[ZM欧洲杯] 30L葡萄牙1-0捷克战术解析
本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-22 10:18 编辑Poland 1-1 Greece: Poland start brilliantly but Greece adjust admirably after red card
June 8, 2012
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The starting line-ups
One goal each, one red card each, and one point each in an entertaining opening game of Euro 2012.
Poland went with their expected side – there were no real debates to be settled in the starting line-up, and Franciszek Smuda used his usual structured yet energetic 4-2-3-1 system.
Fernando Santos had two major decisions to make. The first was in goal, where Kostas Chalkias was chosen from Greece’s three distinctly average goalkeepers. The second choice was on the right of the front three, where Sotiris Ninis started over Dimitris Salpingidis.
This was a game of three phases: 11 v 11, 11 v 10, 10 v 10. Both sides looked in a commanding position at one stage, but a draw was a fair result.
Poland attack the right
Poland started this match excellently, energetically swarming forward as if expressing sheer relief that the long-awaited tournament in their home country had finally began. Once, during the opening minutes, Maciej Rybus stormed past Vasilis Torosidis into a good crossing position down the left, but almost every other attack was concentrated down the opposite flank.
This was no surprise, of course – the right flank is clearly the strongest part of the Polish side, both in terms of individuals and cohesion, as the Dortmund duo of Lukasz Piszczek and Jakub Blaszczykowski are situated on that side. They, in turn, have a great relationship with striker Robert Lewandowski.
Greece didn’t help themselves with the positioning of their players – Giorgos Samaras played as the left-sided forward, and although he and Ninis dropped back to form a midfield five, he wasn’t alert to the runs of Piszczek, and left too much space between himself and Jose Holebas at left-back.
Chances
This was the pivotal part of the tactical battle in the first half, and the situation was particularly perilous for Grece because of the positioning of Holebas, who played much higher up than the other three Greek defenders, perhaps in an attempt to minimise the space ahead of him. Greece were clearly vulnerable down that side, and while Poland immediately looked to their right flank anyway, they were particularly keen to do so here.
Three players benefited from the space down that wing. Piszczek motored past Samaras to stretch the play and support the forward four on the overlap, Blaszczykowski got space to receive the ball and then dribbled past Holebas at speed, and number ten Ludovic Obraniak played as a central winger, either coming deep to pick up the ball on the left, or higher up the pitch to join in the play on the right.
So many chances came from this side. Piszczek played a one-two with Blaszczykowski and then fired a high cross into the six-yard box, when a low pass would have seen Lewandowski tap in. Moments later, Obraniak moved to the right, slipped in Blaszczykowski, and his cross found Lewandowski, this time able to reach the ball (courtesy of some poor goalkeeping from Chalkias) and headed home to give Poland a deserved lead.
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45-68: Greece were forced into an all-new centre-back duo, switching to 4-4-1 at half-time and bringing on Salpingidis for Ninis
Greece attacks
Greece were extremely poor in the first half, a classic broken team when they tried to move the ball forward quickly, with seven defensive players and three attackers. The intended ‘connecting’ player was Giannis Maniatis, who shuttled forward manfully trying to solve this problem, but he ran into the holding midfield duo of Rafael Murawski and Eugen Polanski, and didn’t have the skill to break past.
When they moved the ball more slowly, Greece lacked creativity to break down a packed Poland defence. Ninis had little impact upon the game until the final moments of the first half, as he was tracked well by Sebastien Boenisch, who simply overpowered him in direct confrontations. Most unforgivably, Giorgos Karagounis’ set-piece delivery was terrible, consistently failing to beat the first man.
11 v 10
Then there was Sokratis Papastathopoulos’ red card. Greece had already lost his centre-back partner Avraam Papadopoulos through injury, and he had been replaced by Kyriakos Papadopoulos (no relation). That meant Greece had an all-new centre-back pairing after Papastathopoulos was dismissed, with Kostas Katsouranis dropping back into centre-back, a position he’s played many times before. Considering that double blow, Greece coped excellently at the back.
As Katsouranis was the lone holding player, Santos had to change the formation of the side. If there was anything that went Greece’s way in the first half, it was that the red card came in the 44th minute, and Santos could get his side into the dressing room immediately and explain the strategy for the second half.
Second half
Santos made a change – Salpingidis replaced Ninis on the right – but this didn’t affect their defensive reshaping. They came out for the second half in a basic 4-4-1, with the two other central midfielders now sitting deeper, and the wide forwards told to form a strict second bank of four – whereas previously, they’d been part of a front three and were slow getting back into position.
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68-90: Greece introduced Fortounis for Gekas, moving Samaras upfront. Poland went to 4-4-1 after Szczesny's red card, with Tyton replacing Rybus and Obraniak going to the left.
While Greece wouldn’t have wanted the sending-off (and at the risk of using the “sometimes it’s more difficult to play against ten men” cliché) Poland appeared more affected by the Greek red card. Primarily, this was because Samaras was now doing a good defensive job and protecting Holebas (who himself was more reserved). Poland’s previous supremacy down the right was barely notable.
Poland’s gameplan at 1-0 was unclear – they played with much less energy and attacking intent, but lacked the ability to keep possession and kill the game. Greece, despite having a man less, were much improved in the second half, able to bring their wide players into the game and move forward more regularly, if often very slowly.
Salpingidis
The introduction of Salpingidis was crucial. He scored the goal – which came after a good overlap from Torosidis and more poor goalkeeping, this time from Wojciech Szczesny. Salpingidis later won a penalty, and scored a disallowed goal after a marginal offside call.
Still at 11 v 10, Santos’ third and final substitution came after 68 minutes. He removed striker Theo Gekas and introduced young attacking midfielder Kostas Fortounis, who played on the left, with Samaras moving upfront. This immediately had an impact, with the front three combining brilliantly – Samaras was now in a position where he could hold the ball up, and did so for Fortounis to chip the ball over the defence for Salpingidis, leading to Szczesny’s red card and Karagounis squandering the resulting penalty, in keeping with his dead ball performance from the first half.
Smuda responded by moving to an identical 4-4-1 (removing Rybus, putting Obraniak to the left and bringing on Przemyslaw Tyton, who was the hero with his penalty save). But Greece continued to look the better side, with great thrust on both flanks. Poland, having made a defensive shift at the break, were unable to regain their initial energy, and a 4-4-1 v 4-4-1 battle for the final 25 minutes yielded a draw.
Conclusion
One can question Santos’ initial strategy – although he was simply using Greece’s natural shape, it was suicidal to leave Samaras high up on Greece’s left against the strongest part of Poland’s side, and the home team should really have punished Greece by scoring more than a single goal in the first half.
But he deserves great credit for the way he reacted to the red card. Moving to two banks of four stabilized the game and helped protect Holebas, sucking the momentum out of Poland’s play. Then, the two changes on the flanks allowed Greece back in the game, and both Salpingidis and Fortounis will be hopeful of a start against the Czechs on Tuesday.
Poland started superbly but once Greece started to protect Holebas, they looked lost. Smuda will regret his side taking their foot off the gas for the second half, as the drop in performance was extraordinary.
Both will still fancy their chances of progression. 1楼的参考译文
--------------- 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-12 13:13 编辑
Ukraine 2-1 Sweden: the Shevchenko show
June 11, 2012
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The starting line-ups
The story of the tournament so far – Andriy Shevchenko rolled back the years to complete a surprise turnaround in Kiev.
Shevchenko was named from the start, despite speculation Oleg Blokhin would use him as a substitute. The rest of the side was as expected.
Erik Hamren made a surprise choice in the centre of midfield, playing Rasmus Elm alongside Kim Kallstrom. This meant Ola Toivonen started on the left, and Markus Rosenberg played upfront.
This was a peculiar game, where all the interesting tactical features were completely divorced from the goalscoring action. The goals were simply three smart finishes from clever strikers, and their nature wasn’t representative of the football played over the course of 90 minutes.
Shevchenko’s double was so special because he won the game on his own – it was Shevchenko’s superb runs and smart finishes that were the difference between the sides – he didn’t simply put the finishing touches to a dominant performance, he was the reason Ukraine were victorious.
Formation battle
Sweden set out in roughly the expected system, with Zlatan Ibrahimovic dropping off the front. They defended with two banks of four when Ukraine had long spells of possession, though the shape was more fluid with the ball.
Ukraine were also the expected formation – basically a 4-4-2 but with Anatoliy Tymoshchuk and Andriy Voronin dropped significantly deeper from their lines, making something like a vague 4-1-3-1-1.
Tymoshchuk v Ibrahimovic
This was an interesting battle – Ibrahimovic naturally moves towards the right for Sweden, but Tymoshchuk generally plays towards the opposite side of the pitch, with Serhiy Nazarenko higher up, left-of-centre. Nevertheless, Tymoshchuk spent the first part of the game trying to track Ibrahimovic, who was basically playing as a number ten.
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Ibrahmovic didn’t want this close attention, however, and he was clever with his movement. Sometimes he ventured towards the flanks, away from Tymoshchuk – who had to guard that central zone for fear that Toivonen, Seb Larsson or Kim Kallstrom would move into it – and got space in wider zones. More often he simply became a second striker, drifting high up the pitch where Tymoshchuk didn’t want to drop into.
Voronin
Andriy Voronin was crucial to Ukraine’s system, involved in various key parts of their game – he dropped deeper than the Sweden midfield to link play, and also connected the midfield and Shevchenko.
Equally important was his work without the ball – he dropped back into midfield and moved onto Kallstrom, meaning Sweden found it difficult to play through the Lyon man.
Ukraine counter-attacks
Ukraine had long spells of possession, but their main threat came when they broke quickly through the wingers, Yevhen Konoplyanaka on the left and Andriy Yarmolenko on the right. They sprinted forward as soon as Ukraine won possession and were excellent at dribbling with the ball. Their end product was inconsistent, and they were less effective when Sweden got men behind the ball, but by simply carrying the ball down the flanks, they put Sweden’s backline under pressure. They really stretched the play, hugging the touchline and making themselves available for long crossfield balls.
Ukraine were particularly dangerous on the break because Sweden played without anything close to a natural holding player. They were expected to use Anders Svensson in the centre of midfield – himself more of a ball player than a tackler – but the decision to field Elm alongside Kallstrom meant Sweden looked very open in front of their defence. It was no surprise that Kallstrom picked up a booking within 15 minutes when forced to stop a break illegally, and Hamren waited too late to introduce Svensson (for Toivonen, with Elm moving wide), after the the three goals had been scored.
Another disappointing aspect of Sweden’s play was their set-piece delivery. Ukraine were disciplined and didn’t concede any fouls in shooting positions, but from long free-kicks Larsson’s crosses into the box were overhit.
Shevchenko
But the main feature of this game wasn’t tactics, but simply Shevchenko’s performance. His movement throughout the game was very intelligent, despite his lack of pace and stamina. He moved towards the ball then tried to spin in behind the Swedish centre-backs, and his link-up play was generally good too.
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His goals were similar – one from a right-wing cross, one from a left-wing corner – but both dependent upon sudden movements towards the near post, and fine headers.
Substitutions
Hamren made changes, but broadly kept the same shape. Christian Wilhelmsson was a good introduction – he offered direct dribbling ability from the flank, something Sweden lacked in the first half, while Johan Elmander came on upfront for Rosenberg and should have finished a late chance.
Blokhin simply replaced tired legs, with Shevchenko, Voronin and Konoplyanka withdrawn in the final ten minutes for Artem Milevskiy, Marko Devic and Ruslan Rotan – Ukraine kept the energy high and saw out the win.
Conclusion
Sweden’s shape looked unnatural – no holding player, probably not enough drive and directness from the flanks either. Their build-up play was also surprisingly direct at times, using the striker too quickly rather than building through the midfield. They could have won the game had they defended crosses better, but they still wouldn’t have played well.
Ukraine’s goals barely related to their best attacking moments, which came through the wide players on the flanks. Shevchenko was the key, and now Ukraine are in a great position at the top of Group D – other sides will look to come onto them, and Ukraine can play on the break. 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-13 14:49 编辑
3楼参考译文
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乌克兰2-1瑞典战术分析：一场由乌克兰核弹头舍甫琴科上演的老当益壮秀
译者：thewall
2012-06-12
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交战双方的首发阵容
到目前为止，本届杯赛的首场大逆转诞生了 - 安德里·舍甫琴科在基辅东道主球场沉寂半场时间后，神奇回勇仿佛年轻了几岁，连进2个漂亮的头球而上演了令人惊叹的大逆转！
在东道主乌克兰队的首发阵容中，舍瓦出人意料地被派上场，尽管赛前预测奥列格·布洛欣将使用他作为替补的。该队首发阵容中，其余的位置上的人员皆为预期所言。
在客队瑞典队的首发阵容中，埃里克·汉姆雷恩对中场枢纽的人员作出了出乎意料的选择，让拉斯穆斯·埃尔姆与金·谢尔斯特姆一起搭档。这意味着奥拉·托伊沃宁出任左前卫，而马库斯·罗森伯格则为突前单刀。
这是一场奇特的比赛，比赛中所展现的全部有趣的战术特点，完全与进球动作（瞬间）背道而驰（同床异梦，介个成语到位且犀利不？）。3个进球堪堪都是来自智慧选手三次高光闪烁的犀利表现，介种现象并不能体现一场90分钟比赛的本质。
舍甫琴科的梅开二度，来得那么及时，凭借一己之力帮助主队大逆转赢得了比赛胜利，而显得特别弥足珍贵 - 正是老当益壮的舍甫琴科在球队危难关头时上演高超发挥和如此敏慧的两记终结球，才使得双方对比是如此鲜明 - 他不仅仅只是奉献两记终结球来展现统治力，而且其存在本身，就是乌克兰队取胜的根本原因。
阵型的较量
瑞典队排出一个与预测大体一致的阵型，其中伊布位置有所下降，在突前那位的后面。当乌克兰较长时间控球时，瑞典队就采用4人两排的防守线布局来迎战，尽管队形会随着皮球走向而流变。
乌克兰的阵型亦如预测的那样 - 基本上是一个4-4-2布局，但是前场二重奏阿纳托利·季莫什丘克和安德里·沃罗宁，相应地比他们各自所在前锋线/中场线位置显著地后移许多，从而使得瑞典队阵型在某种角度上看起来像一个模糊的4-1-3-1-1布局。
季莫什丘克 vs 伊布拉西莫维奇
沃罗宁
乌克兰的反击战
舍甫琴科
换人
结论
瑞典队的阵型开起来颇不自然 - 没有后腰则也就大概不足以提供推动力，而且也不见其直接从两翼中任一路来开辟走廊。其团队成建制的运作，也是属于那种令人惊奇地成倍地依赖将球从后场直接打到前场的一锤子买卖，亦即过于简捷地利用攻击手而不是依靠中场支撑来调度。假如他们能够对传中球防守到位的话，他们也许会赢得胜利的，然而看起来他们一直未必能够解决好此问题的。
乌克兰的两粒进球，仅仅与他们把握住了自己的最佳进攻时刻有关，这是通过边路球员在两翼活动赢得了机会的。舍甫琴科发挥了核心的关键作用，而且由于目前乌克兰积3分优势在D组中排名榜首 - 其他未胜的三支球队接下来则要抢分追赶乌克兰了，那么乌克兰就有理由可以打反击的。
（工地中。。。） 乌克兰赛前种种传言全是烟幕弹，尽管他们前总理（？）有过食物中毒的事情，哈哈 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-12 13:21 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Sweden
June 6, 2012
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Possible Sweden line-up (assuming Elmander is not fit)
For the first time since World Cup 1994, Sweden are at a major international tournament without Lars Lagerback. Now in charge of Iceland, Lagerback was at the helm for so long (first as a joint-coach with Tommy Soderberg, then in sole charge) that his footballing style -organised, defensive – became merged with Sweden’s footballing style, to the point where it was difficult to tell the difference between the two, at least to an outsider.
But think back to 1994, and Sweden were an attack-minded side – in fact, they were the highest scorers at that tournament, with 15 goals. Therefore, it shouldn’t come as a complete shock that Sweden are now playing expansive, attacking football under new coach Erik Hamren.
After Sweden became bored of Lagerback’s cautious approach (although it took non-qualification for the 2010 World Cup to seal his departure) they were always likely to become a more open side as a reaction. Along with Germany and Holland, they were one of only three sides to score 30 goals in qualifying.
Ibrahimovic
The main man is, of course, Zlatan Ibrahimovic. His status within the Swedish team is odd – when he plays, they’re cast as a one-man team. When he doesn’t, statistically their results are better. And when he’s on the bench, the entire game seems to revolve around when he’ll come on. He’s a huge presence in the squad and the key man on the pitch, and while he can dominate Sweden’s play too much, on his day he’s unstoppable.
The 3-1 win over Croatia in February confirmed his place in the side. Or rather, it confirmed his position. Not upfront on the shoulder of the last defender, but instead much deeper in a number ten position, becoming involved in build-up play and looking to create chances. It’s similar to the role Samuel Eto’o plays for Cameron (those players, of course, were involved in a high-profile swap deal three summers ago) – if the striker is clearly the best player in a team, often he feels the need to drop deep and help the team, rather than remaining upfront, frustrated at the lack of service.
“I get to keep the ball more, rather than fight for the tough ones like when I play all the way up top,” Ibrahimovic agrees. “I get the ball more at my feet, so that I can turn and advance with pace. That’s what I want to do – Erik told me to find new space all the time, and that gives us more options.”
Hamren suggests that his deep role depends on the strength of the opposition. “We’re thinking about trying it more against stronger teams, to prevent him getting too isolated,” he says. “But I think we still need him as a number nine in many other types of matches.” Of course, Ibrahimovic’s own preference won’t be ignored. An alternative would be a 4-3-1-2 system that could feature three central attackers, although this remains unlikely.
Attack
In an exciting attacking unit, the other places are unclear. The first-choice striker would be Johan Elmander of Galatasaray, but he’s only just returning from a broken metatarsal and may not be fit to start. If that’s the case, then PSV’s Ola Toivonen could play upfront instead – which is a slightly odd situation as he’s a the number ten for PSV, so essentially his and Ibrahimovic’s positions are reversed. Or Markus Rosenberg could play as the number nine.
But Toivonen might go to the left if Elmander is fit. If not, then Rasmus Elm will play on the left flank. He’s another Holland-based player with very good technique and an excellent right foot. He could also play on the right, where Sebastian Larsson, a similar player, will expect to be used. Essentially, it’s three from Rosenberg, Elmander, Toivonen, Elm and Larsson, depending upon Elmander’s fitness.
Midfield
The midfield is perhaps the most interesting part of the side. Sweden hold onto the ball for long periods, and the central duo is comprised of two talented, technical players – Kim Kallstrom, who hits ambitious balls forward with his left foot, and veteran Anders Svensson, who plays a little deeper but is also an intelligent user of the ball.
Hamren wants to play ‘quick and technical’ football, and these two have the most responsibility to prompt that, with Ibrahimovic also helping out in midfield.
Weak defence
At the back, unusually, is Sweden’s weak spot. Olof Mellberg is now 34 but remains an excellent all-round centre-back, but he’s significantly better than the rest of the defence. Daniel Majstorovic would have been his partner, but his injury means Andreas Granqvist will probably partner him.
Granqvist will also act as cover for right-back, where Mikael Lustig is a regular. On the other flank will be Martin Olsson. These players are similar – very quick and keen to stretch the play, allowing the wide players to attack more directly. They often risk leaving the centre-backs covering too much ground, however, and Hamren admits that this has been a problem in the past. “Our full-backs were too wide and when we lost the ball Holland punished us,” he said of a 4-1 defeat early in qualifying.
There’s also a concern about Sweden’s goalkeeper, Andreas Isaakson. He struggles with backpasses and doesn’t command his box, and Sweden have looked particularly poor when defending set-pieces in their pre-tournament friendlies.
Quick guide
Coach – Erik Hamren
Formation – 4-2-3-1
Key player – Zlatan Ibrahimovic
Strength – lots of attacking options and good retention skills
Weakness – the defence and goalkeeper
Key tactical question – where does Ibrahimovic play, and is Elmander fit?
Key coach quote – “It needs to be the whole team out on the pitch that does the job, not just some individual players, even though some individual players might get more attention than others.”
Betfair odds – 70.0 (69/1)
Recommended bet – Sweden to beat Ukraine at 3.1
Further reading – Johanna Gara’s interview with Hamren, Andy Hudson’s preview, Charlie Anderon’s preview 6楼参考译文 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-12 13:24 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Ukraine
June 6, 2012
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Ukraine's possible starting line-up - though this is likely to change from match to match...
It’s difficult to make a case for Ukraine performing well at this competition. They have home advantage, of course (they wouldn’t be here otherwise) but in the long-term they’ve had four coaches in four years, and in the short-term their squad has been suffering from food poisoning, which has hampered pre-tournament preparations.
Oleg Blokhin is an experienced coach and was in charge of Ukraine for their previous international tournament, World Cup 2006. He’s something of an old-school coach who stresses the need for “players who are prepared to fight for their country”, and has a strict rule that “a candidate for the national side must be a first-choice player at his club.” They are hardly unreasonable demands, but Ukraine neither possesses any superstars nor a particularly deep squad, so hecan hardly afford to be picky. An injury to Dmytro Chygrynskiy, perhaps their best player, hasn’t helped.
Rotation
Ukraine don’t have a particularly settled starting XI (the problems with food poisoning during the warm-up games made it particularly difficult to decipher), but this is a deliberate strategy from Blokhin. He understands that his side are unlikely to prosper by being proactive and taking the game to the opposition, and so instead will be reactive.
That could be said of many other coaches and sides in this tournament, of course, but considering Ukraine didn’t need to qualify to get here, and therefore haven’t had to build a stable side that regularly wins games, it’s particularly true here. Blokhin is likely to vary his starting XI from game to game, partly to keep his players fresh, but also because he’ll be trying to pick a team which finds flaws in the opposition, rather than plays to Ukraine’s strengths.
For example, four days after Ukraine drew 3-3 with an experimental Germany side (a game which Blokhin said “proved to ourselves that we could play with the biggest teams in Europe on equal terms”) he made four changes for the match against Austria. Ukraine won 2-1, but Blokhin’s starting selection was questioned.
“I read that we should play the first team against Austria,” he said. “But what is the first team? We choose the tactics for a specific opponent, depending upon the current state of the players.” That is the key to this Ukraine side. On paper they might be the weakest in the competition, but Blokhin will seek to surprise the opposition with switches from game to game. Therefore, it’s difficult to give a true overview of Ukraine’s formation, but they’re likely to set out in a team that is roughly 4-1-3-1-1 – a bit like Denmark at the last World Cup. It’s essentially a 4-4-2, with a player each from the midfield and the attack deeper.
However, they may be one of the more effective sides at pressing – they have energy in midfield and in the pre-tournament friendlies were happy to close down in the opposition half rather than sitting deep, though it remains to be seen how they combine this with a counter-attacking strategy.
Defence
The goalkeeping situation has been a nightmare. Oleksandr Rybka failed a drugs test and was banned for two years, Andriy Dikan suffered serious head injuries following a collision whilst playing for Spartak Moscow, and veteran Oleksandr Shovkovskiy was ruled out with a shoulder injury. Luckily, this is one area Ukraine are reasonably well-stocked in, and Andriy Pyatov is a capable goalkeeper.
At centre-back Blokhin is keen to rely upon existing partnerships. Yevhen Khacheridi and Taras Mykhalyk play together for Dynamo Kiev, but both are physical rather than graceful, and Khacheridi is constantly in trouble with referees. The two back-ups, Yaroslav Rakytskyi and Oleksandr Kucher, also form a solid partnership at club level, for Shakhtar. It’s not inconceivable that Blokhin could switch between the partnerships from game to the next, though that would be extreme even for him.
At right-back, Oleg Husiev is a right-winger dropped deeper and it shows – he motors up and down the flank but can be positionally unreliable and is the weakest player defensively. Yevhen Selin at left-back is a bulkier figure and won’t attack so readily.
Midfield
Bayern’s Anatoliy Tymoschuk, who started the Champions League final at centre-back, will play an extremely deep midfield role, shielding the defence. There’s a legitimate concern that his defensive awareness is given too much credit by the rest of the side – he’s a fine player but can be left stranded on his own at defensive transitions, as Ukraine are slow to get back into position.
Serhiy Nazarenko will probably play as the second central midfielder, deeper than the two wingers but moving forward to join in attacks. Ruslan Rotan would play deeper but still be more attacking than Tymoschuk, while Denys Harmash would be an energetic option but very much a second holder to play alongside Tymoschuk. The selection in this position is key, as it will demonstrate what type of game Blokhin is looking to play.
Attackers
On the wings are the wildcards, the potential players that could turn Ukraine from also-rans to dark horses. Yevhen Konoplyanka is the real young star, a fine dribbler who ran the length of the pitch to score a brilliant counter-attacking goal in the 3-3 against Germany. He could play in the centre, but his pace will be more useful on the left. On the opposite side will be fellow 22-year-old Andriy Yarmolenko, a more powerful player and probably a more direct goal threat.
Andriy Shevchenko appears to have been playing club football for the last couple of years solely to complete in this tournament, but there are concerns about his ability to play anything like a full match, and certainly not three games in nine days. He could be a substitute, with Andriy Voronin in the support striker role, linking midfield and the striker. His partner will probably be Artem Milevskyi, though Marko Devic is another decent option. Yevhen Seleznyov is a pure poacher and will probably only be used when Ukraine are trailing and desperately need a goal – one suspects he’ll be needed at some point.
Conclusion
The only overall strategy is to sit deep and then counter-attack. Ukraine are better at the latter than the former – they have speed and skill on the flanks, but their defensive shape isn’t impressive and they lack cohesion and understanding because the starting XI is changed so frequently.
Quick guide
Coach – Oleg Blohkin
Formation – 4-1-3-1-1ish
Key player: Anatoliy Tymoshchuk
Strength: Good speed on the flanks
Weakness: Slow centre-backs, a lack of goals upfront
Key tactical question: How much does Blokhin change things from game to game?
Key quote: “We choose the tactics for a specific opponent.”
Betfair odds: 60.0 (59/1)
Recommended bet: Poland to get further than Ukraine at 1.65
Further reading: Passive Offside is a great site for Ukraine articles throughout the Euros 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-22 10:35 编辑
8楼参考译文
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来自虎扑足球
ZM2012欧洲杯前瞻之乌克兰篇
2012-06-09
乌克兰想要在本届欧洲杯上有出色的表现可谓难于登天。当然，他们有主场之利（否则根本就不会出现在欧洲杯上），但，从长期角度看，这4年间他们换了4个主教。从短期角度看，他们遭遇了严重的食物中毒，这可不利于他们大赛前的准备。
奥列格-布洛欣是一位经验丰富的老帅，在他们的上一次世界大赛——2006年世界杯上，他就是乌克兰的教头。布洛欣是一个典型的古典派教练——他强调“球员应准备好为国而战”，而且，在选人上，他严格恪守“国家队球员必须是该位置上俱乐部的不二人选”原则。这些要求显然有点过于无理了，但乌克兰既没有超级巨星，也没有一个有深度的阵容，让老帅在圈定阵容时很难这样挑剔。迪米特罗-齐格林斯基，也许是乌克兰最好的球员的受伤，一点帮助都没有。
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/ukraine.jpg
阵容
乌克兰并没有一套固定的首发阵容（热身赛前的食物中毒让阵容的最终安排走向了更加扑朔迷离的方向），但这或许是布洛欣有意而为之。他明白他的球队绝不是一支主动出击并用压倒性优势击败对手的豪华之师，所以，他觉得更应该随机应变。
当然，这个想法也是本届欧洲杯中许多其他教练和球队所共有的，但考虑到乌克兰是直接晋级的，因此他们根本不用去构思怎样组建一个会经常取胜的阵容，所以这一条说他们尤为适应。布洛欣很可能每场比赛排出不同的阵容，这样安排的部分原因是想以此来让他的球员们时刻充满活力，但更多是出于找到对手缺陷的考虑，而不是构建一个发挥乌克兰人强项的阵容。
举个例子，在乌克兰3-3逼平了以试验阵容为目的的德国队（赛后，布洛欣宣称比赛的结果证明了乌克兰有着与欧洲顶尖豪门平分秋色的能力）4天后，在对阵奥地利的比赛中，布洛欣对首发做出了4处调整，但他对首发阵容的选择却受到了广泛质疑。
“我听说有人让我在对阵奥地利的时候应该排出首选阵容。”他说，“但首选阵容是什么？我只知道根据对手的不同特点安排首发，还要看球员的状态。”这番话就是这支乌克兰的关键。论纸面实力，他们也许是本届大赛中最不济的队伍，但布洛欣会运用每场比赛不同的阵容来震惊对手。因此很难给出乌克兰阵容的前瞻，但是他们很可能排除一个4-1-3-1-1的阵型——有些类似于丹麦在10年世界杯的阵型。本质上，这是一个4-4-2，但中场和锋线上各有一名球员撤的更深。
但也许在压迫对手时，这会是一套卓有成效的打法——他们有着富有活力的中场，在欧洲杯前的热身赛上，这帮中场更喜欢在对手的半场狠狠压迫而不是深深后撤。但是，这套打法与反击战是否可以做到无缝对接还是个问题。
防线
在门将的选择上，乌克兰人的麻烦不小。奥列克山大-雷布卡因为药检失败而被禁赛2年，安德烈-迪坎在莫斯科斯巴达时的一次碰撞让他的头部严重受伤，而老将奥莱克桑德-紹夫科夫斯基则因为肩伤而落选国家队。幸好，乌克兰在门将位置上还算储备充足，安德烈-皮亚托夫还是可以成为一个相对靠谱的首发。
而在现有中后卫位置上，布洛欣很可能会使用现有的中卫组合。伊万-卡切里迪和塔拉斯-米哈利克是基辅迪纳摩的俱乐部搭档，但两人都是身体出众而技术不足，而且卡切里迪总是特别不招裁判喜欢。两位备选，亚罗斯拉夫-拉基茨基与奥列克山大-库切尔，在顿涅茨克矿工也是防线上的坚实好搭档。显然，虽然对中卫组合对布洛欣来说都差不多，但要是看到他一场换一个中卫组合千万不要惊讶。
右后卫位置上，右中场奥列格-古谢夫可以后撤打这个位置——他的确可以在右翼不知疲倦的奔跑，但他位置感太差，是全队里最大的防守短板。而叶甫根尼-塞林可以如同磐石一般镇守左路，但他的插上助攻却不那么令人满意。
中场
拜仁球员安纳托利-季莫什丘克，这位在欧冠决赛中作为中后卫首发的球员，将在本届杯赛中深深后撤，来组成后防线前的屏障。但是，关于季莫什丘克一直存在着这样不无道理的担心：他的防守意识大部分要归功于全队，他的确是个优秀的球员，但是在防守换位中单兵防守很容易会被爆，因为乌克兰全队的退守能力很慢。
另一个中场位置也许将由谢尔盖-纳扎伦科占据，他的站位将比两翼的球员靠后，但是会在进攻时压上。鲁斯兰-罗坦的站位也许会更深，但他会比季莫什丘克更具有攻击性。同时，丹尼-加马什也许或成为一个充满活力的选择，但他多数会和季莫什丘克搭档中场。这个位置的选择将是球队的灵魂，因为这将展示布洛欣在比赛所采取的打法。
锋线
乌克兰的两翼将是他们的关键，新星们的发挥将决定乌克兰到底是在小组赛陪太子读书还是成为黑马。叶甫根尼-科诺普尔扬卡是一颗冉冉升起的新星，这个出色的盘带天才在3比3逼平德国的比赛中打击了一粒跨越全场的反击进球。他也可以打中路，但他的速度将在左路构成极大的威胁。在另一边，伫立着他22岁的好搭档安德烈-亚尔莫连科，一个更加强大，也对球门更有威胁的球员。
过去的几年里，许多人认为舍甫琴科依然在俱乐部效力的唯一原因就是为了这届欧洲杯，但有人怀疑到底这杆乌克兰老枪还有没有踢一场完整比赛的能力了，更别说9天踢3场比赛了。他很可能会是替补，而安德烈-沃罗宁会出现在组织前锋的角色，做好前锋与中场的串联工作。他的锋线搭档也许会是阿尔乔姆-米列夫斯基，但马尔科-德维齐也会是一个合适的人选。叶甫根尼-塞列兹诺夫是一个纯正的抢点前锋，也许他只会在乌克兰绝望的需要扳回一球的情况下才会上场——有人觉得总有什么时候用的上他。
结论
总体上，他们唯一的战术就是在门前摆大巴然后反击。但是乌克兰的反击好一些，防守就没那么出色了——他们的边路有着出众的速度与技术，但他们的防守阵型漏洞百出，而且缺乏凝聚力与互相之间的理解，谁叫他们一天换一个首发阵容呢！
快速指南：
主帅：奥列格-布洛欣
阵型：4-1-3-1-1
关键球员:安纳托利-季莫什丘克
强项：两翼出色的速度
弱项：迟缓的中后卫，前场进球不多
战术关键点：每场比赛之间布洛欣到底还要做多少改变？
主教练语录：“我们对每一个对手都有度身打造的战术”。
Betfair赔率：60.0 （59/1）
推荐赌注：波兰比乌克兰走得更远赔率1.65 今早看片段才明白为啥叫“核弹头”了，原来是以头球见长。 瑞典队所丢两球全拜核弹头所赐
舍瓦rp大攒，第二个头球一蹭进网，让身后的伊布情何以堪？ 我得出结论，一个队的老将往往有两种截然不同的表现：要么姜还是老的辣；要么老猫烧须。 我得出结论，一个队的老将往往有两种截然不同的表现：要么姜还是老的辣；要么老猫烧须。
666666 发表于 2012-6-12 13:37 http://bbs.argstorm.com/images/common/back.gif
老猫烧须，介典故，较为陌生啦
老猫烧须，介典故，较为陌生啦
thewall 发表于 2012-6-12 13:38 http://bbs.argstorm.com/images/common/back.gif
地方俚语啊。 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-13 10:16 编辑
Czech Republic 2-1 Greece: Greece vulnerable down their left again
June 12, 2012
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The starting line-ups
The Czech Republic had a very good first ten minutes, and that was enough to put themselves in a commanding position.
Both coaches made changes to their starting line-ups, moving their XI closer to the side that finished their opening matches. Michal Bilek started holding midfielder Tomas Hubschman, with Petr Jiracek on the left of midfield. At the back, Michael Kadlec moved into the middle from the left-back position he looked uncomfortable in against Russia, so David Limbersky came into the side at left-back.
Fernando Santos went with the forward trio that ended the 1-1 draw against Poland, so Giorgos Samaras started in the centre, with Dimitris Salpingidis on the right, and Kostas Fortounis deeper on the left. Santos was without both first-choice centre-backs, so Kyriakos Papadopoulos and Kostas Katsouranis played there, with Giorgos Fotakis starting in the centre of midfield.
This wasn’t a high quality match – the Czech Republic raced into a 2-0 lead and then sat back, preserving their lead, conserving their energy. Like in the first game, Greece improved after half-time, but were still disappointingly tame in the final third.
Czech shape
The main story from this game was how improved the Czech Republic were, having previously looked like one of the competition’s weakest sides. The presence of Hubschan gave the midfield stability and allowed Jaroslav Plasil more freedom to dictate play without having to worry about his defensive responsibilities.
But more important was the balance the Czechs had on the flanks. In the first game they started two similar players on the wings, Vaclav Pilar and Jan Rezek. They both made the same movement from opposite flanks, and the Czech build-up play was rather predictable.
The presence of Jiracek on the right flank made their passing much better – he drifted inside and became another playmaker between the lines to assist Tomas Rosicky, and allowed the Czech captain move deeper into midfield, away from Giannis Maniatis to help retain the ball (which, considering the Czechs went 1-0 up within three minutes, was a large part of their gameplan). But, importantly, Jiracek was also content to stay wider when needed, attempting to get in behind Jose Holebas, the Greek left-back.
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Left-back problems
Holebas’ defensive weakness had been exposed in the first game by Poland – when Jakub Blaszczykowski and Lukasz Piszczek teamed up and created 2 v 1 situations against him, and also took advantage of Holebas’ intention to play high up the pitch. Part of the problem in that match was the fact Samaras was playing on the left wing for Greece (but basically as a second striker) attempting to do his defensive work but frequently switching off, and letting Piszczek past him.
Bilek obviously noted that problem at left-back, and the Czech Republic made the most of it. In theory, Greece should have been stronger on that side of the pitch, because Samaras was upfront and the young Fortounis was on the left, more willing to track back and help out. He wasn’t particularly good defensively either, however, and Greece’s shape without the ball was poor – the wide players were slow to get back into position.
1-0
Fortounis can’t be blamed for the first goal, however – he was too high up the pitch to help out. Holebas was also high up, and was slow to regain his position, though the Czech Republic’s pressing was the major reason for the goal. They put immediate pressure on the Greek defence, with Rosicky moving forward to join Milan Baros, and pressing 2 v 2 from the front.
In turn, Pilar closed down Vasilis Torosidis, with Limbersky following up behind. Torosidis miscontrolled, Limbersky intercepted, and the Czechs were on their way. Greece lost possession in their own half, with only three man behind the ball. Holebas couldn’t shut down the gap between himself and Papadopoulous, and Jiracek raced through and finished. Oddly, his run was probably more typical of the movement (the dropped) Rezek would make, but Jiracek showed his adaptability to play that role too. From then on, he focused more upon linking play.
2-0
But that didn’t signal the end of the Greek problems down that flank. Another key feature of the Czech approach was moving Theodor Gebre-Selassie high up, forcing Fortounis back. For the second goal, Rosicky and Jiracek had swapped positions, and Fortounis got drawn into closing down Rosicky on the wing – in turn, giving Gebre-Selassie a run on him, and Fortounis couldn’t make up the ground, so Gebre-Selassie crossed for Pilar. It was the quickest 2-0 lead in the history of the European Championships.
Pilar played his role very intelligently – with Jiracek moving inside from the opposite flank, Pilar stayed very wide on the touchline to stretch the play, increasing the active playing zone and making it harder for Greece to close down. He still made those direct runs in the channels towards goal, but didn’t move inside and help pass the ball, leaving that to the ball-playing midfielders.
The early two-goal lead meant the rest of the first half was very quiet. The Czech Republic were content to cool the tempo, while Greece had problems getting themselves back into the game. Their midfield was not geared to attack – Giannis Maniatis had previously been the player connecting the midfield and attack, but was now the deepest midfielder. Fotakis didn’t replicate that role adequately, while Fortounis continued to be pushed back by Gebre-Selassie. Meanwhile, the presence of Hubschman helped protect the defence.
Second half
The second half was basically a test of Santos’ ability to turn the game. He’d used his substitutes excellently in the opening match, but here was limited to two tactical substitutions, having been forced to replace his goalkeeper in the first half.
His half-time change was Gekas on for Fotakis. Samaras went to the left, Gekas played upfront, and Fortounis came inside into a central playmaking role, almost turning Greece into a 4-2-1-3. But Hubschman nullified his influence, and most of Greece’s play seemed to go through Samaras, who played an odd hold-up role on the left.
Santos realised Fortounis wasn’t having much of an influence on the game, so replaced him with Kostas Mitroglu, more of a centre-forward. He roughly played in Fortounis’ position, but naturally moved higher up the pitch and effectively became a second striker.
Greece had got back into the game following a terrible Petr Cech error, but after Mitroglu’s introduction they seemed to be overstaffed high up the pitch, with four forwards, and lacked players to carry the ball towards goal. Sotiris Ninis or Giannis Fetfatzidis would have been useful options, players able to take on opponents. Instead, Greece hit lots of crosses, often from very deep positions.
Bilek’s swaps didn’t change things significantly. The Czech defence often dropped too deep and the side had effectively given up trying to score a third, but they hung on for the win.
Conclusion
Both managers attempted to correct the mistakes they made for the first game. For Bilek, it went perfectly – there was more defensive presence in the midfield, and more balance on the wings.
Greece simply failed to defend the left-back zone adequately for the second game running. On paper, Fortounis offered more protection for Holebas – but on the pitch, Holebas played too high up, and Gebre-Selassie got the better of Fortounis. 15楼参考译文 希腊左路脆弱的防守再次坑爹啦 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-13 10:21 编辑
Poland 1-1 Russia: Poland beef up their midfield and prevent Russia counter-attacking
June 13, 2012
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The starting line-ups
Neither side played particularly open football – but strangely, this turned out to be a very good contest.
Wojciech Szczesny was suspended, so Franciszek Smuda continued with Przemyslaw Tyton, the hero of the first game, in goal. More interestingly, he changed the structure of his side, moving to more of a 4-1-4-1 formation, dropping left-winger Maciej Rybus in favour of a solid holder, Dariusz Dudka. Ludovic Obraniak moved to the left.
Dick Advocaat continued with the XI that hit four goals in Russia’s opening day win over the Czech Republic. Aleksandr Kerzhakov retained his place upfront despite Roman Pavlyuchenko’s impact from the bench – Kerzhakov’s finishing had been wayward, but his movement and link-up play was excellent, and he deserved his place here.
Neither side took the initiative and both looked to prevent the other counter-attacking. Smuda was reactive with his approach and fairly negative, but his tactics worked well.
Poland approach
Dudka could have been accommodated within Poland’s 4-2-3-1 had Smuda wished to continue with that system, with Rafael Murawski moving higher up the pitch and watching Igor Denisov. But Smuda chose the more defensive approach, effectively fielding three holding midfielders in front of his defence.
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Although ‘defensive’ in basic terms, it actually made Poland more fluid on the counter-attack. In the opening game, both Murawski and Eugen Polanski sat solidly ahead of the defence and left attacking to the other four players, plus Lukasz Piszczek moving forward from right-back.
Here, with Dudka as the insurance policy, those two players had license to join the attacking trio when Poland won the ball, and both popped up on the edge of the box to partake in the attacking combinations.
Russia breaks thwarted
But this was a move predominantly designed to stop Russia from playing. Smuda had seen how smooth Russia’s counter-attacking was against the Czech Republic, and how the Czechs suffered hugely from not having a designated holding midfielder in position to tidy up in front of the defence. In that game, Russia played excellent combinations through their midfield triangle, which generally ended with either Roman Shirokov or Alan Dzagoev finding space between the lines.
Not only did Poland put Dudka rigidly in that zone, they also dropped their midfield deep, and prevented Russia from getting space between the lines, even in the positions either side of Dudka, where Andrei Arshavin and Dzagoev like to work. Dudka, Polanski and Murawski worked as a trio and communicated well, but generally kept their shape and weren’t dragged around by the rotation of Shirokov and Konstantin Zyryanov.
Russia attacks
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Russia couldn’t move the ball forward quickly, and had to keep returning to Denisov, who was playing as the pivot in midfield. Poland didn’t attempt to close him down, and consequently Denisov completed by far the highest number of passes – 98, with Zyryanov the next highest on 68.
With the central midfield zone crowded, Russia looked forward to Kerzhakov much quicker. He continued to drift from side to side, particularly to the left, his favoured run at club level with Zenit. It helped that Piszczek was trying to advance down that flank to support Poland’s attack.
Poland attacks
When Piszczek did so, Poland often shifted their other three defenders across, so Marcin Wasilewski became the right-back in a three-man defence. That, plus the three central midfielders, gave Piszczek freedom to get forward and combine with Jakub Blaszczykowski. This tested the defensive ability of Arshavin, and he generally tracked back and helped Yuri Zhirkov well.
On the other flank, Ludovic Obraniak – having started central and drifted wide in the opening game, did the reverse here. He moved inside into his favoured number ten position, and became involved in combinations with Blaszczykowski, Robert Lewandowski and the two central midfielders. Poland’s passing through the centre of the pitch was occasionally excellent, whereas in the first game they channelled everything down the flanks.
However, with both sides getting three-man midfields quickly behind the ball and playing on the break, it was going to take something very special to break down an organised opposition in open play. Russia’s goal came through Dzagoev, from a set-piece, shortly before half-time
Second half
Smuda surprisingly made no substitutions at half-time, but Poland played with more energy in the second half. They didn’t attempt to press the Russian centre-backs, but started the pressure on the halfway line, making some good tackles and launching quick breaks.
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At this point, it seemed appropriate for Russia to become more cautious, with the full-backs staying in defensive positions. But this didn’t happen – shortly before Poland’s equaliser, Yuri Zhirkov was in the opposition penalty box trying to score a second goal. Russia’s endeavour must be admired, and the full-backs attacking is crucial for their system (regardless of the scoreline) but they were very cavalier at 1-0 up.
Zhirkov was in position for the equaliser, however. It was simply a fine equaliser from Blaszczykowski, who received the ball from Obraniak, who was breaking forward on the right flank despite nominally being the left-winger. The majority of Poland’s attacks went down the right, as the positions of their ’shot assists’ shows – despite Blaszczykowski being quiet until then, it seemed likely that if Poland scored, it would be from that flank.
The only significant substitution was from Smuda on 73 minutes. Dudka was withdrawn, Adrian Mierzejewski replaced him, so Polanski and Murawski dropped back to become the two holders. Mierzejewski went to the right to cut inside onto his left foot, and Blaszczykowski did the same on the other side. Obraniak became the number ten once more. It showed Poland’s intent to attack more, but Russia had the majority of the ball for the final 15 minutes, and a draw was fair.
Conclusion
Poland’s main intention was to frustrate Russia, and although they did try to get the winner late on, one suspects Smuda would have taken this result before the game – it means Poland will progress with a win against the Czech Republic on Saturday. Smuda now has a lot of important decisions to make, however – ranging from which goalkeeper he selects (it’s likely to be Tyton) to which formation he plays.
Russia’s Zenit-style counter-attacking in the first match was superb, but Zenit’s weakness against strong opponents has been a reliance upon counter-attacking. Here, Poland showed that Advocaat’s side are much less effective when the opposition pack the central midfield zone and keep it tight between the lines, but Russia remain strong favourites to top the group. 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-19 16:54 编辑
18楼参考译文
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来自虎扑
波兰1-1俄罗斯战术复盘：波兰稳住中场，俄罗斯反击无门
2012-06-13
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首发阵容
对战双方打得都不是很开放，但是出人意料的是这反而成就了一场非常耐看的比赛。
什琴斯尼停赛，因此斯姆达只能继续让蒂通担任首发门将，他曾在第一轮比赛中扑点救主。更加让人感兴趣的是，斯姆达改变了他的球队阵型，本场比赛波兰队的阵型更像是4-1-4-1，他撤下左边锋里布斯，让杜德卡打单后腰，并将奥布拉尼亚克移至左路。
俄罗斯方面，艾德沃卡特则继续沿用首场对捷克打入4球的11人首发阵容。虽然上一场比赛帕夫柳琴科替补上场之后表现出色，但他仍坚持使用科尔扎科夫首发前锋。虽然科尔扎科夫的射门准星失灵时不灵，但他的跑位和衔接非常出色，他配得上一个首发位置。
比赛中双方都没有采取主动策略，而是忌惮会被对手打反击。斯姆达的战术非常保守，但是却起到了很好的效果。
波兰队的战术
如果波兰继续使用4-2-3-1阵型，杜德卡也能够很好地适应。穆拉夫斯基位置可以前移，盯防德尼索夫。但是斯姆达本场比赛选择了一个更加偏重防守的阵型，在后防线的前面布置了三名后腰保护。
虽然从纸面上看这样的阵型侧重“防守”，但实际上却使得波兰队在反击中的跑位更加灵活。在首场比赛中，穆拉夫斯基与波兰斯基在后卫线身前负责防守，另外四名球员从左路进攻，并辅以右路的皮什切克不断前插。
在这里，杜德卡起到的是双重保险的作用。当波兰队得球时，穆拉夫斯基和波兰斯基允许前压与前场球员组成进攻三角，两人会一直推进到对方禁区前沿，参与进攻中的配合。
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俄罗斯战术受阻
但是波兰队的意图是以不间断的跑位来全面压制俄罗斯的进攻，斯姆达在俄罗斯与捷克队的比赛中见识到了俄罗斯的反击有多么犀利，也看到捷克队的后防线由于缺少一名事先指定的后腰保护，是如何被折磨得痛苦不堪。在那场比赛中，俄罗斯的中场三角配合非常流畅，西罗科夫和扎戈耶夫总能在对手的中场和后卫线之间觅得空当，形成射门。
波兰队不仅将杜德卡牢牢钉在这个区域，而且将中场后撤，以防止俄罗斯再利用两线之间的空当做文章。由于阿尔沙文与扎戈耶夫很喜欢在杜德卡的两侧活动，杜德卡、波兰斯基和穆拉夫斯基形成一个三角，配合默契，大体上很好地保持了阵型，没有被西罗科夫与季里亚诺夫的轮流跑位带离位置。
俄罗斯的进攻
俄罗斯很难快速持球推进，只能不断地将球回传给中场中枢德尼索夫。波兰队并没有对他贴身盯防，因此德尼索夫的传球数为本场最多，达到98次；第二多的是季里亚诺夫的68次。
发现双方的中场人满为患之后，俄罗斯不再在中场多做纠缠，而是更快地将球转移给科尔扎科夫。他不断地往两个边路游曳，尤其是左路，这是他在泽尼特非常喜欢的位置。这也在一定程度上帮助球队压制了对位皮什切克的前插助攻。
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波兰队的进攻
当皮什切克前插时，波兰队的后防线会调整为三后卫的阵型，瓦西莱夫斯基内收成为右后卫。这样一来，再加上三名中场，就给了皮什切克前插与库巴配合的空间。这对于阿尔沙文的防守能力是很大的考验，他回防很积极，很好地协助了日尔科夫的防守。
另一边的奥布拉尼亚克在揭幕战中首发位置是中路，但他在比赛中不断地拉向边路。本场比赛正好相反，他来到中路，踢的是他最喜欢的10号位，从而能够与库巴、莱万多夫斯基以及另外两名后腰配合。波兰队本场比赛在中路的传球颇为流畅，而不像揭幕战中那样更多走两个边路。
这样，双方均是以三中场对峙，而且更多侧重于如何打断对方的进攻。这时就需要有一个机会打破这组织有序的僵持场面。上半时临近结束时，俄罗斯通过一次定位球机会由扎戈耶夫破门得分。
下半时
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斯姆达出人意料地没有在中场进行任何换人，但是波兰队下半时踢得更加积极。他们不再尝试压制俄罗斯的中卫，而是从中线开始就通过准确的抢断和快速断球压迫对手。
从这一点来看，俄罗斯正确的选择应该是打得更加小心谨慎一些，两个边后卫应该更多地待在防守位置上。但是他们并没有这样做，就在波兰队扳平比分之前，日尔科夫还在对方的禁区内想要扩大比分。俄罗斯的进取心应该得到肯定，而且两名边后卫的前插进攻是他们战术体系中非常重要的一环（无论是否能够得分）。但是同时他们也应该反省，在1-0领先之后踢得太漫不经心。
日尔科夫应该为这个失球负责。奥布拉尼亚克从左路换到右路，沿边路突破之后将球传给库巴，库巴破门得分。波兰队大部分进攻都是从右路发起的，库巴扳平比分的进球也是得益于右路的助攻。虽然库巴在此前的表现稍显沉寂，但他抓住机会为波兰队打入一球。实际上此前波兰的右路已经多次打出有威胁的进攻，说明如果有进球，肯定是在这一侧发生。
唯一一次比较重要的换人来自斯姆达在第73分钟的换人。杜德卡换下，米尔泽耶夫斯基换上。如此一来波兰斯基和穆拉夫斯基就后撤组成双后腰。米尔泽耶夫斯基是一名左脚球员，他上场后习惯性地在右路内切，另一边的库巴则从左路内切。奥布拉尼亚克再次站在了10号位上。这表明波兰队有意加强进攻，但是在比赛的最后15分钟，俄罗斯掌握了大部分球权，最后平局的结果是公平的。
结论
波兰队想要阻挡俄罗斯前进的脚步，虽然他们在比赛的后半段表现出争胜的心态，但是斯姆达很可能在赛前就想到了平局的结果。这就意味着他们必须在最后一轮战胜捷克才能小组出线。波兰队中现在有多处位置需要调整，比如派哪个门将首发（很可能是蒂通），比如下一场打什么阵型。
俄罗斯的泽尼特式反击在第一场比赛中非常犀利，但是泽尼特在面对强敌时的问题同样是太依赖反击。本场比赛，波兰队在中场布重兵防守，同时将中场与后卫两条线的距离拉得非常近，在这种情况下，艾德沃卡特的球队进攻效果大为减弱。但是无论如何，俄罗斯都是本组第一名出线的最大热门。 俄国队反击依然犀利，扎戈耶夫给力，二战进3球，高居射手榜首位
http://sports.people.com.cn/mediafile/201206/13/F201206130444303083916163.jpg 波俄大战，焦点镜头回眸
第7分钟，奥巴布尼亚克把球吊入小禁区前沿，波兰队头球攻门打在门将身上弹出来。必杀球的机会，门将根本反应不及，可惜波兰队运气不佳，他们没有捷克队闪电进球的好运。
第11分钟，波兰队外围莱万多夫斯基禁区外接到队友头球摆渡，凌空打门，稍稍高出。莱万多夫斯基开场的运气不错，这脚射门显示出他全面的射门技巧。
第18分钟，莱万多夫斯基外围直塞波兰斯基，后者将球打进，可惜裁判举起示意其越位。波兰队开场的攻势很猛，虽然此球越位，但是也暴露出俄罗斯防线的一些问题。
第29分钟，俄罗斯队中场快速反击，科尔扎科夫这次来到左路，自己向中路走，禁区外果断起脚远射，打高了。首场比赛，克尔扎科夫7射0中的，本场不到30分钟他的2次射门又都放了高射炮，俄超的超级射手怎么了？
第38分钟，阿尔沙文前场定位球送入禁区内，扎戈耶夫禁区内头球一蹭，把球顶入后角，泰顿扑救不及。扎戈耶夫首开纪录，这是这位90后新星本届欧洲杯的第三个进球，扎戈耶夫也成为欧洲杯开赛以来最为闪耀的明星。处于劣势的俄罗斯，总是能够依靠犀利反击，取得领先，而扭转局势。
第47分钟，波兰队禁区外的直塞，莱万多夫斯基趟过门将出脚晚了，被挡出底线。这个球和英法大战中米尔纳晃过门将的那一个进球很像，有异曲同工之妙。
第58分钟，波兰队反击给到右路，库巴自己带球，向中路走，晃过一名后卫，禁区内起脚抽射，力量角度俱佳，直窜球门死。波兰队迎来了久违的进球，1-1的比分会让比赛变得更加开放。
第79分钟，扎戈耶夫对裁判的判罚不满，像裁判咆哮，被黄牌警告。扎戈耶夫火气不小，看起来这位小将也是性情中人。
第93分钟，主裁吹响了全场比赛结束的哨音，双方球员都显得很沮丧。被扳平对俄罗斯来讲难以接受，而两连平让波兰队只能在末轮死拼捷克队。 多谢各位版主鼓励!
掌声同样送给各位!:handshakeem021{:3_245:} 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-18 12:03 编辑
Portugal 2-1 Holland: van Marwijk makes changes, but Holland crash out with zero points
June 18, 2012
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The starting line-ups
Portugal suffered an early setback, but played better football and fully deserved their win.
Paulo Bento kept the same starting XI for the third game in a row.
Bert van Marwijk made three changes. In defence, Ron Vlaar replaced Johnny Heitinga in a straight swap. It was further forward where he made significant alterations – Rafael van der Vaart came in for Mark van Bommel in order to add some creativity to the midfield, while Klaas-Jan Huntelaar started upfront, meaning Robin van Persie played just behind a and Wesley Sneijder went to the left, the system Holland used at the end of the Germany match.
There was a huge contrast in styles here – Holland were a bunch of individuals without any cohesive structure, while Portugal were disciplined, organised and clear with their attacking intentions.
Dutch shape
This was van Marwijk’s final role of the dice, and while Huntelaar playing upfront was a clear change, the major story was in the midfield zone. Instead of two holders – which utterly failed against Germany (albeit against a side with excellent movement and a good understanding in midfield), the duties in midfield were clearly split. De Jong sat deep and protected the defence, while van der Vaart moved forward to create.
There was some flexibility between these two, but it was a surprise that de Jong generally stayed to the left, and van der Vaart to the right. That’s the most natural way to play, as van Bommel plays to the right and so it caused less disruption. But it was surely preferable to play de Jong centre-right, able to stop Cristiano Ronaldo when he broke past Gregory van der Wiel. The alternative argument is that Jetro Willems needed help against Nani, but Ronaldo was the primary threat, and de Jong should have been in that zone.
Van der Vaart’s display was classic van der Vaart – he curled in a superb opener, yet his presence made Holland completely open at defensive transitions, and utterly lacking shape without the ball. In this game, with Holland needing a big win (and a favourable result elsewhere), it was probably the correct decision from van Marwijk to go with the more offensive option in the centre of midfield – it was win or bust – but this performance basically supports his theory that against big sides, van der Vaart is simply too anarchic to play deep in midfield. Kevin Strootman always seemed the best compromise between a holder and a creator, and it’s frustrating that he didn’t play a minute in this tournament.
Holland attacks
Even though van der Vaart offered more attacking presence than van Bommel, Holland hardly excelled going forward. Van Marwijk persisted with this shape, presumably on the back of it looking half-decent against Germany. But there were no promising attacking combinations – Miguel Veloso stayed goalside of van Persie and the other two Portuguese midfielders stayed near, forming a triangle around the Arsenal forward, which cut Holland’s central player out of the game.
Arjen Robben contributed little from the right, while Sneijder had his quietest game of the tournament, drifting into that position occupied by the three Portuguese central midfielders. Huntelaar barely got the ball, although his excellent reverse run, overlapping Fabio Coentrao, was important in creating space for Robben to lay the ball into van der Vaart for the Dutch goal. That off-the-ball run was subtle and selfless, but important in making life easier for his teammates. Maybe Holland needed more of that from others?
Portugal strategy
Portugal played well, primarily looking to break through the flanks with their two wingers. Ronaldo had an excellent game in the final third, combining well with Nani. There were still concerns about Ronaldo’s defensive work, and van der Wiel motored past him far too readily – but with de Jong rarely in a covering position, Portugal had a quick out-ball when they won possession. It wasn’t too different from the situation against Denmark, when Ronaldo’s poor defensive play nearly cost Portugal the win – but whereas he missed two one-on-ones in that game, today he more than compensated. (Besides, Portugal were quick to cover the space behind Ronaldo, with Joao Moutinho or Raul Meireles, depending on who was closer, moving out to that flank.) Van der Wiel was out of position when Ronaldo hit the post early on, a warning sign of things to come.
Despite attacking mainly down the flanks, Portugal also found space inside, almost accidentally, because Holland were so open there. De Jong covered the first midfield runner, usually Meireles, while Moutinho got space deeper and completed 36 passes, ten more than any other Portugal player. (Although Portugal’s passing figures are actually quite low, as they played on the break for long periods. Holland needed to win 2-0, so were always the side to make the running.)
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Dutch changes
Van Marwijk changed things around – van Persie moved to the right, Sneijder to the middle, Robben to the left. It seemed a change for the sake of it, with no real motive or specific intention, just a “may as well try something” move. Holland didn’t look any better. Portugal brought on Nelson Oliveira upfront for Postiga, and the young Benfica forward once again impressed with his good movement inside the penalty box.
But the key substitution was when van Marwijk went for broke – Willems off, Ibrahim Afellay on down the right, and van Persie forward to partner Huntelaar. Holland, in theory, went to a back three, with Mathijsen moving across slightly – but they didn’t really, they were effectively still a back four, just with no left-back.
It showed: Nani missed a sitter whenhe was unmarked for a Ronaldo cross, then Portugal punished Holland directly down the right, with Nani setting up Ronaldo. That was game over.
Bento introduced Custodio, the truest’ holding player Portugal have, with Meireles departing. Rolando replaced Nani – as against Denmark – for some penalty box defending late on. In the end, Portugal came closest to scoring the game’s fourth goal, with Ronaldo increasingly dangerous on the break.
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Conclusion
Third favourites for the tournament, yet going home with zero points. That is actually a harsh reflection of Holland’s tournament – no, they weren’t very good, and yes, van Marwijk made mistakes. But Holland were extremely unlucky to lose against Denmark, with van Persie’s surprising lack of composure in the penalty area a major reason for the failings, rather than poor tactics from van Marwijk.
Against Germany, they were outclassed by a very fine side, granted. But tonight was not a ‘true’ game – Holland needed to win by two goals, they had to relentlessly push forward even when winning. Overall, Holland were bad, but not quite ‘zero points’ bad. It’s not van Marwijk’s fault that van Persie stumbled when presented with a great chance against Denmark, nor is it his fault that Huntelaar missed a one-on-one when brought on as a substitute – that’s simply an individual finishing badly, and a whisker away from an ‘inspired masterstroke’. Better luck against Denmark would have completely changed their campaign, and if you’re unfortunate against (on paper) the weakest side in the toughest group, you’ve really got an uphill struggle.
The decision to go with two holders against Germany made sense in theory, because Germany are so good in that zone. The criticism should not be “Why he didn’t play a more offensive player?” but “Why didn’t van Bommel and de Jong do their jobs?” That, of course, is van Marwijk’s responsibility too, but the criticism should be directed at the right issue.
The ‘problem position’ in midfield could have solved with Strootman, who isn’t the answer to all Holland’s failings, but would have played an important, selfless role in midfield. He didn’t play enough. On the other hand, Afellay was given too many chances and Robben contributed little. The big names were given too much leeway, and this fits into the rumoured problems in the dressing room – that, more than tactics, appears Holland’s main issue.
It’s tough to judge Portugal so far. Their gameplan wasn’t a million miles away from working against Germany, but then they defeated Denmark despite Bento failing to fix his side’s clear weak spot. This performance was good, but against a Dutch side chucking men forward in search of a two-goal win. This played into Portugal’s counter-attacking plans, and they won’t get that freedom in the knockout stages – especially not if they concede the first goal of the game.
Certainly, Bento has the most talented attacker in the tournament, and Ronaldo illustrated that today. More interestingly, Bento also has reliable options from the bench – Oliveira and Silvestre Varela have both contributed a lot in the three group games. Is it a coincidence that both are accustomed to being superbsubs with their clubs? 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-19 13:16 编辑
23楼参考译文
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来自虎扑
葡萄牙2-1荷兰战术分析：范马尔维克虽有变阵，但荷兰队却难逃三吃鸭蛋的厄运而惨淡出局
2012-06-18
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双方首发阵型
葡萄牙虽然开局不顺过早丢球，但随后他们的表现更好，也完全配得上这场胜利。
本托连续三场保持首发阵型不变。
范马尔维克则做了三处变动。防守方面，弗拉尔代替海廷加出现在了中卫的位置上。最大的变招来自前场——为了增加中场的创造力，范德法特顶替范博梅尔出场，亨特拉尔也首发出场，这样范佩西就撤到了他的身后，而斯内德则移到了左路，这也是在对阵德国的最后时刻里荷兰人所使用的阵型。
两队的体系差距非常明显——荷兰是各自为战的11个个体，而葡萄牙则纪律严明，组织有度，目标明确。
荷兰阵型
本场比赛是范马尔维克的最后一搏，虽然亨特拉尔首发是个极为明显的变化，但真正的变招是在中场。荷兰并没有使用之前输给德国的双后腰阵型（当然德国的中场移动组织和配合非常出色），而是安排了两个分工明确的中场。德容殿后保护防线，范德法特则上前助攻。
战术安排上两人的位置是有些弹性的，但令人惊讶的是，本场比赛基本上是德容在左，范德法特在右。不过这也是自然的，因为通常范博梅尔都是出现在右边，这样也算保持了原来的阵型。不过显然德容出现在中路偏右的位置更合适，因为他能在C罗突破了范德维尔之后及时补防。当然，威廉斯也需要帮助来协防纳尼，但是C罗的威胁更大，所以德容应该出现在偏右的位置上。
本场比赛的范德法特是典型的范德法特——他用一脚美妙的弧线打破了场上的僵局，但是他的存在致使荷兰队在防守时门户大开，球队无球时的阵型也非常糟糕。虽然本场比赛荷兰需要一场大胜（当然还要看另外一场比赛的赛果），换上一个进攻能力更好的中场无可厚非——胜败在此一举——但是本场比赛再一次验证了在对阵强队时，范德法特出现在中路拖后的位置是行不通的。其实要想在防守者和创造者中间找一个平衡点，斯特罗曼一直是个不错的选择，但令人沮丧的是，本届欧洲杯他1分钟的时间也没捞到。
荷兰的进攻
比起范博梅尔，虽然范德法特带来了更多的攻击火力，但是本场比赛荷兰的进攻实在说不上出色。范马尔维克坚持阵型不变，大概是因为这个阵型在对阵德国时还算不错。但是他们并没有组织起什么有质量的进攻——维罗索一直盯在范佩西身后，另两名中场也在附近伺机而动，这样就对范佩西形成了一个三角包夹趋势，直接防死了荷兰的核心人物。
罗本在右路的贡献也少的可怜，在移到左路这个葡萄牙有三中场布防的区域后，斯内德也奉献了本届欧洲杯最安静的一场比赛。虽然亨特拉尔漂亮的反跑带走了科恩特朗，给罗本内切创造了空间，罗本也助攻范德法特打入进球，但是全场下来，亨特拉尔很少拿到球。他的跑动狡猾而无私，但在给队友们创造机会方面非常重要。或许荷兰队需要其他人也来这么做？
葡萄牙的对策
葡萄牙踢的非常不错，战术首选就是通过两个边锋打开对方的边路。C罗在进攻腹地的表现非常出色，和纳尼的配合也很不错。当然，C罗的防守依然值得担忧，范德维尔就过他过的非常容易——但是他把德容牵扯了出来，这样当葡萄牙获得球权时，他们可以迅速反击。这场比赛其实和对阵丹麦时也没多少差别，C罗糟糕的防守差点让葡萄牙输球——但是那场比赛C罗错失了两次单刀机会，而今天全补回来了。（不得不说，葡萄牙对C罗身后的空间的补防也非常迅速，穆蒂尼奥和梅莱勒斯，谁近谁就移到边路去补。）比赛早期C罗击中立柱的那个球，范德维尔失位严重，这也预示了接下来的比赛趋势。
虽然进攻多数是从边路展开，葡萄牙在中路的机会也不少，这跟荷兰的中路意外的开放有很大关系。德容会去限制第一个插上来的葡萄牙中场——多数是梅莱勒斯，这样穆蒂尼奥在其身后就获得了不少空间，他完成了36次传球，比队中的第二名还多10次。（虽然葡萄牙的传球数据很低，但这是因为他们主要靠打反击。荷兰必须以2-0获胜，所以多数时候都是他们在控球。）
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荷兰的变阵
范马尔维克的调整动作不小——他把范佩西移到了右路，斯内德去到中路，而罗本则来到左路。不过这更像是为了变招而变招，没有什么真正的动机和意向，有点“管他呢，试试看吧”的意思。变阵后的荷兰并没有踢的更好。葡萄牙则用奥利维拉换下了波斯蒂加，而来自本菲卡的年轻前锋再一次用禁区内漂亮的走位给人留下了深刻的印象。
但是关键的换人来自范马尔维克放手一搏的那次——下威廉斯，上阿费莱去到右路，范佩西移到锋线搭档亨特拉尔。理论上说，这时候的荷兰踢的是三后卫阵型，马泰森稍微移到边路——但事实上，他们并不是真的在踢三后卫阵型，依然算是四后卫阵型，只不过是没有左后卫罢了。
从后面就可以看出：C罗的横传找到了无人盯防的纳尼，只不过纳尼错过了这次绝佳的机会，随后葡萄牙一直主攻右路，最终纳尼助攻C罗反超比分。比赛结束。
本托用葡萄牙阵中真正的后腰库斯托迪奥换下了梅勒莱斯。后来为了在比赛后半段增加对禁区的保护能力，他又用罗兰多换下了纳尼——就像对阵丹麦那样。最终，葡萄牙差点又打进了比赛中的第四粒进球，罗兰多在反击时极具危险。
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结论
作为本届欧洲杯的三号种子，荷兰队却以0分打道回府。事实上，这样的赛果对荷兰来说有些残忍——的确，他们的表现并不好，范马尔维克也犯了不少错误。但是输给丹麦的比赛他们其实非常不走运，失利更多是因为范佩西在禁区内缺乏冷静，而不是范马尔维克的战术糟糕。
对阵德国，德国确实技高一筹，这没话说。但是今晚，甚至不能算是一场“真正”的比赛——荷兰需要赢两球以上，所以即使领先，他们也要不断的压上进攻。总的来说，荷兰踢的很糟糕，但不是那种“一无是处”的糟糕。对阵丹麦时范佩西错失了一脚绝佳的机会，这并不是范马尔维克的错，替补上阵的亨特拉尔错失单刀也不是他的错——这只能说是单个球员把握机会能力不佳，就像是一个“美妙计划”中突然冒出来的不可控瑕疵。如果对阵丹麦时的运气能好点，那么他们本届欧洲杯的表现会完全两样，如果说你在对阵小组中实力最差的球队（纸面上）时还运气不佳，那你真的有的受了。
理论上说，对阵德国时上双后腰也是合理的，因为德国的中场太强大了。我们不该指责他“怎么不上个攻击性更好的球员？”而该问他“为什么德容和范博梅尔踢的那么差？”显然这也是范马尔维克的责任，但是我们要找对问题。
中场的“位置问题”或许可以用斯特罗曼来解决，虽然他并不是荷兰失利的一切原因，但是他可以在中场提供非常重要非常无私的作用。他的出场时间不够。话分两头，阿费莱的出场时间则太多了，罗本的贡献也太少。范马尔维克给了大牌球员太多的自由，这也印证了荷兰更衣室内不和的传闻——相比起战术，这才是荷兰最大的问题。
现在还很难给葡萄牙下结论。他们的战术布置也并没有比对阵德国时好到哪去，但是虽然本托并没有处理好阵中最明显的弱点，他们还是击败了丹麦。本场比赛他们的表现也不错，但是对阵的是全线前压追求两球获胜的荷兰，这正中葡萄牙防守反击战术的下怀，但是在淘汰赛阶段他们肯定碰不到这样的好事——要是先落后一球就更别想了。
如你所知，本托拥有本届欧洲杯最具天赋的攻击手，C罗今晚也证明了这一点。有趣的是，替补席上本托也有不少靠谱的选择——奥利维拉和瓦雷拉在三次小组赛中都表现不错。这两人在各自俱乐部也都算是超级替补，这是巧合吗？ 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-18 12:25 编辑
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荷兰0-1丹麦之双方首发阵容
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荷兰1-2德国之双方首发阵容
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葡萄牙2-1荷兰之双方首发阵容
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