[ZM欧洲杯前瞻]3L德国、5L荷兰、23L西班牙
本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-10 12:20 编辑Euro 2012 previews: general themes
June 5, 2012
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Team-by-team previews are on their way later today. But, to save repetition in many articles, here are some general themes based upon recent international tournaments:
1. For underdogs, being defensive and organised, then playing on the break is the best bet
Fans of outsiders in this competition have often complained that they’re not passing the ball well enough and that they want to see a more expansive game. That might be personal preference in terms of aesthetics, but the current success as Spain shouldn’t be seen as the template for more minor football nations in this competition.
Recent underdogs who have proved successful have generally been very defensive, have allowed themselves to be dominated, then relied on counter-attacking and set-pieces. Continental champions Greece in 2004 and Zambia in 2012 had the lowest pass completion rate of any side in the tournament. Uruguay weren’t quite so extreme in World cup 2010 and Copa America 2011, but were very reactive. For the likes of Ireland, Czech Republic and Ukraine, playing ‘good football’ is not on the agenda.
Being a knockout tournament, you can get far simply by being hard to beat – Paraguay reached last year’s Copa America final with five consecutive draws.
2. Strikers don’t need to be prolific to be part of a winning side
In 1998 Stephane Guivarc’h spearheaded the victorious French side despite not scoring in the entire tournament, in 2006 Luca Toni did something similar, only scoring in one game. Even Spain in 2010 didn’t see their starting striker score in any matches – David Villa only scored in games where he’d started on the left, and Fernando Torres didn’t score.
In international football the striker is often a target man and a hold-up player rather than a brilliant poacher, and the Golden Boot might be won with as few as four goals.
3. The schedule will be important
This has been touched on before – the draw was important not just because of who each team was drawn against, but because some sides will have a serious advantage in terms of preparation time.
4. Club connections are vital
Spain depended a lot on Barcelona at the last World Cup, Italy had good club connections (Pirlo-Gattuso, Cannavaro-Zambrotta, Totti-Perrotta) thoughout the side too. Football is, more than ever, based around familiarity and cohesion when it comes to passing moves. Club football has never been so superior to international football, and it’s now obvious that international sides suffer by not having enough time to work on attacking moves as club sides.
Therefore, it’s clear to see that Russia have built upon Zenit and CSKA players and the Czechs have built on (ex-)Plzen players, for example. There are many more instances.
5. Lesser nations don’t have stars
With the exception of Zlatan Ibrahimovic (and a couple of younger players like Christian Eriksen who haven’t yet proved themselves on the international stage) the outsiders in this competition don’t have a single world-class figure to build the side around.
That, to a certain extent, has always been the case. But there is no Gheorghe Hagi, no Hristo Stoichkov, no Pavel Nedved, no Zlatko Zahovic, no Marc Wilmots – players who, around ten years ago, utterly dominated their side and played a huge part in their success or failure. This time around, coaches of outsiders have stressed the importance of playing as a team to maximise ability, having acknowledged the lack of top-class players.
6. Various sides are atypical of their nationality
Holland aren’t very Dutch, Germany aren’t very German, Italy aren’t very Italian, Sweden aren’t very Swedish – the list goes on.
7. The major contenders have made few changes from 2010
Germany, Holland and Spain were the only three European sides to make the World Cup quarter-finals two years ago. Then, there was no talk of a ‘last chance’ for any particular generation of players, and these three nations have broadly kept the same side. Spain have called 19 of the same 23 players, for example (it would have been 21 had David Villa and Carles Puyol been fit) while the German and Dutch sides will be familiar to anyone who hasn’t watched them in the last two years, though each side has been forced to evolve slightly to prevent becoming predictable.
Coincidentally, left-back has been the position each of these three sides has either changed, or struggled to fill.
8. Little variety in shape
Tactical interest at the World Cup came from non-European sides: Brazil’s lopsided shape, Chile’s 3-3-1-3, North Korea’s 5-1-2-1-1, New Zealand’s 3-4-3, Uruguay’s various systems, the USA’s 4-2-2-2, Mexico’s 3-4-3 / 4-3-3.
Unless Italy spring a surprise, there probably won’t be any three-man defences. We’re also looking to Italy for the only real chance of a 4-3-1-2. Every other country will play a back four, a central striker, two wide players and a combination of three central midfielders, in some format. It’s 4-4-2, 4-4-1-1, 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1. Any side that is brave enough to try something different may prosper. 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-7 23:10 编辑
1楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻之一：泛主题性概述
译者：thewall
2012-06-06
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本届欧洲杯的每个参赛队的前瞻在今天晚些时候逐一奉上的。但是，为了在很多文章中不再赘述，那么根据最近几届国际大赛特点，下面给出一些带有普遍性的主题前瞻。
1、对于弱队而言，先作好防守和有序组织，依靠反击伺机图谋取胜吧，这才是最好的选择（赌注）
弱队的球迷们在这样的比赛中经常抱怨，他们支持的球队传球不够好，他们希望看到一场更加精彩的比赛。这也许出自审美方面的个人喜好，但是像西班牙队那样的当下成功，不应被甚小国家的足球队视为在这样的大赛中要奉行的模板。
最近已证明取得成功的弱队，一般都非常注重防守，允许他们自己处于从属地位而将主导权让出，然后依靠反击和定位球取胜。洲际冠军，如2004年欧洲杯冠军希腊队和2012年非洲杯冠军赞比亚队，这两支夺冠队伍都是当年比赛中传球成功率最低的球队。在2010年世界杯上，乌拉圭队情况没那么严重，但在2011年美洲杯上，情形却极其被动。对于像爱尔兰、捷克共和国和乌克兰等这样的小国家足球队而言，踢“漂亮的足球”则非明智之举，不该提上议事日程的。
因为这是具有淘汰赛性质的锦标赛，你则可以通过硬抗而端直地向前走得更远些–像巴拉圭队愣是凭借连续五场平局（90/120分钟），则挺进去年美洲杯的决赛。
2、多产的前锋并不一定就是出自赢家的球队（换言之，上帝并不青睐冠军球队的前锋的）
1998世界杯上，斯蒂芬·吉瓦什作为最终获得那届冠军的法国队正印前锋，可是在整个比赛阶段就是坑爹不进球啦，而2006世界杯上，（冠军队伍意大利的正印前锋）卢卡·托尼也有一些类似的坑爹经历，只有一场比赛进球了。即使2010世界杯上，并不见得冠军西班牙队的首发前锋场场都能得分的——大卫·比利亚只有首发出现于左路的那些比赛场次中才能得分的，而费尔南多·托雷斯根本就不进球
（译者注：板鸭进了8个球，是第8个世界杯冠军，也是进球最少的冠军，其中比利亚包揽5个，其余2个分别是半决赛后卫普约尔头球淘汰德国、决赛中场小白绝杀荷兰，另外一个是谁打进的？一时想不起来了）。
在国家队足球的国际大赛中，前锋往往是防守队员的众矢之的，与其说他们是辉煌的偷猎者（得分手），倒不如说他们是被套牢的玩家，而赢得金靴者，也可能只有4球在握而已。
3、赛程表安排表对进程和结局而言将很重要的
这一点，之前已经提到过的，即分组抽签的影响很重要的，这不仅因为每一队被抽到的对手是谁，而且因为一些队伍在准备时间上将获得极大利好。
4、国家队与大俱乐部的联系（国家队球员所依托的俱乐部背景及其熏陶）也是至关重要的
上届世界杯上，西班牙国家队多名球员来自巴萨，意大利队多名队员也有很好的大俱乐部背景（皮尔洛-加图索、卡纳瓦罗-赞布罗塔、托蒂-佩罗塔）。足球，比以往任何时候，都更加基于（或强调）球员之间的熟悉性和凝聚力，尤其是当进行团队传切配合推进时。俱乐部足球比赛从未如此超越国家队的足球比赛，而现在这一点愈发明显了，即国家队不像俱乐部队那般有足够时间进行攻击推进的磨合训练和比赛而要遭受麻烦的。
因此，可以清晰地看到，例如俄罗斯构成，则已经建立在泽尼特和莫斯科中央陆军队的球员基础上，捷克队则是建立在（前）比尔森的球员基础上。还有很多例子，在此不再赘述。
5、较小的国家鲜有明星球员
出现在这种级别的大赛中，个别小国的球队如瑞典队，拥有斯拉坦·伊布拉西莫维奇这样世界级明星球员（以及尚未在国际舞台上证明自己的一对年轻球员，例如丹麦队克里斯蒂安·埃里克森这样的明日之星）。除此之外，那些所谓的弱队，还没有一个世界级的球星作支撑的。
一定程度而言，这种情况则一贯如此的。但是，对弱队而言，现在情况是没有格奥尔基·哈吉，也没有赫里斯托·斯托伊奇科夫，也缺少帕维尔·内德维德，也无兹拉特科·扎霍维奇，还没有马克·威尔莫茨 — 这样级别的球员。他们这些超级球星，大约在十年前左右，能够完全主宰自己球队，在比赛中发挥巨大的作用，无论成功或者失败。而在这个时候，弱队教练则要强调这样的重要性，即最大化地发挥一个团队的能力，在承认缺乏顶级球员的前提下。
6、各队均无纯国籍的球员
荷兰队中并非都是荷兰人，德国队中并非都是日耳曼民族，意大利队中并非都是很地道意大利人，瑞典队中并非都是传统意义上的瑞典人，这样名单还有一长串的。
7、2010年以来，冠军的三大主要竞争对手已经发生了一些变化
2年前，只有德国队、荷兰队和西班牙队，这三支欧洲队伍打进了世界杯1/4决赛。那么，对于任何特殊的一代球员，这并非说是“最后的机会”，而这三支国家队组成都是广泛地保持一致的。举个例子吧，西班牙已经招够了23名中的19人（假定大卫·比利亚和卡洛斯·普约尔痊愈的话，那就是21人了），而德国队和荷兰队的面孔，对于最近两年来没有观看他们比赛的球迷而言，届时将还是那么熟悉的。尽管他们每个队在构成上已经被迫进行些微的演进以防止被对手预先吃透。
巧合的是，这三支作为冠军的有力争夺者的队伍，在左后卫位置上的人员都有变更，或许需要努力来弥补这一弱项的。
8、阵型上变化则是不多的
上届世界杯上，阵型所引起的眼球和关注来自非欧球队：巴西队的侧向流体阵型、智利队的3-3-1-3阵型、朝鲜队的5-1-2-1-1阵型、新西兰队的3-4-3阵型、乌拉圭队的多阵型体系、美国队的4-2-2-2阵形、墨西哥队的3-4-3/4-3-3阵形。
除非意大利队蹦出一个惊喜来着，恐怕木有别家队伍将会用任何的三后卫战术的。欧们也期待意大利将是唯一的真正实现4-3-1-2战术机会的队伍。其他的每个国家的队伍将采用这样的战术：4后卫、单中锋、2个边路球员以及按照某种方式的三中场组合。阵型无非就是4-4-2、4-4-1-1、4-3-3和4-2-3-1。任何一个队伍，若是足够有勇气去尝试不同的打法，也许就成功了。 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-6 04:04 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Germany
June 5, 2012
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Germany's possible starting line-up. Klose may start instead of Gomez.
They didn’t win the competition, but Germany hit the greatest heights at World Cup 2010. While Spain embarked on a series of controlled but rather uninspiring 1-0 victories, Germany hit four goals past Australia, England and Argentina.
The problem was, those matches tended to be won with predominantly counter-attacking football. It’s a little harsh to criticise in this respect – you can hardly blame Germany for scoring early, the opposition having to come forward more and then Germany hitting them on the break – but the contrast in styles during their defeat to Spain in the semi-final was obvious. Spain were about proactively pressing and winning the ball high up, Germany wanted to counter.
But once Spain went 1-0 up, Germany could no longer counter as Spain weren’t leaving spaces at the back. Furthermore, they found it difficult to come out of their shell and press to win the ball. They had to become a more proactive side.
Pressing
Now, things have changed. Germany don’t sit deep in two banks of four – they’re more energetic, more mobile. They press more, forcing the opposition defence into poor passes, they win the ball in the opposition half, and are good at tactical fouls. “We are no longer focused on the fast transition from defence to attack,” says Philipp Lahm. “We are playing less on the counter. We now have players who are so good that we can dominate the game against any opposition.”
In addition to the increased pressing, Germany’s possession play is also superior. They hold the ball for long periods, using this period to rest, but they keep the tempo high and circulate the ball quickly. Jogi Low is particularly proud of the latter aspect – since he took over in 2006, the average amount of time each player spends in possession of the ball has fallen from 2.8 seconds to 1.1 seconds.
But Germany haven’t lost their ability to break quickly. That quick pace means they can still transfer the ball forward swiftly and efficiently. Spain remain the side to beat, but can be too predictable. Germany are the best all-round attacking side, at least on paper. “We have a good understanding in our build-up, and are quick to turn defence into attack,” says Mario Gomez.
Striker?
Gomez is one part of the greatest conundrum in the side. Should he start upfront, or should it be Miroslav Klose? It’s a classic situation of form against familiarity – Gomez has scored 80 goals in the last two seasons compared to Klose’s 32, but Klose has a superb understanding with Lukas Podolski in particular, but also with Mesut Ozil and Thomas Muller. Fitness concerns also play a part – Klose missed the final two months of the season with a thigh strain. If he’s 100% fit, Low will probably choose him for the sake of understanding and cohesion, but that looks unlikely and the more robust Gomez will instead play. He’ll have to score quickly, however, or Klose will return to the side.
With Klose, Podolski’s place is also less secure. He has consistently done well for Germany even when his club form has been poor, and he offers pace, direct running and a goal threat from the left. Andre Schurrle is challenging him for a place on the left, and in the final pre-tournament friendly over Israel, Germany were much improved once Schurrle replaced Podolski, but Low is likely to stick with the Arsenal-bound forward for the opening game.
Attacking
In the centre is Mesut Ozil, who stands a great chance of being voted the Player of the Tournament. He is perfect for this German side – he can orchestrate counter-attacks by directly dribbling with the ball at speed, but he can also unpick deep defences because of his superb spatial awareness. His off-the-ball movement, his overlapping runs and his amazing selflessness in the penalty box make him an ideal central playmaker, and if he performs to his maximum ability, he will have a greater influence than any other player in the tournament. On the right is World Cup Golden Boot winner Thomas Muller, who is disciplined defensively and clever with his movement.
Germany have great attacking options from the bench. In addition to the players already mentioned, there is new Dortmund signing, forward/winger Marco Reus, who would prefer to take Muller’s place, Dortmund’s other wonderkid in Mario Gotze, who could play in any of the three attacking positions and offers great speed and dribbling ability, and Toni Kroos, who could fill in for Ozil – but is more likely to be seen in one of the deep-lying roles.
Double pivot
The first choices for those positions are again Bastian Schweinsteiger and Sami Khedira, who were united for the World Cup after the injury to Michael Ballack. Now, Ballack is out of the picture and these two are very much established in the centre of midfield. With the continued shift from a counter-attacking side to a possession-based team, their roles have changed slightly – they’re forced to make sudden runs to connect midfield and attack and provide another attacking option. When they did that two years ago it was generally as part of a direct attack, now the runs come as a more gradual part of the build-up play.
They move forward in turn, and seem to take their positioning from Ozil – if he’s to the right it’s the left-sided midfielder who moves forward, and vice-versa, keeping a triangle in the centre of the pitch with one player becoming the holder. Khedira is generally more defensive, and now Germany press more, he often has to cover a large amount of space ahead of the back four. Kroos, Lars Bender and Ilkay Gundogan are alternative options.
Defensive worries
Germany’s problem is at the back. Well, it’s actually two problems. First, their best left-back and best right-back is the same player, Lahm. He’s comfortable on either side and doesn’t seem to mind switching at short notice, and Low has taken a while to decide which flank to field him on. Now, with Dortmund’s Marcel Schmelzer disappointing for the national team in his left-back position, it seems Lahm will play on that side. However, Bendikt Howedes of Schalke hasn’t been great at right-back either, so Jerome Boateng (a centre-back for Bayern, though a right-back earlier in his career) will fill in. He and Lahm could, in theory, switch sides.
Second, they lack a sturdy centre-back partnership. Holger Badstuber has continued to improve and looks a certain starter in the left-sided centre-back role, but Mats Hummels hasn’t brought his Dortmund form to the national side, and Per Mertesacker has been injured for the last few months. He also lacks mobility, which is a real option with Germany playing much higher up the pitch, and getting less structural support from the midfield. Mertesacker’s experience seems likely to get him a starting place, but Germany will be troubled by balls played in behind the defence. Having moved from being a counter-attacking side to a possession side, they’re now most vulnerable to counter-attacks themselves.
Conclusion
Germany were very close to Spain’s level two years ago, and while Spain have lost a couple of key players, Germany have improved. Technically and tactically they might be as good as Spain. They lack that experience of winning, although that could be turned around into a positive – they’re still hungry for success, and this time around, having been knocked out by Spain in 2008 and 2010, they might just win the competition.
Quick guide
Coach – Jogi Low
Formation – 4-2-3-1
Key player – Mesut Ozil
Strength – Pace, energy and an excellent squad
Weakness – Uncertainty and a lack of a solid unit at the back
Key tactical question – Klose or Gomez upfront?
Key coach quote – “They are desperate for success, and simply love coming together to play high-tempo attacking football.”
Betfair odds: 4.3 (10/3)
Recommended bet: Germany to score the most goals in the tournament at 3.85
Further reading: James Tyler on Germany’s new identity, Ulrich Hesse-Lichtenberger’s Tor!: The Story of German Footballhttp://www.assoc-amazon.co.uk/e/ir?t=zonamark06-21&l=ur2&o=2, and the excellent Bundesliga Fanatic website. 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-7 22:17 编辑
3楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻：德国队
译者：thewall
2012-06-07
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/germany.jpg
预测的德国队首发阵容：克洛泽或许会替代戈麦斯出任单前锋
虽然没有赢得2010世界杯，但德国队在那届杯赛中，却赢得了最大比分和眼球注意力。当西班牙队开启一系列的掌控场面、结果却甚为平淡的1比0小胜的比赛征程时，德国战车却在轰隆隆地碾过澳大利亚队、英国队和阿根廷队的蹂躏式比赛中，都向对手大门轰进四球。
问题在于，这些比赛的大比分赢球，往往是在领先后通过反击战获得的压倒性优势而实现的。在这方面的批评不绝于耳，虽然有些苛责了 - 但你很难责怪德国人早早进球领先了，而这时对手不得不倾巢而出往前压，这正中领先者的下怀，于是德国人反击一打一个准 - 然而在半决赛遭遇西班牙队的败局中，出现了形成鲜明对比的踢球方式，这是显而易见的。西班牙队主动压迫，并牢牢将控球权掌握在自己一边，而德国队却想反其道而行之（这次木有成功的）。
一旦，西班牙队进入1-0的领先轨道，德国队并不再可能取得反击机会的，因为斗牛士军团不会给他们留下后防空档的。此外，德国人发现他们很难走出他们自己的防护区，去前压而获得控球权。于是，德国人不得不变为欲更加主动出击的一方。
（以下来谈德国队在本届欧洲杯上的前瞻性问题）
压迫
现在，情况已经发生改变了。德国队不用把(中后场)两排的各四名球员后撤很深–他们体能更加充沛，上下移动更加频繁。他们更多前压，迫使对方防守队员处于传不出球的尴尬境地，这样他们就能在对方的半场赢得球权，并且擅长利用战术犯规。“俺们不再强调由守转攻的快速切换，”菲利普·拉姆说道，“俺们正在减少反击的踢球方式了。俺们现在拥有如此擅长主导比赛的球员，即使面对任何对手”
前锋？
戈麦斯是德国队最大难解之题的一部分。是他该首发作为单前锋，还是该由米罗斯拉夫·克洛泽来担当这一角色？这就面临着形式遭遇熟悉性的典型性情景 - 最近两个赛季戈麦斯打进了80球，而克洛泽只打进了32个，但是克洛泽不仅对搭档卢卡斯·波多尔斯基有极佳的默契了解，而且对搭档梅苏特·厄齐尔和托马斯·穆勒也不例外。身体恢复问题也会产生部分影响的 - 克洛泽因为大腿肌肉拉伤而错过了本赛季最后2个月的比赛。如果他百分百地复康了，出于理解力和凝聚力的考虑，勒夫可能会选择他的，但这看起来不太可能，要是戈麦斯的话，他反而会踢得更High。戈麦斯必须尽早取得进球，否则，克洛泽还是会回到球队首发位置的。
与克洛泽一样，波多尔斯基的首发位置也难保无虞。即使在俱乐部比赛中表现较差，他在德国队的比赛中一直做得很好，而且他有速度，从左路直接发起攻击后，会面对大门制造进球威胁的。安德烈·许尔勒将对他在左路位置发起挑战的；在前不久最后一场战胜以色列的友谊赛中，当许尔勒替代波多尔斯基上场后，德国队这路进攻改善了许多，但是在德国队的首场比赛中，勒夫可能还会坚持使用这位下赛季的阿森纳前锋的
攻击
双制支撑点
防守的隐忧
结论
快捷指南
教练 - 乔吉·勒夫
阵型 - 4-2-3-1
核心球员 - 梅苏特·厄齐尔
强项 - 速度、体能和优秀阵容
弱点 - 不确定性、并不稳固的后防组合
关键战术问题 - 谁来担当单前锋，克洛泽还是戈麦斯？
教练语录亮点 - “他们渴望成功，而且纯粹热爱齐心协力的配合来展现高节奏的进攻足球”
赔率：4.3（10/3）
推荐赔率：德国队在本届杯赛上赢得最多进球的赔率为3.85 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-6 04:12 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Holland
June 5, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/holland.jpg
Holland's probable starting line-up
After a reputation for playing beautiful football was undermined by Holland’s brutal performance in the 2010 World Cup final, Holland’s strategy in the past two years has been an interesting balancing act – Bert van Marwijk wants to look as if he’s moved on to a more open style of football, but remains reluctant to abandon the structure and functionality that took Holland to the World Cup final in the first place.
Despite retaining roughly the same core of players, Holland are a more attractive side than two years ago. They hold onto the ball for longer periods, and the circulation of the ball is quicker.
van Bommel partner?
But there remains a great debate about the style of play, and discussion about Mark van Bommel’s midfield partner is effectively a microcosm of the wider debate about the overall ideology of the side. Inevitably, Johan Cruyff has been keen to give his view:
“The problem with two holding midfielders is quite simple, but somehow many coaches don’t see it. The build up happens too slow – holding midfielders always need that extra touch, always need to have a look when they have the ball already. That takes time away. The opponent can position themselves to stop the killer pass and the forwards are all marked. Plus, having two holding midfielders means there is one less creative playmaker. It’s a double edged sword…we need one good controller in midfield and two creative players on the wide midfield spots, like Barcelona does…if our build up is slow, the effectiveness of our creative forwards will decrease significantly. Robin van Persie got a lot of criticism last World Cup, and I believe it was because we played to defensively and passively. We became a counter team. Our best players are up front, though. They need the ball, and they need it quick.”
Van Bommel’s place in the team is assured. His partner at the 2010 World Cup was another holder, Nigel de Jong. His karate kick into the chest of Xabi Alonso was the single most memorable example of Holland’s force in the final, and when another strong tackle (although it wasn’t deemed a foul) broke the leg of Hatem Ben Arfa in a Premier League game, van Marwijk dropped him from the Holland squad. ”It was a wild and unnecessary offence. He went in much too hard,” he said.
That strange decision was an attempt to improve Holland’s footballing reputation. The other two options for that role were, happily, much more forward-thinking players. Rafael van der Vaart often played there against weaker sides, and van Marwijk won the World Cup semi-final against Uruguay by gambling and putting van der Vaart on for de Jong at half-time. Van der Vaart would be the choice of his fellow players and probably the Dutch public too, but van Marwijk will find it difficult to field such an anarchic player in a deep position against quality opposition.
The other option is Kevin Strootman, the young PSV midfielder who made his international debut last year. He appears the perfect compromise – he’s not a defensive midfielder like De Jong, nor an attacking midfielder like van der Vaart. He sits deep and sprays the ball across the pitch, keeping the tempo high and providing a quick initial pass into the front four with his left foot. He started the final four qualification games, but also played in the 3-0 friendly defeat to Germany in November, when he and van Bommel were unable to cope with the constant waves of German attack through the centre of the pitch. He was removed after an hour, with de Jong brought on to provide defensive strength.
Strootman’s problem (and also van der Vaart’s) is that Holland have been drawn in such a tough group, with Portugal, Germany and Denmark. As the Dutch football site 11Tegen11 points out, the defensive approach of two holding midfielders is used against strong sides, while van Marwijk prefers to play with a deep-lying playmaker against weaker opposition. In such a tough group, de Jong seems likely to get the nod. He’s started the four friendlies since Strootman’s outing against Germany, and after all this fuss, Holland will play the same central midfield combination that started throughout the World Cup. As a result, their football will be more structured than fluid.
Striker?
That’s not the only debate in the side. Upfront, despite Robin van Persie being the clear first-choice at the World Cup, and being in sensational form over the last 18 months, his position has faced a challenge from Klaas-Jan Huntelaar, who enjoyed a brilliant Bundesliga campaign with Schalke. Van Persie wouldn’t have been dropped – he could have been moved wider.
But in the recent friendly against Bulgaria, the use of both players resulted in a poor performance and a 2-1 defeat. It would be nice to get Huntelaar into the side, but structurally it doesn’t seem possible without moving van Persie – who remains the superior player – into a role he’s less comfortable in. Therefore, van Persie will start with Huntelaar on the bench.
Left winger?
Here there are three options, who all offer something very different. There is Dirk Kuyt, who offers the most defensive protection (which is important, as Holland lack a reliable left-back, which will be discussed shortly), and his ability to play deep alongside the two holding players in the World Cup final gave Arjen Robben the freedom to effectively become a second striker – which should have won Holland that game, had Robben not squandered two great one-on-one chances. The balance Kuyt provided shouldn’t be underestimated.
Then, there’s van der Vaart. Unlikely to start in the wide role and with Wesley Sneijder a certainty in his favoured number ten position, the possibility of playing van der Vaart on the left is appealing – with Robben more direct on the right, having a player who can move infield and become a ’second number ten’ alongside Sneijder gives Holland another playmaking option. That’s especially important, of course, if they’re playing a static defensive-minded duo deep in midfield. But the problem is that Sneijder himself likes to drift to the left, and Holland would risk having roughly the same type of player doing the same job.
Therefore, it seems that Holland’s left-sided player will instead be a proper winger, Barcelona’s Ibrahim Afellay. He spent most of the campaign injured, and hasn’t played a full game for a year – but looks likely to start, bringing a classic Dutch system of two wingers stretching the play and making the pitch as big as possible, even if it’s in a 4-2-3-1 rather than a 4-3-3. His performance in the final pre-tournament friendly against Northern Ireland secured his place – two goals and an assist.
Left-back?
This is the real problem area. Giovanni van Bronckhorst has retired and is the only player from Holland’s first-choice World Cup XI not to be in the current squad. His natural replacement was PSV’s Erik Pieters, but his foot injury ruled him out of the tournament. Instead, van Marwijk will probably select Jetro Willems, Pieters’ club back-up. He’s an excellent prospect – fast and technical – but is 18, inexperienced and was uncapped until two weeks ago.
The only alternative is Stijn Schaars, ten years older and more combative, but a holding midfielder, although he is left-footed. This creates another, unwanted debate about the more appropriate style of player.
Elsewhere
Aside from these debates, Holland are unchanged from the World Cup. The defence is relatively weak, although critics said that two years ago and they performed admirably. This weakness, however, is another reason for van Marwijk selecting two holders.
The final questions are about the roles of van Persie and Sneijder, who effectively play as a front two. Van Persie didn’t perform particularly well as a goalscorer at the World Cup (partly because he wasn’t 100% fit after a long injury lay-off) and spent much of the time holding the ball up and assisting others. “In the whole World Cup, I was only put in front of the keeper four or five times,” he complains. “Cesc did it four or five times a match.” The role of Holland’s forward is not about poaching – and van Persie has increasingly become a poacher at club level – but about playing as a team player. He has no problems doing that, it’s just a case of whether he has become accustomed to being a penalty box player.
Equally, the reason Sneijder wasn’t putting him through on goal was because he, with five goals, was Holland’s main goalscoring threat, despite the fact his goalscoring record at Inter was average. Since then, his role at Inter under various coaches has become extremely confused – and although he generally performs well for Holland, it’s still an odd situation.
Finally, Holland have great options from the bench. Huntelaar, Kuyt, van der Vaart and Strootman will be options, as will clever centre-forward Luuk de Jong and explosive winger Luciano Narsingh. It feels like at least one of those ‘different options’ will be needed in each game.
Conclusion
A marginally more attractive footballing side than in 2010, but a less secure, stable starting XI means Holland are arguably a weaker team. In such a tough group, van Marwijk will go for two holding midfielders and is unlikely to change that in the knockout stage, which Holland will expect to qualify for. With each position having two contenders who interpret the role very differently, this is all about finding the right balance between defence and attack.
Quick guide
Coach – Bert van Marwijk
Formation – Basically a 4-2-3-1, though the position of the wingers and Sneijder hint at a 4-2-1-3 at times
Key player – Wesley Sneijder
Strength – A plethora of attacking options
Weakness – A slightly dodgy defence, and a tendency to pass too slowly when two defensive midfielders are used
Key tactical question – Who partners van Bommel?
Key coach quote – “A good team plays within a certain structure. You hear coaches say their team can play four or five different systems but I don’t think that’s realistic. What you can do is vary the details – that way, we can make life difficult for our opponents.”
Betfair odds: 8.0 (7/1)
Recommended bet: van Persie to outscore Huntelaar at 1.45
Further reading: David Winner’s excellent book Brilliant Orangehttp://www.assoc-amazon.co.uk/e/ir?t=zonamark06-21&l=ur2&o=2, the very promising iPad magazine Orange Crush and the Dutch tactics site 11Tegen11 5楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻：荷兰队 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-6 04:19 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Portugal
June 5, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/portugal.jpg
Portugal's probable starting line-up
Such is their habit for producing a certain type of footballer, it rather feels like we’ve encountered a Portugal side with these strengths and weaknesses many times before.
Portugal is home to the superstar winger. For years their highest-profile player has resided on the flank – first Luis Figo, then Cristiano Ronaldo – with a slight overlap between the two. Simao Sabrosa, Ricardo Quaresma and Nani have all been hyped as a potential world beater – Simao has now retired from international football, Quaresma is on the fringes of the squad, and Nani will start on the opposite flank to Ronaldo, keen to make an impact having missed the 2010 World Cup through injury. “Our kids grow up learning how to dribble, how to run with the ball, how to have the ball at their feet,” Nani says of Portugal’s obsession with wingers. “They rarely play with their back to goal, that’s why I think there aren’t so many strikers in Portugal.”
Still a strong defence
This is a fairly similar squad to the one which travelled to South Africa, but the main difference is a key one – the coach. Carlos Queiroz drilled Portugal excellently at the back – they had the best defensive record at the World Cup – but his side lacked invention and penetration with the ball. After a rather messy divorce a couple of games into Portugal’s qualification campaign for Euro 2012, Paulo Bento took over, and has Portugal playing slightly more open, attractive football that fits with his status as the youngest coach at this competition.
He faces the same problems, however – and has created two of his own, after bust-ups with both Ricardo Carvalho and Jose Bosingwa meant a premature end to the international careers of two fine defenders, at least for as long as Bento is coach. It’s a shame to disturb a unit that worked so well together, although neither were assured of their place anyway: Portugal has a fearsome centre-back duo of Bruno Alves and Pepe that is excellent aerially, if a little brutal at times. Joao Pereira is now the first-choice right-back, after a good couple of seasons for Braga and Sporting, and he’s recently earned himself a move to Valencia for next season, where he’ll replace another old Portuguese right-back, Miguel. On the left there is Fabio Coentrao, who was the best left-back at the World Cup.
Number nine?
At the other end of the pitch is Portugal’s traditional weak spot. A striker is as the only thing Portugal have lacked for years (this is probably slightly untrue: Pauleta had an excellent scoring record at international level, even if he rarely played well in tournaments, while Nuno Gomes was a very intelligent striker with great movement, and had an eye for an important goal). The problem has become more evident in recent years, when those two were past their best.
As in 2010, it’s pretty much a straight choice between Hugo Almeida and Helder Postiga upfront, with the latter likely to get the nod. Almeida is a straight target man, whereas Postiga’s link-up play is better but he’s become a more basic number nine as the years have gone by. Neither are prolific – and so the stereotype remains true – but this isn’t necessarily a huge problem. International football is full of number nines who ‘do a job’ in a successful side without being superb goalscorers, and besides, this has been such an issue for Portugal for so long, that they’ve now become accustomed to playing without a Golden Boot contender up top. It isn’t a shock situation, and it’s reasonable to suggest that Cristiano Ronaldo (146 goals in 144 games for Real Madrid) and Nani can provide goals from the flanks.
Number ten?
But Portugal have developed a secondary problem – a lack of creativity. While Figo received the most acclaim, the heartbeat of Portugal’s ‘golden generation’ was Rui Costa, as pure and as brilliant a number ten as Europe has seen this century. His decline towards the end of his career happened at a perfect time for Portugal, as Deco acquired Portuguese citizenship and became a top-class player at roughly the same point. The transition between the two was slightly clunky (and it was sad that Rui Costa effectively got bumped down to a reserve on home soil in his final tournament in 2004), but at least there was always a constant source of creativity. After Deco, and with the sad injury to the brilliant Zenit playmaker Danny (on the fringes of the side, yet capable of breaking through) there is nothing.
Well, that’s not quite true. Central midfield is traditionally an area Portugal excel in, yet at the World Cup there was a huge problem with a lack of ambition from that zone. It was obvious before the tournament that Queiroz wasn’t allowing his midfielders any freedom of expression or license to move forward, and it was incredible to see the ball carried forward down the flanks, only for three central midfielders to sit behind the ball, broadly doing the same job. You basically need ball-winning, passing and creative ability from a midfield trio, but Portugal had three players covering the first two jobs between them, and no-one moving forward towards the front three, with Deco staying deep in the role he was used to for Chelsea, rather than the position he played so well for Porto back in 2003/04.
Midfield duties
There’s a danger of that happening again. Portugal’s deep-lying midfielder will be Miguel Veloso, who is more of a cultured player than a pure scrapper, and sits in front of the back four spreading play to the flanks – particularly to Portugal’s right, as he is naturally left-footed. He needs to be more active to get into positions to receive the ball – he still doesn’t quite seem accustomed to playing so deep. Slightly ahead to his left, his old Sporting colleague Joao Moutinho is an intelligent, gifted passing midfielder who keeps things simple, and also likes to look to wide positions rather than play an incisive forward pass. There’s already a slight overlap in duties there.
The third midfielder, therefore, has to be more forward-thinking. However, in the absence of a Rui Costa or a Deco, the verticality will instead come from Raul Meireles (with Ruben Micael a similar option). He is essentially a box-to-box player, a jack of all trades, shoved forward to connect the midfield and the attack. It’s not an ideal situation, but it’s workable – and in the pre-tournament friendlies there was a good understanding between the two more advanced midfielders – one came deep when the other moved higher up, and vice-versa.
Yet for all the passing quality from deep and the energy from Meireles, there’s still a problem with creativity. Again, Portugal will be forced to look to the flanks, but can you expect two wingers, however talented, to do the job of a number ten and a number nine? That’s even before you think about them doing their duties as wide players.
Wingers
Ronaldo, inevitably, is given license to do as he pleases, to a certain extent. He plays narrow on the left, always looking to come inside into a shooting position. That narrowness is compensated for by the attacking thrust of Coentrao coming down the outside – those two had a good relationship even before Coentrao joined Ronaldo at Real Madrid, and the left flank is certainly the strongest part of the side going forward (although opposition right-backs can ask questions of Ronaldo’s defensive awareness by breaking quickly). Pereira supports Nani well, but with less gusto and excitement, in addition to the fact that Nani stays wider.
Despite a strong defensive unit, it’s debatable whether Portugal are good enough at stopping counter-attacks – Veloso isn’t a natural holder (Custodio, a back-up, is, and “has different characteristics to all the other midfielders – he is a positional player who is good for this single role,” says Bento) and the centre-backs aren’t the quickest.
In charge of a side that neither scored nor conceded many goals at the World Cup, Bento will probably need to make good use of his bench. There, Portugal have options. Hugo Viana, originally omitted from the squad yet given a late call-up after the injury to Carlos Martins, offers an ability to play clever passes from midfield. Introducing him for one of Portugal’s midfield trio would be a good way to play a more proactive game without taking a big gamble, although Bento’s original selection indicates he’s not a huge fan of the Braga player. “Hugo Viana had a good season, he’s a good player, but in view of our style of play he did not fit into this 23-man list,” he had said.
On the flanks, there is Quaresma – unpredictable and often underwhelming, but exactly the kind of player you’d given ten minutes to ‘try and make something happen’, although Silvestre Varela might be a more likely supersub, having reluctantly grown used to that role at Porto.
Upfront, Almeida will probably start on the bench and is a more direct version of Postiga. Nelson Oliveira is a rough diamond – the Benfica youngster “offers us something different to our other two strikers, and he is a young player with a lot of potential and a lot of quality,” in Bento’s words, and could be a revelation.
Conclusion
There will be few surprises from Portugal. They’ll retain the ball well, and look to the flanks quickly for Ronaldo and Nani to provide a moment of magic. If Ronaldo is on top of his game, he’s the most dangerous attacker in the tournament, and therefore Portugal have a decent chance of a good run – but it’s rare for a victorious international side to rely on individual brilliance over attacking cohesion and variation.
Quick guide
Coach – Paulo Bento
Formation – 4-3-3
Key player – Cristiano Ronaldo
Strength – the flanks, specifically the left due to the support of Coentrao
Weakness – the double problem of a lack of creativity and a lack of a true poacher
Key tactical question – Is Meireles good enough in his advanced position to connect midfield and attack?
Key coach – “If the team score plenty of goals, it really doesn’t matter who gets them as long as we win and our attacking plan works. We have a lot of attacking options and I am confident that our strikers are good enough.”
Betfair odds: 21.0 (20/1)
Recommended bet: Ronaldo to be Portugal’s top scorer at 2.9
Further reading: The sublime Portugoal 7楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻：葡萄牙队 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-6 04:25 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Denmark
June 5, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/denmark.jpg
Denmark's probable starting line-up
It’s impossible to think of Denmark at the European Championships without thinking of their astonishing victory 20 years ago. Then, they triumphed at Euro 92 despite not qualifying for the tournament initially…yet they’re even more of outsiders this time around.
That’s not due to the ability of the side, but because of their group. Together with Germany, Holland and Portugal (three of the top five sides in the world, according to the FIFA Rankings), they have the worst draw of any of the 16 teams in the competition. In Group A, they might have been favourites. In group B, they’re expected to finish bottom.
Yet there are grounds for optimism. Denmark finished above Portugal in their qualification group, and thrive upon the role of underdog.
Eriksen
This is a slightly different type of Danish side to usual. For years they seemed to turn up at major tournaments with the same mix of players, mainly based around the wing threat from Martin Jorgensen, Jesper Gronkjaer, Thomas Kahlenberg and Dennis Rommedahl. The latter two remain, and Rommedahl – who still has good pace despite being 34 next month, will start on the right flank. But overall, Denmark seem to be more of an all-round threat.
The reason for that is the presence of Cristian Eriksen, the highly talented Ajax number ten who acts as the chief playmaker in Morten Olsen’s system. He travelled to the World Cup two years ago but was too young to have a meaningful impact. Now, he’s unquestionably Denmark’s star player, and perhaps the player in the tournament most responsible for his team’s creative threat. He has tremendously quick feet, can play clever through balls but also likes a chipped ball over the defence to a winger making a late run into the area. He’ll be able to cope with the big responsibility – his appreciation of space is fantastic and his movement into zones to receive the ball is excellent.
Around Eriksen
Because of Eriksen’s free role this is a slightly unusual system – not quite a 4-2-3-1, not quite a 4-3-3, more of a 4-2-1-3. Eriksen has two sturdy holding midfielders behind him: Niki Zimling and William Kvist have an excellent partnership, and generally stay in position rather than venturing forward.
Eriksen will be supplying three other attackers. Nicklas Bendtner has an excellent record at international level and is perfect for the system – he can hold the ball up, and also get on the end of crosses. Expect Rommedahl to motor down the right before attempting to provide low balls across the penalty area. On the other flank, Michael Krohn-Dehli plays a narrower role, a half-winger and more of a link between midfield and attack, which is important as it means Eriksen doesn’t have to do all the connecting by himself.
Technical defence
At the back, Denmark seem vulnerable to individual errors. Bad mistakes from Daniel Agger and Christian Poulsen gifted Brazil two goals in a pre-tournament friendly. However, they possess centre-backs very good at playing incisive passes, so opponents need to be wary of them stepping forward and firing a pass into the front four, bypassing the midfield altogether. Daniel Agger’s left foot brings good balance to that department, but his centre-back partner is unclear. Simon Kjaer should be first-choice, but he’s endured a couple of disappointing season at club level and could be replaced by Andreas Bjelland.
Denmark’s left-back will be slightly more attacking than their right-back – for a combination of two reasons. First, Rommadahl’s high positioning means that overlapping is difficult down that zone, and Lars Jacobsen will be cautious with positioning. On the left, however, Simon Poulsen scampers up and down the line well.
In goal, Thomas Sorensen’s injury means Stephan Andersen will start.
Depth?
With the exception of the question marks in defence, this should be one of the more predictable sides in the competition, partly because Denmark lack strength in depth, particularly going forward. “We can’t afford to get any injuries, otherwise we will not qualify,” Olsen bluntly admits. There is no clear supersub ready to replace the front four. Variations in attacking structure will probably come from the same starting quartet, with the wingers and Eriksen able to move higher or deeper according to Olsen’s demands.
Conclusion
So much depends upon Eriksen – if he’s on top of his game, Denmark could have the player of the tournament in their ranks. If he’s closed out by powerful opposition double pivots sitting deep, Denmark will struggle to create.
Quick guide:
Coach – Morten Olsen
Formation – 4-2-1-3ish, with the option to move to either 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3
Key player – Christian Eriksen
Strength – A settled starting XI, combined with a degree of flexibility in shape
Weakness – A lack of game-changers from the bench, plus question marks about the reliability of the defenders and goalkeepers when under sustained spells of pressure
Key tactical question – How much does Eriksen influence the game?
Key quote – Olsen: “Eriksen cannot carry the team by himself and we have told him that he shouldn’t try to do that.”
Betfair odds: 100.0 (99/1)
Recommended bet: Nicklas Bendtner to be Denmark’s top scorer at 3.55
Further reading: Dave Farrar’s piece on Denmark’s 1992 side in Issue One of the Blizzard is well worth paying ‘however much you want’ to read 9楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻：丹麦队 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-6 04:30 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Poland
June 5, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/poland.jpg
Poland's probable starting line-up
Poland come into this tournament with the lowest world ranking of the 16 competitors, but they are certainly not the weakest side in the competition.
Their ranking is unfairly lowered, of course, because they are the co-hosts and therefore haven’t been playing competitive games over the past two years. The last two years has made a big difference – 24 months ago Poland seemed to lack players established enough to compete at a major international tournament, but the rise of the Dortmund trio (Lukasz Piszczek, Jakub ‘Kuba’ Blaszczkowski and Robert Lewandowski) plus Arsenal goalkeeper Wojciech Szczesny, means they do possess some fine footballers.
Teamwork
But this is not a side based around standout individuals, something coach Franciszek Smuda is unable to do. “We don’t have stars,” he says. “We can only accomplish something as a team.”
That is code for a defensive style, and Poland have fallen back upon the standard template for outsiders in major international tournaments, having initially tried to be more inventive under Smuda. He promised “offensive and attacking football” when he took over, and experimented with a variety of systems: 4-3-2-1, 4-1-4-1/4-3-3 and 4-4-2. Now, it’s cagey, counter-attacking football combined in a structured 4-2-3-1. There have been disagreements with players about the nature of the tactics, with Lewandowski a particularly vocal character, but few would argue that this formation and approach doesn’t make the best use of Poland’s decent squad.
Defensive style
Poland’s best quality is their defensive strength. They’re on an excellent run of clean sheets in their friendlies (albeit against questionable opposition at times – their final pre-tournament friendly was against an extremely poor Andorra side). Smuda says the biggest progress the team has made over the last two years is that ability to not concede goals, and Group A looks certain to be low-scoring. The inevitable next question is about how good they are at attacking. Smuda wants the side to pass the ball quickly through the side, playing one-touch football and breaking directly down the flanks.
Solid defence
At the back, the centre-back duo is fairly unremarkable. Marcin Wasilewski is a sturdy, physical defender while Damien Perquis is slightly more cultured, and has recovered from injury in time to make the side. Left-back Sebastian Boenisch is actually right-footed (maybe explaining why he wears the number two shirt) and therefore prefers to play forward passes into the front four rather than overlapping down the left.
Good right flank
On the other side is unquestionably Poland’s biggest strength, as right-back Piszczek and right-winger Blaszczkowski have an excellent partnership for Dortmund and will bring that to the national side. Piszczek plays high up the pitch and looks to stretch the play, while Blaszczkowski makes very direct runs towards goal, and can run at speed with the ball, as well as protecting Piszczek well and covering when the right-back goes forward.
Interestingly, especially with Boenisch being predominantly right-footed on the other side, Piszczek assisted two goals in pre-tournament friendlies by coming inside onto his left foot before crossing into the penalty box – so opponents should be wary that both full-backs can come inside onto their ‘wrong’ side.
Unambitious central midfield
In midfield, the holding duo of Eugen Polanski and Rafal Murawski is more defensive than is ideal – both are strong and good in the tackle, but there’s not much variety in their passing, with both tending to simply knock the ball wide rather than look for a more incisive ball. Polanski tends to play slightly higher up, but Murawski is probably more likely to provide a clever pass. Both can shoot from outside the box, with mixed results.
Attacking options
On the opposite side to Blaszczkowski is Maciej Rybus on the left. He plays a similar role, maybe positioned slightly wider. This position was up for grabs, with Ludovic Obraniak and Adrian Mierejewski also options, but Rybus has impressed in pre-tournament friendlies and should get the nod from the start of the competition.
That means that Obraniak, a former Lille superbsub who has moved to Bordeaux, will play as the number ten. The fact that he can play on the flank means he plays as a central winger, always looking to move into wide positions, helping to create overloads and providing another crossing option with his left foot – again, often from the ‘wrong’ side, the right. He can drift in and out of games, but is Poland’s most intelligent midfielder and this position allows him the greatest amount of positional freedom – had he been stuck out on the wing, his creative energy would have been diminished and his defensive awareness can be suspect. He’s the one individualistic player in an otherwise solid unit.
Upfront, Poland have Lewandowski, fresh from a superb season in Germany with Dortmund. He performed better than anyone could have expected having been a back-up in 2010/11, and comes into this tournament in great form and with his confidence very high. He is basically a typical number nine and can be a little selfish, but for Poland he works the channels well. He tends to play slightly left-of-centre, and often hangs around that position waiting for long crosses from his Dortmund colleagues from the right.
Conclusion
Poland are not a bad side. They have home advantage and are in the weakest group, plus have a genuine Golden Boot contender upfront. Expect relatively defensive football, quick counter-attacking, a strong static box of four in the centre of the pitch, and plenty of energy down the flanks.
Quick guide:
Coach – Franciscek Smuda
Formation – 4-2-3-1
Key player – Robert Lewandowski
Strength – the all-Dortmund right flank
Weakness – a lack of creativity and guile in the centre of the pitch
Key tactical question – how good will Poland’s transitions be? They need to work the ball forward quickly to cause opponents problems.
Key coach quote – “Individuality is a player like Messi. We don’t have such players, so we should do our best to be strong as a team.”
Betfair odds - 50.0 (49/1)
Recommended bet - Lewandowsi to be Poland’s top scorer at 2.5
Further reading – the excellent Polish Football Scout website. 11楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻：波兰队 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-6 04:37 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Russia
June 5, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/russ2.jpg
Russia's possible starting line-up
There are many lessons to take from Spain’s dominance of international football over the past few years, and an important one has been the importance of bringing a solid club connection to international level.
Spain’s World Cup-winning side had a core of Barcelona players, played roughly the same style of football, and therefore benefited from long-standing relationships that couldn’t have been built in the minimal time international sides enjoy together.
Russia coach Dick Advocaat is well aware of this, and has been keen to follow a similar principle as Russia coach. “I just built upon a group of CSKA and Zenit players,” he says. “Both teams are doing well, and it has proved to be the right view.”
Zenit midfield connection
Zenit are the main team represented. That’s obvious off the pitch (Surgey Fursenko, the President of the Russian Football Union, used to be at Zenit, as did Advocaat) but more importantly, on it. “It’s a fixed system, always 4-3-3, the same one I played with at Zenit,” says Advocaat.
Most obviously, the midfield three all play for Luciano Spalletti’s side. Zenit are a wonderful, free-flowing side who rotate their midfield triangle well and play predominantly on the counter-attack. Few other countries will have such a good understanding in the centre of their side. Furthermore, Andrei Arshavin has returned to Zenit, while right-back Aleksandr Anyukov is another. If Aleksandr Kerzhakov starts upfront, which seems likely, that’s six of the ten outfield players provided by Zenit.
CSKA defence
CSKA provide the defensive base of the team. Goalkeeper Igor Akinfeev has returned from injury and will start if 100% fit (though there are big doubts about this – inevitably, his back-up is Zenit’s keeper, Vyacheslav Malafeev), and plays behind the centre-back pairing of Aleksei Berezutski (in for his injured brother) and Sergei Ignashevich, a trio that has played together at club level for years.
Further forward, Alan Dzagoev is another CSKA player, so the only odd man out in the probable starting XI is Anzhi’s Yuri Zhirkov – although he played for CSKA for five years until 2009, so there’s an understanding with the centre-backs there, too.
Forward dilemma
The real debate in this side is upfront, where Advocaat has a choice between two different styles of player. He could go for the simple, target man option – either Pavel Pogrebnyak or Roman Pavlyuchenko, who are strong, good in the air and hold the ball up and wait for midfield runners. The more likely option is Kerzhakov, who plays a very different role – he drifts to the flanks, particularly the left, dragging defenders away and creating space for the midfielders to exploit. He’s smaller, trickier and better technically.
Despite the difference in style, there’s a clear consistency – the striker is not in this side predominantly to score goals (though that would be nice) but to spearhead the attack and create opportunities for the other players. Kerzhakov understands that better than anyone else, but the false nine has rarely worked successfully at international level, with coaches generally preferring a traditional number nine and a more basic style of football. But with the club connection, Advocaat can afford to go with a false nine and the most sophisticated of the three strikers.
Goalscoring could be problematic – with a large part of the striker’s job about bringing others into play, Russia rely upon those attacking midfielders having the confidence in front of goal. With Arshavin, for example, that’s a risky strategy. They may look to set-pieces for goals – in the pre-tournament friendly against Italy, they twice threatened with very long corners towards a runner coming in at the far post.
Formation and fluidity
Although this is a 4-3-3, it’s a very different type of 4-3-3 from the way Barcelona, for example, play a 4-3-3, because it features two wide players who both come inside into the centre of the pitch. Arshavin essentially becomes a playmaker, a number ten, while the highly-promising Dzagoev plays in a similar position but looks to get in advance of the striker more frequently, and was Russia’s top goalscorer in qualifying, with four goals.
But the real dark horse, in terms of goalscoring, is Roman Shirokov. He breaks forward from midfield to the edge of the penalty box with very well-timed runs. That was particularly obvious during Zenit’s match against Benfica in the Champions League this season, and also in Russia’s warm-up match against Italy – in both games, he scored twice.
Without the ball, Shirokov and Konstantin Zyryanov work as a duo, pressing more heavily than the equivalent players in similar systems will do at this tournament. They’re not scared to move across the halfway line to shut down their man, which can leave Igor Denisov a little stranded in front of the defence – although Denisov can also move forward to track an opposition number ten, often leading to rash tackles to win the ball, or cynical fouls to break up counter-attacks. With the ball, Russia can move the ball around excellently with quick, one-touch passing – though they can also hold onto the ball for too long, and dominate possession without creating chances.
Quick full-backs, slow centre-backs
With Arshavin and Dzagoev coming inside, the width comes from full-back. Zhirkov tends to become involved in attacking play frequently and is technically the better of the two, but Anyukov is a very powerful runner and arrives later on in attacking moves. These two must provide forward runs, in order to stretch the play, and a side that pins them back will make Russia very narrow.
Despite the good understanding at the back, there is a concern about the pace of the two centre-backs, and with both full-backs moving forward and the midfield pressing rather than sitting deep, Russia might be vulnerable to quick passes through the side. The centre-backs, like the midfielders, stick tight to their man, and can be dragged around by intelligent forwards. Another defensive concern is the work rate and positioning of the two wide forwards.
Fitness
The physical condition of the side is also an issue. Almost the whole squad currently plays in Russia (a few having returned to secure their place in this side, after underwhelming spells in the Premier League), and have just finished a long ‘transition’ season from a summer to a winter calendar. They’ve effectively played one-and-a-half seasons, with the ‘half’ exclusively comprised of games against other big sides after a ’split’ in the table, meaning a very demanding run-in for all these players.
When combined with an old squad (and even the youngest player, Dzagoev, recently missed over a month with a toe injury) and a match every four days, it’s a genuine problem – which contributed to the arrival of the controversial, innovative fitness coach Raymond Verheijen, who has worked with Advocaat before. “Of all the sixteen Euro participants Russia is the only team which has consistently trained just once a day – it’s about freshness instead of fitness,” he says.
Conclusion
Russians don’t seem optimistic, but this is a relatively exciting team. “We’re not going to suddenly go defensive,” promises Advocaat. “In qualifying we were successful because we went out to win games. We have to be positive.” In a poor group that looks likely to be cagey, Russia will the most proactive side and will expect to qualify for the knockout stage.
Quick guide
Coach – Dick Advocaat
Formation – It will be termed 4-3-3 – although it’s 4-1-4-1 without the ball, and roughly 4-3-2-1 with it
Key player – Alan Dzagoev
Strength – the cohesion of the midfield
Weakness – the pace of the centre-backs
Key tactical question – which striker starts? This will determine Russia’s play in the final third
Key coach quote – “I don’t care about big names as long as they can play as a team. Everyone knows what their position is.”
Betfair odds: 23.0 (22/1)
Recommended bet: Russia to be eliminated in the quarter-finals at 2.3
Further reading: Jonathan Wilson’s Behind The Curtainhttp://www.assoc-amazon.co.uk/e/ir?t=zonamark06-21&l=ur2&o=2, James Appell’s articles on Russian football at the Football Ramble. 13楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻：俄国队 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-6 04:41 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Greece
June 5, 2012
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The possible starting line-up. Torosidis' fitness is a concern, Ninis could start instead of Salpigidis, and the goalkeeping position is uncertain
Greece aren’t overwhelmingly different from the team that shocked Europe to win Euro 2004. They’re not as extreme in their negativity, and not as effective, but are still broadly defensive and their main threat will come from set-pieces.
The continuity from eight years ago is obvious when looking at the midfield zone: dead ball specialist Giorgios Karagounis and the defensive Kostas Katsouranis are present and are expected to start. They have a good relationship from years of playing together for Greece, Panathinaikos, and going a few years back, Benfica.
Also at Benfica with those two was Greece’s coach, Fernando Santos, which helped him settle into the job having taken over from the legendary Otto Rehhagel. The two veterans play an important role in the dressing room, making their position in the side secure.
More attacking style
Though Greece are more attacking, more technical and less structured than under Rehhagel, they haven’t evolved significantly since the last World Cup.
There is still the same formation, 4-3-3, which features Fanis Gekas as the primary striker, supported by Giorgos Samaras moving inside from the left flank, and Dimitris Salpigidis likely to play the most energetic role of the three. His position may come under threat from the younger, more exciting and more popular Sotiris Ninis, but Salpigidis was favoured throughout qualification and seems likely to start. Either way, that player needs to offer width and stretch the play, because Samaras’ tendency to become a second striker means Greece are otherwise very narrow high up the pitch.
Broken team?
Greece can become a broken team, with a 7:3 split and no connecting players. The two veterans in midfield need a runner alongside them to bring energy and verticality to the side. In an ideal world, Ninis would be in a position to take up a permanent midfield slot alongside them, making an all-Panathinaikos midfield trio, but the position will almost certainly go to Giannis Maniatis, a versatile player who often plays at right-back. He’s more of a hard worker than a creative player, but his stamina and speed will be vital in the midfield zone.
Physical defence with attacking full-backs
The lack of midfield thrust and attacking width is compensated for, in part, by Greece’s attack-minded full-backs. Vasilis Torosidis is something of a Philipp Lahm character, able to play in either full-back position and possessing a good long-range shot. He’s likely to start on the right, allowing Jose Holebas to motor up and down the left. Centre-backs Avraam Papadopoulos and Sokratis Papastathopoulos are solid and physical, although they are decent on the ball too.
Torosidis is an injury doubt for the first game, however, which would probably mean Papastathopoulos moving to right-back, and Avraam Papadopoulos being joined by (no relation) Kyriakos Papadopoulos, the promising young Schalke player. This is what Santos did in the pre-tournament friendly against Armenia.
In goal there’s something of a question mark, where Santos has a plethora of options yet none are particularly convincing. Kostas Chalkias and Alexandros Tzorvas are both error-prone, and Michalis Sifakis might play instead, despite being less experienced. Whoever Santos chooses, this is Greece’s weak link.
Attacking options
The excitement is likely to come from the bench. Ninis is the obvious choice if he doesn’t start, but the introduction of Giannis Fetfatzidis could be an even better option. He’s 21, 5′5, starts from the right but comes inside onto his left foot and has great balance and upper body strength when dribbling past opponents. He likes a chipped finish too – all which means, inevitably, he’s ‘The Greek Messi’, a tag he’ll never live up to, but he’s a fine player and likely to be a classic supersub.
As in 2004, set-pieces will be key. Their most important win in qualifying, the 2-0 victory over Croatia, was sealed with two goals from set-pieces at the end of a dull match. Karagounis’ delivery is good, while Holebas and Fetfatzidis are other options, with the centre-backs and Samaras obvious aerial options because of their height, but Gekas is also good at making runs unchecked.
Conclusion
An old, static core to the side that needs energy from younger players to be remotely exciting. Ninis will hopefully get playing time, Fetfatzidis should appear from the bench, while Maniatis provides functional mobility in midfield. The full-backs are attack-minded and might surprise opponents with their constant running, but Greece’s lack of quality upfront is a big problem.
Quick guide
Coach – Fernando Santos
Formation – 4-3-3 with little width upfront, but attacking full-backs
Key players – The full-backs: they offer the width and directness that doesn’t come from further forward
Strength – Set-pieces: Karagounis is a fine free-kick taker, and Greece possesess aerial threat from corners
Weakness – A lack of security in goal and a very static side overall
Key tactical question – How much do Greece stretch the play, and how much do they connect midfield and attack?
Key quote – Santos: “Greece don’t have a Messi, so it’s tactics first, then quality second”
Betfair odds - 110.0 (109/1)
Recommended bet - Poland v Greece to be under 1.5 goals at 2.6
Further reading – Ed Malyon’s preview at InBedWithMaradona 15楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻：希腊队 本帖最后由 thewall 于 2012-6-6 04:44 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Czech Republic
June 5, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/czech.jpg
Probable starting line-up, if Rosicky is fit. If not, Hubschman will come in, with Plasil moving higher
Michal Bilek hasn’t been particularly popular during his time as Czech Republic coach, but he has assembled a well-organised, functional side that mixes experience with youth.
The three star names are the trio who featured prominently in the superb Czech side that might have won Euro 2004 were it not for Pavel Nedved’s cruel injury in the semi-final – Milan Baros upfront, Tomas Rosicky as the playmaker, and Petr Cech in goal. It’s a solid spine, but if the Czechs are to spring a surprise, it will be because of the younger, more mobile players located on the flanks.
“I’d characterise our system as a 4-2-3-1,” says Bilak. “But the system is not as important as how the players are able to carry it out. The advantage of this system is that it creates a strong midfield, and that there are fast and skilful players on the wings who can support Baros.”
In terms of the starting XI, this one of the more difficult sides to predict. Although the 4-2-3-1 seems certain (despite Bilas trying a 4-2-2-2 in qualifying) a number of versatile players mean positions are up for grabs.
Decent defence
Cech is a sure starter in goal. Ahead of him, it now seems likely that Michal Kadlec, often used at left-back, will move inside to partner Tomas Sivok, a traditional centre-back who is very good in the air. That would mean David Limbersky playing on the left of the defence – he’s a much more attacking player than Kadlec, and also quicker. He can play the ball with both feet, and could be an attacking threat moving forward from deep positions. On the other side, Theodor Gebre Selassie is also an attack-minded player and should be given license to get forward.
Midfield structure?
Perhaps the main debate is about the two players is in the centre of midfield. Tomas Hubschman, another who was in the Euro 2004 squad, started the majority of qualification games, and is the best true holding midfielder in the squad. He plays that role excellently for Shakhtar Donetsk, and on paper should be sure starter. Yet when he was suspended for the away game against Lithuania and the play-offs against Montenegro, Bilek had to start with a double pivot of Petr Jiracek and Jaroslav Plasil. Suddenly, the side looked better – more fluid, more open, more energetic in the centre of midfield, and that combination will probably start here.
Plasil had previously been used higher up, but being brought back into the deeper role he plays at Bordeaux has suited him. He sees more of the ball, and breaks forward to join the front four. Jiracek plays a more reserved role, and his movement to pick up possession is often out to the left side (he’s very obviously left-footed) particularly when the defence are trying to work the ball forward – he tests how much the opposition central midfielders are happy to move to the flanks and track him. The two holding players work extremely hard to get into space and receive a pass, which makes the entire side look very energetic.
This assumes that Rosicky is fit, which seems likely, although he has missed the pre-tournament friendlies with injury. His direct replacement, Daniel Kolar, is very much a step down – and if Bilek finds himself without Rosicky, he will surely consider moving Plasil forward again, and play Hubschman after all. That would make the Czechs both less creative and less mobile, so the availability of Rosicky is vital.
Pace out wide
The two wide players will probably be Vaclav Pilar on the left and Jan Rezek on the right. They play broadly similar roles – they’re both very direct and look to break forward quickly towards goal, supporting Baros as quickly as possible.
Baros is clinging onto the lone striker position, despite competition from players eight years younger, Tomas Necid and Tomas Pekhart. Baros used to rely on knock-downs from Jan Koller but now has to fend for himself, and he spends a lot of time dropping deep to hold up the ball, and also moving into the channels where his movement is good. He also makes clever runs towards the near post at set-pieces, but he hasn’t been in the goals recently, and the Czech’s top scorer in qualification was Kadlec – the top scoring defender in the entire qualification process, mainly thanks to three penalties.
A little like Russia, the Czechs are relying on a core of players who have recently appeared together at club level. Limbersky, Rezek, Pilar and Jiracek all play for, or used to play for, Viktoria Plzen. ”It would have been be stupid if we had not made the most of that,” says general manager Vladimir Smicer.
This is not an attacking side, but they are relatively direct. Cech often thumps the ball downfield quickly towards Baros (despite the fact he’s nothing like a target man), and Baros is quickly supported by two wide forwards on either side, plus Rosicky lurking just behind in the hole.
Conclusion
It’s difficult to see what Bilek’s side truly excel at. However, their energy and mobility, particularly on the flanks, is impressive – and against Russia and Greece, two sides who have immobile defences, they could pick up results.
Quick guide
Coach – Michal Bilek
Formation – 4-2-3-1
Key player – Tomas Rosicky
Strength – pace down the flanks
Weakness – a lack of goals
Key tactical question – the midfield combination, and the type of player used in that midfield trio
Key quote – Bilek: “The advantage of this system is that it creates a strong midfield, and that there are fast and skilful players on the wings who can support Baros.”
Betfair odds – 90.0 (89.1)
Recommended bets: Kadlec to be Czech top scorer at 9.0
Further reading: The Czech Up website and Mark Smith’s preview at InBedWithMaradona 17楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻：捷克队 本帖最后由 colinfirth 于 2012-6-6 22:00 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Ireland
June 6, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/ireland-1.jpg
Probable Ireland starting line-up
It is a decade since Ireland last qualified for a major international tournament, and the three biggest stars from the 2002 World Cup will represent Ireland again here – Shay Given in goal, Damien Duff on the wing and Robbie Keane upfront.
They’re probably still the three biggest stars, which rather sums up Ireland’s situation – they don’t have any world class footballers, and that has been foremost in Giovanni Trapattoni’s mind since he took charge of Ireland.
Trapattoni has focused upon creating a solid, reliable unit. Everything he says is about the system, about discipline. “I have given them balance, an equilibrium, and I have underlined that all 11 players attack and defend, without necessarily expecting to play well,” he once said. His quotes are celebrated, his playing style is not. Ireland are ultra-defensive. “In the past had ships with sails and they had to go wherever it was the wind took them,” Trapattoni says. ”Now, you can set a course and that is what I have done with this team. But if you depart from the course, then you end up on the rocks.”
Conservative selection
Because of his focus upon shape and discipline, Trapattoni has been remarkably consistent with his team and squad selection. This has been controversial in Ireland – talented players like Wes Hoolahan and Seamus Coleman have been ignored, and it seemed as if exciting winger James McClean was also set to be omitted, although he’s made the squad despite little international experience. However, the point remains – Trapattoni wants tried, tested and most importantly trusted players, and this team is overwhelmingly about systems rather than individuals. His template is Greece 2004.
Trapattoni was a man of many formations as (a rather unsuccessful) coach of Italy, but with Ireland he doesn’t stray from a traditional 4-4-2, with two defensive-minded midfielders, two wingers breaking down the flanks, one forward dropping off and a big target man upfront. Ireland don’t hoof the ball towards the number nine as quickly as possible, but they’re hardly playing out of their comfort zone: they’ll spend long periods without the ball, then be direct when they win possession.
Defence
At the back, Ireland’s key man is Richard Dunne, a defender who has a remarkably basic skillset for a Premier League and international player, yet he is in his element in this system, where his job is to sit on the edge of the box, make headed clearances and get last-ditch blocks in. The fact that Ireland’s midfield stays so deep means he shouldn’t have to move forward and follow forwards out, as he is slow on the turn. His partner is Sean St Ledger – a fairly ordinary centre-back, yet a consistent performer at international level.
At full-back Trapattoni’s first-choices are Stephen Ward and John O’Shea. They full-backs are defensive-minded, and with Ireland attacking directly there are few opportunities to overlap – they generally don’t venture into the final third.
Midfield
Central midfield is the area that has prompted the most debate. Trapattoni’s favoured men throughout qualification were Keith Andrews and Glenn Whelan – again, unspectacular footballers but capable of doing the scrappy things in front of the defence, as well as playing simple square balls out to the flanks. Those two seemed untouchable in Trapattoni’s mind, but recently the Italian has been spending a lot of one-on-one time with Darron Gibson in training, and has declared that he will be an ‘important player’ for Ireland, suggesting there could be a last-minute change in the centre of the pitch. Gibson can spread play with more ambitious passes than either Whelan or Andrews, so he is a more proactive option, but Gibson’s good performance in the friendly against Bosnia, Trapattoni returned to Whelan-Andrews for the final pre-tournament friendly against Hungary.
However, having previously looked the most inflexible of the 16 coaches in terms of formation, Trapattoni hinted this week that he’d consider playing a 4-5-1. “If we have another situation like this , we need another approach,” he said. “When we have another player in midfield, we can make it more difficult.” That was a shock admission, and for Ireland to change system now would surely be a mistake. They’re unlikely to outpass the opposition – and the 3-2 defeat to Russia showed how clearly a two-man midfield can be overcome by a three-man midfield, but that was when Ireland conceded an early goal and were forced to chase the game for a long period. Prevent an early concession, and Ireland should be OK, although Keane offers the flexibility to help out in midfield.
On the flanks there’s another debate. Two clear first-choices throughout the qualification campaign (Duff and Aiden McGeady) and then a young challenger in McClean, who also performed well against Bosnia – though this seemed to bring the best out of McGeady when he came on as a substitute. Again, Trapattoni has the ability to switch these players. They are all traditional wingers – they look to take on full-backs before crossing to the two forwards.
Forwards
Robbie Keane is the number ten, asked to play, in Trapattoni’s words, “the Francesco Totti role” – although he also makes the occasional run in behind the defence.
Upfront, Trapattoni has options. Kevin Doyle is the first choice but had a poor season for Wolves, and two West Brom forwards, Simon Cox and Shane Long are able deputies. Jon Walters is another option, and is adaptable and has played a deeper role for Stoke this year. Though all are slightly different players, Trapattoni’s decision will probably be about form, fitness and confidence levels rather than tactical reasons.
That said, the strikers play a key part in the defensive phase of play. “Did you ever wonder why certain strikers no longer form part of the squad set-up? Because they would lose the ball and then stand around and watch. But you’ve got to chase back,” Trapattoni says. “Sometimes, your best defenders are your forwards,” he reiterated this week. “If a striker lets his defender go down the pitch and cross for a goal, he has not helped the team. He is like Pontius Pilate. Instead, I want them to run back with the defender and stop him crossing for the goal.”
System over individuals
It’s not harsh to say that Ireland are probably the most technically-limited side in the competition, but Trapattoni is aware of their limitations and has constructed a solid unit that should thrive as the underdog. More importantly, the players sitck to the plan and have a great team spirit (which seems a patronising thing to say, but after England’s complains of boredom at the World Cup, can be an important factor).
Ireland are nicely prepared for this tournament. Each of the other 15 sides would play the same way against Spain, but while for some that would mean a huge departure from their natural gameplan, Ireland are used to being defensive, organised and reactive.
This is very much a game-by-game campaign, and Trapattoni is looking at the weaknesses of his opponents rather than his own side’s strengths. “I spend all my time watching DVDs of Spain, Croatia and Italy, looking at the tactical approach and what I can do. I have seen all of the games – home and away – of the teams we will play. Every little detail – free-kicks, corner kicks, throw-ins, how they start the game – is important for us and will be important in the games in June,” he says.
Ireland’s most winnable game is the opening fixture against Croatia. From those DVDs, Trapattoni will have seen how poor Croatia were when defending set-pieces in the 2-0 qualification defeat to Greece, and this should play into Ireland’s hands beautifully. A 0-0 will be the target against Spain, and then the final game against Italy will be crucial. If Ireland have pinched four points from the first two games – the dream scenario – another goalless draw should be enough.
Conclusion
This is a very reactive side, but if there’s one thing Ireland have been good at in past international tournaments, it’s squeezing through the group despite scoring few goals. They stand a good chance of frustrating superior opposition.
Quick guide:
Coach – Giovanni Trapattoni
Formation – 4-4-1-1 / 4-4-2
Key players – the wingers, who must turn defence into attack swiftly
Strength – excellent shape without the ball
Weakness – ball retention and creativity
Key tactical question – does Trapattoni abandon the shape that has taken him this far?
Key coach quote – “I have underlined that all 11 players attack and defend, without necessarily expecting to play well.”
Betfair odds – 110.0 (109/1)
Recommended bet – Ireland to finish 2nd behind Spain at 9.6
Further reading – Paul Little’s top ten moments in Irish Euro history, Miguel Delaney on Ireland being hard to beat, but not winning much, James Richardson on Giovanni Trapattoni 19楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻：爱尔兰队 本帖最后由 colinfirth 于 2012-6-6 22:16 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Italy
June 6, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/italy.jpg
Italy's possible starting line-up
In many ways, Cesare Prandelli isn’t a typical Italian coach. He’s a highly intelligent man, but one doesn’t think of him as a pure tactician like Marcello Lippi, Giovanni Trapattoni or Fabio Capello. He’s of an Arsene Wenger figure – he wants an overall, attacking philosophy rather than lots of specific tactics, and likes developing young players to suit his footballing identity.
He has attempted to move Italy towards a more positive style of play. That’s partly because it’s Prandelli’s natural style as coach, but also because Italy don’t have the secure defenders we’re accustomed to. The days of Fabio Cannavaro, Alessandro Nesta and Paolo Maldini have gone – Italy have good defenders, but not great ones. They’re more blessed in midfield.
Prandelli explains: “Many of the players felt that the time had come to play – I won’t say a different type of game because, in football, there is nothing new – but something else. Given that I have plenty of quality midfielders, I felt we should play to our strengths and with these players that means a much more attacking game.”
Midfield rotation
However, Italy’s problem is that they lack good wide players to play a four-man midfield. This isn’t a new problem, and even when they won the World Cup in 2006 they played a central midfielder (Simone Perrotta) on one flank, and an Argentine (Mauro Camoranesi) on the other. However, they’ve generally compensated for that with a world class number ten, allowing them to play a 4-3-1-2 or a 3-4-1-2, basing their play around a Roberto Baggio or Francesco Totti figure. Prandelli doesn’t really have that type of player either – Antonio Cassano plays higher up, Sebastian Giovinco’s international experience is limited and Alessandro Diamanti still doesn’t seem like a serious option, despite his inclusion in the squad.
Prandelli’s compromise has been interesting – he wants a constantly rotating midfield, making up for lack of a nominated central playmaker with movement and fluidity. That was obvious when he played 4-3-3 (the preferred formation at the start of his reign), and the experiment has continued with the midfield diamond he’s been using recently. The player at the base of the diamond, the fabulous Andrea Pirlo, stays in position and sprays passes forward. But the other three players – probably Daniele De Rossi and Claudio Marchisio as the shuttlers, and Riccardo Montolivo nominally at the top – switch around.
It’s an unusual system that is more fascinating than it is truly effective, and it doesn’t completely disguise the fact the Italy don’t have a true trequartista. Montolivo is a talented yet frustrating player who has never quite found his best position – even after years of playing under Prandelli for Fiorentina – and it’s arguable that he doesn’t offer anything not provided by the other three midfielders. Still, if his movement is intelligent he can drag players around and create space for the runs of De Rossi and Marchisio, who are both excellent at steaming into the box.
Further forward, in a strike duo that is probably the most naturally gifted yet most troublesome in the tournament, Prandelli is putting his faith in Cassano, who will play as an inside-left, and Mario Balotelli, who is the primary centre-forward but tends to move into the channels.
Back three?
But this assumes that Prandelli will play the 4-3-1-2 system. In fact, he retains that Italian penchant for switching systems late in the day – which provides great tactical interest. He’s the only coach in the tournament who seems unsure of his best formation, and also the only coach who will probably go with something other than a 4-4-2, a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-3-3.
The other option is a 3-5-2. This would see the same forward duo, one player – probably Montolivo – dropped from the midfield, and a back three combined with wing-backs. A week ago, this made great sense because it meant Prandelli could field an all-Juventus back three of Giorgio Chiellini, Leonardo Bonucci and Andrea Barzagli, ahead of Juve’s goalkeeper Gianluigi Buffon. However, this is less likely because of the news that Barzagli will miss a significant part of the tournament with a calf strain. De Rossi could drop deep – he showed this season for Roma that he can play there, but it’s clearly not his best position.
Defence
And so we return to the idea of a diamond in midfield, and a back four. It will still be an all-Juventus centre-back pairing of Chiellini and Bonucci, and with Domenico Criscito omitted due to his involvement in the current match-fixing probe in Italy, Palermo’s Federico Balzaretti will play (he would have battled Chiellini for that role, but Chiellini is now needed in the centre).
On the opposite flank will be Napoli’s Christian Maggio. Both these players are extremely energetic and forward-thinking – Maggio has been used as a wing-back rather than a full-back for the last few years as Napoli, while Balzaretti has often got through a lot of running in Palermo’s narrow systems. With a midfield diamond probable, Italy need consistent support from full-back, and the onus upon these players to get forward is huge.
Pirlo
That could leave the Italian defence exposed, often without protection from full-back, and while Pirlo has been superb for Juventus in that lone holding role this season, he’s not the best player defensively nor the most mobile, and may be overawed with direct counter-attacks through the centre of the pitch. He’ll need support from higher up, with De Rossi and Marchisio expected to close down energetically, yet also scamper back and protect the defence.
But let’s not imply that Pirlo is Italy’s weak link – he’s their key player. His ability to hit accurate long balls (with either foot) into the feet of the strikers is Italy’s best asset, and when combined with the runs of Cassano and Balotelli, he could be one of the tournament’s star performers.
Bench
Italy also have attacking variety. Fabio Borini is a clever wide forward, another who makes good runs (and would be perfect if Prandelli wants to switch to a 4-3-3), while Antonio Di Natale isn’t really fancied by Prandelli, but would be a constant menace and a natural finisher. Giovinco and Diamanti, again, provide different options. Prandelli’s problem isn’t variety, but outright quality.
Conclusion
Italy don’t have enough players who guarantee top-level performances, and therefore they’re relying upon the strategy of their coach to have a significant impact upon this tournament. Prandelli’s preference for unusual formations (in the context of this tournament) means Italy will provide an interesting challenge for their opponents, who might struggle to cope with a diamond.
Quick guide
Coach – Cesare Prandelli
Formation – Probably 4-3-1-2
Key player – Andrea Pirlo
Strength – Good possession play
Weakness – The absence of two key starters from the defence, plus no reliable number ten
Key tactical question – What formation does Prandelli play?
Key quote – Prandelli: “The feeling was that we needed to evolve our style, to try and play a little more on the front foot.”
Betfair odds: 18.0 (17/1)
Recommended bet: Italy v Spain to be over 2.5 goals at 2.46
Further reading: Calcio by John Foothttp://www.assoc-amazon.co.uk/e/ir?t=zonamark06-21&l=ur2&o=2, the Football Italia website and an excellent interview with Cesare Prandelli 本帖最后由 colinfirth 于 2012-6-6 22:18 编辑
21楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻：意大利队 本帖最后由 colinfirth 于 2012-6-6 22:21 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Spain
June 6, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/spain.jpg
Possible Spain starting line-up. Albiol could replace Pique, Llorente or Negredo could replace Torres, various players could replace Silva
Spain didn’t win World Cup 2010 through pure tiki-taka. They won because they mixed tiki-taka with different options that brought more directness and urgency to their play.
When they went with pure tiki-taka, they stumbled. The defeat to Switzerland in their opening game of the World Cup was a huge shock, but while the Swiss deserved credit for the way they defended, the real story was how painfully predictable Spain were in their build-up play. With Andres Iniesta on one flank and David Silva on the other, and both coming inside into the same area of the pitch, Spain often occupied a width of around ten metres with their attacking trio. With Xavi Hernandez, Xabi Alonso and Sergio Busquets all sitting behind the ball, Spain never looked like offering enough variation to make the breakthrough, and they lost 1-0.
Variety
From then on, Spain were always enhanced when they added ’something different’ to the mix. Silva didn’t see any more gametime, which was harsh on him, but considering Iniesta’s impact on the rest of the tournament, Vicente Del Bosque dropped the right man.
There were three elements of variety. First, they could offer directness from the flanks, which came from David Villa starting wide and charging towards goal (with Fernando Torres upfront), or from more natural wide players like Pedro Rodriguez and Jesus Navas, who both played important roles in the final.
The second option was direct forward runs from midfield, which came from Cesc Fabregas, used from the bench four times in the competition, including in the final.
The third option only featured once – Fernando Llorente came on to play a target man role against Portugal and transformed the way Spain played. He should have scored at least once, but his mere presence pushed Portugal back and closed out the game.
Squad harmony
Del Bosque is doubtless aware of this, and while he’s a fine coach, he’s not a particularly keen tactician. The main feature of his management, without wishing to simplify his talents, is to create a harmonious squad. As important as the variation on the field in South Africa was the togetherness off it, and his determination to replicate that is demonstrated by how he’s tried to keep that World Cup squad together – only David Villa and Carles Puyol (injured) and Joan Capdevila and Carlos Marchena (34 and 32, and neither regulars for their clubs over the course of 2011/12). He hasn’t left out any serious options.
Even Torres and Pedro, coming off the back of awful campaigns, remain – they’re popular members of the squad. Roberto Soldado, a fine striker but a potential troublemaker, was axed from the travelling party. “One of the fundamental issues is the good relationship that exists within the group,” Del Bosque says. “I have been fortunate to have a good group made up of nice people. It is important to reinforce the relations that exists between the players – that was a key part of our success in recent years.”
Silva reintroduction
All of which is important in any successful team, but it is paramount to Del Bosque. He listens to his players when it comes to tactics – Carles Puyol’s header against Germany in the World Cup semi-final was a move requested by the players, who thought they’d been overusing Del Bosque’s favoured short corner. Perhaps he listens to them on selection issues too – Silva complained that he hadn’t been used enough last year. “‘Over the past year I’ve been feeling like a bit part player. I’ll work hard to maintain my level with City but I doubt if I’ll go to the European Championship finals,” he said. “‘I do not count on the confidence of the coach.”
It was an exaggerated protest – there was no chance that a fit Silva wasn’t going to be in the 23. But since then, seeing the first sign of dissent amongst his ranks, Del Bosque has tried to make room for Silva.
But this puts Spain back to the situation seen in the Switzerland game – you don’t want two wide players coming inside. Del Bosque has even tried to fit Silva in as a false nine, (largely without success) and Silva doesn’t quite have the natural skillset for that role anyway. Besides, if you have a forward coming short, you need wide players (or midfield runners) making direct runs. You can’t have four players bunching into the same part of the pitch, central between the lines.
Who to drop?
The problem is that Del Bosque can’t include all his playmakers. Busquets, Xabi Alonso, Xavi, Fabregas, Iniesta, Silva, Mata and Santi Cazorla, judging by their ability and form over the past season, all ‘deserve’ to be in their national side. But eight ball-playing midfielders can’t exist together. Probably only four can, naturally – in conjunction with a back four, a striker and a wide player who stretches things. Del Bosque’s attempts to include five or even six are fascinating, but potentially suicidal.
The obvious way to accommodate another of the attacking playmakers would be to play only one holder, which would mean dropping Alonso (rather than Busquets who is better at breaking up play). This would allow Xavi deeper into his Barcelona role, and the same goes for Iniesta. Even then, however, it’s probable that Del Bosque would then put Silva on one flank and either Cazorla or Mata on the other, which doesn’t solve the problem.
And while Del Bosque has said that “We may adopt an even more attacking approach”, it is highly unlikely he’ll do away with Busquets, Alonso or Xavi. This is slightly frustrating – as Roberticus says, “Spain is currently achieving the laudable feat of fielding three of the world’s iconic midfielders and somehow conspiring to render each one uncomfortable and less effective in the presence of one another.”
Still need width
Regardless of the discussion above, Silva and Iniesta will probably start in the wide positions. Iniesta is undroppable, while Del Bosque seems particularly keen to include Silva. Those two combined superbly for the only goal in the pre-tournament friendly victory over China, but that paints a false picture – Spain were terrible in the first half and good in the second – and the main reason for the improvement was that Jesus Navas came on to stretch the play, opening up gaps for Silva and Iniesta to create. The situation hasn’t changed.
If Spain go with Iniesta and Silva wide, and no true winger, then it’s not unrealistic to say that their most important player is Jordi Alba at left-back, a relative newcomer to the side. Everyone else’s job is broadly covered by another player in the XI, but Alba is the only one who would offer outright pace, directness and width. Right-back Alvaro Arbeloa is a good full-back, but nowhere near as accomplished technically. Alba could become 2012’s Pedro/Navas figure, which would allow Del Bosque to indulge in his festival of playmakers higher up.
Defence
In defence, the loss of Puyol is huge for both his defensive ability and his leadership ability. Ramos has come inside into the centre of defence, where he’s played for Real Madrid – weakening Spain’s attacking thrust from right-back – but his partner is uncertain. Two years ago the idea that Gerard Pique wouldn’t be first-choice in 2012 was laughable, but after a poor season for Barcelona, and amid various reports that he’s taken his eye off the ball, Raul Albiol could start instead.
Number nine?
The other issue is at the opposite end of the pitch. The loss of David Villa is huge – his international goalscoring record is incredible, and so often he provided key goals for Spain in international tournaments. Assuming Del Bosque doesn’t start with Silva or Fabregas as a false nine (which remains unlikely), he has a straight three-way choice between Torres, Llorente and Alvaro Negredo. Each has a clear weakness – Torres lacks form, Llorente lacks fitness, Negredo lacks experience. This is very difficult to call, and it would be a surprise if all three were not used at some point in the competition.
Llorente would be favourite if fully fit, and Negredo’s clever runs in behind the defence give Spain offer most penetration, but Del Bosque’s loyalty to Torres shouldn’t be underestimated. It’s not the right decision on paper – but Del Bosque isn’t an ‘on paper’ man. He’s a ‘dressing room’ man, and as always, squad unity and harmony appears to come before tactical efficiency.
Conclusion
Compared to two years ago, Spain are even stronger in the department they excel in. Silva and Mata have developed further since their moves to England, Fabregas has become a better player tactically, in his own words, by returning to Spain. The sublime Cazorla, injured two years ago, offers yet another option.
Yet elsewhere they are weaker – there’s no Villa upfront, there’s no Puyol at the back, and Pedro and Pique aren’t at the level of 2010 (all of which has dealt a bow to the Barcelona connection throughout the side). Spain have an unbalanced squad, but Del Bosque must assemble a balanced team.
Quick guide
Coach – Vicente Del Bosque
Formation – Roughly 4-2-1-3
Key player – Whoever offers width: possibly Jordi Alba
Strength – Xavi, Iniesta, Mata, Silva, Fabregas, Cazorla – six of the best playmakers in the world
Weakness – The lack of a settled back four
Key tactical question – Who does Del Bosque play in the wide positions?
Key quote – Del Bosque: “The hardest thing about being a national manager is that you have to leave out people who have done enough to deserve a place, players who are not regulars for their club, or you have players on the bench and they are not happy.”
Betfair odds: 3.9 (roughly 3/1)
Recommended bet: A Spain v Germany final is 9.0 (8/1)
Further reading: Morbo by Phil Ballhttp://www.assoc-amazon.co.uk/e/ir?t=zonamark06-21&l=ur2&o=2, Sid Lowe on del Bosque’s management style, David Cartlidge’s player guide. 本帖最后由 colinfirth 于 2012-6-6 22:25 编辑
23楼的参考译文
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2012欧洲杯前瞻：西班牙队 本帖最后由 colinfirth 于 2012-6-6 22:24 编辑
Euro 2012 preview: Croatia
June 6, 2012
http://i1231.photobucket.com/albums/ee512/zonal_marking/croatia.jpg
Croatia's probable starting line-up. Rakitic could replace Perisic. Pranjic or Strinic.
Of the 16 teams in this competition, Croatia are one of the hardest to define. They seem trapped between a few different ways of playing, and don’t have a specific footballing identity
They are clearly not as good as the excellent side of 2008, despite retaining a few of the key players, and a hint of the same formation and style. The loss of Niko Kovac, the excellent holding midfielder, has never really been compensated for, and while their current defensive midfielder Tomislav Dujmovic is hard-working, he lacks the positional intelligence of Kovac.
When that is combined with a centre-back duo that badly lacks pace, Croatia are forced into a much more conservative style than four years ago. Slaven Bilic’s reputation has fallen sharply in that time, but he still has a chance to go out on a high before joining Lokomotiv.
Formation
At their best, Croatia played an attack-minded 4-1-3-2. There’s still the vague hangover from that formation, but it’s more of a boxy 4-4-2 for longer periods. Luka Modric, Croatia’s star man, was effectively a number ten in 2008 but after a few years playing as a deep-lying playmaker for Tottenham, now operates broadly in his club position as part of a midfield duo, and spends a lot of time drifting around trying to pick up the ball close to the centre circle.
Modric is exhausted after a long season at Spurs (where compatriot Vedran Corluka suggested a lack of squad rotation was the reason for Spurs’ sharp decline in the final months). He’s been put on a special training programme in order for him to regain full fitness, but is unlikely to be 100% fit.
Midfield variety
That’s a big blow, because much of the creative burden falls upon him. Elsewhere in midfield, the left-sided midfield position now seems likely to go to Dortmund’s Ivan Perisic, an attack-minded winger, although it’s also possible that Ivan Rakitic could play there. The problem when Rakitic and Modric play together, however, is that they tend to operate in roughly the same zone and make Croatia too narrow on the left.
On the opposite side is Darijo Srna, formerly a rampaging right-back but now pushed forward into midfield. He plays an interesting role – rather than bombing forward down the flank, he is less explosive with his movement, and comes deep to collect the ball. His defensive awareness helps Dujmovic in front of the back four as he moves narrow without the ball, and this balance allows Croatia to be more attack-minded on the left.
Slow, narrow defence
What of the defence these players are protecting? Dejan Lovren might not have been selected for the first XI, but his injury was a blow. The first-choice duo is likely to be Josip Simunic, who at 34 is very slow on the turn, and Gordon Schildenfeld, who isn’t much quicker. They’re protected by both the midfield and by the full-backs, who play very narrow.
Domagoj Vida is basically a centre-back shoved out wide and offers little on the ball, and on the other flank Vedran Corluka offers roughly the same thing, though both Ivan Strinic and Danijel Pranjic could play there and offer much more going forward. Stipe Pletikosa is a good goalkeeper and a firm first-choice.
Decent forwards
At the other end of the pitch, Croatia are weakened by the absence of Ivica Olic through injury. Although he had a poor season, he is an extremely energetic player who helped close down high up the pitch, and constantly made runs into the channels. It means Bilic will now play Everton’s Nikica Jelavic as the primary striker – he tends to hang back on the opposite side of the pitch to where the ball is, and then storm towards the near post for a one-touch finish. He’ll be supported by Mario Mandzukic, who is more mobile and energetic, and can drop into midfield without the ball if needed, to mark the opposition holding player.
From the bench, Nikola Kalinic is Jelavic’s understudy, while Eduardo may also feature – his record of 22 goals in 45 international appearances is superb and he remains a good poacher.
Gameplan
Expect Croatia to sit deep and then break quickly – sometimes their counter-attacks can be extremely swift and effective, like in their superb 3-0 play-off win at Turkey. They take advantage of their two strikers staying high up the pitch, and the lack of an opposition spare man at the back (assuming they’re playing against a four-man defence) does have its advantages. The disadvantage is that they don’t compete well in midfield, and despite the guile of Modric, they’re often very slow in possession and keep the ball for long periods without looking to penetrate the opposition defence.
There are also concerns about the attacking-to-defensive transition – Croatia can be slow to get back into shape. Set-pieces are also another area of weakness, judging by the crucial 2-0 loss at Greece in qualification, and that could be a significant factor against Ireland.
Conclusion
Croatia aren’t a bad side, but it’s difficult to see how they’ll pull off a shock at this competition. They don’t appear to excel at anything in particular, and their star man Modric seems exhausted and won’t be able to carry the side by himself. Quick forwards should enjoy playing against Croatia, although their counter-attack remains a threat.
Quick guide:
Coach – Slaven Bilic
Formation – 4-4-2
Key player – Luka Modric
Strength – as always, a deep squad for a country of its size
Weakness – a lack of pace at the back
Key tactical question – will Bilic be more proactive against Ireland? That seems like a game Croatia must win
Key coach quote – “Modric is our main player”
Betfair odds – 65.0 (64/1)
Recommended bet – Croatia to finish bottom of Group C at 3.45
Further reading: Jonathan Wilson’s Behind The Curtainhttp://www.assoc-amazon.co.uk/e/ir?t=zonamark06-21&l=ur2&o=2, the Croatian Football Blog.