[ZM欧洲杯西意篇] 板鸭4球决胜载入史册
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-7-2 11:36 编辑Spain 1-1 Italy: Spain start with no striker, Italy use a 3-5-2
June 10, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/italy-spain.jpg
The starting line-ups
A fascinating tactical battle between two systems rarely seen at international level.
Vicente del Bosque supposedly had a three-way choice between Alvaro Negredo, Fernando Llorente and Fernando Torres upfront – but instead chose to play with a false nine, with David Silva and Cesc Fabregas both becoming the highest player up the pitch at different points.
Cesare Prandelli went with the 3-5-2 system he’s been using in training over the past two weeks, which meant Daniele De Rossi dropping into the defence, and Emanuele Giaccherini making his international debut as a left wing-back.
Spain inevitably had more of the ball, and probably created more too. But Prandelli’s system frustrated the reigning champions for long periods of the game (as Spain’s own narrowness and lack of depth) and of the two unusual systems, it was Prandelli’s that was more impressive.
Formation battle
You don’t get many formation battles like this. Spain played with three forwards, none of which played high up against the Italian defence, and instead tried to find gaps between the lines. Italy were actually happy to allow Andres Iniesta, Fabregas and Silva space in that zone – they were dealt with by the defence, while the three-man Italian midfield focused their attention on the three Spanish midfielders.
Despite the midfield containing some of the best passers in the world, this zone was relatively uninteresting. It was three versus three, with little rotation, movement or forward thrust from either side.
On the flanks, there was a battle between the Italian wing-backs and the Spanish full-backs – on paper Spain could have outnumbered Italy down the sides, but because Silva and Iniesta came inside and were dealt with by the Italian back three, it was actually a simple 1 v 1 situation. As is generally the case in these clashes, the wing-backs dominated the full-backs, able to be braver with their positioning, and more mobile as a whole.
Finally, Spain had no spare man at the back. Antonio Cassano and Mario Balotelli swapped around but always looked to work the channels, getting the ball in wide positions, and dragging the Spanish centre-backs out of position before trying to storm past them.
http://tf-chalkboards.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/images/08ZXQ.png
Italy with the ball
Italy may have had only 35% possession, but they caused Spain problems when they had the ball. Spain’s pressing throughout the game was poor, and although pressure often started high up the pitch, it didn’t continue throughout the side.
The main problem, from the Spanish point of view, was on the flanks. Iniesta, Fabregas and Silva could pressure the Italian defence 3 v 3, which was easy and when done as a unit, forced Italy into hurried passes forward. But the defenders could play simple balls out to the wing-backs, Christian Maggio and Giaccherini. With Iniesta and Silva higher up, the players closing down the wing-backs should have been the Spanish full-backs, Jordi Alba and Alvaro Arbeloa. But often they were too deep, and Italy were allowed too much time on the ball.
At one point, Xavi Hernandez was shouting at Arbeloa to press Giaccherini, but the Spanish full-backs were reluctant to do so, as they were also supposed to be providing cover at the back. If they’d moved up and effectively become wing-backs themselves, they would have left an unwanted 2 v 2 situation at the back, and with Cassano and Balotelli eagerly working the wide zones (particularly the space in behind Arbeloa), this would have been too risky. Instead, they stayed at home, and Italy could pass the ball easily across the back five, and then into the middle for Pirlo, who was often closed down quickly. He looked to get the ball to Balotelli and Cassano, while further long passes came from De Rossi, who hit some good diagonals. Pirlo looked for the forwards, De Rossi looked for the wing-backs.
http://tf-chalkboards.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/images/08wpT.png
Spain with the ball
Here, there were the expected problems. As mentioned in the preview, del Bosque is desperate to field as many playmakers as possible, but when he fields so many, Spain become slow, predictable and congested in the centre of the pitch. Without going over old ground, Spain play better when at least one player is either stretching the play laterally, or providing depth with forward runs. Preferably, one of each.
It’s difficult to know which Spain needed more. On one hand, Spain lacked width: Alba can provide that from left-back, especially against sides that defend with two banks of four (when the opposition full-backs get sucked inside by the Silva and Iniesta, and the opposition wide midfielders get drawn into the midfield battle). Here, however, the Italian wing-backs simply had to track the Spain full-backs, so neither Alba nor Arbeloa had a great attacking impact on the game. Spain should have stretched Italy’s back three with width from higher up, attempting to drag out of position.
On the other, the lack of verticality was shocking – Spain were content to play in front of Italy, and despite the fact they often worked the ball into a position between the lines, the next pass was never available, as no-one was making a run in behind. Many of Spain’s attempts were blocked, as they shot without trying to get past the Italian back three.
Giorgio Chiellini and Leonardo Bonucci were brave with their positioning and aggressive with their tackling, happy to close down Iniesta and Silva quickly. De Rossi stayed behind and swept up – sometimes he was rash with his tackling, but he read the game excellently. In theory, Italy should have been nervous at the back with no spare man – but then with Spain’s ‘forwards’ always making runs into midfield to make a 4 v 3 in that zone, Italy usually did have a spare man.
One incident involving Silva summed it up – a pass was fired into his feet, and he would have had a clear sight of goal had he turned quickly. Instead, he played a backwards pass, and Italy had time to get back into shape. It’s entirely possible to have success with a false nine, but the idea of a false nine is to open up space for others to run into. If the verticality isn’t provided from the flanks (or deep from midfield), then you are simply playing another midfielder and not offering a goal threat.
Silva and Fabregas both took up the false nine position at points in the first half. Although Fabregas is the more direct player and therefore the best makeshift forward, it was Silva who was more suited to the role…because it meant Fabregas played deeper, and then provided the verticality. When Silva was the false nine and came deep, Fabregas pushed on. When Fabregas was the false nine and came deep, Silva stayed deep too. Those two would combine for the Spanish goal later, and support this theory – but it was actually Iniesta who was the biggest goal threat, constantly dribbling past opponents towards goal.
Second half
Spain improved at the start of the second period, with quicker passing and more movement. Xavi moved higher up the pitch and became more of a number ten, rather than dropping back to replicate the role being played by Sergio Busquets and Xabi Alonso. Spain had more shots from long-range, though no clear-cut chances.
Maybe Spain were trying to recreate their pattern at the World Cup – play cautiously in the first half, retain the ball, tire the opposition, then pounce in the second half. That generally came after a substitution, though, and despite Spain’s problems, del Bosque didn’t turn to his bench.
But this was a different situation from at the World Cup. In South Africa, del Bosque could afford to be patient because there was little danger of conceding. Here, without Carles Puyol, Spain weren’t so secure. Balotelli and Cassano’s movement was excellent, and their hunger to win individual battles was highly impressive. Balotelli’s final action before being removed was to beat Sergio Ramos and storm into the box for a great chance – but he took too long, and Ramos got back to tackle.
Substitutions
Antonio Di Natale seemed like an obvious option. This is a striker who is used to playing upfront in a 3-5-2ish system (it’s more like 3-5-1-1) with Udinese, a striker who loves working the channels and making clever runs in behind the defence. He replaced Balotelli, and the switch worked almost immediately as Di Natale put Italy 1-0 up, after some brilliant midfield invention from Pirlo, maybe the only true creativity we saw from the six central midfielders.
Spain responded immediately with a goal that showed Spain did know how to play the false nine system, with Silva moving towards play, Fabregas running in behind, and that combination unlocking the Italian backline.
Then del Bosque finally introduced some width, with Jesus Navas out wide. But he chose to remove Silva – and so, frustratingly, this meant Fabregas became the (more permanent) false nine, moving towards the ball again. Navas is a player who stretches laterally rather than vertically, and Spain seemed to lose their forward thrust immediately.
Then del Bosque brought on a natural striker, Fernando Torres, for Fabregas. Torres’ natural game – whatever one thinks of his current form – is to run in behind, and he did so almost immediately, going one-on-one with Gigi Buffon and forcing the goalkeeper into a clever tackle. Next, he made a clever run towards the right of the pitch in behind the defence, but chose the wrong passing option. Then, a couple of minutes later, he played a one-two with Xavi, was through against Buffon, but chipped over the bar. His finishing was poor, but his natural centre-forward running gave another dimension to Spain’s attack. They’d waited nearly 75 minutes to test Italy’s offside trap – it turned out, it wasn’t very good – and Spain had some very fine chances to win the game.
http://tf-chalkboards.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/images/08rdR.png
Italy had a glorious chance too. Sebastian Giovinco replaced Cassano and played deeper between the lines – turning Italy into a 3-5-1-1 system (much like Di Natale is used to at Udinese). Giovinco’s chip to Di Natale on the stretch could have produced a winner, and put simply, better finishing from either centre-forward would have won the game.
Italy tired late on, and Prandelli’s only mistake was not introducing Antonio Nocerino sooner – his energy would have helped Italy compete in midfield, as they risked losing the game late on.
Conclusion
The game finished as a draw, but Prandelli’s tactics worked better than del Bosque’s. Italy coped well at the back, won the battles down the flanks, and both strikers looked dangerous in the channels. Spain lacked verticality and penetration, and their full-backs were unable to stretch the play. They still need variety in their attack, and del Bosque seems to be using six players to do the job of roughly four – although the goal demonstrated the value of playing with a false nine.
Italy performed extremely well across the pitch, and Prandelli will surely stick with this 3-5-2 for Italy’s next match, against Croatia in Poznan on Thursday. 本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-6-19 13:53 编辑
1楼的参考译文
-------------
来自虎扑
板鸭1-1意大利战术分析：博斯克祭出无锋怪阵，普兰德利采用3-5-2战术沉着应对
2012-06-11
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/italy-spain.jpg
首发阵容
这场比赛是国际赛事中非常罕见的高水准战术对抗。
文森特-德尔-博斯克本来可以在锋线上三选一，他有内格雷多、略伦特和托雷斯，但是他却选择使用伪九号，在不同时期将大卫-席尔瓦和法布雷加斯分别推到最前场。
切萨雷-普兰德利排出了在过去的两个星期中一直在演练的3-5-2阵型，达尼埃拉-德罗西出任中卫，贾切里尼则在左翼卫的位置上演了自己的国家队首秀。
西班牙毫无意外地在控球上占了上风，也可能创造出了比较多的机会。但是普兰德利的体系在很长一段时间内都让卫冕冠军举步维艰（西班牙自己的阵型也过于狭窄而且缺乏深度），在这两种并不常见的阵型对抗中，普兰德利的球队表现更佳。
阵型之争
这样一场阵型之间的争斗非常罕见。西班牙派上了三前锋，但是并无一人在很前场的位置对抗意大利的防线，只是在对方的几条线之间寻找空间。意大利其实很乐意让伊涅斯塔、法布雷加斯和大卫-席尔瓦在这个区域里活动——反正他们面对的是铜墙铁壁，这样中场三人组就可以集中精力应对西班牙的三位中场球员。
尽管中场有几位世界上最好的传球手，但这个区域看起来相对沉闷了一些。很简单的3对3，几乎没有来自于任何一方的移形换位、跑动或者突然前插。
在边路，则是意大利式翼卫和西班牙边后卫之间的较量——纸面上看来，西班牙在边路上的人数超过意大利，但是由于席尔瓦和伊涅斯塔内切进来对抗意大利的三后卫，边路其实也是一对一。而且在实际场上的对抗中大多是这种情况：翼卫压制住了边后卫，在卡位上更大胆，整体来说显得更灵动。
最后，西班牙在后防线上并没有自由人。卡萨诺和巴洛特利到处扫荡，总是在寻找进入的通道，他们把球拉到边路，先把西班牙的中卫带离位置之后，再试图突然爆发而甩开对手。
http://tf-chalkboards.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/images/08ZXQ.png
意大利持球时的表现
意大利的控球可能只有35%，不过他们在持球时却给西班牙造成了不小的麻烦。西班牙整场比赛中的压迫做得很糟糕，尽管通常开始于很前场的地方，但是却不能够持续。
从西班牙的角度来看，主要问题出现在边路。伊涅斯塔、法布雷加斯和席尔瓦可以对意大利的防线形成3对3的压迫，这个不难，而且当三人同时发动的时候，会迫使意大利匆忙向前传球。但是意大利的后卫们可以很轻易地把球分给两个翼卫马乔和贾切里尼。伊涅斯塔和席尔瓦前压的时候，贴身紧逼翼卫的应该是西班牙的边后卫阿尔巴和阿贝罗阿，但是他们两个人却经常处于很靠后的位置，这就给了意大利太多的时间可以从容拿球。
有一次，哈维大喊着让阿贝罗阿去压迫贾切里尼，但是西班牙边后卫们却并不情愿，因为他们也需要保护自己的腹地。如果他们前移的话，自己也就变成了翼卫，就会在后防线上留下可能出现的2对2隐患，而且卡萨诺和巴洛特利一直在边路寻找机会（尤其是阿贝罗阿身后的区域），这太冒险了。于是，两名边后卫选择留在后场，这样意大利的传球就可以轻易通过后边的五个人，送到中场皮尔洛的脚下，不过西班牙盯防皮尔洛倒是一直非常迅速。皮尔洛将球传给巴洛特利和卡萨诺，而比较长的传球通常来自于德罗西，后者对角线斜传很出色。皮尔洛负责寻找前锋，而德罗西则负责寻找翼卫。
http://tf-chalkboards.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/images/08wpT.png
西班牙持球时的表现
这里出现的问题不出所料。正如前瞻中提到的一样，德尔-博斯克绞尽脑汁想要派出尽可能多的组织核心，但是有这么多组织核心的时候，西班牙的速度就变得很慢，动作也太容易被预料到，中场也变得拥挤不堪。就算不用看之前的比赛也知道，西班牙在至少有一名球员能横向拉出宽度，或者有前锋通过跑动来提供纵深时，踢得要更好些，两者兼有的话就更好了。
很难知道西班牙更需要哪一个。一方面来说，西班牙缺乏宽度：阿尔巴本可以在左后卫的位置贡献自己的力量，尤其是在面对排出两排四人防线的球队时更为如此（对方边后卫被席尔瓦和伊涅斯塔搞得焦头烂额，对方边前卫又被卷入了中场的争斗）。但是在本场比赛中，意大利的翼卫们只需要盯住西班牙边后卫就可以了，因此阿尔巴和阿贝罗阿在进攻方面都几乎没有作为。西班牙本来应该在前场扯动意大利的三后卫，将他们带离自己的位置。
另一方面，纵深的缺乏简直令人震惊——西班牙满足于在意大利面前活动，虽然他们经常把球带入对方两条线之间的位置，但是下一脚传球却根本无路可去，没有人绕到意大利的防线后面。西班牙的好多次进攻都被阻断了，因为他们还没有绕过意大利的三后卫就选择了射门。
贾切里尼和博努奇在卡位上很大胆，抢断也是咄咄逼人，对伊涅斯塔和席尔瓦的贴身盯防也非常敏捷。德罗西留在后边进行扫荡——有时候他的抢断有些冒失，不过他对比赛的解读完美无缺。理论上来说，没有后防自由人的意大利本来应该更谨慎些——但是西班牙的“前锋们”总是跑进中场，这样意大利对西班牙就形成了4对3的局面，自由人就有了。
席尔瓦参与的一次进攻很好地总结了这一切——球被迅速地传到了他的脚下，这时他的位置本来对球门有着极佳的视野，应该立即转身。但是，他却选择了回传，这就送给意大利足够的时间来填补空缺。使用假9号是非常有可能成功的，但是假9号的任务是为队友们打开跑动的空间。如果边路（或者中场后部）不能提供纵深，那么你也就是多了一个中场球员而已，并不能形成破门威胁。
席尔瓦和法布雷加斯在上半场的时候都担当过假9号。虽然法布雷加斯因风格更直接而在前插方面表现最好，但是席尔瓦才是那个更适合这个角色的人……因为这就意味着法布雷加斯先要后撤，然后提供纵深。当席尔瓦是假9号的时候，就是他后撤而法布雷加斯上前；当法布雷加斯是假9号的时候，他后撤，席尔瓦也留在后面。他们两人后来帮助西班牙队取得了进球，证明了假9号的作用——但是最大的破门威胁仍然来自于伊涅斯塔，他持续地靠运球过人来甩开了对手冲向球门。
下半场
西班牙在下半场开场阶段打得好了些，传球和跑位都更加迅速了。哈维前移，变得更像是10号，不再回到后场去重复布茨克斯和阿隆索的工作。西班牙的远射多了起来，但是并没有势在必得的机会。
也许西班牙是在试着重建他们在世界杯时候的模式——上半场小心翼翼持球，消耗对手，然后在下半场爆发。不过，这个模式确实在换人之后出现了，尽管西班牙出现了不少问题，但是博斯克一开始并没有想要使用替补球员。
这次与世界杯时候的情况不同。在南非，博斯克有资本保持耐性，因为并没有什么被破门的危险性。而在这场比赛中，没有普约尔的西班牙并不安全。巴洛特利和卡萨诺的跑动非常精彩，他们想要赢得一对一对抗的渴望也令人侧目。巴洛特利在下场前的最后一击是想要完爆拉莫斯并冲进了禁区——但是他的动作太慢，结果被拉莫斯及时回防并抢断成功。
换人
迪纳塔莱的上场原因显而易见，他在乌迪内斯的时候已经习惯了在类似3-5-2（实际上更像是3-5-1-1）阵型中打前锋，而且很擅长打开通路，并通过聪明的跑动绕到防线之后。他替下了巴洛特利，这个换人的效果几乎是立竿见影，迪纳塔莱很快让意大利1-0领先，这个进球也归功于皮尔洛在中场精彩的调动，这也许是中场区域六位成员爆发的唯一一次创造力。
西班牙迅速反应，扳平的进球显示出西班牙确实知道怎样利用假9号体系，席尔瓦突前，法布雷加斯随即跟在他身后，这个组合击破了意大利的后防线。
之后，博斯克终于给阵型带来了些许宽度，他让纳瓦斯拉边，但是却选择了换下席尔瓦——因此，令人崩溃的是，这意味着法布雷加斯（永久）成为了假9号，再次开始前移。纳瓦斯对比赛的拉伸大多是横向的，并非纵向，西班牙几乎是立刻失去了进攻的威胁。
这时博斯克换上了真正的前锋托雷斯，替下了法布雷加斯。不管人们对他目前的状态作何评价，托雷斯真正的作用是突至后防线的身后，而他几乎是立即做到了这一点，与布冯形成一对一，迫使这位门将做出了一次精彩的抢断。接下来，他又一次聪明的跑动来到球场右边，再一次绕过了后防线，但是却做出了错误的传球选择。紧接着几分钟之后，他与哈维做出撞墙配合，再次与布冯一对一，但是他的挑射高出了横梁。托雷斯对机会把握得不好，但是他天然的中锋属性让西班牙的进攻另辟蹊径。西班牙等了将近75分钟才开始试探意大利的越位陷阱——结果显示这个陷阱并不出色——而且创造了很多本可以拿下比赛的机会。
http://tf-chalkboards.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/images/08rdR.png
意大利也有一次绝好的机会。乔文科替下了卡萨诺，后撤至对方两条线之间——意大利的阵型变成3-5-1-1（正是迪纳塔莱习惯了的乌迪内斯阵型）。乔文科抓住时机传球给迪纳塔莱，这本该是造成进球的机会。一句话，两方的前锋对机会把握得再好一点的话，都本可以拿下比赛。
意大利在比赛后期体力下降，普兰德利唯一的错误是没有早些换上诺切里诺，他充沛的体力本该让意大利的中场更具有竞争力，结果他们却差点晚节不保。
结论
双方握手言和，不过普兰德利的战术比德尔-博斯克更有效。意大利的后防表现出色，还赢得了边路的争斗，两名前锋也相当具有威胁性。西班牙缺乏纵深，也缺乏穿透力，边后卫们也没能拉开阵型的宽度。他们的进攻仍然需要多样性，博斯克似乎用了6名球员来完成4个人的工作——只不过进球证明了假9号的威力。
意大利整体表现得非常好，普兰德利在接下来周四对阵克罗地亚的比赛中应该会继续使用3-5-2。 本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-6-11 11:29 编辑
附录1: ZM对板鸭本届欧洲杯赛前总前瞻
----------------------
Euro 2012 preview: Spain
June 6, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/spain.jpg
Possible Spain starting line-up. Albiol could replace Pique, Llorente or Negredo could replace Torres, various players could replace Silva
Spain didn’t win World Cup 2010 through pure tiki-taka. They won because they mixed tiki-taka with different options that brought more directness and urgency to their play.
When they went with pure tiki-taka, they stumbled. The defeat to Switzerland in their opening game of the World Cup was a huge shock, but while the Swiss deserved credit for the way they defended, the real story was how painfully predictable Spain were in their build-up play. With Andres Iniesta on one flank and David Silva on the other, and both coming inside into the same area of the pitch, Spain often occupied a width of around ten metres with their attacking trio. With Xavi Hernandez, Xabi Alonso and Sergio Busquets all sitting behind the ball, Spain never looked like offering enough variation to make the breakthrough, and they lost 1-0.
Variety
From then on, Spain were always enhanced when they added ’something different’ to the mix. Silva didn’t see any more gametime, which was harsh on him, but considering Iniesta’s impact on the rest of the tournament, Vicente Del Bosque dropped the right man.
There were three elements of variety. First, they could offer directness from the flanks, which came from David Villa starting wide and charging towards goal (with Fernando Torres upfront), or from more natural wide players like Pedro Rodriguez and Jesus Navas, who both played important roles in the final.
The second option was direct forward runs from midfield, which came from Cesc Fabregas, used from the bench four times in the competition, including in the final.
The third option only featured once – Fernando Llorente came on to play a target man role against Portugal and transformed the way Spain played. He should have scored at least once, but his mere presence pushed Portugal back and closed out the game.
Squad harmony
Del Bosque is doubtless aware of this, and while he’s a fine coach, he’s not a particularly keen tactician. The main feature of his management, without wishing to simplify his talents, is to create a harmonious squad. As important as the variation on the field in South Africa was the togetherness off it, and his determination to replicate that is demonstrated by how he’s tried to keep that World Cup squad together – only David Villa and Carles Puyol (injured) and Joan Capdevila and Carlos Marchena (34 and 32, and neither regulars for their clubs over the course of 2011/12). He hasn’t left out any serious options.
Even Torres and Pedro, coming off the back of awful campaigns, remain – they’re popular members of the squad. Roberto Soldado, a fine striker but a potential troublemaker, was axed from the travelling party. “One of the fundamental issues is the good relationship that exists within the group,” Del Bosque says. “I have been fortunate to have a good group made up of nice people. It is important to reinforce the relations that exists between the players – that was a key part of our success in recent years.”
Silva reintroduction
All of which is important in any successful team, but it is paramount to Del Bosque. He listens to his players when it comes to tactics – Carles Puyol’s header against Germany in the World Cup semi-final was a move requested by the players, who thought they’d been overusing Del Bosque’s favoured short corner. Perhaps he listens to them on selection issues too – Silva complained that he hadn’t been used enough last year. “‘Over the past year I’ve been feeling like a bit part player. I’ll work hard to maintain my level with City but I doubt if I’ll go to the European Championship finals,” he said. “‘I do not count on the confidence of the coach.”
It was an exaggerated protest – there was no chance that a fit Silva wasn’t going to be in the 23. But since then, seeing the first sign of dissent amongst his ranks, Del Bosque has tried to make room for Silva.
But this puts Spain back to the situation seen in the Switzerland game – you don’t want two wide players coming inside. Del Bosque has even tried to fit Silva in as a false nine, (largely without success) and Silva doesn’t quite have the natural skillset for that role anyway. Besides, if you have a forward coming short, you need wide players (or midfield runners) making direct runs. You can’t have four players bunching into the same part of the pitch, central between the lines.
Who to drop?
The problem is that Del Bosque can’t include all his playmakers. Busquets, Xabi Alonso, Xavi, Fabregas, Iniesta, Silva, Mata and Santi Cazorla, judging by their ability and form over the past season, all ‘deserve’ to be in their national side. But eight ball-playing midfielders can’t exist together. Probably only four can, naturally – in conjunction with a back four, a striker and a wide player who stretches things. Del Bosque’s attempts to include five or even six are fascinating, but potentially suicidal.
The obvious way to accommodate another of the attacking playmakers would be to play only one holder, which would mean dropping Alonso (rather than Busquets who is better at breaking up play). This would allow Xavi deeper into his Barcelona role, and the same goes for Iniesta. Even then, however, it’s probable that Del Bosque would then put Silva on one flank and either Cazorla or Mata on the other, which doesn’t solve the problem.
And while Del Bosque has said that “We may adopt an even more attacking approach”, it is highly unlikely he’ll do away with Busquets, Alonso or Xavi. This is slightly frustrating – as Roberticus says, “Spain is currently achieving the laudable feat of fielding three of the world’s iconic midfielders and somehow conspiring to render each one uncomfortable and less effective in the presence of one another.”
Still need width
Regardless of the discussion above, Silva and Iniesta will probably start in the wide positions. Iniesta is undroppable, while Del Bosque seems particularly keen to include Silva. Those two combined superbly for the only goal in the pre-tournament friendly victory over China, but that paints a false picture – Spain were terrible in the first half and good in the second – and the main reason for the improvement was that Jesus Navas came on to stretch the play, opening up gaps for Silva and Iniesta to create. The situation hasn’t changed.
If Spain go with Iniesta and Silva wide, and no true winger, then it’s not unrealistic to say that their most important player is Jordi Alba at left-back, a relative newcomer to the side. Everyone else’s job is broadly covered by another player in the XI, but Alba is the only one who would offer outright pace, directness and width. Right-back Alvaro Arbeloa is a good full-back, but nowhere near as accomplished technically. Alba could become 2012’s Pedro/Navas figure, which would allow Del Bosque to indulge in his festival of playmakers higher up.
Defence
In defence, the loss of Puyol is huge for both his defensive ability and his leadership ability. Ramos has come inside into the centre of defence, where he’s played for Real Madrid – weakening Spain’s attacking thrust from right-back – but his partner is uncertain. Two years ago the idea that Gerard Pique wouldn’t be first-choice in 2012 was laughable, but after a poor season for Barcelona, and amid various reports that he’s taken his eye off the ball, Raul Albiol could start instead.
Number nine?
The other issue is at the opposite end of the pitch. The loss of David Villa is huge – his international goalscoring record is incredible, and so often he provided key goals for Spain in international tournaments. Assuming Del Bosque doesn’t start with Silva or Fabregas as a false nine (which remains unlikely), he has a straight three-way choice between Torres, Llorente and Alvaro Negredo. Each has a clear weakness – Torres lacks form, Llorente lacks fitness, Negredo lacks experience. This is very difficult to call, and it would be a surprise if all three were not used at some point in the competition.
Llorente would be favourite if fully fit, and Negredo’s clever runs in behind the defence give Spain offer most penetration, but Del Bosque’s loyalty to Torres shouldn’t be underestimated. It’s not the right decision on paper – but Del Bosque isn’t an ‘on paper’ man. He’s a ‘dressing room’ man, and as always, squad unity and harmony appears to come before tactical efficiency.
Conclusion
Compared to two years ago, Spain are even stronger in the department they excel in. Silva and Mata have developed further since their moves to England, Fabregas has become a better player tactically, in his own words, by returning to Spain. The sublime Cazorla, injured two years ago, offers yet another option.
Yet elsewhere they are weaker – there’s no Villa upfront, there’s no Puyol at the back, and Pedro and Pique aren’t at the level of 2010 (all of which has dealt a bow to the Barcelona connection throughout the side). Spain have an unbalanced squad, but Del Bosque must assemble a balanced team.
Quick guide
Coach – Vicente Del Bosque
Formation – Roughly 4-2-1-3
Key player – Whoever offers width: possibly Jordi Alba
Strength – Xavi, Iniesta, Mata, Silva, Fabregas, Cazorla – six of the best playmakers in the world
Weakness – The lack of a settled back four
Key tactical question – Who does Del Bosque play in the wide positions?
Key quote – Del Bosque: “The hardest thing about being a national manager is that you have to leave out people who have done enough to deserve a place, players who are not regulars for their club, or you have players on the bench and they are not happy.”
Betfair odds: 3.9 (roughly 3/1)
Recommended bet: A Spain v Germany final is 9.0 (8/1)
Further reading: Morbo by Phil Ballhttp://www.assoc-amazon.co.uk/e/ir?t=zonamark06-21&l=ur2&o=2, Sid Lowe on del Bosque’s management style, David Cartlidge’s player guide. 3楼的参考译文 本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-6-11 11:25 编辑
附录2：ZM对意大利队欧洲杯赛前总前瞻
Euro 2012 preview: Italy
June 6, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/italy.jpg
Italy's possible starting line-up
In many ways, Cesare Prandelli isn’t a typical Italian coach. He’s a highly intelligent man, but one doesn’t think of him as a pure tactician like Marcello Lippi, Giovanni Trapattoni or Fabio Capello. He’s of an Arsene Wenger figure – he wants an overall, attacking philosophy rather than lots of specific tactics, and likes developing young players to suit his footballing identity.
He has attempted to move Italy towards a more positive style of play. That’s partly because it’s Prandelli’s natural style as coach, but also because Italy don’t have the secure defenders we’re accustomed to. The days of Fabio Cannavaro, Alessandro Nesta and Paolo Maldini have gone – Italy have good defenders, but not great ones. They’re more blessed in midfield.
Prandelli explains: “Many of the players felt that the time had come to play – I won’t say a different type of game because, in football, there is nothing new – but something else. Given that I have plenty of quality midfielders, I felt we should play to our strengths and with these players that means a much more attacking game.”
Midfield rotation
However, Italy’s problem is that they lack good wide players to play a four-man midfield. This isn’t a new problem, and even when they won the World Cup in 2006 they played a central midfielder (Simone Perrotta) on one flank, and an Argentine (Mauro Camoranesi) on the other. However, they’ve generally compensated for that with a world class number ten, allowing them to play a 4-3-1-2 or a 3-4-1-2, basing their play around a Roberto Baggio or Francesco Totti figure. Prandelli doesn’t really have that type of player either – Antonio Cassano plays higher up, Sebastian Giovinco’s international experience is limited and Alessandro Diamanti still doesn’t seem like a serious option, despite his inclusion in the squad.
Prandelli’s compromise has been interesting – he wants a constantly rotating midfield, making up for lack of a nominated central playmaker with movement and fluidity. That was obvious when he played 4-3-3 (the preferred formation at the start of his reign), and the experiment has continued with the midfield diamond he’s been using recently. The player at the base of the diamond, the fabulous Andrea Pirlo, stays in position and sprays passes forward. But the other three players – probably Daniele De Rossi and Claudio Marchisio as the shuttlers, and Riccardo Montolivo nominally at the top – switch around.
It’s an unusual system that is more fascinating than it is truly effective, and it doesn’t completely disguise the fact the Italy don’t have a true trequartista. Montolivo is a talented yet frustrating player who has never quite found his best position – even after years of playing under Prandelli for Fiorentina – and it’s arguable that he doesn’t offer anything not provided by the other three midfielders. Still, if his movement is intelligent he can drag players around and create space for the runs of De Rossi and Marchisio, who are both excellent at steaming into the box.
Further forward, in a strike duo that is probably the most naturally gifted yet most troublesome in the tournament, Prandelli is putting his faith in Cassano, who will play as an inside-left, and Mario Balotelli, who is the primary centre-forward but tends to move into the channels.
Back three?
But this assumes that Prandelli will play the 4-3-1-2 system. In fact, he retains that Italian penchant for switching systems late in the day – which provides great tactical interest. He’s the only coach in the tournament who seems unsure of his best formation, and also the only coach who will probably go with something other than a 4-4-2, a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-3-3.
The other option is a 3-5-2. This would see the same forward duo, one player – probably Montolivo – dropped from the midfield, and a back three combined with wing-backs. A week ago, this made great sense because it meant Prandelli could field an all-Juventus back three of Giorgio Chiellini, Leonardo Bonucci and Andrea Barzagli, ahead of Juve’s goalkeeper Gianluigi Buffon. However, this is less likely because of the news that Barzagli will miss a significant part of the tournament with a calf strain. De Rossi could drop deep – he showed this season for Roma that he can play there, but it’s clearly not his best position.
Defence
And so we return to the idea of a diamond in midfield, and a back four. It will still be an all-Juventus centre-back pairing of Chiellini and Bonucci, and with Domenico Criscito omitted due to his involvement in the current match-fixing probe in Italy, Palermo’s Federico Balzaretti will play (he would have battled Chiellini for that role, but Chiellini is now needed in the centre).
On the opposite flank will be Napoli’s Christian Maggio. Both these players are extremely energetic and forward-thinking – Maggio has been used as a wing-back rather than a full-back for the last few years as Napoli, while Balzaretti has often got through a lot of running in Palermo’s narrow systems. With a midfield diamond probable, Italy need consistent support from full-back, and the onus upon these players to get forward is huge.
Pirlo
That could leave the Italian defence exposed, often without protection from full-back, and while Pirlo has been superb for Juventus in that lone holding role this season, he’s not the best player defensively nor the most mobile, and may be overawed with direct counter-attacks through the centre of the pitch. He’ll need support from higher up, with De Rossi and Marchisio expected to close down energetically, yet also scamper back and protect the defence.
But let’s not imply that Pirlo is Italy’s weak link – he’s their key player. His ability to hit accurate long balls (with either foot) into the feet of the strikers is Italy’s best asset, and when combined with the runs of Cassano and Balotelli, he could be one of the tournament’s star performers.
Bench
Italy also have attacking variety. Fabio Borini is a clever wide forward, another who makes good runs (and would be perfect if Prandelli wants to switch to a 4-3-3), while Antonio Di Natale isn’t really fancied by Prandelli, but would be a constant menace and a natural finisher. Giovinco and Diamanti, again, provide different options. Prandelli’s problem isn’t variety, but outright quality.
Conclusion
Italy don’t have enough players who guarantee top-level performances, and therefore they’re relying upon the strategy of their coach to have a significant impact upon this tournament. Prandelli’s preference for unusual formations (in the context of this tournament) means Italy will provide an interesting challenge for their opponents, who might struggle to cope with a diamond.
Quick guide
Coach – Cesare Prandelli
Formation – Probably 4-3-1-2
Key player – Andrea Pirlo
Strength – Good possession play
Weakness – The absence of two key starters from the defence, plus no reliable number ten
Key tactical question – What formation does Prandelli play?
Key quote – Prandelli: “The feeling was that we needed to evolve our style, to try and play a little more on the front foot.”
Betfair odds: 18.0 (17/1)
Recommended bet: Italy v Spain to be over 2.5 goals at 2.46
Further reading: Calcio by John Foothttp://www.assoc-amazon.co.uk/e/ir?t=zonamark06-21&l=ur2&o=2, the Football Italia website and an excellent interview with Cesare Prandelli 5楼的参考译文 普兰德利完爆博斯克，不过博斯克水平也就那样，没有勇气对叠床架屋的指挥中枢进行一次有深度的改革 小法能踢伪9是因为身边有9号10号都能踢的梅西
在板鸭没这条件
典型的山寨巴萨不成反倒束手束脚，阿隆索在中场又阻碍中场流动
真是白瞎了伊涅斯塔那么好的状态 板鸭排出了一个46阵型，来对阵更加变态的352阵型
哈哈！
俗话说得好，46就是不靠呀
不过板鸭更加杯催的是，当46不靠打出一个精彩的中路渗透的进球后，换上2个标准前锋来，却错失了至少2次进球机会 本帖最后由 pedro 于 2012-6-11 16:45 编辑
普兰德利完爆博斯克，不过博斯克水平也就那样，没有勇气对叠床架屋的指挥中枢进行一次有深度的改革
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2012-6-11 14:59 http://bbs.argstorm.com/images/common/back.gif
比之去年8月份的友谊赛的失利来讲，板鸭这次好多了
在落后1分情况下，迅速扳平比分，之后还有2次明显的扩大比分机会。
其实中场休息时，大家都说板鸭缺少正儿八经前锋，所以席尔瓦几次在禁区一对一和后卫的较量以及打门都不靠谱
至少换下10号和21号中一个，板鸭终结水平会大大提高的
另外，阿韦洛亚这一路明显比10世界杯上拉莫斯角色要弱的
当然拉莫斯在左边路也有1次明显失误，不过巴神更nc 阿韦罗亚是皇马和板鸭的毒瘤，拉低两队档次
都被他害死了 阿韦罗亚是皇马和板鸭的毒瘤，拉低两队档次
都被他害死了
WLSOUTMAN 发表于 2012-6-11 16:33 http://bbs.argstorm.com/images/common/back.gif
那家伙一次停球也是5-6仗远，木有纳瓦斯上去之前，板鸭右路攻击基本无力或者下底基本木有，席尔瓦开场还在右边路活动，后来就跑到中路或者中锋位置上去了 阿韦洛亚本身就是能力问题
阿尔瓦最近的表现则是越来越差，不知能否及时打回在巴伦西亚的状态 阿韦洛亚本身就是能力问题
阿尔瓦最近的表现则是越来越差，不知能否及时打回在巴伦西亚的状态
弗爵爷 发表于 2012-6-11 16:59 http://bbs.argstorm.com/images/common/back.gif
左后卫是巴萨和西班牙的软肋
不过本场看，右后卫更令人担心的
卡萨诺几次射门就是从左向右内切的 又脑残了！巴神思考人生错失单刀
http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/XNDExMzUyNDgw/v.swf 天赋异禀！失单刀难盖巴神蝎尾停球
http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/XNDExMzAzMzQ0/v.swf 巴洛拖丽
拖雷斯
都是“拖沓天王”，没有之三 这都不进！托雷斯第二次错失单刀外加空门
http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/XNDExMzUxNjU2/v.swf 有人分析整形吗？西班牙用460，意大利532，和大多数442,4231，很大不同啊 托神个人秀：西班牙 vs 意大利 （Euro2012）2012.6.11 HD720p
http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/XNDExNTgwODY0/v.swf 全场集锦 西班牙1-1意大利
http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/XNDExMjc5OTcy/v.swf
北京时间2012年6月11日0时(波兰当地时间10日18时)，2012EURO C组首轮第1场在格但斯克竞技场展开角逐，卫冕冠军西班牙1比1战平意大利，终结正式比赛14连胜，未能改写1920年后正式比赛常规时间不胜意大利的历史。迪纳塔莱替补出场237秒破门，法布雷加斯3分钟后追平，替补托雷斯单刀被布冯化解。 找到了西意大战的上半场录像 2012欧洲杯C组：西班牙 vs 意大利 上半场录像 （2012-06-11）
http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/XNDExMjgxNTQ0/v.swf 意大利和西班牙国歌旋律，听起来真心不错 巴神的摇摆
http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/XNDExMjgxNTQ0/v.swf