less of an asset.
Gerrard’s positional discipline will be questioned in a deep role, and though these concerns are probably slightly exaggerated, a Parker-Gerrard midfield duo isn’t as positionally intelligent as Hodgson would like. The Michael Carrick situation is too complex to go into, but he would have been extremely useful.
The real question marks are on the flanks. Theo Walcott didn’t feature until late in Hodgson’s second friendly, but this can be explained by him returning from a hamstring injury, and he will probably start on the right. Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, James Milner, and Stewart Downing all started in the friendlies, and none were particularly impressive. The most likely player for the left is probably Milner, whose hard work, positional discipline and constant running means he should be perfect for Hodgson’s system. Downing also keeps shape well, but he had a terrible season at Liverpool, while Oxlade-Chamberlain seems ideal as a supersub.
Forwards
Upfront, there is the issue with Wayne Rooney – suspended for the first two games, but available for the final group game and any knock-out matches. Without him, England will play Young just behind the primary striker – again, his goal in Norway was perfect for this system and his lateral movement into the channels should give England forward passing options.
But who will play as the number nine? It seems a toss-up between Carroll and Welbeck – Carroll is the classic target man, but Welbeck’s fine goal against Belgium might get him the nod. For the France game, Welbeck is the better option – France struggle with balls played in behind the defence, as the centre-backs are poor at covering for each other. There have been suggestions that Downing starting makes Carroll more likely, and vice-versa, but that hardly worked for Liverpool this season.
What will happen when Rooney returns? It seems silly to predict it now, as it depends upon the performances of the four attacking players – but it’s likely that he’ll return to his number ten position, with Young replacing either Walcott or Milner, depending upon their performances. Alternatively, if Young has been disappointing he could be dropped, or if neither striker has done well, then Rooney could play upfront. In theory Rooney might not play – but that’s simply not going to happen, as it would require all of the front four playing so well that they’re undroppable. Jermain Defoe, along with Oxlade-Chamberlain, will be decent impact substitutes.
Conclusion
“I’d refer you to the Danes in 1992 and the Greeks in 2004,” Hodgson said, when asked if England stood a chance of winning the competition. He was probably going for an ‘anything can happen in football’ type comment, but the statement revealed Hodgson’s mindset – the role of underdog, and that will be reflected in England’s tactics.
Quick guide
Coach – Roy Hodgson
Formation – 4-4-2 / 4-4-1-1
Key player – Ashley Young, at least until Rooney’s return
Strength – a fine goalkeeper, and probably a good defensive shape
Weakness – little attacking cohesion because of the lack of time spent playing in this system, plus a lot of injuries leaves them with inadequate back-ups
Key tactical question – how good are England’s transitions from defence to attack? This will determine their level of attacking threat
Key coach quote – “With 4-4-2, you’ve got ‘twos’ all over the field. I would always be looking to find a team that can play with a back four. Amongst the front six there a lot more options.”
After a long rain delay, France took the initiative and went onto win the game comfortably.
Laurent Blanc made two changes. One was a straight swap, with Patrice Evra dropping out and Gael Clichy starting at left-back. Higher up, the introduction of Jeremy Menez at the expense of Florent Malouda meant Samir Nasri moved into a permanent central position, and France switched to a 4-2-3-1.
Oleg Blokhin had said before the tournament that he didn’t have a set first choice XI, and would switch from game to game, but after Ukraine’s famous 2-1 victory over Sweden on Monday, he stuck with the same side.
The first half was heavily affected by the rain delay – the teams returned to the pitch and played very slow football that lacked ambition. In the second half, the game was much more open and interesting.
Formation battle
France’s shift to 4-2-3-1 seemed to make them a better side, with a central orchestrator in Nasri, but also thrust from both flanks. That was very different from in the first game against England, where Nasri was moving inside from the right flank to play that role anyway, but leaving the right flank bare, and making Malouda’s job unclear.
Nasri was marked by Anatoliy Tymoshchuk, who had done a similar job on a very different player, Zlatan Ibrahimovic, against Sweden. Whereas Ibrahimovic tried to escape Tymoshchuk by moving forward to become a second striker, Nasri naturally dropped deeper into midfield, into a position where Tymoshchuk was scared to follow.
Meanwhile, Serhiy Nazarenko was given the job of tracking Yohan Cabaye, who started in a deeper role but increasingly moved forward and influenced the game in the final third. To complete the clash of midfield triangles, Andriy Voronin dropped onto Diarra, making sure Ukraine weren’t overrun in the middle.
Strategies
Ukraine tried to play a high line against France, a surprising move considering they don’t have great pace at the back, and France’s three attackers all threaten by getting in behind the defence. That high line was clear even in the four minutes before the rain delay, but Blokin persisted with it throughout the first half.
Ukraine’s strategy was basically to play on the break, although they struggled to get the two (very) wide players involved in the game – the two French full-backs won both those battles. They started playing longer balls to the strikers, and while Voronin was often too concerned with his defensive duties to find space, Andriy Shevchenko worked the channel next to Adil Rami and created a couple of half-chances after diagonal balls.
France looked most likely to score when Benzema moved to the left and linked with Franck Ribery, a combination which had looked promising throughout France’s pre-tournament friendlies. Ribery’s burst of pace combined with Benzema’s simple wall passes got France into good positions, and these moves usually ended with a chance for Menez, who was making runs in behind the defence.
Ribery v Husiev
But the key battle here was Ribery against Oleg Husiev. Put simply, Ribery didn’t want to track back and help defend (which is even more dangerous in a 4-2-3-1 than in a 4-3-3), while Husiev continually made forward runs and then was out of position when Ukraine lost the ball.
But first, the game needed to become more open, and Blokhin’s decision to replace Voronin with Marko Devic was a big surprise. Devic is more of a natural striker, and while Voronin wasn’t contributing much going forward, his defensive job on Diarra was nullifying France’s midfield advantage. Besides, Ukraine should have been happy with 0-0 – there was no need to gamble.
Devic didn’t drop onto Diarra so quickly, and the game became much more frantic. Ukraine were more confident about their chances going forward, and Shevchenko went close shortly after half-time. France were able to break more swiftly through the centre of the pitch, and down the left.
Ribery comes out on top
That Ribery v Husiev clash was still key – and it could have gone either way. Husiev often overlapped Andriy Yarmolenko energetically, only to not receive a pass when totally unmarked. Had Ukraine been cleverer in the final third, Husiev’s bravery would have won the day.
Instead, Ukraine failed to take advantage of having a man in space, and Ribery’s running with the ball was a huge threat. For the first goal, he hadn’t bothered to track Husiev back, and therefore was in a great position to launch a counter-attack – Tymoshchuk was dragged across, Benzema had time to turn when Ribery slipped him in, and Menez was calm enough to cut inside from the right and finish inside the near post.
At 1-0 up, France played their best football of the tournament. There was a great deal of fluidity about their play – shown by Cabaye venturing into the box for the second goal, and the superb 20-pass move that ended with the Newcastle midfielders hitting the post.
It felt like France could have gone onto score more, but Blanc replaced Cabaye with Yann M’Vila on 68 minutes, a sign he wanted to shut the game down. France were very professional in the final 20 minutes, and won the game comfortably.
Conclusion
Two major parts to this game – first, there was the Ribery v Husiev battle. With neither showing anything like the required defensive discipline, both got freedom to run at the opposition defence. Ribery was excellent with the ball at his feet, but was lucky Ukraine didn’t punish his laziness.
But Blokhin’s half-time change must also be questioned – maybe he wanted to be more ambitious and wasn’t impressed with Voronin’s contribution upfront, but Ukraine didn’t need to win the game. Devic’s lack of defensive work didn’t impact directly on the goal, but the switch made the game much, much more open. That generally favours the better technical side.作者: thewall 时间: 2012-6-17 11:28 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-22 09:56 编辑
A scrappy game low on quality, but high on entertainment.
Roy Hodgson made one change. Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain was dropped with Ashley Young moving to the left, and Andy Carroll coming upfront as a target man.
Erik Hamren brought in three players – Johan Elmander upfront, Anders Svensson in the middle, and Jonas Olsson at the back, though Sweden played pretty much the same formation as against Ukraine.
This was a crazy, open match that could have gone either way – both sides had spells when they were on top.
Formations
This was basically 4-4-2 against 4-4-2. Sweden’s formation is often described as a 4-2-3-1, but here Zlatan Ibrahimovic played high up the pitch, basically as a second striker. Welbeck, meanwhile, played high up the pitch close to Carroll. He often dropped into midfield when England didn’t have the ball, but his role was a little confused, and this deep position meant he couldn’t work the channels as he’d done against France. The only time he got running with the ball was towards the end of the first half, when five Sweden defenders surrounded him.
The key in terms of positioning was not necessarily the formation battle, but how high the defensive lines were playing. England were pushing very high up, much further up the pitch than against France. Sometimes they pressed well and forced Sweden back, but often they were exposed with passes in behind. Ibrahimovic nearly embarrassed John Terry in a straight race, while Glen Johnson had to make a last-ditch tackle after a ball in behind England’s back four.
Sweden probably didn’t defend high enough. Their defence lacks pace, but they dropped into the penalty box readily and were vulnerable to Carroll’s aerial threat. He tended to work the left of the pitch, against Olof Mellberg and Andreas Granqvist. His goal, after a superb Steven Gerrard cross from deep, justified his selection and England’s approach.
Carroll and long balls
But the problem with playing Carroll is that the side becomes too focused upon playing long balls – and while that obviously had a decisive impact in the penalty box, it must also be partly blamed for England’s inability to keep the ball. Their pass completion rate didn’t improve from the France game, despite playing against weaker opposition and higher up the pitch, and Hodgson’s side could have done with calmer, steadier passing to hold the advantage at 1-0.
But the game was largely about headers and set-pieces, and territory was more important than possession – maybe typical, for a game involving these two nations. England’s tendency to lose the ball meant they were forced into their own half, and they kept giving away free-kicks, giving Sweden a chance to get the ball in the box. There didn’t seem to be much creativity from open play.
Second half
Sweden scored from two early second half set-pieces, and at 2-1 up were clearly on top. England looked shellshocked, unable to keep the ball for long periods and retreating much deeper than they’d been in the first half.
The introduction of Theo Walcott was crucial to England’s recovery. The standard criticism of Walcott is that he had little more than pace, but his raw speed was absolutely crucial for England in this battle of territory. He simply drove England up the pitch and forced Sweden to defend deeper. At no point did England play good football, but a goal from another set-piece (a corner, which came after Isaksson had saved a header from a preceding free-kick) got them back in the game.
Walcott’s strike was deflected (look at Sebastian Larsson’s sock when the ball goes past it) and the nature of the strike didn’t illustrate what he was bringing to the game (directness and width), but he was the appropriate goalscorer.
Closing stages
Walcott was the only crucial substitute. Sweden made changes upfront and at right-back due to injury, and the introduction of winger Christian Wilhelmsson (who came off the bench to good effect against Ukraine) could have done for Sweden what Walcott did for England. It didn’t, and Walcott was the most important player in the final twenty minutes, setting up Welbeck for a clever finish for the winner.
But the second half’s main feature was simply terrible defending – both at set-pieces and in open play. For two sides expected to retain great shape without the ball, they were both were all over the place – the wingers were slow to get back into position, the central midfielders scampered forward when they should have been protecting their back four, and too many free-kicks were conceded.
All that, combined with (a) poor possession play when either side was ahead and (b) the fact that, realistically, both needed a win, meant a goalfest – but neither side actually played well, in tactical or technical terms.
Conclusion
Tactically, one of the least impressive games of the tournament – though it was interesting how territory was so much more important to both sides than possession, (which, for the record, was 50-50).
Sweden are eliminated after two very disappointing performances, and their terrible record of conceding headed goals from set-pieces continued, though England did their best do out-do them at the other end.
Hodgson will find more negatives than positives in this display, despite the win. England didn’t do much well – they didn’t retain the ball nor have a good defensive shape, though the Walcott change was vital. With three different scorers, Wayne Rooney’s return will mean disappointment for at least one of Welbeck, Carroll and Walcott.作者: thewall 时间: 2012-6-17 11:34 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-22 10:05 编辑
Wayne Rooney returned to head in a simple goal, and England finish top of Group D.
Roy Hodgson dropped Andy Carroll to bring in Rooney, so Danny Welbeck returned to his position as the primary centre-forward.
Oleh Blokhin made various changes – Andriy Shevchenko wasn’t fit enough to start, and Andriy Voronin was dropped, so there was an all-new centre-forward partnership of Artem Milevskiy and Marco Devic. Serhiy Nazarenko was replaced by Denys Harmash, and Yaroslav Rakitskiy came in at the back.
Like all three of England’s matches, this was poor technical game lacking in quality, and many of the chances came from set-pieces and crosses.
Flanks
This was a clash between two similar sides – 4-4-1-1, with one forward dropping off into midfield. It created a cagey, frustrating game that saw little creativity from the centre of the pitch, and both sides looking to work the ball into wide positions.
The most interesting battle was Oleh Huisev against Ashley Young. The Ukrainian right-back played extremely high up the pitch, pushing Young back towards his own goal. At the start of the game Young appeared surprised by Husiev’s attacking intent (he shouldn’t have been, based upon Ukraine’s two games), and Ashley Cole moved out wider and allowed too much space between himself and Joleon Lescott. When Young adjusted his positioning and played deeper, however, Husiev was no longer a threat. Blokhin later tried to get Husiev into more space by moving him to the right of midfield.
It was crucial that England stopped Husiev, because they’ve looked vulnerable to crosses in this tournament, and Husiev was the main threat in that respect. The two wingers came inside, though Andriy Yarmolenko sometimes looked to receive long diagonals up against Cole.
On the other flank, Yevhen Konoplyanka stayed wide initially, then cut inside suddenly to have long-range shots. One tested Joe Hart, forcing him into an awkward save, but four were off target. England were probably happier with a winger coming inside rather than one charging down the outside and crossing, but they must be careful in that zone ahead of the back four, having conceded from that position against France.
England on ball
England were disappointing on the ball, with little invention from the midfield zone. Steven Gerrard and Scott Parker play flexibly and switch sides depending on where Gerrard ends up after attacking, but Gerrard tended to stay more to the right of the pitch in this game, having previously spent more time to the left – though this may have been unintentional.
Rooney found space in deep-lying positions, but England couldn’t get the ball to him via the midfielders, who were closed down quickly. Instead, England looked better when the defence hit ambitious balls forward, bypassing the midfield completely. Their best chance of the first half came after a long diagonal from John Terry to Young, followed by a cross that should have been headed in by Rooney.
Corners
Either side of half-time, it became a game of set-pieces. England built pressure with corners in the first half, and while they went ahead following a right-wing corner (Gerrard’s third right-wing assist of the tournament, which might hint at why he spent more time towards that side), they then became penned in by a succession of Ukraine corners.
In truth, the game never developed into a truly exciting spectacle. England were content with their 1-0 (in fact, with news from the other game, they would have topped the group with a draw) while Ukraine were disappointingly tame in front of their home crowd, needing a win to progress – though they probably would have rallied had Milevskiy’s deflected shot been given as a goal.
The substitutions changed little, with only one significant re-structuring by either coach. Blokhin introduced right-back Bohdan Butko for Milevskiy – on paper a very defensive change, but Blokhin moved Husiev forward and Yarmolenko inside, and Ukraine played in roughly the same system.
Hodgson called upon Theo Walcott, Andy Carroll and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, who have all played previously in the tournament, to give a renewed attacking threat – but they completed five passes combined, and their introduction was irrelevant to the feel of the game.
Conclusion
4-4-1-1 versus 4-4-1-1, and two naturally reactive teams. As in England’s previous matches, set-pieces were crucial to England’s goalscoring, although they still don’t appear comfortable defending them at the other end. Still, England have their back four and two central midfielders sorted, and Hodgson has options in the other four positions, with players who offer different attributes and tactical variety. Regardless of how England fare in the knockout stage, Hodgson’s performance as coach has been quietly impressive.
Ukraine rarely played well in this tournament. Even their win against Sweden was down to brilliance from Shevchenko rather than great overall play, and Blokhin may regret that unnecessary half-time substitution against France. Still, the Shevchenko-inspired turnaround against Sweden will be remembered forever in Ukraine – and in the absence of a realistic chance of winning the competition, that was probably the best possible outcome.作者: 乔治六世 时间: 2012-6-22 09:33
22楼参考译文作者: colinfirth 时间: 2012-6-22 13:32
鲁小胖绝杀破门秀新发型
After three one-sided quarter-finals, this should be a much tighter, tenser tactical battle.
Roy Hodgson will name a standard 4-4-2 / 4-4-1-1 formation, and although there’s a chance that a more direct winger could start on the flanks, it’s probable that he’ll stick with the starting XI that overcame Ukraine in the final group game.
Cesare Prandelli’s formation is much less clear. Having used a 3-5-2 for Italy’s opening two games against Spain and Croatia, he switched to a 4-4-2 diamond for the win over Ireland.
Italy formation
Which formation will Prandelli play here? Prandelli has been keen to keep his starting shape a secret throughout the competition. First, he was annoyed that Italian journalists leaked his plan to switch to the diamond against Ireland. Then, he told off Andrea Barzagli in a press conference, when the Juventus defender told the media that Italy would “defend with four defenders”. Could this be an elaborate hoax, with Italy trying to trick Hodgson?
It’s not impossible, but it seems much more likely that Italy will play the diamond. Of course, they could switch between the formations within the match, as Daniele De Rossi played at centre-back in a back three, then in central midfield in a diamond. “We used Daniele De Rossi at centre-back in emergency situations, when using the three-man defence,” says Prandelli. “Now he is returning to midfield because we need his quality there.”
Wing play
The 3-5-2 arguably makes more sense in theory – it would allow a spare man at the back. But Italy were caught out with two-versus-one situations down the flanks against Croatia, and the system worked better against a Spanish side that had no proper wingers (or striker).
England will attack with width, and while the diamond doesn’t offer great protection for the full-backs, it should be able to shift laterally across the pitch to close down the England full-backs – who generally only attack one at a time. (With the diamond sliding from side to side, crossfield balls and switching the point of attack is theoretically the right approach for England, but unlikely unless Ashley Cole and Glen Johnson play higher up.)
Wide defenders
A more telling sign will be the selections of the wide defenders. For a back three Prandelli prefers natural wing-backs Christian Maggio and Emanuele Giaccherini, for a back four he wants Ignazio Abate and Federico Balzaretti. Prandelli has been intelligent in recognising the differences between playing as full-back and playing as wing-back, and has changed players accordingly.
Maggio is a fine wing-back for Napoli, but uncomfortable as a full-back. Giaccherini is a winger and can adapt to playing at wing-back, but full-back is too deep for him. As it happens, despite being more comfortable in a four, Abate and Balzaretti are better at going forward themselves, so England must attack them.
False ten?!
The other decision for Prandelli to make is at the top of the diamond. Thiago Motta played that role against Ireland, but is an injury doubt and Riccardo Montolivo may take his place. This position is a very interesting role within the context of the rest of the diamond, especially when Motta, more of a holding midfielder, plays. This man isn’t playing as a traditional Italian trequartista (like, for example, Francesco Totti). He isn’t directly connecting the midfield and attack. Instead, they tend to drop back into deeper positions and create space for the two shuttlers on the sides of the diamond to break into, while Pirlo also moves forward to become Italy’s true playmaker.
In the game against Ireland, Motta passed to Pirlo more frequently than any other player, showing that the Juventus man is the main creative threat despite being positioned twenty yards deeper.
Upfront, Mario Balotelli will probably start rather than Antonio Di Natale.
Hodgson decisions
For England, the first seven places in the side are assured – the goalkeeper, back four and two central midfielders have started all three games so far, and are set in stone. Ahead of that, Wayne Rooney will also play and Danny Welbeck is highly likely to be the main striker.
On the wings, there are question marks. Whichever way Italy play, they’ll be most vulnerable down the sides of the pitch – either England can create two-versus-one situations against the wing-backs in a 3-5-2, or (more likely) they can get their wingers to take on the full-backs, who will lack protection.
Hodgson likes James Milner because of his defensive awareness, and because England’s wide midfielders might get sucked inside to cope against Italy’s four central midfielders, Milner is well-suited to this game. Looking at the graphic above, he might be asked to pick up De Rossi. On the other side, Ashley Young has been disappointing so far, and because he tends to drift inside with the ball, Hodgson might be concerned he doesn’t have a direct winger to take advantage of Italy’s weaknesses on the flanks. Theo Walcott and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain will, in all probability, be substitutes – but either would be a great addition to the side, in order to stretch the play.
If Milner does pick up De Rossi, with Gerrard and Parker dealing with Montolivo (or Motta) and Marchisio, plus Rooney dropping back on Pirlo, the left-winger might be the out-ball.
Possession and Pirlo
Italy will dominate possession.They will flood the centre of the pitch with four good ball-players, and around 60%-40% is realistic. For their part, England’s approach without the ball will be particularly interesting. Hodgson insists on strict zone play, so Steven Gerrard and Scott Parker won’t be dragged around too much – but Italy’s midfield layout is peculiar, as Montolivo (or Motta) is essentially a decoy, with Marchisio looking to slide forward to the edge of the box, De Rossi powerfully storming forward, and Pirlo lurking in deeper positions. England could simply be outnumbered in that zone if Gerrard and Parker try to close down, but could allow Pirlo too much time if they don’t (which is far more likely).
This means Rooney will probably be asked to drop back on Pirlo and help out in the midfield zone, and Pirlo’s long distribution into the channels is very dangerous. The trouble with playing against Italy (as Spain demonstrated) is that opponents are keen to get their full-backs forward to capitalise on Italy’s weakness on the flanks – but this leaves them vulnerable to Cassano and Balotelli working the channels and dragging the centre-backs wide. If those get a couple of yards of space in wide positions, Pirlo will find them with diagonal balls.
Finally, set-pieces and crosses might be England’s best chance of scoring. Italy are the smallest squad at this tournament (although they’ll be taller than in previous matches) while Gerrard has been in superb crossing form when moving out to the right, having assisted goals for Joleon Lescott, Andy Carroll and Wayne Rooney from that flank.作者: 乔治六世 时间: 2012-6-27 23:33
30楼参考译文作者: 乔治六世 时间: 2012-6-27 23:44 本帖最后由 乔治六世 于 2012-6-28 16:02 编辑
Italy were the better side all over the pitch here – only finishing let them down.
Tactical battle
This was a simple game – there was no progression midway through, no switch in systems, no key substitutions, no sudden change of pace. It was one system against another for two hours.
Italy’s system wanted to dominate the centre of the pitch, with two passers at either tip (Andrea Pirlo and Riccardo Montolivo) and two shuttlers along the sides providing energy and forward runs. England’s system, at least in theory, offered more width.
There were two key parts to the game – first, the width coming from full-back. Second, England allowing Pirlo to dominate the game.
Narrowness and full-backs
Italy had much more of the ball than England. This was entirely expected, whether you look at it from the point of view of systems or coaches. As a result, the formation battle was essentially on Italy’s terms, and England got dragged into a system they didn’t really want to play.
In other words, they became too narrow. James Milner was drawn inside and played close to Daniele De Rossi, while Ashley Young also ended up in a very central position near Claudio Marchisio. Milner was suited to this role and performed his defensive duties well, but Young was uncomfortable defensively and also offered little going forward. Hodgson may have been better making his side lopsided, asking Milner, Steven Gerrard and Scott Parker to deal with De Rossi, Montolivo and Marchisio, allowing Young to remain free for an out-ball on the left, to prompt counter-attacks.
As England were dragged narrow, all the width came from full-back, from both sides. England started brightly in this respect, as Glen Johnson attacked down the right and had the game’s first clear chance, when he got the ball stuck under his feet in the penalty box. He also put in a couple of good crosses, and England seemed to have the right idea when they had the ball – but after half an hour, Johnson was much more restricted in his movement.
The more the game went on, the less of the ball England enjoyed. And that meant Italy’s full-backs had much more license to get forward, stretch the play and increase the active playing zone, making England work harder to cover a large amount of ground. The Italian full-backs played significantly higher up the pitch and influenced the game more, and although they rarely provided great service into the box, they forced England back.
Pirlo
More important, however, was the freedom Andrea Pirlo enjoyed. At times England’s shape was good, bringing both strikers back into the midfield zone, remaining compact and getting both Danny Welbeck and Wayne Rooney goalside of Pirlo. When Welbeck was in a position to close down the Juventus midfielder, he generally did his job excellently.
Rooney was much sloppier, and after half an hour when Pirlo’s dominance had become clear, Joe Hart was clearly heard shouting at Rooney to pick him up. Hodgson clearly wanted Rooney to do this, because for much of the game Rooney could be seen half-heartedly jogging towards Pirlo. It was reminiscent of the 2011 Champions League final, where he started off marking Sergio Busquets, before gradually leaving Manchester United outnumbered in midfield.
It’s odd that Rooney’s tactical indiscipline has become such a problem – only a few years ago his willingness to sacrifice his own attacking game for the good of the team was reagrded as one of his main qualities. England could have done with someone like Rooney’s club teammate, Park Ji-Sung, who did a superb job on Pirlo in 2009/10 – Urby Emanuelson did something similar for Milan earlier this year. Leaving Pirlo free was suicidal, and he completed over 30 more passes than any other player.
And these weren’t just sideways balls, either – though he did help to spread the play to the full-backs. Many of them were the game’s best passes – he started off by trying to find Antonio Cassano, who was causing John Terry problems, but it soon became clear that Mario Balotelli’s pace was Italy’s main threat. One situation summed it up – Pirlo got the ball in his own area, jogged forward with the ball for 30 yards before thumping it over the top for Balotelli, who was denied by a last-ditch block from Terry. There was no pressure on Pirlo, and he subsequently created another fine chance for Cassano at the far post, who knocked the ball towards Balotelli in the six-yard box.
England never dealt with Pirlo directly, but they (presumably) inadvertently stopped him being such a threat by dropping increasingly deep. In the first half England had kept a surprisingly high line and were caught out by balls over the top, but the more Italy dominated possession, the more England were scared to leave the edge of their own penalty box.
Therefore, the space in behind had vanished, and Pirlo’s only great moment of creativity in extra-time was a similar pass to his earlier ball for Balotelli, shortly after Rooney had lost possession in the Italy box, when England were high up the pitch. But England attacked so rarely, and Italy might have benefited if England had come into the game more and left gaps at the back. England actually defended well as a unit in the final hour of the tie, with their narrowness allowing them to make plenty of blocks.
Few changes
The benches played little part in the game. Prandelli brought on Alessandro Diamanti for Cassano, Antonio Nocerino for De Rossi, and Christian Maggio for Abate. All three were influenced by fitness concerns over the departing players, and the shape of the game changed little.
Hodgson’s double substitution was slightly more about strategy, even if the formation remained the same. Theo Walcott on for Milner theoretically offered more counter-attacking ability, but Walcott never seemed to get the right pass, with Parker noticeably overhitting a couple towards him. Andy Carroll replaced Welbeck to provide more of an aerial route – this helped relieve pressure, but England rarely got players close to him.
Carroll and Walcott were the logical players to introduce, although taking off Milner and Welbeck was debatable - Milner was at least suited to the defensive challenge, while Welbeck was playing better than Rooney and would have done more to shut down Pirlo, if asked to play behind Carroll as he did commendably (albeit without attacking success) against Sweden.
But Italy were the better side for the vast majority of the 120 minutes, and it was right that Pirlo provided the most thrilling moment in an Italian shoot-out victory.
Conclusion
Italy’s diamond controlled the game, and Pirlo was the star player – he set the tempo and created chances. England’s failure to deal with him was criminal, and Rooney’s defensive role must be questioned. Italy also dragged England narrow before attacking through the full-backs, and they really should have won the game in normal time.
We’re still waiting for Italy to produce completely convincing display – for all their dominance here, their finishing was dreadful. They’ve only scored one goal from open play in the competition, and have only beaten one side, Ireland, who had already been eliminated. Their possession play is impressive and Pirlo has been one of the competition’s star players, but they’ll surely need to be more ruthless in the final third to win the competition.
England simply weren’t good enough here, and while individual decisions can be questioned tonight (the handling of Pirlo, and the substitutions), Hodgson’s overall approach was right for the competition. When inheriting a side at such short notice, particularly a squad without great technical quality compared to either sides in the competition, it made sense to focus upon organisation and shape. The defensive performance wasn’t always impressive, but England didn’t lose a game. With more from the likes of Young and Rooney, England might have overachieved – although the non-performance of talented, creative attackers can’t be divorced from the use of a functional, defensive system. There was rarely a clear transition plan – that was evident tonight, with the wide players dragged inside and in no position to launch an attack.
For Hodgson, the real test starts now. Such a reactive style of football is entirely forgiveable for a short-term project, but England have to be in a position to play a more proactive, flexible brand of football if they want to be genuine contenders, rather than organised underdogs hoping to get lucky.作者: 乔治六世 时间: 2012-6-27 23:50 本帖最后由 乔治六世 于 2012-6-28 15:58 编辑
