[ZM欧洲杯狂胜篇]4L：克罗地亚3-1爱尔兰战术解析
本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-11 12:37 编辑Russia 4-1 Czech Republic: Russia’s Zenit-style counter-attacking exposes Czech weaknesses
June 9, 2012
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The starting line-ups
Russia made a terrific start to their Euro 2012 campaign with a high quality counter-attacking performance.
Dick Advocaat named his expected side – a 4-3-3 system, with Vyacheslav Malafeev in goal.
Michel Bilek’s side featured one alteration from the expected XI – Michal Kadlec moved to the left, where he frequently played during qualification, which meant Roman Hubnik playing at centre-back, and no place for David Limbersky.
Russia were simply the better side throughout the game – more organised defensively, and showcasing much more penetration going forward.
Pressing
The game started at a good tempo, with an obvious 4-3-3 v 4-2-3-1 battle. Each midfielder had an opponent close to him and was generally closed down quickly and tracked across the pitch, while the full-back v winger battles were also enjoyable: in particular, Andrei Arshavin’s drifts inside meant Theodor Gebre-Selassie had a few opportunities to bomb down the right.
But it was the midfield battle that truly decided the balance of the game. Igor Denisov played a very disciplined holding role, and his constant pressure on Tomas Rosicky forced the Czech captain deeper and deeper, to the point where Milan Baros became very isolated upfront. Konstantin Zyryanov and Roman Shirokov worked as a duo against the Czech double pivot of Jaroslav Plasil and Petr Jiracek. Plasil generally stayed a little deeper to get time on the ball, while Jiracek made some good forward runs and closed down more energetically.
Hubschman
However, the key midfield was one who wasn’t playing, Thomas Hubschman. As explained in the Czech preview, “Hubschman…is the best true holding midfielder in the squad…and on paper should be sure starter. Yet when he was suspended for the away game against Lithuania and the play-offs against Montenegro, Bilek had to start with a double pivot of Petr Jiracek and Jaroslav Plasil. Suddenly, the side looked better – more fluid, more open, more energetic in the centre of midfield.”
It was widely expected that Jiracek and Plasil would begin the game in the centre of midfield, and that fluidity was important in giving the Czech Republic more variety in their attacking play. However, with the benefit of hindsight, it was the wrong decision to omit Hubschman. As Russia are so adept at counter-attacking, primarily thanks to the brilliant relationship of the Zenit trio in midfield, plus their natural understanding with Aleksandr Kerzahkov and his intelligent movement, the Czechs desperately needed a stationary defensive midfielder to break up the play when Russia won the ball and moved directly towards goal.
This was a particular problem because Russia had four players moving into the zone between the Czech defence and midfield – Kerzhakov, who dropped deep and created space for others, Andrei Arshavin and Alan Dzagoev, who both had excellent games drifting inside from the wings, plus Roman Shirokov, who scored a trademark goal with a break into the box.
Jiracek and Plasil were presumably selected as more energetic runners able to press high up the pitch, which is a partial explanation. But it was that closing which made the Czechs so vulnerable to quick, direct passing through the lines – those two often moved forward together and one pass cut them both out of the game, most obviously for Shirokov’s goal, when he was the one to initially receive a clever ball that bisected Jirasek and Plasil. The defence, which lacks pace, didn’t want to move too high up the pitch, and therefore Russia found room to work in.
There had been a danger that Russia were too narrow in their attacking play, because Arshavin and Dzagoev both came inside quickly into that space, and sometimes Russia lacked a player to stretch the game, with the full-backs more reserved than expected (possibly because they were scared of the pace the Czechs have in wide areas, although Zhirkov did increasingly get forward). This problem was solved for the first goal by a surprise overlapping run from Zyryanov, and thereafter Russia compensated for the lack of width by finding space between the lines and playing clever straight passes through the defence.
When the Czech Republic were trailing in the game, they tried to press even higher up the pitch to win the ball. Rosicky, for example, started to move forward close to Baros and closed down the centre-backs 2 v 2. But this then left Denisov free, and if Jiracek or Plasil moved onto him, it left Zyryanov or Shirokov free. Then there was the threat of Arshavin and Dzagoev sneaking in behind them. Russia simply found gaps between the Czech banks of players and their excellent one-touch passing meant they slipped through the lines quickly and efficiently. Against a counter-attacking side, the more you press, the more you’re vulnerable.
Second half
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Line-ups at the start of second half
Bilek recognised his side’s weakness, and brought on Hubschman to sit in front of the defence. Rezek was removed, with Jiracek moving to the right. This stabilised the Czech side, giving them more protection in the zone ahead of their defence, while Jiracek (a midfielder) played a narrower role than Rezek (a winger/striker) had, coming inside and providing another simple passing option.
There was better balance about the Czechs after half-time, with a ball-playing wide man on one flank and a more direct player (Vaclav Pilar) on the other. Pilar’s run for his goal was very well-timed, though Aleksandr Anyukov went to sleep and played the offside trap awfully.
Ultimately, even with Hubschman on the pitch, the more the Czech Republic needed to attack, the more they pushed forward, the more Russia looked dangerous when the won the ball. Kerzhakov missed various good chances after getting the ball in the channels, although it must be emphasized that his all-round game and link-up play was very good, and a key factor in Russia’s slick play.
Russia became more clinical when Roman Pavlyuchenko replaced Kerzahkov. 4-1 didn’t flatter Advocaat’s side.
Conclusion
A key theme of the tournament is how many coaches have attempted to maintain good club connections throughout their side, and no coach is doing that more obviously than Advocaat. There was simply a wonderful cohesion about Russia tonight, especially in midfield, and it’s no coincidence that Kerzhakov, Arshavin, Zyryanov, Shirokov and Denisov all play together at club level. By recreating the style of football Zenit play, with the players Luciano Spalletti uses, Russia have a great advantage – although as it happens, the star player tonight was the one non-Zenit player in the attacking six, Dzagoev.
The Czech side seemed too open, almost naive, in their approach without the ball. Not only did this leave them open to direct breaks, it didn’t even suit their own approach – which was also expected to be about playing on the break. Had they soaked up pressure by defending deep, they might have been able to bring Russia up the pitch and then attacked the space in behind with the pace of their wide players. That’s eventually how they got their goal, but this approach might have been more consistently dangerous had they drawn Russia forward. 1楼的参考译文 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-11 12:36 编辑
附录1：ZM对俄罗斯本届欧洲杯的总前瞻
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Euro 2012 preview: Russia
June 5, 2012
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Russia's possible starting line-up
There are many lessons to take from Spain’s dominance of international football over the past few years, and an important one has been the importance of bringing a solid club connection to international level.
Spain’s World Cup-winning side had a core of Barcelona players, played roughly the same style of football, and therefore benefited from long-standing relationships that couldn’t have been built in the minimal time international sides enjoy together.
Russia coach Dick Advocaat is well aware of this, and has been keen to follow a similar principle as Russia coach. “I just built upon a group of CSKA and Zenit players,” he says. “Both teams are doing well, and it has proved to be the right view.”
Zenit midfield connection
Zenit are the main team represented. That’s obvious off the pitch (Surgey Fursenko, the President of the Russian Football Union, used to be at Zenit, as did Advocaat) but more importantly, on it. “It’s a fixed system, always 4-3-3, the same one I played with at Zenit,” says Advocaat.
Most obviously, the midfield three all play for Luciano Spalletti’s side. Zenit are a wonderful, free-flowing side who rotate their midfield triangle well and play predominantly on the counter-attack. Few other countries will have such a good understanding in the centre of their side. Furthermore, Andrei Arshavin has returned to Zenit, while right-back Aleksandr Anyukov is another. If Aleksandr Kerzhakov starts upfront, which seems likely, that’s six of the ten outfield players provided by Zenit.
CSKA defence
CSKA provide the defensive base of the team. Goalkeeper Igor Akinfeev has returned from injury and will start if 100% fit (though there are big doubts about this – inevitably, his back-up is Zenit’s keeper, Vyacheslav Malafeev), and plays behind the centre-back pairing of Aleksei Berezutski (in for his injured brother) and Sergei Ignashevich, a trio that has played together at club level for years.
Further forward, Alan Dzagoev is another CSKA player, so the only odd man out in the probable starting XI is Anzhi’s Yuri Zhirkov – although he played for CSKA for five years until 2009, so there’s an understanding with the centre-backs there, too.
Forward dilemma
The real debate in this side is upfront, where Advocaat has a choice between two different styles of player. He could go for the simple, target man option – either Pavel Pogrebnyak or Roman Pavlyuchenko, who are strong, good in the air and hold the ball up and wait for midfield runners. The more likely option is Kerzhakov, who plays a very different role – he drifts to the flanks, particularly the left, dragging defenders away and creating space for the midfielders to exploit. He’s smaller, trickier and better technically.
Despite the difference in style, there’s a clear consistency – the striker is not in this side predominantly to score goals (though that would be nice) but to spearhead the attack and create opportunities for the other players. Kerzhakov understands that better than anyone else, but the false nine has rarely worked successfully at international level, with coaches generally preferring a traditional number nine and a more basic style of football. But with the club connection, Advocaat can afford to go with a false nine and the most sophisticated of the three strikers.
Goalscoring could be problematic – with a large part of the striker’s job about bringing others into play, Russia rely upon those attacking midfielders having the confidence in front of goal. With Arshavin, for example, that’s a risky strategy. They may look to set-pieces for goals – in the pre-tournament friendly against Italy, they twice threatened with very long corners towards a runner coming in at the far post.
Formation and fluidity
Although this is a 4-3-3, it’s a very different type of 4-3-3 from the way Barcelona, for example, play a 4-3-3, because it features two wide players who both come inside into the centre of the pitch. Arshavin essentially becomes a playmaker, a number ten, while the highly-promising Dzagoev plays in a similar position but looks to get in advance of the striker more frequently, and was Russia’s top goalscorer in qualifying, with four goals.
But the real dark horse, in terms of goalscoring, is Roman Shirokov. He breaks forward from midfield to the edge of the penalty box with very well-timed runs. That was particularly obvious during Zenit’s match against Benfica in the Champions League this season, and also in Russia’s warm-up match against Italy – in both games, he scored twice.
Without the ball, Shirokov and Konstantin Zyryanov work as a duo, pressing more heavily than the equivalent players in similar systems will do at this tournament. They’re not scared to move across the halfway line to shut down their man, which can leave Igor Denisov a little stranded in front of the defence – although Denisov can also move forward to track an opposition number ten, often leading to rash tackles to win the ball, or cynical fouls to break up counter-attacks. With the ball, Russia can move the ball around excellently with quick, one-touch passing – though they can also hold onto the ball for too long, and dominate possession without creating chances.
Quick full-backs, slow centre-backs
With Arshavin and Dzagoev coming inside, the width comes from full-back. Zhirkov tends to become involved in attacking play frequently and is technically the better of the two, but Anyukov is a very powerful runner and arrives later on in attacking moves. These two must provide forward runs, in order to stretch the play, and a side that pins them back will make Russia very narrow.
Despite the good understanding at the back, there is a concern about the pace of the two centre-backs, and with both full-backs moving forward and the midfield pressing rather than sitting deep, Russia might be vulnerable to quick passes through the side. The centre-backs, like the midfielders, stick tight to their man, and can be dragged around by intelligent forwards. Another defensive concern is the work rate and positioning of the two wide forwards.
Fitness
The physical condition of the side is also an issue. Almost the whole squad currently plays in Russia (a few having returned to secure their place in this side, after underwhelming spells in the Premier League), and have just finished a long ‘transition’ season from a summer to a winter calendar. They’ve effectively played one-and-a-half seasons, with the ‘half’ exclusively comprised of games against other big sides after a ’split’ in the table, meaning a very demanding run-in for all these players.
When combined with an old squad (and even the youngest player, Dzagoev, recently missed over a month with a toe injury) and a match every four days, it’s a genuine problem – which contributed to the arrival of the controversial, innovative fitness coach Raymond Verheijen, who has worked with Advocaat before. “Of all the sixteen Euro participants Russia is the only team which has consistently trained just once a day – it’s about freshness instead of fitness,” he says.
Conclusion
Russians don’t seem optimistic, but this is a relatively exciting team. “We’re not going to suddenly go defensive,” promises Advocaat. “In qualifying we were successful because we went out to win games. We have to be positive.” In a poor group that looks likely to be cagey, Russia will the most proactive side and will expect to qualify for the knockout stage.
Quick guide
Coach – Dick Advocaat
Formation – It will be termed 4-3-3 – although it’s 4-1-4-1 without the ball, and roughly 4-3-2-1 with it
Key player – Alan Dzagoev
Strength – the cohesion of the midfield
Weakness – the pace of the centre-backs
Key tactical question – which striker starts? This will determine Russia’s play in the final third
Key coach quote – “I don’t care about big names as long as they can play as a team. Everyone knows what their position is.”
Betfair odds: 23.0 (22/1)
Recommended bet: Russia to be eliminated in the quarter-finals at 2.3
Further reading: Jonathan Wilson’s Behind The Curtainhttp://www.assoc-amazon.co.uk/e/ir?t=zonamark06-21&l=ur2&o=2, James Appell’s articles on Russian football at the Football Ramble. 3楼的参考译文 3楼的参考译文 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-11 11:48 编辑
Croatia 3-1 Ireland: Ireland invite pressure, but deal with it poorly
June 10, 2012
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The starting line-ups
Croatia recorded a comfortable victory over Ireland and go top of Group C.
Slaven Bilic used Vedran Corluka in the centre of defence and played Darijo Srna in his traditional position of right-back in order to play Ivan Rakitic on the right of midfield, and used Ognjen Vukojevic as his holding midfielder.
Giovanni Trapattoni announced his XI days ago, and they started as expected (with 1-11 on their backs).
Set-pieces played a large part here, but Croatia were the better side – more inventive with their passing, cleverer with their movement, more ruthless in the penalty box.
Formation battle
Ireland played the usual 4-4-1-1, with Robbie Keane dropping off Kevin Doyle upfront, and the wide players forming a deep second bank of four ahead of the defence.
Croatia’s system could be interpreted as something similar, but as they dominated possession of the ball and pushed men forward, it was more like the old 4-1-3-2 they used at the last European Championships. Vukojevic sat very deep in front of the defence, with the other three midfielders attacking high up the pitch. Mario Mandzukic drops off Nikica Jelavic when Croatia are out of possession – but for the majority of the game they had the ball and were in the Irish half, so Mandzukic was a second striker and an outright goalscoring threat.
Srna – Rakitic
Srna has played as a winger for Croatia over the past year, but it was good to see him at home in his right-back position here – not high up against a full-back and getting the ball with his back to goal, but instead pushing on down the flank, able to see the whole pitch and time his runs well, and attack the space Ireland allowed Croatia on the flanks. He benefited from Rakitic moving into the centre of the pitch, which created gaps for him on the overlap.
Croatia’s most frequent passing combination was Rakitic to Srna (15), showing their constant route of attack. Srna’s crosses weren’t always accurate, but he was stretching the Irish defence and helping build pressure.
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On the other flank, Ivan Perisic stayed wider, so Ivan Strinic was more cautious than Srna with forward movements. Perisic later crossed for the third Croatia goal.
Irish defending
Ireland’s basic problem was defensive mistakes, which completely undermined their gameplan. Trapattoni’s strategy is based around a solid back four, but the first two Croatian goals were incredibly soft, and both came following set-pieces, the area of the game Ireland were expected to specialise in (and the area Croatia were supposedly weak in). Granted, Sean St Ledger’s equaliser also came from a set-piece, but put simply, Ireland conceded more than they scored from set-plays…and they were never going to dominate Croatia in open play.
To what extent were the mistakes purely individual errors, and to what extent did Ireland’s strategy lead to them? To start, it must be said that Ireland were playing a risky game by defending so deep against Jelavic and Mandzukic. Against more technical sides, Ireland’s defensive positioning would have been fine, but Croatia were entirely happy to get wide and centre the ball – their side possesses both good crossers, and good aerial strikers. Ireland aren’t accustomed to keeping a high defensive line, but moving 5-10 yards further up the pitch would have been preferable.
Modric
Modric’s influence could be seen in two very different ways. You can make the case that he dominated the game (which can be backed up with statistics: he completed 58 passes, 19 more than the next highest player, Srna), and it’s certainly true that his intelligent passing and constant probing in the midfield zone steadily built the pressure that Ireland eventually crumbled under.
But it would have been difficult to stop him. Dropping Keane onto him wasn’t an option, as Modric played too high up the pitch. Moving one of the midfielders higher onto him would have left space in front of the defence, which the other central midfielder probably wouldn’t have been able to cover on his own, with Mandzukic dropping deep and Rakitic moving inside from the flank.
Modric’s importance was largely dependent upon Ireland’s penalty box defending. Because they made those mistakes, they looked stupid for giving Modric time on the ball. Had they defended like they did throughout qualification, it would have seemed intelligent that they stood off Modric and focused on preventing the next pass – after all, Modric is an orchestrator rather than a provider, and rarely provides the assist. Like Xavi Hernandez, he can be impossible to nullify, and you have to accept he’ll dominate and focus on keeping things tight in deeper positions. And, in fairness, when Ireland went 1-0 down they did start to close down Modric, with Andrews moving higher up the pitch to pressure him.
Ireland attacks
Ireland were disappointing with the ball – they were always going to play basic football, but their passing here was even more long and hopeful than usual, with the Croatian front two working hard without the ball, forcing the defenders into hurried clearances downfield. The passing performances of Richard Dunne and Stephen Ward were particularly ugly.
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Doyle won some free-kicks and worked the channels well, Keane buzzed around but saw little of the ball. Damien Duff moved infield but Vukojevic was often in his way, while McGeady was invisible in open play, completely dominated by the superb Srna.
Second half
The second half mirrored the first. Ireland should have played higher up the pitch, but didn’t. And like in the opening period, they conceded after three minutes – this time, as a direct result of inviting a cross and defending deep.
That goal came after 48 minutes, but seemed to seal the game. Croatia’s ball retention after that was excellent, and while Trapattoni’s approach was logical considering the players he had available and the situation he faced, we always knew Ireland had no plan B, and were highly unlikely to fight back from a losing position. Three strikers came on – Jon Walters, Simon Cox and Shane Long – but Ireland played the same system and there was no James McClean to bring a spark of excitement on the flanks. Ireland relied on set-pieces for a couple of half-chances.
Bilic only made one significant change. Niko Kranjcar replaced Jelavic and played much deeper, helping Croatia retain the ball.
Conclusion
Predictably, this was nowhere near as interesting as the other Group C encounter tonight. A game based around defensive mistakes and set-pieces was perhaps what Ireland were hoping for – but Croatia put far more pressure upon the Ireland defence than vice-versa, and deserved their victory.
Bilic and Croatia played this one well – they knew they were up against an organised, defensive side, and combined clever movement and intelligent passing with some simple, brutal strength in the penalty box. Modric spread the play to the flanks, Rakitic created space for Srna, Srna stretched the play. The understanding and cohesion of the side was good, and although Croatia will have tougher tests than this, they’ve put themselves in a strong position in a tough group. 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-11 12:42 编辑
6楼的参考译文
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克罗地亚3-1爱尔兰之战战术解析：爱尔兰回收迎战对方前压，但结果却搞砸了
译者：thewall
（工地中。。。） 本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-6-17 16:10 编辑
Portugal 3-2 Denmark: No tracking from Ronaldo and Rommedahl means goals come from that flank
June 13, 2012
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The starting line-ups
Silvestre Varela grabbed a late winner as Portugal registered their first win of Euro 2012.
Paulo Bento named an unchanged side from the team that lost to Germany – Helder Postiga continued upfront, despite Nelson Oliveira’s positive impact from the bench in the opening game.
Morten Olsen also made no changes from Denmark’s surprise 1-0 win over Holland.
Think of Portugal and Denmark – not just the current sides, but their style over the course of the century so far – and you think of width. That was the main story here, with little happening in the centre of midfield, and all the attacking thrust coming from the flanks.
Rommedahl and Ronaldo
Or maybe that should be ‘flank’, because both sides continually worked the same area of the pitch. There was a clear tactical reason for this; neither Dennis Rommedahl nor Cristiano Ronaldo showed the slightest interest in tracking back and helping protect their full-back.
This wasn’t much of a surprise – Rommedahl did the same in the Holland game (where Denmark’s defensive shape was actually quite poor, despite their clean sheet), creating a large amount of space for Wesley Sneijder to work in – and Sneijder created ten chances for his teammates, the most in one game by a player at this tournament so far. Rommedahl was substituted (to his disgust) in the final minutes, as Olsen wanted a more defensively aware winger.
Ronaldo isn’t particularly keen on defending in general. He gave a good, disciplined display in the defeat to Germany, but in this game, where Portugal had to take the initiative and attack, he stayed high up the pitch and looked to get into goalscoring positions. He was clearly desperate to make an individual impact on the tournament.
Attacking possibilities
As a result of these two players staying high up, there was ample space for the opposition down that flank. There were two effects – first, it benefited the two full-backs, with Fabio Coentrao scampering past Rommedahl and Lars Jacobsen doing the same past Ronaldo. Sometimes those full-backs had space to cross, and sometimes they created 2 v 1 situations with the winger ahead of them.
Second, it meant the opposition winger down that flank had a greater space to work in – they could come deep, pick up the ball and run with it, with no-one trying to prevent the ball being played into their feet. Ronaldo’s attacking intent helped Rommdahl attack, and vice-versa.
Uneventful midfield
For the record, the midfield battle was static and uneventful. Christian Eriksen was marked out of the game for the second match running, with Miguel Veloso sticking tightly to him, happy to follow him into wide positions content in the knowledge that Denmark rarely had a player becoming the ’second number ten’.
That was because William Kvist and Niki Zimling (and his replacement Jakub Poulsen) stayed deep in midfield and rarely made forward movements. They were tracked by Joao Moutinho and Raul Meireles, and these sets of players cancelled each other out. Meireles offered more forward runs which gave Moutinho space, and he played the most passes of any Portuguese player).
In fact, with no-one available in this zone, both sides looked to bypass the midfield. Denmark tried to play out from the back with Daniel Agger and Simon Kjaer, and they both used their good passing skills by looking to hit the front three directly. For Portugal that was even more evident, with both Pepe and Bruno Alves’ passing very long and often wayward.
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Portugal go 2-0 up
But the real action was down that same flank. Rommedahl was the most obvious offender in the first half, continually letting Coentrao past. Portugal put pressure upon the Danes in the early stages, eventually breaking through from a left-wing corner, one of many good set-piece deliveries in the first half.
From then on, the goals were all from open play, all from that flank. For the second, Coentrao was allowed to wander forward with the ball (Rommedahl was nowhere to be seen), and the left-back had all the time he liked to swing in a cross. Nani picked up the ball on the far side and passed to Postiga to finish.
Ronaldo switches off, Denmark draw level
At 2-0, Bento might have considered telling his wingers to sit deeper, but the Danes started to dominate possession and Jacobsen kept sneaking past Ronaldo. For the first Denmark goal, Ronaldo’s work rate can’t be questioned – he did try to close down Jacobsen – but he switched off and got into a poor position, meaning Denmark could hit a long diagonal out to the right-back, and a very neatly worked goal started from that position.
In the second half, Bento had ample opportunity to fix the problem. Ronaldo was still walking back, with Jacobsen pushed increasingly high up the pitch and Kjaer trusted in a 1 v 1 situation against Ronaldo. Denmark always had an out-ball on the right, always the long diagonal to Jacobsen.
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Ronaldo should have been removed from that zone – it’s unlikely he would have been substituted, but Postiga was being withdrawn anyway (with Oliveira coming on) – Ronaldo could have been pushed upfront, with a more defensive-minded player used on the left.
Ronaldo could have made this irrelevant had he converted either of the two one-on-one chances he had, but his shots were very disappointing. His poor finishing failed to clinch the win, and his poor defensive positioning nearly cost Portugal the win. Jacobsen got forward yet again and crossed for Nicklas Bendtner to head home his second goal of the game.
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Final stages
Now Portugal had to go for it. Varela replaced Meireles, and like against Germany, Portugal went with a fluid Nani-Ronaldo-Varela-Oliveira quartet for the final ten minutes.
Inevitably, the goal came from the Portuguese left, with Coentrao getting forward to deliver the cross. Rommedahl had since departed through injury, Tobias Mikkelsen had a period on the right, but for this goal it seemed to be another substitute, Lasse Schone, defending that flank. He was turned far too easily by Coentrao.
For the short period remaining, Bento finally got the message. Oliveira, despite being regarded as an out-and-out striker, was moved to the left, with Ronaldo pushed upfront. That – plus the use of an auxiliary centre-back, Rolando – helped Portugal close out the 3-2. But really, they should have been closing out a 2-1, and Bento got lucky with Varela’s late goal having failed to address a clear shortcoming in Portgual’s defensive shape.
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Conclusion
Denmark’s right-winger didn’t defend, so Portugal attacked down the left. Portugal’s left-winger didn’t defend, so Denmark attacked down the right. Not much more to it.
Both sides are on three points and can progress with a result on the final day of Group B. 8楼参考译文
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